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Preface
The Fire Engineering Design Guide was first published in 1994, following the introduc-
tion in 1991 of a new building regulatory environment in New Zealand. This
regulatory environment allows building designers to meet the requirements of the New
Zealand Building Code either through the use of prescriptive provisions or by the use of
specific fire engineering design, sometimes referred to as ‘performance-based
design’. The second edition of the Design Guide was published in 2001 and it
contained several new chapters, including more information on the Australian building
regulatory environment. The use of performance-based design in fire engineering has
become more prevalent around the world with several countries now allowing for
specific fire engineering design solutions and others looking to follow suit in the near
future.
This Design Guide provides a useful introduction to fire engineering to those who are
new to the discipline or want to get an overview of the range of problems that fire
engineers deal with. Fire science and engineering continues to develop at a rapid pace
and new research findings, design methods and computer tools are being made
available all of the time. Since this Design Guide was first published there have been
many newer and much more detailed books published in the fields of fire science and
engineering. Readers should consult these books to get a deeper understanding of the
topics covered in this Design Guide.
As editor of the third edition, I would like to acknowledge the work that Andy Buchanan
put in to the first and second editions. The third edition has built on the work of the
original contributors, with the help of several new authors and reviewers. New chapters
on Fire Risk and Rural Fires have been added to this edition, as well as major updates to
several other chapters.
I would also like to acknowledge Kristin Hoskin for manageding the project and for her
willingness to chase up authors, as well as the editor. The revision could not have been








I wish to welcome Australian readers to the Fire Engineering Design Guide.
While this Design Guide was written primarily for use in New Zealand, the third edi-
tion has again been written with the Australian design process and the Australian prac-
titioner also in mind.
Clearly a number of aspects of the building codes, legislation and regulations differ
between Australia and New Zealand. However, there is a similarity between many of
the Performance Requirements, and fire safety engineering in both countries is based
on common fundamentals of fire science and engineering. New chapters on Fire Risk
(AS/NZS 4360) and Rural Fires with particular empahsis on the urban rural interface
will be of strong interst to Australia fire professionals.
This Design Guide provides a range of analytical methods, data and design approaches,
which many Australian fire engineers and approval authorities will find useful. It also
highlights the Australian performance requirements and refers to Australian standards
and other documents to which design professionals in Australia and New Zealand may
refer.
This Design Guide does not replace the “International Fire Engineering Guidelines”
developed by an international consortium for use in Australia, New Zealand, Canada
and other countries. Rather it is complementary and offers Australian fire engineers an







The Fire Engineering Design Guide (3rd Edition) was a collaborative effort of many
professionals, specialists and researchers engaged in fire engineering and related fields
from New Zealand and Australia. CAENZ would like to thank the contributors to this
and previous editions for their generosity in giving their time and sharing their knowl-
edge through this publication.
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Accidental fires are a threat to human life (Figure 1.1), property and the environment.
Fire engineering design can reduce these threats in a cost-effective way for the benefit
of society.
Fire engineering design of buildings and other structures is a large, complex and
rapidly expanding multi-disciplinary subject area which extends well beyond the scope
of this Fire Engineering Design Guide.
This Guide introduces fire engineering design and provides basic strategies and design
information supplemented by some worked examples. It is not a stand-alone document
and should not be used without referring to supporting texts that are recommended at
the end of each chapter. This will be a useful starting point for those who wish to
become professional fire engineering designers through a combination of further edu-
cation, design experience and fire investigation. In particular, this Design Guide pro-
vides introductory guidance to those wishing to carry out or review specific fire engi-
Figure 1.1: The worst fire disaster in New Zealand was the 1947
Ballantynes fire in Christchurch where 43 people died
(photo courtesy of The National Library of New Zealand)
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neering designs. The worked examples provided throughout the text are simple hand
calculations and it is likely that more complex analysis will be required in real fire
engineering design. Numbers used in the worked examples are selected to illustrate the
calculation method and are not intended to be definitive or recommended for a particu-
lar purpose.
1.2 Performance-based Design
Performance-based fire engineering design is being adopted around the world as a ra-
tional means of providing efficient and effective fire safety in buildings. This develop-
ment is being supported by the adoption of performance-based codes which specify the
objectives and minimum performance requirements for fire safety, and allow those
objectives to be met in a variety of ways, provided that safety can be demonstrated.
Traditional design for fire safety, which is still practised in many countries, relies on
‘prescriptive’ codes which specify how a building is to be built, with no statement of
objectives and little or no opportunity to offer more rational alternative designs.
Most modern performance-based codes have a clear statement of objectives, and allow
those objectives to be met either by compliance with a prescriptive ‘acceptable solu-
tion’, or by specific fire engineering design. New Zealand has had a performance-based
building code since 1992. This Design Guide is based on the building control system in
New Zealand (Buchanan, 1994) which is very similar in many other countries, for
example Australia (ABCB, 2007), Sweden (SBHBP, 1994) and England & Wales
(HMSO, 2000). In the USA, several regional building codes have been combined into
a national code which is moving towards a performance-based approach (ICC, 2006).
1.3 Regulatory Environments
New Zealand
The Building Act was first passed into law in December 1991. This Act consolidated a
wide range of previous legislation relating to building construction, established the
Building Industry Authority and required that all new construction be in accordance
with the Building Code.
The Act makes it clear that, with due regard to costs and benefits, the principal fire
safety objectives are for the health and safety of the building occupants, protection of
neighbouring property and facilitating rescue and fire fighting operations by the New
Zealand Fire Service.
Protection of property, including the building structure and contents and tenants’ prop-
erty, are not included in the legislation. If design for property protection is considered
necessary, the designer must establish any additional performance requirements be-
yond those required by the Act and the Building Code.
The New Zealand Building Code (NZBC), included in the Building Regulations, is a
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performance-based code that specifies objectives and performance, permitting compli-
ance to be achieved with an approved Compliance Document. The Compliance Docu-
ments contain at least a Verification Method (such as a structural design code) or an
Acceptable Solution. There are no approved Verification Methods for fire safety, so an
Acceptable Solution must be used. The Acceptable Solution is a prescriptive method of
meeting the requirements of the Building Code. For many small or simple buildings,
design in accordance with the Acceptable Solution will be satisfactory. Even in those
cases where additional requirements are established or where specific fire engineering
design is intended, it is likely that the Acceptable Solution will be used as a starting point.
The Building Act allows ‘alternative solutions’, such as specific fire engineering de-
sign, where the Building Consent Authority is satisfied on ‘reasonable grounds’ that the
performance provisions of the Building Code can be met. Note that the provisions of
the Building Code are generally non-quantitative, so designers will need to be guided
by experience, training and engineering judgement (as defined in IFEG (ABCB, 2005)).
Chapter 18 gives a more detailed description of the regulatory framework in New
Zealand.
Australia
Unlike New Zealand, Australia has a wide range of legislation, which varies consider-
ably from State to State. The key element in each State or Territory is a form of building
act which provides the enabling legislation for building regulation and control in that
particular State or Territory. The legislation typically provides each State and Territory
with control over:
• planning provisions;
• project approval procedures;
• adoption of the Building Code of Australia (BCA) and State Appendix into legisla-
tion;
• appeal mechanisms;
• registration of Building Practitioners; and
• preparation and distribution of Regulations.
The Government departments or authorities responsible for the administration of the
building Acts also play a public and industry education role.
All states and territories have one or more Fire Brigade Acts which control the role,
management and operations of the fire brigades in their State. Key roles defined by the
Fire Brigade Acts around Australia include:
• fire fighting operations;
• building fire safety inspections;
• community fire safety;
• input to Government policy and fire safety administration; and
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• building approvals process.
In Australia, the acceptable solutions are known as ‘Deemed-to-Satisfy’ provisions.
They are the prescriptive provisions that are deemed to satisfy the performance require-
ments of the Building Code of Australia.
Chapter 17 gives a more detailed description of the regulatory framework in Australia.
1.4 Specific Fire Engineering Design
Specific fire engineering design can be used when:
(a) the Compliance Documents are not applicable; or
(b) the Compliance Documents require specific fire engineering design; or
(c) the owner’s requirements go beyond those of a building code; or
(d) additional benefits in cost or safety will result from specific design.
Quantifying performance
There are no simple methods available for quantifying building performance or safety
in a possible fire. The performance requirements of a building code are generally
qualitative, not quantitative. In the final analysis, the acceptance or not of perform-
ance requirements is a matter of opinion by those who are best equipped to make such
a judgement.
Several aspects of fire engineering can be calculated with reasonable accuracy, but
others can only be roughly estimated or require subjective judgement. There is no over-
all framework that allows a single figure to be placed on safety.
Methods for fire safety evaluations of buildings using risk assessment are under devel-
opment. Fire design guidelines based on or including risk assessment have been pro-
duced in Australia (FCRC, 1996), Canada (Yung et al, 1997), Sweden (Frantzich et al,
1997) and USA (Fitzgerald, 1993). Other risk assessment methodologies are under
development.
Owner’s requirements
At an early stage in the design process, it is essential to establish the performance
requirements for the building. These will be established by the owner in consultation
with the designer, the owner’s insurance company and any other relevant stakeholders.
Each case should be assessed on the basis of the proposed use (and future uses) of the
building and the likely impact on the building’s owner if a fire occurs.
The performance requirements must meet the minimum requirements of a building
code, which in some cases will be the basis for more extensive protection. Any fire
engineering design solution should be checked to ensure that the minimum require-




Factors influencing the performance required from a specific fire engineering design
include:
• building geometry and intended use;
• location of adjacent properties;
• probability of a fire occurring;
• fuel load and distribution;
• number, location and abilities of occupants;
• proximity and likely response of the fire service;
• available water supply; and
• building management practices that affect fire safety.
1.6 Compliance Schedule in New Zealand
The Building Act requires certain fire safety systems in buildings to be subjected to
regular inspection, maintenance and reporting procedures. A Compliance Schedule is
required for each new building, to be provided by the designer as part of the documen-
tation package. The Compliance Schedule details the required maintenance of specific
systems in the building including automatic sprinkler systems, fire doors, fire alarm
systems, emergency lighting, escape route pressurisation systems, riser mains for the
fire service, signs, means of escape from fire and fire hose reels.
Inspections and maintenance will generally cover complete installations, appropriate
to the type of system and the consequences of system malfunction. The Compliance
Schedule is valid for the first 12 months the building is occupied. After that time a
certificate must be displayed in the building, called the Building Warrant of Fitness, to
be renewed every 12 months. This is the responsibility of the building owner, who hires
an Independent Qualified Person (IQP) to perform the inspections.
Fire safety depends on successful operation of active fire protection measures at any
time in the life of a building, which may be 50 or 100 years or more. Provision must be
made for regular maintenance, good housekeeping, and checking of all systems, both
active and passive over the life of the building.
Certain active systems will be checked regularly within the Building Warrant of Fitness
scheme, but some others such as passive systems and housekeeping matters are not
covered. Special monitoring must be provided if the specific fire engineering design
has placed limitations on the use of the building, such as restrictions on the type of
furniture, storage height of goods, number of occupants or access through adjacent
rooms for egress. The use of management procedures and the Compliance Schedule to
overcome issues of design needs to be carefully thought through and not left to building
management and those who have no knowledge of the requirements or implications of
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not ensuring that they are adhered to.
The Building Act also deals with buildings deemed to be dangerous in respect of fire
and egress, and suggests that the Building Consent Authority seek advice from the New
Zealand Fire Service. The New Zealand Fire Service will also be assessing buildings
under the Fire Safety and Evacuation of Building Regulations 2006, which will, to
some extent, address passive systems and housekeeping matters.
In Australia, maintenance of fire protection systems has become a significant issue
through use of Essential Services Legislation (see Section 17.8).
1.7 Insurance and Building Design
Insurance has a number of areas relevant to building design and construction:
• loss or damage to the project and lost profits during the construction and defects
liability period;
• liability for loss, damage or interference with surrounding property;
• marine cargo covering the transportation of goods, plant and machinery from all
around the world to the project site;
• professional liability of designers and certifiers or others rendering a professional
opinion or service; and
• post-construction insurance of the building and contents, and loss of use or increased
cost consequential upon damage.
The insurance market operates as a series of segments, each specialising in a class of
insurance. For example, it is very likely that insurance for each of the above areas of
risk will be provided by a quite different market segment or individual insurer. In most
cases, each will be negotiated at different times. Negotiations will most likely be via an
Insurance Broker whose function is to place the insurance with an underwriter or series
of underwriters.
The loss, damage or liability areas involve insurance of the asset itself during construc-
tion and of the liability for harm suffered by other parties consequential to construction.
These insurances need to be negotiated and in place prior to commencement of the
contract. An important issue to insurers who offer such insurance cover are the fire
protection arrangements during construction, e.g. floor-by-floor extension of riser mains,
progressive enlivenment of sprinklers and fire prevention activities such as control of
flammable liquids, ‘hot work’ and site tidiness along with separation from adjoining
buildings.
Marine cargo covers are intrinsically linked with the conditions of purchase. These
conditions will establish who is responsible for the goods and when this responsibility
changes hands. Their relevance is primarily the building contractors concern, but in
industrial projects where large items of machinery are being imported, cognisance of
purchase agreements and marine cargo insurance are necessary to ensure an efficient
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over all project programme.
The professional liability category is insurances taken out to defend and settle claims
against an individual or firm for failure to fulfil an obligation or a legal duty, whether
statutory or contractual. Such insurances are likely to be general and not specific to a
particular building. The key issues to an insurance company offering this type of cover
will be the competency of those individuals providing the service (including their ‘quality
system’ practices) and the extent to which the services provided reflect conventional or
innovative technology or design.
As a general rule, insurers are most comfortable when on familiar ground and may
require additional information (and premium) if, for example, a first principles design
is envisaged. To the extent that building failure can lead to personal injury or death, this
risk exposure is considerably modified in New Zealand by the Accident Rehabilitation
and Compensation Insurance Act, which substantially denies the right to sue for com-
pensation for personal injury arising from accident.
Post-construction insurance will be purchased typically by both the owner and the ten-
ant, close to the end of the contract. Handover from construction insurance to operating
annual insurance needs to be seamless or at least with a time gap and generally occurs
when partial or practical completion is reached. Sufficient notice needs to be given to
the principal of impending practical completion so that they may arrange the operating
insurances.
Only where the building is one of a group of existing buildings owned and insured
collectively is there much likelihood of the designer being able to discuss fire protec-
tion arrangements with certainty with the insurer. Nevertheless, the insurance market
across the board has a number of design preferences which apply to most buildings. By
incorporating these features, the designer will ensure that the operating insurances will
be able to be negotiated from a favourable basis. Important design preferences include:
• Automatic sprinkler protection of the whole building in accordance with NZS 4541
(Standards New Zealand, 2007) or similar Standards like NFPA or Factory Mutual
Standards (where compliance is with NZS 4541 as amended by the New Zealand
Building Code this may be of interest to insurers).
• Low combustibility walls and cladding systems (the use of insulated panel systems
needs special consideration).
• Non-combustible roofs.
• Adequate water supplies to and around the site.
• Internal subdivision in fire resisting construction and fire doors on the openings,
particularly in tall buildings.
• In large buildings (even with sprinklers), the size without subdivision by fire walls
will be a factor because of the accumulated value of the buildings contents and
impact on continued business operations.
• Fire sealing of openings for reticulation of services and gaps between floor slab
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edges and outer facing walls.
Where possible, insurers should be consulted early in the design process to enable
property protection requirements to be considered for incorporation into the overall
design and to reduce the risk of costly retrofitting of protection measures.
The insurance market moves in cycles, typically five to seven year periods. During
‘hard’ markets, available capacity is low and pricing is high. Insurers are also more
selective. In this situation good built-in protection can be beneficial in controlling price
and obtaining capacity. In the ‘soft’ part of the market cycle insurers will not be so
forthcoming with individual premium costings. Most buildings will outlive several in-
surance market cycles, hence the need for a mature, rather than minimalistic, view of
the required fire safety.
1.8 Design Documentation
It is essential that fire engineering designs be well documented in a rational and con-
sistent manner (Caldwell et al, 1999). Documentation should include the acceptance
criteria that were agreed to by all the stakeholders involved in the design. Every design
submittal should be a written report including:
1 The name and credentials of the person with overall responsibility for the fire safety
design, including co-ordination between various trades.
2 The name and credentials of the person or persons doing the actual fire safety design.
3 A statement of design philosophy including at least:
(a) The performance requirements forming the basis of the design.
(b) The differences between the performance requirements and those of a
building code.
(c) The overall strategy for meeting the performance requirements.
(d) An overview of the fire engineering analysis.
(e) A summary of the building design and fire protection features.
(f) Assumptions about the long-term life and use of the building.
4 A clear description of the fire scenarios considered, and why they were used.
5 Assumptions regarding performance of the fire service.
6 Calculations which provide sufficient information for the entire procedure to be
followed clearly and precisely, with references for all equations and assumptions.
References should only be to literature that has been peer reviewed. Copies of im-
portant references may be included as an appendix.
7 Full details of any computer input, and a summary of the output with graphs rather
than numerical print-out. Actual print-out can be included in an appendix.
8 A statement of any inspection procedures necessary on site.
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9 A schedule of the drawings and specification which form part of the fire design
package, including applicable drawing numbers and dates.
The submittal should include adequate contract drawings showing the fire safety re-
quirements. These may be separate fire engineering drawings or suitably marked archi-
tectural drawings. The drawings must be consistent with the written report and the
specification.
The written specification for the contract must support the requirements shown on the
drawings. There should be a separate fire section to provide overall information,
including references to the drawings and cross reference to all other sections of the
specification which have fire related material. Inspection procedures should be included.
A detailed methodology for presenting fire engineering designs and documentation is
given in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) (ABCB, 2005), described
in Section 18.6.
1.9 Peer Review
All fire engineering designs in New Zealand are subject to review. This may be an in-
house review by the Building Consent Authority (for example, a City Council), or it
may be a peer review by other consultants, especially if the approving authority does
not have sufficient expertise. It is important that peer reviews be carried out in a profes-
sional manner, be well documented and consistent across the country (Caldwell et al,
1999). Essential documentation for fire review reports includes the following:
1 The name and credentials of the person carrying out the review.
2 The reviewer’s association with the designer and any possible conflict of interest.
3 Confirmation of the design philosophy used by the designer.
4 A statement of the basis on which the design is accepted or rejected:
(a) The design is an ‘acceptable solution’ that meets the prescriptive
requirements of a compliance document, or
(b) The design is an ‘alternative solution’ based on fire engineering
principles, accepted on the basis of:
i. Evidence by analysis or otherwise that the design meets the performance
requirements of a building code; or
ii. Evidence by analysis or otherwise that the design is equivalent to the
prescribed acceptable solution; or
iii. Some other criteria.
5 A statement as to whether the whole design process has been checked, or just the
design solution.
6 Expression of concerns about any of the steps in the design procedure, even if the
design solution appears to be acceptable. For example, if computer modelling was
inappropriately used, even if it had no effect on the final outcome.
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7 Any additional analysis recommended.
8 Confirmation or modification of any inspection procedures necessary on site.
9 Confirmation of the schedule of dated drawings and specification which form part
of the fire design package that was reviewed.
In Australia, the review is generally undertaken by the Certifying Building Surveyor,
although, like other engineering disciplines, the surveyor may call upon or ask for fur-
ther evidence of compliance from a peer reviewer.
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This Chapter outlines the major steps to be followed in the fire engineering design of a
building. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (ABCB, 2005) has a similar
structure.
The basic flow chart is shown in Figure 2.1. The design procedure is essentially a ‘trial
and error’ process to analyse the likely effects of a fire given the worst likely location
and time of ignition. Knowledge of the fuel loads, the number and location of occu-
pants and the fire protection features is essential for assessing whether the performance
criteria are met.
Determine geometry, construction
and use of building
Determine design fuel loads
Establish performance
requirements
Estimate maximum likely number
of occupants and their locations
Assume certain fire
protection features








Figure 2.1: Overview of specific fire engineering design
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The first two steps are to determine the geometry, construction and use of the building
and to establish performance requirements. The following steps revolve around sce-
nario analysis, considering all possible scenarios.
Some parts of the analysis can be quantified with numbers, but much of the analysis
requires subjective judgement as to the likely movement and consequences of a fire
and the likely location and movement of people. If the performance criteria are not met,
then either the building geometry or the fire protection features must be modified until
satisfactory performance is achieved. This process must be repeated for all possible fire
scenarios. The more important boxes in the flow chart are described in more detail
below.
2.2 Building and Occupant Characteristics
The first part of the design process is to determine the building, occupant and fire load
characteristics. The building area, its height, number of floors, proximity to other build-
ings etc. need to be established. The building construction might need to consider the
likely materials that will be used, how those materials will be configured, hidden spaces
or shafts that might allow fire or smoke travel. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss these aspects in
more detail. The usage of the building in terms of activities, occupancy times also need
to be established.
Determination of the building occupants needs to take into account factors such as the
likely maximum number of occupants, their distribution within the building, their physi-
cal and mental capabilities, their likely behavioural characteristics and how familiar
they are with the building. Further details regarding occupancy considerations are given
in Chapter 11.
The construction, use and contents of the building will determine the potential sources
of ignition and the subsequent fire development. Consideration of the likelihood of
ignition, the fire growth rate, the total fire size and toxic product generation will influ-
ence the design. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are relevant to these aspects.
2.3 Fire Protection Features
The principal fire protection features that can be provided or modified by the designer
include those on the following list. This can be used as a checklist when establishing
performance requirements or checking the scope of a design.
To prevent ignition:
• Control ignition sources (electrical, cooking, smoking materials, machines and equip-
ment etc.).
• Control items of hazardous fuel.
To control fire growth:
• Control fuel sources (good housekeeping).
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• Specify suitable covering materials for walls and ceilings.
• Provide hose reels, extinguishers.
• Install sprinklers or other suppression systems.
• Check water supplies in the street for fire service use.
To control smoke spread:
• Install smoke-stop doors and lobbies.
• Ensure that doors are closed.
• Seal penetrations.
• Provide smoke reservoirs,  mechanical vents or natural vents.
• Provide smoke detectors and smoke dampers in ducts.
• Provide automatic controls for an HVAC system.
• Pressurise stairwells.
• Limit quantities of smoke produced by using sprinklers.
To limit fire spread within the building:
• Provide compartmentation - fire resistance to walls and floors:
– ensure that doors are closed;
– control vertical shafts;
– seal penetrations; and
– provide fire dampers in ducts.
• Partition ceiling spaces and other concealed spaces.
• Limit the size and geometry of external windows.
• Control the fire by installing sprinklers.
To prevent fire spread to other buildings:
• Limit the size of windows and type of glazing.
• Provide adequate separation distances.
• Ensure stability of external walls.
• Maintain integrity of glazing using drenchers.
To allow rapid egress:
• Provide detection and alarm systems.
• Provide sufficient number of escape routes.
• In large or complex premises provide emergency public address (PA) and emer-
gency warden intercommunication systems (EWIS).
• Make escape routes of sufficient width.
• Limit the lengths of dead end paths and open paths.
• Provide signs and emergency lighting.
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• Practice evacuation procedures.
• Program a security system to release doors when the fire alarm activates.
• Maintain good housekeeping in escape routes.
To facilitate fire service operations:
• Provide alarms with direct connection to the fire service.
• Provide index panels showing fire location.
• Provide point level identification of fire detectors.
• Provide access for fire appliances.
• Provide fire resistant access within the building.
• Provide for control of lifts.
• Provide a fire control room.
• Check water supplies in the street.
• Ensure that fire hydrants are nearby.
• Provide riser mains within the build-
ing.
• Allow for water collection from haz-
ardous substance fires.
To prevent structural collapse:
• Provide the main structural members
with adequate fire resistance.
• Control the extent of the fire through
compartmentation.
• Control the fire with sprinklers.
To minimise damage to the building and
its contents:
• Control or extinguish the fire with
sprinklers.
• Control the extent of the fire and smoke
through compartmentation.
• Control smoke spread with smoke ven-
tilation.
Figure 2.2: The 1988 fire in the First
Interstate Bank, Los Angeles, illus-
trates the importance of containing
the fire and providing structural
stability (Boris Yaro)
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2.4 Acceptable Performance
A building is considered to have acceptable performance if the designer shows that the
performance requirements have been met to the approval of the owner and the Building
Consent Authority. The Certifying Building Surveyor provides this approval in Australia.
The IFEG recommends that a Fire Engineering Brief (FEB) be developed by all of the
stakeholders to document the acceptance criteria needed to meet the building code.
Determination of acceptable performance is a matter of informed judgement supported
by analysis when appropriate. The state of the art in fire engineering is not sufficiently
developed to provide simple methods of quantifying the overall fire safety of a building.
Quantitative risk assessment methods and large-scale fire tests may be used in certain
cases.
2.5 Performance Requirements
The minimum performance requirements permitted by law are those specified, for ex-
ample, by the New Zealand Building Code or the Building Code of Australia. Addi-
tional performance requirements may be agreed upon by the owner and the designer,
particularly with regard to protection of building contents and structure, as discussed in
Chapter 1.
The performance requirements can be summarised as follows:
1 The design of the building and the activities within the building do not present an
unreasonable probability of fire occurring; and
2 In the event of a fire, the following can be achieved with an acceptable degree of
certainty, by extinguishment or active or passive control of the fire:
(a) All occupants will have adequate time to move to a safe place without
being overcome by the effects of the fire.
(b) The fire service will have adequate time and suitable access to undertake
rescue operations and to protect property.
(c) The fire will not spread to adjacent household units or other property.
(d) Significant quantities of hazardous substances will not be released to
the environment.
(e) The fire will not spread beyond the firecell of origin.
(f) The contents of the building will not be significantly damaged.
(g) The building itself will not be significantly damaged.
(h) Any damage to the building will be easily repairable.
Note that items 2(a) to (e) are summaries of the minimum performance required by the
New Zealand Building Code. The remaining items will generally be additional require-
ments of the building owner. The Building Code of Australia addresses items (a), (b),
(c) and (e) only, with item (d) addressed by other legislation in some States.
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2.6 Fire Engineering Analysis
For each building space in turn, the designer must consider all the consequences of a
fire occurring with the assumed fire protection features in place. The details of the
procedure and what assumptions might be considered reasonable may have been part
of the acceptance criteria agreed to by the stakeholders such as through an FEB proc-
ess.
Procedure
1 Determine the worst or most likely location for first ignition.
2 Determine the worst likely arrangement of combustible materials during the pro-
jected life of the building.
3 Determine the rate of fire development, temperature rise and smoke production.
4 Determine the activation time for detection and suppression systems.
5 Throughout the development and burning phases, consider the likely movement of:
People Smoke, by Fire, by
number natural convection conduction – barriers
location forced convection convection – openings
notification mechanical plant – penetrations
response – concealed spaces
rate of movement – gaps or weaknesses
safety of route radiation – across shafts
– to other buidings
6 For life safety, continue the analysis until all occupants are deemed to have reached a
location considered acceptable, with additional allowance for safety of fire fighters.
7 For neighbouring property and public safety, continue the analysis for the full dura-
tion of the fire to ensure that external walls do not collapse and external openings do
not increase in area, thereby allowing fire spread.
8 For the owner’s property protection, continue the analysis for the full duration of
the fire to ensure that damage is minimised.
9 For hazardous substance fires, ensure that excessive toxic products are not released.
10 Repeat the procedure with altered parameters.
The following assumptions are considered reasonable in the fire engineering analysis:
(a) If sprinklers are present, assume that they operate and limit the fire to a certain
size. There is always a small probability that sprinklers will not control the size of
the fire, especially after an earthquake. The designer should consider the conse-
quences of sprinkler failure within the overall context of the building’s fire safety.
(b) Ignore the possible use of fire hose reels or portable extinguishers on fire
growth because they will not always be used successfully (conservative assump-
tion).
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(c) Ignore the effect of fire service intervention on the initial fire growth because
of uncertainty about time of arrival.
(d) Assume that the design fire load is less than the total fire load if the available fire
service facilities with adequate water supplies can be relied upon to interrupt the
growth and spread of the fire.
(e) Consider the possibility and consequence of fire safety system failure. Avoid cata-
strophic outcomes resulting from the failure of a single fire safety feature. Look
for common cause failure modes that could affect more than one safety feature.
The analysis should be repeated for different times of day, different locations of igni-
tion, different activities of the building, different arrangements of doors and windows
etc. The analysis may be done by hand calculation or using fire growth computer mod-
els. In either case, detailed knowledge and experience of fire behaviour in buildings is
essential. Large-scale fire tests may be used in special situations as part of the fire
engineering analysis.
Analysis methods must be appropriate to the problem being considered. Methods can
range from a simple conservative approach through to highly complex procedures.
Supporting justification of the method applied and any data used should be provided.
The sensitivity of the analysis output to input values should be explored. The analysis
should include appropriate factors of safety that reflect the uncertainty involved in the
current understanding of fire science, the calculation methods and the availability of
data etc. Fire engineering judgment will be needed to weigh up the analysis and to
interpret the outcome according to current best practice.
2.7 Fire During Construction
The risk of fire is often greater during construction or alteration than during normal
occupancy. At these times, the fuel loads will be very different, many additional poten-
tial ignition sources will be present and the occupants will be of a different type and in
different places. The structure may yet to be fire rated and separations may not be
complete with no closures (doors) and lack of penetration seals. Many fire protection
systems will not be installed, or will not be in full operating condition such as the
isolation of parts of a system during alterations.
A specific fire engineering design should include the possibility of fire occurring dur-
ing construction or alteration. A British code of practice on the protection from fire of
construction sites and buildings undergoing renovation is available (FPA, 2006).
2.8 Fire Following Earthquake
The risk of an uncontrolled fire following a major earthquake is a serious threat to life
and property, as evidenced by disasters in Tokyo, San Francisco, Napier (Figure 2.3),
Kobe, and other cities (Botting, 1998). Earthquakes are largely unpredictable, and large
fires following earthquakes are even less predictable. Historical records show that small
fires are often initiated by earthquakes, and these sometimes grow into large destruc-
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tive fires causing loss of life and severe damage to property. The concern is initially
with fire damage in individual buildings, where the potential loss of life is much greater
in tall buildings than in low-rise buildings. A subsequent concern is the possibility of a
large urban conflagration. The factors which affect the likelihood of small fires grow-
ing into large ones include the amount of earthquake damage, the type and density of
building construction, wind conditions, loss of water supplies, and fire-fighting capa-
bilities (Scawthorn et. al., 2005). Fire following earthquakes is described more fully in
Section 7.6.
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Figure 2.3: Debris in streets creates difficulty in access for fire-fighters
after the Napier Earthquake, 1931






The purpose of this Chapter is to outline a risk management approach to fire engineer-
ing. The joint Australia/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management (Stand-
ards New Zealand, 2004) is one of several documented approaches to risk management
(Raz and Hillson, 2005) and is internationally regarded as a leading approach to risk
management. This Chapter gives an overview of risk management in relation to fire;
readers should obtain their own copy of the Standard and related guidelines, HB 436
Risk Management Guidelines (Standards New Zealand, 2004) if they need full details
of the standard and its wider application.
3.2 About Risk and Risk Management
Risk
AS/NZS 4360 defines risk as “the chance of something having an impact on objec-
tives”. All people and organisations have objectives of one sort or another and are
exposed to risks.
The definition in the Standard goes on to say that a given risk is often described in
terms of an event or circumstances and the consequences that may flow from it. Note
that consequences is in the plural meaning that a given event or circumstance might
have several consequences, an important point when analysing risk. The Standard notes
that risk is measured in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event and
their likelihood and that a risk may have a positive or negative impact.
Fire is a phenomenon that can be used to our advantage (a positive outcome) but, if it
escapes from our control, can result in harm to individuals and businesses (negative
outcomes). Failure to manage risks due to fires can cause death or injury and disrupt
normal business activities.
Risk management
Risk management is defined in AS/NZS 4360 as:
... the culture, processes and structures that are directed towards
realising potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects.
Historically, people have applied risk management to such activities as making sure
that trading ships reached their destinations safely so they could buy and sell goods for
a profit. These applications may have been subconscious but, more recently, risk man-
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agement strategies have been consciously applied to a range of business and public
sector activities. Risk is now recognised as one of the key drivers of human civilisation.
Risk tolerance
Different people and organisations will accept or tolerate different levels of risk at dif-
ferent times, potentially leading to conflicts in organisational and social development.
One of the problems in risk management is to determine how much risk is acceptable.
A conceptual model (Warner, 1983; Health and Safety Executive, 1992; Health and
Safety Executive, 2001) shows how risk tolerability is often portrayed (Figure 3.1). In
the intolerable region no risk can be accepted by individuals, organisations or society
whereas in the broadly acceptable region risks are generally accepted. In between the
lines, risks should be reduced until they are as low as reasonably practicable or ‘ALARP’.
A leading case on the term ‘reasonably practica-
ble’ is Edwards versus The National Coal Board
(Kings Bench, 1949). This case is often cited in
New Zealand. It established that:
… a computation must be made in which
the quantum of risk is placed on one scale
and the sacrifice, whether in money, time
or trouble, involved in the measures nec-
essary to avert the risk is placed in the
other; and that, if it be shown that there is
a gross disproportion between them, the
risk being insignificant in relation to the
sacrifice, the person upon whom the duty
is laid discharges the burden of proving
that compliance was not reasonably prac-
ticable.
In other words, major risks will require a major sacrifice to avert them whereas insig-
nificant risks may require little or no action.
Fire engineering measures may be required by legislation, typically to deal with risks to
lives, but they can be applied in ways that enhance the resilience and business continu-
ity capacity of the building users. Such opportunities will need to be explored with the
client and other stakeholders.
Risk management process
The AS/NZS 4360 standard defines the risk management process as:
… the systematic application of management policies, procedures and
practices to the tasks of communicating, establishing the context, identi-
fying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk.
The intolerable region for risk,
action must be taken
Tolerable region where




Figure 3.1: The ALARP model
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This definition is consistent with international understanding of risk management and
is a comprehensive process spanning all stages of a project and organisational under-
takings. Each of the tasks mentioned in the definition is a stage in the process of man-
aging risks due to fire and is set out in Figure 3.2. The rest of this section explores the
stages and gives examples and cross references to examples and other chapters in this
Design Guide.
Establish the context
What sort of business do we operate?
What are our objectives?
Who are our contractors/subcontractors?
What are our operational activities?
What are our business functions?
What is our business structure?
Who are our suppliers and what do they supply?
Who are our customers?
What are our criteria for liklihood, consequences and risk tolerance?
Identify possible fire risks
What fire hazards are there?
What fire ignition sources are there?
How could an ignition source get to a fuel?
What can be set on fire - the fuel?
Who would be at risk?
What assets would be at risk?
Does the risk vary – between shifts?
       – day/night?
     – with the seasons?
Analyse the risk with no controls (likelihood and
consequence) and determine the level of risk
Analyse the risk with controls (likelihood and
consequence) and determine the level of risk
What are the controls set in place?
How likely is the risk to occur with those controls?
What would the consequences be with those controls?
Are the controls working effectively?
Compare with criteria set earlier
Treat
risks?
Analyse the risks with various treatment options
Identify options
Assess options or carry out a cost benefit analysis
























Figure 3.2: Risk management process and fire (adapted from HB 4525, Standards
New Zealand, 2006)
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Risk naming
Risks should be named so that their analysis gives the best information. The Standard
says that risk is defined in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event and
their likelihood and that a risk may have a positive or negative impact. Thus, a well
named risk should have the following pattern.
  Event or circumstance    Consequence 1    Impact 1    Named objective
This risk naming pattern concisely provides considerable risk information and can be
repeated for each risk consequence. If there are many risks, and they are entered into a
spreadsheet or database, they can be sorted and analysed, so enabling different views of
risks.
3.3 Risk Management and Fire
The risk management process, as applied to fire, is set out in detail in HB 4525; Figure
3.2 summarises the process. The feedback arrows indicate the need to check back at
every step in the risk management process. For fire engineering purposes, the key tasks
are presented below.
Communicate and consult
It is crucial that the fire engineer establishes who the stakeholders in a project are. They
will include the client and building control staff but may also extend to the end user of
a building, neighbours, other regulatory agencies and insurers. It is good practice to
develop a communication and consultation plan and keep copies of all communications
and notes on consultation. These may prove invaluable in the future in illustrating good
practice by the fire engineer, as well as in determining the risk criteria to be considered
in the project.
A description of good consultation is set out in the judgement in the 1992 Wellington
International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand case (Court of Appeal, 1992). It includes
the comment that:
Consulting involves the statement of a proposal not yet finally decided
upon, listening to what others have to say, considering their responses
and then deciding what will be done.
Context
AS/NZS 4360 discusses the external, internal and risk management contexts. Some of
the contextual questions to ask are shown in Figure 3.2. This stage is often done poorly,
or not at all, yet it is the foundation of understanding an organisation.
The governance arrangements for the client and the specific project must be identified
to ensure that decision-makers know and understand the consequences that might flow
from risk-decisions. Time spent establishing and documenting the context is well spent




A crucial step is to determine what criteria will be used to analyse risks and which
criteria may be relevant to evaluating the risks. Analysis criteria for likelihood might
cover ignition probabilities (Daycock and Rew, 2004) whereas criteria for consequences
might cover:
• human lives and wellbeing (employees, contractors or third parties);
• environment;
• dollar value in terms of assets, capital value, brand value, profitability, lost opportu-
nity costs, increased costs and reduced income, fines and penalties, contractual
penalties;
• fire damage;
• facility integrity; and/or
• operational impact and delivery standards.
If a simple matrix is to be used for risk analysis, the risk analysis criteria might scale the
financial consequences of a risk from a few hundred dollars to millions or tens of mil-
lions of dollars. See Lewis and Dailey (1997), HB 4525 and Chapter 6 of HB 436 for
further guidance. Risk evaluation criteria may be developed by describing the possible
outcomes for fires for different designs and asking the client to evaluate the risks.
Risk assessment
Risk assessment includes risk identification, analysis and evaluation.
Risk identification
Risks arising from fire may be identified by drawing on the experience of the fire engi-
neer or by examining records. It can also be done by consulting with employees of the
client, within the trade or industry or with insurers. At this stage, the consequences and
likelihood of fires may also become clear. Identification of risks that the project presents
to the fire engineer and engineering consultancy should also occur during this stage.
Risk analysis
Risk analysis of the immediate consequences of a fire in proposed or current buildings
may be done by modelling with software. Other techniques such as a HAZOP study
(International Electrotechnical Commission, 2001; Standards New Zealand, 1998) or
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) may also help (International Electrotechnical
Commission, 1985).
Fault tree analysis (Standards New Zealand, 1998; International Electrotechnical Com-
mission, 1990) can be used for a specific project or to develop a generic model. It
shows a tree of fault conditions linked through a series of logic gates, with the outcome
under study as the top event. Fault trees can be combined with event trees to analyse
events that could result in consequences of harm to people or damage to assets. Each
event or circumstance in turn suggests risk treatments that could be applied to modify
the risk.
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The risk analysis should be carried out as if none of the current or (for a new building)
proposed controls are in place (the inherent, raw or absolute risk) and then repeated
with the current or proposed controls (the controlled level of risk). This approach will
show the importance of individual fire controls in relation to inspection, maintenance,
training and testing requirements.
Appendix C of HB 4525 contains a summary and analysis of life safety and property
protection controls (measures that are currently in place) and treatments (options that
could be introduced). They are set out in the following hierarchy:
• avoid or eliminate the risk of fire occurring (e.g. re-engineer a process);
• reduce the likelihood of fire occurring (e.g. procedural controls);
• reduce the consequences of a fire (e.g. fire detection and suppression systems);
• isolate the hazardous process or activity from other activities (e.g. put a hazardous
process in a separate building); and
• share the risk with a third party (e.g. subcontract the work or buy insurance).
The key features, accountabilities, range of costs, communication and monitoring is-
sues for each option are also described in Appendix C of HB 4525.
Risk evaluation
Risk evaluation requires comparison of the current or proposed level of risk with the
evaluation criteria developed earlier. A fire engineer should report the results of the risk
analysis, the agreed evaluation criteria and a summary of known risk reduction options
and ask the client to determine if the level of risk is acceptable. This approach has the
advantage of giving management of fire-related risks to the client while avoiding any
professional liability for inappropriate or incorrect advice.
Risk treatment
As noted above, Appendix C of HB 4525 sets out options to treat fire-related risks that
are evaluated as too great. Other options may be identified as part of the consultation
process. Consultation at this stage should include the insurance broker and insurer as the
insurer will be carrying some of the financial consequences if a fire subsequently occurs.
Monitor and review
For a fire engineer, the monitor and review process requires monitoring of agreed ac-
tions to their completion and reviewing the whole design process to ensure no changes
have occurred in any of the stages.
3.4 Practical Examples
Dust explosion
Figure 3.3 shows how a generic fault tree combined with an event tree can be used to
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analyse the events and circumstances that could result in an explosion with conse-
quences of harm to people or damage to assets. The fault tree analysis was developed to
explain how the risk of a dust explosion in a feed plant could be reduced. It might be
adapted for use at the design stage of an industrial building that will house a dusty
process.
Using the fault tree, a fire engineer might ask:
• can the process be changed to reduce or eliminate dust formation?
• could a build-up of dust insulate cables, resulting in overheating; at the design stage,
a number of options exist including cable layout to limit dust accumulation and
facilitating regular cleaning to remove any build up?
• can maintenance work be isolated in a separate building, away from any dust?
Injury to people onsite
Injury to people offsite
Damage to own assets










NB: this generic analysis shows some of
the more common factors giving rise to the
risk of a dust explosion. It needs to be
customised if it is to be applied to a specific








































Figure 3.3: Fault tree analysis and event for a dust explosion
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• can a vacuum cleaning system be built in that will reduce the chance of a small dust
cloud being lifted by floor sweeping?
• what effect would addition or removal of a given control have on business continuity?
Fire
The fault tree analysis for a major fire (Figure 3.4) was developed to explain why a
major fire had occurred in a large warehouse and how the risk of a similar fire could be
avoided. It might also be adapted to show how to avoid or eliminate fire initiating
factors.
Using the fault tree, a fire engineer might ask:
• what rating, design standards and training are relevant for first aid fire-fighting
equipment?
• can a very risky product (e.g. aerosols with butane as the propellant) be isolated in
a separate area?
• would a change in fork lift truck fuel reduce the chance of accidental ignition?
• how could waste be removed promptly to an area where it can be more safely han-
dled?
• can maintenance work be isolated in a separate building?
• what water supply is needed and what is actually available to fight a fire?
• what effect would addition or removal of a given control have on business continuity?
3.5 Conclusions
Standards
AS/NZS 4360 is likely to become an international standard (ISO 31000), but the struc-
ture outlined above should remain the same. HB 436 provides much general risk man-
agement information. HB 4525 was developed under contract to the New Zealand Fire
Service and contains fire-specific guidance and a worked example. All three docu-
ments should be on a fire engineer’s bookshelf.
Benefits of risk management
Using a documented risk management approach to fire engineering will help:
• ensure a wide range of design options are identified and explored;
• ensure that stakeholders are consulted and understand risks, design options, con-
trols and costs;
• enable the client to develop procedural controls, including Building Warrant of Fit-
ness compliance arrangements;
• stakeholders such as regulatory agencies and insurers understand the design ap-
proach and recommend changes if use of the building changes; and
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Figure 3.4a: Fault tree analysis for a fire
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Figure 3.4b: Fault tree analysis for a fire
– private or public response sub-branch
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This Chapter gives a brief overview of the main stages of fire development and subse-
quent decay as an introduction to the following chapters, and the use of this informa-
tion in design.
The science of fire development is a complex subject that continues to develop rapidly.
Readers should consult texts such as Drysdale (1998), Quintiere (1998), Karlsson and
Quintiere (2000), or various chapters in the SFPE Handbook (DiNenno, ed., 2002) for
more information.
There are three basic elements to combustion and flame production – oxygen, heat, and
fuel – and the dependence of all three factors interacting simultaneously has led to the
‘fire triangle’ concept (Figure 4.1). If any one of the three components is removed,
combustion ceases. This is the basis for most means of suppression where, for example,
adding water removes the heat component, covering with foam or other materials pro-
vides a barrier between the heat and unburnt fuels and also smothers the fire by starving
it of oxygen. Combustion is called a ‘chain reaction’ since heat acts as a catalyst but is
also a product of the reaction, and has the potential to perpetuate the reaction. A fourth
element to combustion and flame production is also often included, which accounts for
this chemical chain reaction. This fourth element is often combined with the fire trian-








Figure 4.1: The fire triangle
Heat transfer refers to the physical processes by which the heat energy is transmitted.
There are three mechanisms of heat transfer:
• Convection – transfer of heat by the movement of masses of hot fluid.
• Conduction – transfer of heat through solid matter by the motion of adjacent mol-
ecules.
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• Radiation – the transfer of heat by electromagnetic waves with the speed of light
from warm surfaces to cooler surroundings.
The vast majority of fires follow a pattern of distinct stages, although the timescales,
rates and magnitudes vary widely. Typical stages of development for fires where no fire
suppression intervention takes place are shown in Figure 4.2. Each of the main stages
of fire development is discussed below.
4.2 Fire Initiation
Fire initiation includes ignition and the development of a self-sustaining combustion
reaction. There are many possible sources of ignition both deliberate and accidental.
The ignition source is commonly very small and has low energy, but if it affects
combustible materials it is often sufficient to start a fire. There are many cases where
ignition events have not started a significant fire because combustible materials were
not close enough to ignite, or a small fire did not become self-sustaining and died
out.
Ignition normally takes place in one of three ways:
• Piloted ignition where flaming is initiated in a flammable vapour/air mixture by a
‘pilot’, such as a flame or an electrical spark.
• Spontaneous ignition (sometimes called auto-ignition) where flaming develops spon-
taneously due to a sufficiently high temperature within a flammable vapour/air mix-
ture in the absence of a pilot flame or spark. The fuel for the flammable vapour/air
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Figure 4.2: Typical fire development curve
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pyrolysis of a solid fuel. Pyrolysis is the thermal decomposition of solid fuel into
flammable vapours.
• Spontaneous combustion in bulk fuels. This is a less common means of fire initia-
tion and is caused by self heating in bulk solids as a result of biological processes,
chemical reactions or heating due to oxidation of drying oils, which can lead to
smouldering combustion, normally starting deep within the mass of fuel.
4.3 Incipient Stage
Ignition is always preceded by heating of potential fuel, often producing smoke and/or
other (toxic) products of combustion. In many cases, the incipient phase can be
detected before ignition, by the occupants smelling smoke or by operation of a smoke
detector. It is usually very easy to terminate the heating and prevent the fire from occur-
ring if people are nearby. There will not be enough heat produced in this stage to
operate a heat detector or a sprinkler system.
The duration of the incipient stage can be from a few milliseconds to several days
depending on the initial fuel involved, ambient conditions, heat source, etc. In the case
of a flammable liquid spill the incipient phase is effectively nonexistent. If the source is
self-heating, the incipient phase can last for hours or days. In some cases, the develop-
ment may never grow beyond the incipient stage, for example a cigarette which smoul-
ders on a woollen fabric-covered chair, never igniting the flammable padding beneath
the fabric. There are far too many variables to allow for reliable modelling of the incipi-
ent phase. When furniture is tested using the furniture calorimeter, a gas burner is used
to simulate a wastepaper basket fire in order to eliminate the effects of the incipient
stage.
Development is considered to be in the incipient stage as long as it is small enough that
the dominant form of heat transfer is not radiation, although it can be difficult to distin-
guish between the incipient stage and the ignition point. The incipient phase is of little
threat to occupants outside the room of origin, and only threatens occupants within the
room of origin if they are sleeping or incapable of self preservation. For computer-
based fire modelling, the incipient stage is usually ignored and the growth stage is
started from time zero. An obvious exception is when a smouldering fire scenario must
be considered, such as in a sleeping occupancy.
4.4 Combustion
Smouldering combustion
A period of smouldering combustion can occur following ignition. Smouldering com-
bustion normally results in slow fire development, which can continue for hours or
days. Smouldering combustion may die out without progressing to flaming combus-
tion. A smouldering fire may be more hazardous to life than a flaming fire due to the
smoke and toxic fumes produced. Smouldering fires are also dangerous because they
may not produce sufficient heat to activate sprinklers or heat detectors. Smouldering
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combustion only occurs in materials that form a stable char. A detailed description of
smouldering fires is given by Ohlemiller (2002).
Flaming combustion
Smouldering combustion can develop into flaming combustion, which results in an
increasing rate of fire development or a fire may immediately begin as flaming com-
bustion. Flaming combustion occurs where the fuel is a gas, a liquid which has evapo-
rated, or a solid fuel which has pyrolysed to produce a flammable vapour.
To initiate flaming combustion of liquids and solids, external heating is required to heat
the fuel, except in the case of flammable liquids that have flashpoints below the ambi-
ent temperature. Once flaming combustion has been initiated, sufficient heat is gener-
ally available from the flame to evaporate or pyrolyse the remaining fuel to sustain the
combustion.
Combustion is an exothermic chemical reaction in which fuel is oxidised to produce
flames, heat and combustion products. Most fuels in building fires have a chemical
structure containing carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. Considering a simple hydrocarbon
such as propane (C3H8), complete combustion producing carbon dioxide (CO2) and
water vapour (H2O) can be represented as:
C3H8 + 5O2 ⇒ 3CO2 + 4H2O [4.1]
In all real fires there is incomplete combustion, producing carbon monoxide gas (CO)
and some carbon (C), which appears as smoke. The combustion process also generates
energy and this generation is referred to as the ‘heat release rate’ of the fire. Fire engi-
neers often refer to the ‘size’ of a fire in terms of its heat release rate.
4.5 Fire Growth Stage
Fire development can be split into two parts:
1. Fire growth to flashover (pre-flashover phase – see Chapter 5); and
2. Fire development after flashover (post-flashover phase – see Chapter 6).
Knowledge of the growth stage of fire development prior to flashover is very important
for fire engineering, as the initial risk to life safety is due to the heat and smoke pro-
duced during this stage. Typically, fire engineering analysis assessing life safety of
building occupants requires an understanding of fire growth to flashover.
The growth stage is considered to begin when the radiation feedback from the flame
governs the burning rate. Assuming that the compartment has ventilation, the growth
rate is primarily governed by the properties and orientation of the fuel. During the
growth stage, the fire spreads across the fuel surfaces, increasing the burning area and
the corresponding heat release rate. The heat release rate is often assumed to be inde-
pendent of the fire enclosure and governed mainly by the flame spread rate. Radiation
feedback from nearby surfaces may enhance the fire growth.
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The fire growth stage follows the start of flaming combustion as the fire develops and
spreads to adjacent fuel. Once flaming combustion is taking place, the fire will nor-
mally continue to develop unless it is remote from other fuel or fire control and extin-
guishment measures are applied. The fire will then develop at a rate governed by the
geometry, combustibility and arrangement of the fuel until the fire size is limited by the
surface area of the fuel or by a restricted air supply.
The early stage of fire growth is termed ‘fuel controlled’ as fire growth is governed by
the fuel availability and geometry. If the fire is within a compartment, there will be a
time where the fire growth starts to be limited by the oxygen available. At this point, the
rate of fire growth may reduce, due to lack of available oxygen. This is referred to as a
‘ventilation controlled’ fire. If the ventilation changes (doors opened, windows break),
then the fire may return to being fuel controlled for a period of time.
During the growth stage, the conditions in a room can be approximated by the
two-layer model shown in Figure 4.3. The air in the lower layer is close to ambient
temperature, at least in the early stages. A plume above the fire carries smoke and hot
gases into the upper layer (Figure 4.4) along with a considerable volume of entrained
air. Temperatures in the upper layer rise rapidly due to the heat in the combustion prod-
ucts carried up in the plume. When the plume reaches the ceiling, hot gases travel along
the ceiling, moving radially away from the fire. This flow of hot gases is known as the
‘ceiling jet’, which may be sufficient to trigger operation of heat detectors or sprinklers.
Automatic sprinkler systems are designed to operate well before flashover, while the
fire is small enough to be controlled or extinguished with a moderate amount of water
(see Section 8.10). The duration of the growth stage may be only a few minutes or











Figure 4.3: Two-layer model with fire plume
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a fire may grow rapidly when fresh air is intro-
duced, sometimes leading to a backdraft.
4.6 Flashover
As the fire continues to develop, the tempera-
tures rise and all the exposed surfaces are heated
by radiation from the flames, hot surfaces and,
especially, the upper layer of smoke and hot
gases. Once the temperature in the upper layer
reaches approximately 600°C and the direct ra-
diation at floor level reaches about 20 kW/m2,
all exposed combustible surfaces ignite rapidly
and burn fiercely. This event is known as
flashover.
Flashover can be thought of as a transition from
a small object oriented fire to full room involve-
ment. This transition typically occurs over a
short time span measured in seconds. Figure 4.5
is a plot of the heat release rate and upper layer
temperature versus time for a compartment with
wood cribs and wood fibre-board wall linings. Flashover occurs in the first shaded
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Figure 4.5 Heat release rate compared to upper layer temperature for
 a compartment fire
Figure 4.4: Black smoke deposits
on walls show the depth of the hot
smoke layer during the fire
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upper layer temperature. The increase in radiation from the upper layer not only ignites
all of the combustibles in the room but also enhances the pyrolysis rate of all the burn-
ing objects.
Prior to flashover, fire growth is limited mainly by the pyrolysis rate of the fuels in-
volved in the fire. After flashover, the maximum fire size within an enclosure is usually
limited by the available ventilation, as more fuel is being pyrolysed than can be burnt
using the available air supply. A fire transitioning to flashover is typically observed by
flames occurring outside the compartment.
It is not possible for occupants in the compartment to survive a fire after flashover
because of the high temperatures, high concentrations of carbon monoxide and smoke
and the lack of oxygen.
For a typical well-ventilated living room with plenty of soft furnishings, the time be-
tween ignition and flashover is often less than five minutes. For larger spaces, such as
the whole floor of an office building, flashover may take much more than five to ten
minutes to occur, or may only occur in a local area, not across a whole floor.
Flashover will not always occur, even where fire supression systems, such as sprin-
klers, are absent. For example, in large firecells, such as warehouses, a growing fire
may not reach flashover as the compartment size may be too large for all combustible
items to be flaming at the same time and the temperature of the hot layer will rise more
slowly and never reach the high temperatures required for flashover; or in well-sealed
firecells where the fire size and hence the upper layer temperatures are limited by a lack
of oxygen supply to the fire.
4.7 Fully-developed Fire
The fully-developed fire (the burning stage) is most important when considering prop-
erty protection, structural stability and the possibility of fire spreading to other proper-
ties. Analysis of structural stability is reliant on predicting a time-temperature curve (or
curves) for a compartment and its possible ventilation scenarios.
Once flashover has occurred, the fire is in the fully-developed stage, which is charac-
terised by a high heat release rate and high temperatures when compared to pre-flashover
conditions. During this stage the fire is usually ventilation controlled, the rate of burn-
ing being governed by the compartment openings. Typical gas flows through an open-
ing in the fully-developed fire are shown in Figure 4.6. In most fully-developed fires,
ventilation control means that the rate of fuel pyrolysis is greater than can be burnt by
the available air supply, resulting in flames burning from openings as the unburnt gases
obtain access to outside air (Figure 4.7). Exterior flames are indicative of a ventilation-
controlled fire and do not normally occur in the growth stage.
The nature and arrangement of the fuel and the thermal properties of the walls and
ceiling affect the growth, intensity and duration of a fully-developed fire. The duration
of the fully-developed stage depends on the total amount of fuel and the available ven-
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tilation. The duration may range from minutes to hours and may be difficult to predict.
Figure 4.8 shows typical time-temperature curves for fully-developed wood crib fires
in compartments with varying fire load density and ventilation. Ventilation is defined
in terms of the opening dimensions A hv  (see Section 6.3) and the total surface area of
the compartment boundaries At . It can be seen that low ventilation produces longer,
cooler fires than high ventilation. The more fuel available, the longer the fire burns.








Figure 4.6: Gas flows through openings for a fully-developed fire
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The heat release rate in a post-flashover fire will not be the same as the heat release rate
for the same fuel burning in the open air for two reasons, discussed below.
Firstly, many burning objects actually release more fuel than can be consumed within
the compartment, i.e. the fire is ventilation limited. When there is more fuel released
from the burning object than can be consumed inside the confines of the compartment,
the excess fuel will burn with visible flames outside the window or door opening. The
excess fuel that is not consumed within the compartment is not easy to measure and has
only been quantified in a few cases.
Secondly, the burning rate inside a compartment is usually much greater than the burn-
ing rate in the open air because of the additional radiant heat on the burning object from
the hot gases and hot lining materials. In the case of wood cribs, the mass loss rate from
a crib burning in a compartment is enhanced by approximately 33% over the identical
crib burned in the open. For pool fires, where the entire burning surface is seeing the
radiating compartment environment, it has been shown that there can be as high as
100% increase over the open-air burning case. This compartment enhancement has
been incorporated in the COMPF2 computer model for pool fires and wood cribs
(Babrauskas, 1979) but has not always been explicitly incorporated into other models
and should be considered by the designer.
At all stages of the fire development there is an energy balance. The energy released by
combustion of the fuel in the room is equal to the sum of the energy conducted into the
























































































































Figure 4.8: Time-temperature curves for various fuel loads and opening
 factors.  Fuel load is MJ/m2 of bounding surface area
(Magnussun and Thelandersson, 1970)
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away by convection of smoke, hot gases and combustion products through openings.
The energy balance has been used in computer programs such as COMPF2 (Babrauskas,
1979; Feasey, 1999) to calculate the fire temperatures in post-flashover fires.
4.8 Decay Stage
After a period of fully-developed burning, the fire intensity decreases as the fuel is
consumed. Once the fuel supply diminishes to a point where it is unable to sustain the
maximum burning rate, the fire is said to be in the decay stage. The transition to the
decay stage is often defined as the time when 80% of the fuel has been consumed.
During the decay stage, the fire passes back from a ventilation-controlled fire to a fuel-
controlled fire, with the burning rate governed by the fuel supply with more than suffi-
cient air available for combustion of the remaining fuel. The fire continues to decay
until the available fuel is consumed or sustained burning can no longer be maintained.
For fires that involve thermal plastics which melt and form pool fires, the expected
decay stage would be quite short. However, for cellulosic fuels which form a char that
will eventually be consumed the decay stage will be much longer. The decay stage is
primarily of interest when determining the required fire resistance of structural ele-
ments and is rarely an issue for addressing life safety.
4.9 Intervention
The stages of fire development described above ignore any fire fighting intervention by
automatic or manual systems. Intervention with fire fighting media at any stage can
control or extinguish the fire if sufficient cooling power is available.
In the case of water, the smaller the fire the less that is required. Hand held extinguish-
ers or hose reels can extinguish a very small fire. Sprinklers are designed to suppress a
fire in the growth stage, but not after flashover.
The fire service can generally supply large volumes of water (Chapter 14), which can
extinguish a pre-flashover fire or a small fire after flashover. The fire service may be
unable to initially extinguish some large fully-developed fires because of lack of suffi-
cient cooling capacity and difficulty getting water on the seat of the fire. In these cases,
they can reduce the rate of heat release by applying as much water as possible, thereby
preventing the fire spreading until most of the combustible contents are consumed. The
fire can then be extinguished in the decay stage. Fire fighting water applied to exposed
surfaces of adjacent buildings can reduce the probability of fire spread by radiant heat
transfer.
4.10 Design Fires
Most of the design calculations that a fire engineer makes are dependent on the heat
release rate from the fire. The first step in most cases is to determine which fire is to be
used as the ‘design fire’. The design fire is an approximation of the reasonable worst-
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case fire scenario expected over the life of the building. Typically the design fire is
described in terms of the heat release rate as a function of time. Indeed, the heat release
rate history is considered the single most important variable in describing a fire hazard
(Babrauskas and Peacock, 1992). The description of the design fire may also include an
estimate of the area of the fire, the smoke production rate, and the gaseous species
being produced, all as a function of time. Unfortunately it is not possible to derive a
design fire from first principles, so the fire engineer is forced to rely on experimental
data, correlations, curve fits and engineering judgment to come up with the appropriate
design fire.
The detail required for a design fire is dependent on the issue being investigated and
what questions the engineer is trying to answer. For example it is not much use to have
a design fire that includes a detailed description of the decay phase if the engineer is
trying to model the activation of a sprinkler. Likewise, the growth stage makes little
difference if the engineer is trying to model the fire resistance of a structural member
after several hours of fire exposure. Thus, the first question a fire engineer must ask is
“What am I trying to achieve?”.
Figure 4.9 shows an idealised heat release rate history for a compartment fire from
ignition through to burnout. A fire described in this way is the most important item of
input to most fire growth models. Each stage of this fire curve is discussed in a quali-
tative framework in this Chapter. Quantitative methods for calculating heat release
rate are given in Chapter 5 for the growth period and Chapter 6 for the fully developed
fire.













Figure 4.9: Idealised heat release rate history showing all stages
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The objective of this Chapter is to provide simple methods of quantifying the pre-
flashover fire. For more detail, consult Drysdale (1998), Quintiere (1998) or the SFPE
Handbook (DiNenno, ed., 2002).
Design for life safety requires the ability to predict the likely behaviour of a pre-flashover
fire and the resulting production of heat and smoke. Pre-flashover fire growth can be
predicted from experience in real fires and estimated using fire growth models. A com-
bination of these two methods will likely give the best results.
Computer models for examining fire growth are described in Chapter 12. These can be
used to predict such variables as the rate of burning, time to flashover, compartment
temperatures, detector response and production of smoke and toxic gases.
5.2 Calorific Value of Fuels
Fire loads should be determined using the effective heat of combustion cH∆  (MJ/kg),
also referred to as the nett calorific value, of combustible materials. Values for cH∆  of
some liquids, gases and solids are given in Table 5.1.
The effective heat of combustion of moist materials such as wood products can be
found from:
∆H h m mc n c c= −( )−1 0 01 0 025. . [5.1]
where hn is the nett oven-dry heat of combustion (MJ/kg) as determined by ISO 1716
(International Organization for Standardization) or similar and mc is the moisture con-
tent as a percentage by weight where:
m m mc d d= ×( ) +( )100 100 [5.2]
and md is the moisture content as a percentage of the dry weight (as usually quoted for
wood products).
5.3 Design Fires
Many assumptions are made in a fire modelling process. One of the most important is
the design fire, which is required as input for nearly all fire growth computer programs.
Most fire growth models require the user to input a design fire as a specified heat
release rate varying with time. The design fire is often the heat release rate for the fuel
assuming that it is free burning in the open air.
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Table 5.1: Calorific values of combustible materials (CIB 1986)
Accurate modelling the actual growth rate of a fire is extremely difficult and is a current
area of research. The fire growth rate is dependent on many factors which are not only a
function of the burning object but are more stochastic in nature such as size and location
of the ignition source, orientation of the object, and proximity to other objects, walls, or
window openings. Notwithstanding these limitations, the fire engineer must rely on in-
formed judgment when choosing a growth rate. It is true that most fires which will occur
during the life of a building will be quite minor and are likely to go unreported. How-
ever, it is prudent to use the reasonably worst case fire for design purposes.
Liquid fuels
Liquid fuels burning in the open as pool fires tend to burn at a constant rate once steady
state conditions have been reached. The rate of burning is governed by the rate at which
heat from the flames and combustion products is able to evaporate fuel on the surface
of the pool, depending on the pool area. Typical burning rates for a range of liquid fuels
are shown in Table 5.2 (derived from Babrauskas, 2002). These figures are for pools
larger than about two metres in diameter, burning in the open.
Solid fuels
Table 5.2 also includes burning rates of wood, based on a regression rate of 40 mm/
hour on the exposed surfaces. This is a typical regression rate measured in standard fire
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Figure 5.1: Laboratory test of typical
two-seater sofa, less than 2 minutes
after ignition (2 MW fire).
resistance tests (see Section 6.6). Figures are given for a solid slab of wood and for
wooden objects with a range of specific surface areas (m2 of surface per m2 of floor
area). The three plastic materials have burning rates derived from Babrauskas (2002),
for open air burning.
Burning objects
There are several approaches to estimat-
ing the growth rate for a particular de-
sign fire. The most popular is the t2 (t-
squared) fire growth rate. Originally de-
veloped in the 1970s for predicting fire
detector activation, the implicit assump-
tion in many cases is that the t2 approxi-
mation is close enough to make reason-
able design decisions. Obviously more
representative fuel geometries may or
may not produce t2 fire growth. Other
common fire growth rates that may be
applicable to design are t-cubed, para-
bolic and exponential rates that may be
found in racked/high piled storage con-
figurations.
The t2 fire growth can be thought of in
terms of a burning object with a constant heat release rate per unit area in which the fire
is spreading in a circular pattern with a constant radial flame speed. Scaling by a growth
constant can account for a wide range of fire growth rates, from very slow to very fast.
The particular choice of growth constant depends on the type and arrangement of the
fuel. The t2 fire gained popularity when it was included in the appendix of NFPA-72E
(now NFPA-72) with three categories for fire growth; Slow, Medium, and Fast. These
definitions are simply determined by the time required for the fire to reach 1.05 MW. A
Slow fire is defined as taking 600 seconds (10 minutes), a Medium fire 300 seconds (5
minutes) and a Fast fire less than 150 seconds to reach 1.055 MW (rounded to 1.00 MW
in the calculations that follow). An additional Ultra fast growth rate is given in NFPA
204, for example, in which the growth time is 75 seconds to reach 1000 kW.
It should be noted that the t2 growth rate has sometimes been applied well beyond the
scope of the original assumptions, in some cases for fires as large as 30 MW, and such
applications have been questioned in the literature (Babrauskas, 1996).
The heat release rate Q&  (MW) for a t2 fire is given by:
Q̇ t k= [ ]2 [5.3]
where t is the time (seconds) and k is the growth time (seconds)
To be dimensionally correct, k should have units s/MW1/2, but for fire engineering
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585 609 356 0.099 1.0 0.099 46.0 4.55
LPG (mostly CH4) 415 677 281 0.078 1.0 0.078 50.0 3.90
Petrol 740 268 198 0.055 1.0 0.055 43.7 2.40
Aviation fuel JP-5 810 240 194 0.054 1.0 0.054 43.0 2.32
Liquid hydrogen 70 874 61 0.017 1.0 0.017 120.0 2.04
Kerosene 820 171 140 0.039 1.0 0.039 43.2 1.68
Heavy fuel oil 970 130 126 0.035 1.0 0.035 39.7 1.39
Ethanol 794 68 54 0.015 1.0 0.015 26.8 0.40
Methanol 796 77 61 0.017 1.0 0.017 20.0 0.34
Wood
Flat wood 550 40 — 0.0056 1.0 0.0056 16 0.09
1 m cube 550 40 — 0.0056 6.0 0.0323 16 0.53
100 mm in crib* 550 40 — 0.0056 14 0.078 16 1.24
Furniture 550 40 — 0.0056 20 0.11 16 1.8
25 mm in crib* 550 40 — 0.0056 47 0.26 16 4.2
Softboard 300 108 — 0.0090 1.0 0.0090 16 0.14
Plastics
PMMA 1184 — — 0.054 1.0 0.054 24.9 1.34
Polyethylene — — — 0.031 1.0 0.031 43.8 1.36
Polystyrene 1050 — — 0.035 1.0 0.035 39.7 1.40




























































Figure 5.3: Heat release rates for t2 fires
purposes the numerical value of k is the time in seconds for the fire to reach a heat
output of 1.055 MW. Heat release rates are shown in Figure 5.3 for the four different
growth times given in Table 5.3.
An alternative formulation that gives identical results is to describe the heat release rate
Q (MW) for a t2 fire by:
Q̇ t=α 2 [5.4]
where α is the fire intensity coefficient (MW/s2). Values of α are given in Table 5.3.
The terms α and k are directly related by:
α = 1 055 2. k [5.5]
The fire can be considered to grow according to the t2 curve until either the fuel is
consumed, or until the heat release rate reaches a peak value expected for that particular
object, in which case the duration of constant burning at that rate can be calculated.
Some typical fire growth rates and peak heat release rate values are given in Appendix
B. This calculation assumes that the fire growth is not limited by the available ventila-
tion, which may change if the burning object is in a room, as described in Section 5.4.
Calculations
Calculations for a t2 fire are given, with reference to Figure 5.4. Using Equation 5.3 for
a t2 fire, the time t1 (in seconds) to reach the peak heat release rate Q̇p (MW) is given
by:
t k Qp1 = ˙ [5.6]
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y
600 2.93 x 10-6 Densely packed wood products
300 1.17 x 10-5 Solid wooden furniture such as desks
Individual furniture items with small amounts of
plastic
150 4.66 x 10-5 High stacked wood pallets
Cartons on pallets
Some upholstered furniture
75 1.874 x 10-4 Upholstered furniture
High stacked plastic materials




































Figure 5.4: Calculation of heat release rate









If the total energy Q  (MJ) in the fuel has not been released at time t1, the energy
released in the steady burning phase 2Q  (MJ) is given by:
Q Q Q2 1= − [5.8]
and the duration of the steady burning phase is given by:
t t Q Qp2 1 2= − ˙ [5.9]
If the fuel has insufficient energy to reach its peak heat release rate, all of the fuel will
be consumed in time tm (sec) where:





and the burning rate at time tm is given by:
Q̇ t km m= ( )
2 [5.11]
Figure 5.5 shows three heat release rate curves for a fire in office furniture. The furni-
ture weighs 160 kg with an effective heat of combustion of 20 MJ/kg, giving a total fire
load of 3200 MJ. The peak heat release rate has been taken as 9 MW, being
2.0 MW/m2 over an area of 4.5 m2. The curves show the heat release rates for Slow,
Medium and Fast fire growth. In each case the area under the curve is 3200 MJ. Calcu-
lations are shown below for the Fast and Slow fires.
Worked example
For fuel of known weight, effective heat of combustion and peak burning rate, calculate
the heat release rate curve for all the fuel to burn in the open.
Assume a t2 growth period followed by a steady phase, with no decay phase.
Mass of furniture m = 160 kg                     Heat of combustion ∆Hc = 20 MJ/kg
Total energy in fuel Q m Hc= ∆  = 3200 MJ              Peak burning rate Q̇p  = 9.0 MW
Fast fire k = 150 s/MW1/2
Time to reach peak burning rate t k Qp1 = ˙  = 450 s (7.5 min)








Q Q1 <  so there is a steady state
Energy released in steady state Q Q Q2 1= −  = 1850 MJ
Duration of steady state t
Q
Qs p
= 2˙  = 206 s (3.4 min)
Slow fire k = 600 s/MW1/2








 = 5400 MJ
Q Q1 >  so the fire does not reach a steady state
Time for all fuel to be burned t Qkm = ( )3 2
1 3/
 = 1512 s (25.2 min)
Burning rate when all fuel is burned Q̇ t km m= ( )
2  = 6.3 MW
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Figure 5.5: Heat release rates for a fire load of 3200 MJ
If design fires are available for individual fuel items in a room, they can be aggregated
into one heat release rate curve by estimating the times of fire spread from one item to
the next. Alternatively, an overall t2 fire can be estimated by considering all of the fuel
packages as one item, considering the rate of burning of each package and the expected
rate of spread from one to the next.
5.4 Room Fires
Fire growth computer models are used to calculate fire behaviour in a room (Karlsson
and Quintiere, 2000). The input heat release rate, as described above, is the design fire
that would occur if the fuel was burned in the open air with no limits on ventilation.
The actual heat release rate in the room, which can be calculated by the fire growth
model, will follow the input curve if ventilation is not limiting, but will become less
than that of the design fire if the door and/or window openings are not large enough to
allow free burning. Hand calculations can be made for room fires, using Equations 5.6
to 5.9. The value of pQ
&  should be the smaller of (a) the total peak heat release rate for
all the fuel in the room, or (b) the ventilation controlled heat release rate as calculated in
Chapter 6. For most rooms, the ventilation controlled heat release rate will govern.
As described in Chapter 12, fire growth models predict the temperature and depth of
the hot layer, the volume of smoke produced and vented through various openings and
the concentrations of gases and combustion products. Sophisticated computer fire growth
models can calculate enhancement of the burning rate by radiation from the hot upper
layer.
All of this information is very useful when calculating the time to response of active
systems or the time available for escape of occupants.
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5.5 Detector and Sprinkler Response
Activation time
The computer models described in Chapter 12 can be used to estimate the time of
activation of heat-activated devices such as heat detectors and sprinklers.
Heat detector or sprinkler activation time can be used as part of egress calculations on
the assumption that the detectors/sprinklers are connected to an alarm system that will
notify the occupants of the fire. The operation of automatic sprinkler systems will ei-
ther extinguish a fire or limit its size. It is a conservative assumption to assume a con-
stant burning rate after sprinkler operation.
Smoke detectors will generally activate considerably faster than heat-activated devices
or sprinklers, and hence are of great benefit for improving life safety. However, smoke
detector operation is more difficult to predict with fire growth models. Smoke detectors
can be considered very sensitive heat-activated devices where a temperature rise of 4˚C
or 5˚C at activation provides a good agreement with experiments in which the detectors
were installed on ceilings 2.4 m high (Bukowski and Averill, 1998). More appropri-
ately, smoke detector activation can often be predicted using the characteristics of smoke,
such as smoke density or visibility.
Installations to NZS 4512 (Standards New Zealand, 2003) or AS 1670/AS 4428 (Stand-
ards Australia, 2004 and 1998) have an Alarm Verification Facility (AVF), commonly
called ‘double-knock’ applied to point-type conventional smoke detectors to reduce
false activations. This can typically be modelled by adding a fixed detector response






























Figure 5.6: Example of typical detector activation times, shown on a heat release
rate curve for a Fast fire
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AVF delay. While their initial response may be slower (perhaps 60 s from a standing
start depending on algorithm settings), there is no confirmatory delay to account for.
Figure 5.6 shows a comparison between typical response times of smoke detectors,
heat detectors and sprinklers.
Life safety
Most fire fatalities occur in the pre-flashover stage of a fire. The principal life safety
objective is to allow people to escape. Calculations of escape times, which are de-
scribed in Chapter 11, require knowledge of the rate of fire growth and smoke produc-
tion. These rates affect the time of detection of the fire and subsequent notification of
occupants, and the time available for escape before conditions become untenable.
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The objective of design for a post-flashover fire is to contain the fire and prevent struc-
tural collapse, as necessary to meet the performance requirements.
In the post flashover phase of a fire all of the combustible objects in the compartment
are burning and the heat release rate is limited either by the fuel surface area or the
available air supply.
This Chapter gives a method for assessing the expected severity of a post-flashover fire
in a firecell, with known fire load and ventilation, and describes simple methods of
assessing the fire resistance of elements of building construction.
6.2 Firecells and Fire Compartments
The New Zealand Building Code requires buildings to be divided into ‘firecells’, sur-
rounded by barriers that have resistance to the spread of fire. The Building Code of
Australia uses the term ‘fire compartments’.
If the firecell or fire compartment has no internal partitions, it is possible to calculate
the expected severity of a post-flashover fire occupying the whole firecell. For large
open firecells with no partitions (floor area over about 100 m2), the fire will typically
move through the firecell as a migrating fire, not exposing all of the firecell to maxi-
mum temperatures at any one time. There are methods for estimating temperatures in
migrating post-flashover fires (Clifton, 1996), but it is usually conservative to consider
the whole firecell as one space involved in fire. The one exception is in long, thin
firecells with ventilation at one end only, where the temperatures may be hotter for
longer than consideration of fire over the whole firecell simultaneously would give.
A firecell or fire compartment may consist of a number of rooms, separated by temporary
or permanent walls. In this case, a fire in one room may be contained in that room or it
may spread progressively to other rooms via concealed spaces, weaknesses in the walls
or failure of the walls after sufficient fire exposure. If the walls have significant fire
resistance, separate fire severity calculations may be necessary for each room.
6.3 Fires
Fire loads
The design fire load (or fuel load) is a value close to the maximum fire load expected in
the life of the building. The design fire load is the sum of fixed and moveable fire loads.
54
Fire Engineering Design Guide
When the fire load is determined from client-supplied information specific to a particu-
lar building, the design load should be that load which has less than 10% probability of
being exceeded in 50 years or the life of the building (consistent with the definition of
wind and earthquake loads for structural design).
When the fire load is determined from surveys representative of particular occupan-
cies, the design fire load should be the 80 percentile value of surveyed loads.
The results of some surveyed fire loads in New Zealand are available from BRANZ
(Narayanan, 1994). In the Compliance Document C/AS1 (DBH, 2005), design fuel
load energy density values for Fire Hazard Categories (FHC) 1, 2 and 3 are given in
Paragraph 2.2.1 as 400, 800 and 1200 MJ/m2 floor area, respectively. For other occu-
pancies or special situations, Appendix C of this guide gives moveable fire loads for
many occupancies.
The total fire load stored in a firecell Q (MJ) is the sum of all the energy available for
release when the combustible materials are burned, given by:
Q k m Hc c=∑ ∆ [6.1]
where m is the mass of the fire load (kg)
∆Hc  is the heat of combustion of the fuel (MJ/kg)
kc is the proportion of the fire load available to burn in the time under consideration
The fuel load energy density ef (MJ/m
2 floor area) is:
e Q Af f= [6.2]
where Af is the floor area of the firecell (m
2).
Fire duration and temperatures
Figure 4.8 shows typical temperature curves for post-flashover fires in firecells with
varying fuel load and ventilation, showing that the fire temperatures depend mainly on
the amount of fuel and the available ventilation. These curves were derived from heat
balance calculations based on observed rates of heat release of cellulosic fuels in small
compartments. The curves shown in Figure 4.8 can also be used as the basis of more
advanced fire engineering design methods by calculating the response of a structure to
the expected time-temperature curve.
For a ventilation controlled fire, the rate of burning is limited by the mass of air that can
flow through the openings. This was observed Kawagoe (1958) when he was analysing
the results of experimental post-flashover fires. His empirical relationship can also be
derived by applying Bernoulli’s equation to the post-flashover vent flows (Drysdale,
1998), giving the mass flow rate of air into the compartment am& (kg/s) as:
˙ .m A ha v= 0 5 [6.3]
where Av (m
2) is the total area of the opening in the wall
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h (m) is the height of the opening.
For a room with several openings of different heights, the total area and the weighted
average height should be used.
The heat release rate within the compartment is then estimated using the assumption
that most fuels release a constant amount of energy per unit mass of air consumed, that
is 3.0 MJ/kg of air. Thus the ventilation controlled heat release rate 
vQ
&  (MW) inside the
compartment is:
˙ .Q A hv v= 1 5 [6.4]
This does not include the additional heat released by combustion of unburned gases in
flames outside the window openings, which cannot be readily calculated.
An empirical relationship for the ventilation controlled burning rate was developed by
Kawagoe (1958):
ṁ k A hp v=  (kg/s)
where kp is the combustion factor
Av is the total area of wall openings (m
2)
h is the weighted average height (m).
For small buildings such as the 3.0 x 3.0 m compartments typically used for test fires,
the value of kp = 0.092  so that:
Figure 6.1: Post-flashover experimental room fire with large flames
burning outside the opening
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˙ .m A hv= 0 092 [6.5]
or
˙ .m A hv= 5 5  (kg/minute)
The corresponding heat release rate Q̇v (MW) is given by:
˙ ˙Q m Hv c= ∆ [6.6]
where cH∆  is the heat of combustion of wood.
The rate of burning may be less than Q̇v  if the fuel has insufficient surface area to
achieve this rate of heat release, as calculated using Table 5.2.  If the mass m (kg) of the












Thomas’s flashover correlation can be checked to see if there is sufficient ventilation to
permit a fire to develop a sufficient rate of heat release Q̇ fo  (MW) necessary for flashover
to occur, given by:
˙ . .Q A A hfo t v= +0 0078 0 378 [6.8]
where At is the total internal surface area of the firecell.
If Q̇v  is less than Q̇ fo , it is unlikely that flashover will occur (Walton and Thomas,
1995).
Worked example
For a firecell with a given geometry, fire load and window size, calculate the ventila-
tion-controlled burning rate and duration of the burning. Check Thomas’ flashover cor-
relation to see if flashover is likely to occur.
Length of firecell L f = 6 m
Width of firecell Wf = 3 m
Floor area A L Wf f f= = × =6 3 18m
2
Height of firecell H = 2 5. m
Window height h = 1 8. m
Window width w = 2 4. m
Window area A hv w= = × =1 8 2 4 4 32. . . m
2
Total internal surface area  A A H L Wt f f f= + +( )[ ] = + +( )[ ] =2 2 18 2 5 6 3 81 0. . m2
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Fuel load energy density e f = 1000 MJ/kg
Total fire load Q e Af f= = 18 000, MJ
Heat of combustion of wood fuel ∆Hc = 16 MJ kg
Mass of fuel m Q Hc= = =∆ 18 000 16 1125, / kg
Ventilation-controlled burning rate
            ˙ . . . . .m A hv= = × × =0 092 0 092 4 32 1 8 0 533 kg/s
Heat release rate ˙ ˙ . .Q m Hv c= = × =∆ 0 533 16 8 5 MW
Duration of burning t M mb = = =˙ / .1125 0 533 2110 s (35.2 min)
Thomas’ Flashover Correlation ˙ . .Q A A hfo t v= +0 0078 0 378
              = × + × × =0 0078 81 0 378 4 32 1 8 2 8. . . . .  MW
Flashover will occur because Q̇v  > Q̇ fo
6.4 Fire Severity
This Design Guide generally recommends calculation of fire severity for design purposes
using the ‘equivalent fire severity’ concept. Note that the equivalent fire severity is not
the same as the duration of the fire. An alternative is design based on limiting tempera-
ture, using a design fire temperature-time curve as the heating function (see Section 6.6).
Equivalent time of fire exposure
The fire severity of a post-flashover fire (as used in this Design Guide) is the equivalent
time of exposure to the standard fire that would produce the same maximum tempera-
ture in a protected structural steel member given a complete burnout of the firecell with
no intervention. The time equivalent method was developed for structural steel mem-
bers protected with insulating materials, where the steel temperature lags behind that of
the fire. The method is also applicable to reinforced concrete members where the con-
crete insulates the reinforcing steel. It is considered applicable to heavy timber mem-
bers, but with less accuracy. The method is not accurate without modification for un-
protected steel members, where the steel temperatures closely follow the fire tempera-
tures. This is accommodated by the factor km given in Table 6.2.
The recommended empirical expression (EC1, 2002) for equivalent fire severity te (min)
is:
t e k k we f b m f= [6.9]
where ef is the fuel load energy density (MJ/m
2 floor area)
kb is a conversion factor given by Table 6.1
km is a modification factor for the structural material, given by Table 6.2
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wf is the ventilation factor, given below.
The value of te should be rounded to the nearest 10 minutes.
Table 6.1 has been prepared for typical construction materials, based on Clifton and
Feeney (2000). The value of kb = 0.09 is for firecells lined with fire-resisting plaster-
board on the walls and ceiling, and should be used for calculations where the lining
materials are not known.
This calculated value of fire severity te can be used in the fire resistance calculations
described later in this Chapter when assessing the required fire resistance for materials
or assemblies.
Typical value of 
√λρc (J/m2.K.s0.5) 
Construction materials kb  
400 Very light insulating materials 0.10 
700 Plasterboard ceiling and walls, timber floor 0.09 
1100 Light weight concrete ceiling and floor, 
plasterboard walls 
0.08 
1700 Normal weight concrete ceiling and floor, 
plasterboard walls 
0.065 
>2500 Thin sheet steel roof and any wall system 0.04 
λ = thermal conductivity W/m.K        ρ = density kg/m3       c = specific heat J/kg.K 
Table 6.1: Conversion factor kb  for different firecell lining materials
(Clifton and Feeney, 2000)
Structural material Modification factor km  
Reinforced concrete  1.0 
Protected steel 1.0 
Timber 1.0 
Unprotected steel see note 
(individual member consideration only) 
(13.7 Av (√heq) /At) ≥ 1.0,  
where 0.02 ≤ Av (√heq) /At, ≤ 0.20 
heq = weighted average of openings in all walls 
Note: Use km = 1.0 when using a design procedure written for steel structural systems that contain a mix of 
unprotected and protected steel, such as (Clifton, 2006). 
Table 6.2: Modification factor km  for various structural materials (EC1 2002)
Ventilation factor






































where     αv v fA A=     0 025 0 25. .≤ ≤αv
αh h fA A=
bv v v= + −( )12 5 1 10 2. α α  ≥ 10.0
Af is the floor area of the firecell (m
2)
Av is the area of vertical window and door openings (m
2)
Ah is the area of horizontal openings in the roof (m
2) and
H is the height of the firecell (m).
For a pitched roof it is conservative to use the smallest value of H.
Tabulated values
Values of te using the equations from the 1996 version of Eurocode 1 (EC1, 1996) have
been tabulated in the Compliance Document C/AS1 (DBH, 2005) as Table 6.3. The
 Fuel load energy density 
400 MJ/m2 
Fuel load energy density 
800 MJ/m2 
Fuel load energy density 
1200 MJ/m2 
Av/Af Ah/Af Ah/Af Ah/Af 
 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
0.05 90 60 50 40 40 180 120 100 80 80 240 180 140 140 120 
0.06 80 50 50 40 40 160 110 90 80 80 240 160 140 120 110 
0.07 70 50 40 40 40 150 100 80 80 70 220 160 140 120 110 
0.08 70 50 40 40 30 140 90 80 70 70 220 140 120 110 100 
0.09 60 40 40 30 30 140 90 80 70 70 200 140 110 110 100 
0.10 60 40 40 30 30 120 80 70 70 70 180 140 110 100 100 
0.11 60 40 30 30 30 110 80 70 70 60 160 120 110 100 100 
0.12 50 40 30 30 30 100 70 70 60 60 160 110 100 100 90 
0.13 50 40 30 30 30 100 70 70 60 60 160 110 100 90 90 
0.14 50 30 30 30 30 90 70 60 60 60 140 100 100 90 90 
0.15 40 30 30 30 30 80 70 60 60 60 120 100 90 90 90 
0.16 40 30 30 30 30 80 70 60 60 60 110 100 90 90 90 
0.17 40 30 30 30 30 80 60 60 60 60 110 90 90 90 90 
0.18 40 30 30 30 30 70 60 60 60 60 110 90 90 90 80 
0.19 30 30 30 30 30 70 60 60 60 60 110 90 90 80 80 
0.20 30 30 30 30 30 70 60 60 60 60 100 90 80 80 80 
0.25 30 30 30 30 30 60 60 60 60 50 90 80 80 80 80 
Table 6.3: Values of equivalent fire severity te (minutes) (C/AS1, DBH 2005)
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table is for a firecell ceiling height of 3.0 metres, kb value of 0.09 and for fuel load
energy densities of 400, 800 and 1200 MJ/m2 floor area. Equation 6.9 should be used
for any significant departures from these values.
Single storey buildings
Most single storey buildings and roofs of multi-storey buildings do not have fire resist-
ing roof construction, so that the roofing materials will collapse or burn away during
the fire, at which point the fire becomes more like an open air fire than a compartment
fire. The severity of an open air fire on surrounding structure is less than that of an
enclosed compartment fire because most of the heat is vented directly to the atmos-
phere.
The equivalent fire severity formula can be applied assuming that the roof remains in
place for the duration of the fire. However, for typical roofs of buildings this is inappro-
priate and overly conservative. This is recognised in C/AS1 (DBH, 2005) Table 5.1,
where Note 4 to that table (effective openings), allows a value of Ah/Af = 0.2 to be used
for single storey buildings or the top floor of multi-storey buildings where the struc-
tural system supporting the roof is non fire rated and exposed to the fire (not protected
by a fire resistant ceiling). Skylights that are made of plastic or other material which
will completely melt or burn early in the fire development should also be considered to
be horizontal roof vents when using Equation 6.10. However these two items cannot be
combined, so that roof vents cannot be used in addition to the Ah/Af = 0.2 allowance;
the greater of the two should be used as illustrated in the design example.
If the calculated fire severity exceeds the actual fire resistance of the roof, it is more
realistic to estimate the time of roof collapse and consider the fire to be an open-air fire
from that time on, where the rate of burning is governed by the fuel itself rather than by
the ventilation. In this case it is difficult to make meaningful calculations of fire sever-
ity, but one possible approach is given following the example below.
Worked example
Consider a warehouse 20 m x 40 m x 4 m high storing 30 tonnes of polyethylene plastic.
The warehouse is built with unprotected steel frame and no fire resistant ceiling, has
full height openings 10 m long in one wall and the roof is 15% skylights.
Floor area Af = × =20 40 800m
2
Height of roof H = 4 0. m
Total area of enclosure At = 2080m
2
Area of wall openings Av = × =10 4 40m
2
Height of wall openings h = 4 m




αv = =40 800 0 05.
αh = =( ) =max . ; . .120 800 0 15 0 2 0 2
bv v v= + −( ) =12 5 1 10 18 72. .α α


































Mass of fuel m = 30 000, kg
Heat of combustion of polyethylene ∆Hc = 44 MJ kg
Total fuel load Q H mc= × = × = ×∆ 44 30 000 1 32 10
6, . MJ
Fuel load energy density e Q Af f= = 1650 MJ m
2
Conversion factor kb = 0 04.
Correction factor         k A h Am v eq t= ( )( )max .13 7
             = × × = =13 7 40 4 0 2080 0 53 1 0 1 0. . . ; . .
Equivalent fire severity t e k k we f b m f= = 59 min
rounded to nearest 10 minutes, te = 60 min
Assume that the roof is not fire-rated so that it would collapse after less than half an
hour of fire exposure. Calculate the rate and duration of burning as an open air fire.
From Table 5.2 the heat release rate for a surface of polyethylene is fQ ′′&  = 1.36 MW/m2.
Assume that the exposed surface of polyethylene is the same as the floor area.
Heat release rate ˙ ˙ .Q Q Af f= ′′ × = × =1 36 800 1088 MW














To do this calculation more realistically, the equations in Section 6.7 can be used to
calculate the limiting steel temperature under dead load only, and the time to reach the
limiting temperature, hence roof collapse. An estimate can then be made of the amount
of fuel remaining, hence the burning period of the open air fire. Boundary walls can
conservatively be provided with a fire resistance rating equal to the sum of the two
periods of fire exposure. The use of Ah /Af = 0.2 when this is appropriate, as illustrated
in the above example, offers an easier and only slightly more conservative approach.
6.5 Expected Structural Performance in Fire
The process of structural design under fire exposure is conceptually similar to struc-
tural design for normal temperature conditions. Before making any design it is essen-
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tial to establish clear objectives, and determine the severity of the design fire. The main
differences in structural fire design compared with normal temperature structural de-
sign are that:
• the applied loads are less;
• internal forces may be induced by thermal expansion;
• strengths of materials may be reduced by elevated temperatures;
• cross section areas may be reduced by charring or spalling;
• different load paths and failure mechanisms need to be considered;
• deflections are not important (unless they affect strength); and
• smaller safety factors can be used, because of the low likelihood of the event.
The above factors may be different for different materials (Buchanan, 2001). Predic-
tion of structural performance in fires is very dependent on the type of structure and the
nature of connections between the load-bearing members. It is relatively easy to predict
the performance of simply supported beams, but this becomes difficult for continuous
beams and even more so for two-way slabs and for whole buildings.
Typical fire performance of suspended floor/beam systems in buildings tends to follow
a complex sequence of events, summarised as follows for buildings of steel or concrete
construction:
1. The fire causes heating of the beams and the underside of the slab above the fire.
2. The slab and beam deform downwards initially as a result of thermal gradients and
then later due to loss of strength
3. Thermal expansion and resistance from the surrounding structure cause compressive
Figure 6.2: Fire in a single story industrial building after penetration through the
roof; the walls are preventing fire spread
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axial restraint forces to develop in the beams and slab. The magnitude of these
forces is dependent on the interaction of downwards deflection and thermal expan-
sion, both of which are dependent on the structural materials and the structural
system.
4. The yield strength and modulus of elasticity of both steel and concrete reduce with
heating.
5. The downward deflections increase due to the combined effects of the applied loads,
thermal bowing, and compression forces induced by restraint.
6. With increasing fire exposure, the compressive axial restraint forces reduce due to
the increased deflections and the reduced modulus of elasticity, limiting the hori-
zontal forces on the surrounding structure.
7. With further fire exposure, loss of strength and stiffness (rather than thermal gradi-
ents) cause increasing downwards deflection.
8. The slab beam system deforms into a catenary, resisting the applied loads with
tensile membrane forces resisted by compression ring beam action in the slab edges
and resistance to pull-in from the surrounding structure. This can develop very high
fire resistance in suitably designed and detailed floor systems.
9. As the fire decays, the structural members cool down and attempt to shorten in
length.
10. In the cooling phase high tensile axial forces are induced in the slab, the beams and
their connections (beam-to-beam connections and beam-to-column connections).
This phase can generate the greatest risk of structural collapse after the fire has
gone out.
These actions can take place in two dimensions or three dimensions, depending on the
geometry of the building and the layout of the structure. Large deformations may be
accompanied by local or lateral buckling of steel members and local failure of concrete
members. The highest axial tensile forces in beam, slabs or connections occur as tem-
peratures reduce, sometimes long after the fire is out. Well designed and detailed con-
nections (e.g. HERA (2006b)) will sustain these demands.
Thick concrete slabs (i.e. those with a low span/depth ratio) tend to undergo less down-
wards deflection but generate higher in-plane lateral forces on the surrounding struc-
ture, leading to greater post-fire lateral deformations in plan of the structure (e.g. Bai-
ley, 2002).
As mentioned above, the exact nature of this behaviour is materials and system depend-
ent. For a more detailed description of the behaviour of steel frames with composite
floor systems, refer to HERA (2006a) or to Clifton (2006).
Load ratio
The probability of structural failure under fire conditions depends on the load ratio,
which is the ratio of the load on the structure during a fire to the load that would cause
collapse at normal temperatures. Typical building elements have a load ratio of 0.5 or
less, so that the strength of any member could drop by half or more before collapse
64
Fire Engineering Design Guide
would be expected. The load ratio is far less than 0.5 for buildings or parts of buildings
designed to resist events such as rare snowstorms, extreme wind or earthquakes. The
lower the load ratio, the greater the fire resistance, because of the larger loss in load
carrying capacity needed before failure occurs. This is a most important concept for
structural fire design.
The action that will cause collapse at normal temperatures depends on the type of mem-
ber and the structural material. For beams the critical action is generally the bending
moment, whereas for columns it is either the axial compression load or combined com-
pression and bending. As columns on the fire floor are heated, they try to expand.
Restraint against this expansion will increase the compression loading and this may
modify the load ratio. An example is described in Section 6.7.
6.6 Fire Resistance
Introduction
The objective of design for fire resistance is to ensure that building elements can pre-
vent spread of fire and prevent structural collapse, to meet the specified performance
requirements for the building.
Fire resistance measures the ability of a building element to resist a severe fire, defined
as the time for which the element meets certain criteria when exposed to a standard test
fire. Structural fire resistance can also be specified using temperature or load bearing
capacity of the structural element.
Fire resistance of any building element depends on many factors, including the severity
of the fire, the material, the geometry and support conditions of the element, restraint
from the surrounding structure and the applied loads. The fire resistance of a building
element is not necessarily the failure time in a real fire.
Fire resistance may be required to:
• prevent the spread of fire into the ‘safe path’ of egress routes until all occupants
have escaped, as described in Chapter 11;
• provide protection to fire fighters by preventing spread into egress routes and pre-
venting structural collapse within the firecell, in accordance with Chapter 13;
• prevent spread of fire to other firecells or to other rooms of the same firecell, as
described in Chapter 7;
• prevent collapse of any structural elements;
• prevent spread of fire to neighbouring buildings by insulation failure or collapse of
external walls; and
• provide for repair and reuse of the building after a fire.
The fire resistance rating (FRR) or fire resistance level (FRL) is the fire resistance
assigned to a building element on the basis of a test or some other approval system
(England et al, 2000).
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Design based on limiting temperature
Design based on limiting temperature of steel members involves determination of the
limiting temperature for an individual member, e.g. Equation 6.14, then calculation of
the maximum temperature reached in that member in the fire. The design is satisfactory
if the maximum temperature is equal to or less than the limiting temperature.
This option requires use of an appropriate design fire temperature time curve and heat
transfer analysis. It is not covered further in this Design Guide, however general details
are given by Buchanan (2001) and more specific details for structural steel members by
HERA (2006c).
Design based on equivalent time
Design for fire resistance in this document is based on equivalent fire severity, calcu-
lated as an equivalent time of exposure to the standard fire for comparison with the
results of standard fire tests or calculations based on such tests.
The design should be such that:
t tr ed≥ [6.11]
where  tr is the fire resistance of the element (min) described below
ted is the design fire severity (min) given by:
t k ted s e= [6.12]
where te is the equivalent fire severity calculated as shown in Section 6.4
ks is 0.5 for sprinklered buildings, 1.0 for all others.
The value of ks is the subject of continuing debate and further study. A value of ks < 1.0
implies one or both of the following: (1) recognition that the likely fuel load at the time
of the fire is less than the design fuel load; (2) acceptance of structural damage (but no
collapse) in the event of a fully developed fire that leads to burnout of the firecell. A
value of ks = 0.5 is incorporated into the New Zealand Compliance Document C/AS1
(DBH, 2005). A larger value of ks should be considered where local member failure
could cause disproportionate structural collapse, for example isolated columns in a
multi-storey building that could suffer sudden and complete failure.
Determination of fire resistance
The fire resistance tr may be determined:
(a) by experiment, according to AS 1530 Part 4 (Standards Australia, 2005) or equivalent;
(b) by calculation for some construction elements (except for integrity);
(c) by interpolation or extrapolation and analogy from experimental or analytical results;
(d) by reference to listings of proprietary tested systems;
(e) by reference to listings of generic fire resistance;
(f) by reference to specific design procedures.
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In all of these cases, the fire resistance is measured as the time of exposure to the
standard fire.
Standard fire resistance test
When fire resistance is determined experimentally, a standard fire resistance test of a
full-size component is required. The test specification most often used in Australia and
New Zealand is AS 1530 Part 4, which is similar to ISO 834 (ISO, 1999), BS 476 Parts
20 to 22 (BSI, 1987), and ASTM E119 (ASTM, 1999) (with different pressures and
support conditions).
In tests according to AS 1530 Part 4 or ISO 834, the specimen is exposed to a fire with
temperature T (˚C) increasing according to:
T t T= +( ) +345 8 110 0log [6.13]
where t is the time (min)
T0  is the ambient temperature (˚C)
The three failure criteria for fire resistance testing are stability, integrity and insulation.
To meet the stability criterion, a structural element must perform its load-bearing func-
tion and carry the applied loads for the duration of the test, without structural collapse.
Many testing standards have a limitation on deflection or rate of deflection for load-
bearing tests, so that a test maybe stopped before actual failure of the test specimen
which would damage the furnace.
The integrity and insulation criteria are intended to test the ability of a barrier to contain
a fire in order to prevent fire spreading. To meet the integrity criterion, the test speci-
men must not develop any cracks or fissures that allow smoke or hot gases to pass
through the assembly. To meet the insulation criterion, the temperature on the cold side
of the test specimen must not exceed a specified limit, which is an average increase of
140˚C and a maximum increase of 180˚C at a single point. These temperatures repre-
sent a conservative indication of the conditions under which fire might spread through
the barrier.
All fire rated construction elements must meet one or more of the three criteria as
 Stability  Integrity  Insulation  
Partition   X  X  
Load bearing wall  X  X  X  
Floor/ceiling  X  X  X  
Beam  X    
Column  X    
Fire resistant glazing   X  (see text) 
Table 6.4: Failure criteria for elements of building construction
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shown in Table 6.4, depending on their function. The required fire resistance rating is
often specified separately for stability / integrity / insulation (in that order). For exam-
ple, a typical load bearing wall may have a specified fire resistance rating of 60/60/60,
which means that a one hour rating is required for stability, integrity and insulation. If
the same wall was non-load bearing, the specified fire resistance rating would be -/60/
60. A fire door with a glazed panel may have a specified rating of -/30/- , which means
that this assembly requires an integrity rating of 30 minutes, with no requirement for
stability or insulation. Generally, fire resistant glazing meets only the integrity criterion
because it is not load bearing and it has very little resistance to radiant heat transfer.
However, insulated glazing is available at an additional cost. The numerical value of
the required FRR is often determined from Equation 6.13.
Fire test facilities
The only full size fire resistance testing facility in New Zealand is the 4 m x 3 m
furnace at BRANZ shown in Figure 6.3.  This furnace can be rotated into a horizontal
position for testing of beams 4 m long or floors 4 m x 3 m. Fire resistance furnaces in
Australia are available at Warrington Fire Research and CSIRO.
Figure 6.3: Large fire resistance furnace at the Building Research Association of
New Zealand
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Fire resistance by calculation
Structural fire design by calculation is developing rapidly, and some design guides and
text books are available (e.g. Purkiss (1996), Buchanan (2001), Franssen and Zaharia
(2006) and Clifton (2006)). Design for fire resistance by calculation must be supple-
mented by tests to show that the system will actually work as intended, and the applied
fire protection will remain in place.
Figure 6.4 shows a flow chart for the overall process of determining fire resistance by
calculation. There are three essential component models; the fire model, the heat trans-
fer model and the structural model.
The fire model can be any selected time temperature curve including the standard fire,
or a measured or estimated real fire. Fire temperatures are influenced by the room
geometry, ventilation and fire load. The time equivalent formula in Section 6.4 may be
used as a simple fire model which gives an equivalent time of exposure to the standard
fire.
The heat transfer model is used to calculate the temperature gradients in the member
exposed to fire. Calculation of heat transfer requires knowledge of the geometry of the
element, thermal properties of the materials and heat transfer coefficients at the bounda-






















Figure 6.4: Flow chart for calculating fire resistance
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tion. Heat transfer through solid materials is by conduction. Heat transfer through voids
is a combination of convection and radiation. Practical difficulties are that some ther-
mal properties are very temperature dependant, and heat transfer coefficients are not
well established. Accurate results can only be obtained with a finite element (or finite
difference) computer program. Some approximate heat transfer models for common
situations are given later in this chapter.
The structural model is the process of structural analysis in fire conditions. This proc-
ess is similar to analysis in non-fire conditions, with certain differences described in
Section 6.5.
Simple models for calculating the performance of structural elements exposed to fire
are described later in this Chapter. Most of these have been taken from the appropriate
material design codes for steel, concrete and timber structures. Hand calculation meth-
ods can be used for simple elements, but sophisticated computer models are necessary
for the analysis of frames or larger structures. Widely-used programs include general
purpose programs and specific fire engineering programs. Further details on these com-
puter-based structural analysis models are given in Chapter 12.
Fire emergency design loads
Loads and local combinations for fire design calculations are those specified in AS/
NZS 1170 (Standards New Zealand, 2002) for the specified type of occupancy.
The load combination which is most often critical for non-fire design is:
1 2 1 5. .ω ωG L+
whereωG is the dead load and ωL is the live load.
For fire emergency conditions, the load combinations are:
ω ωG L+ 0 6.  or ω ωG L+ 0 4.
the 0.6 factor being for storage occupancies and the 0.4 being for all other occupancies.
Material-related strength reduction factors (ϕ factors) are specified in the material codes,
generally taking a value of ϕ < 1.0 for cold design and ϕ = 1.0 for fire conditions.
Proprietary listings
Proprietary approvals are approvals of proprietary systems most of which have been
tested by manufacturers or trade organisations. These include light frame wall and floor
systems and passive protection for structural steelwork. These approvals can be used
directly in many cases, but do not always take actual load levels or complex structural
behaviour into account. Individual manufacturers should be contacted for detailed
information.
Since the withdrawal of MP9 (Standards New Zealand, 1991), there is  no current
listing of approved fire rated structural systems for New Zealand. Instead designers
must use relevant overseas documents, e.g. ASFP (2007), UL (1996) or manufacturers
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data which is based on standard fire resistance testing such as Winstone Wallboards
(2006).
Generic listings
Generic approvals are those that are not related to specific proprietary products or cal-
culation methods. For example, generic listings include concrete encasement of steel
members or minimum thicknesses and cover requirements for reinforced concrete mem-
bers. Generic ratings for reinforced concrete members are included in NZS 3101.  In
Australia, Specification A2.3 of the Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 2007) contains
generic listings of fire resistance levels.
6.7 Structural Steel
Traditionally, design of steel buildings for post-flashover fires has been based on the
performance of single members as determined in the standard fire test, leading to pas-
sive fire protection of all members. However, the real fire behaviour of whole structural
systems is very different to that of individual members in a standard fire test, so the fire
resistance of an appropriately designed and detailed steel building can be much greater
than that of the individual members. A concerted international research effort over the
past two decades has led to this behaviour being researched and understood to the
extent where design methods now available include simple design methods for indi-
vidual members and more advanced methods for whole buildings. Both are applicable
in different circumstances, as described below.
The behaviour of multi-storey steel framed building in fully developed fires is very
complex. This behaviour is described in HERA (2006a). Designers using procedures
other than the Compliance Document C/AS1 (DBH, 2005) should consider the global
behaviour of the building as well as the expected extent of damage, by using advanced
computer-based calculation methods, or by consulting specific steel design guides such
as HERA (2006a). Guidance on steel design to Eurocode 3 is given by Franssen and
Zaharia (2006).
Design using unprotected steel members
For some applications it is possible to use unprotected steel and still meet the structural
fire performance requirements outlined by New Zealand Building Code (DBH, 1992).
However, it is important that designers intending to use unprotected steel in buildings
where inelastic response is likely in fully developed fires  understand the behaviour of
unprotected steel in post-flashover fires, in order to determine whether unprotected steel
members are suitable and what design procedure should be used to establish their suit-
ability. Brief mention of three such design procedures is given below, with references.
Unprotected exposed steel elements are likely to reach a temperature close to that of the
surrounding hot gases (HERA, 2006a). Typically, where the principal heat transfer into




T = Tg - 150  for I-section flanges in contact with a concrete slab,
T = 0.95 Tg  for I-section webs and flanges not in contact with a concrete slab
where  Tg (˚C) is the gas temperature of the fire.
Unprotected beams on the edge of a firecell will be some 20% cooler than this.
Beams which are shielded from direct fire exposure will be much cooler. This is illus-
trated dramatically in the BHP Test 4 at 140 Williams St (Thomas, 1992) where unpro-
tected floor beams in the ceiling space above the firecell were shielded from the fire by
a non fire rated suspended ceiling system which remained largely intact throughout the
test. Gas temperatures below the ceiling reached 1200˚C. Beams above the ceiling
reached only 535˚C, while unprotected stub sections below the ceiling reached around
1000˚C.
Steel beams that are unprotected and are directly exposed to fully developed fire will
undergo initial rapid vertical downwards deflection, driven by large thermal gradients
and then, once the temperature rises above the NZS 3404 limiting temperature, by loss
of strength. The rate of temperature increase is greater for thin steel sections than for
thick steel sections, as described below.
Unprotected steel columns supporting walls in single storey buildings will typically
remain near vertical during fire, provided they have a base-plate connection with a
nominal moment capacity. When a nominal level of base rotation support is provided,
e.g. suitable to resist 0.5 kPa face loading applied to the wall supported by the column,
there is little difference between the fire stability of portal frame columns with no ap-
plied fire protection compared with those with partial height applied fire protection,
and no difference in performance between partial height protected columns and those
protected to the underside of the knee (O’Meagher et al, 1990).
Figure 6.5: Unprotected steel beam and composite steel concrete floor slab showing
large deformations but no collapse after severe fire in Cardington test building
(column was protected during test; protection removed before photo taken).
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Columns in multi-storey buildings will typically experience increased compression load-
ing due to restraint against thermal expansion imposed by the surrounding structure.
If steel temperatures exceed the limiting temperature calculated in accordance with
NZS 3404, then local or lateral buckling of these elements is likely. Below this tem-
perature, any change in length is recovered on cooling. Local buckling in beams, unless
severe, will not limit their load carrying capacity nor cause damage to elements remote
from the beam. Local or lateral buckling in a column, however, will lead to permanent
shortening on cooling which may cause damage on all levels above which are sup-
ported by that column.
Because columns will be subjected to increased compression loading from the restraint
of the surrounding structure, the limiting temperatures of multi-storey columns are a
function of the extent of severe fire exposure and the column geometry, as well as the
level of fire emergency design loading. Details are given in the Limiting Steel Tempera-
ture section below.
Alternative design solutions incorporating unprotected steel
Three alternative design methods have been developed for multi-storey buildings, al-
lowing for the greater use of unprotected steel than is possible from application of C/
AS1, while providing equal or better fire safety than required by the New Zealand Building
Code (DBH, 1992). Each method addresses aspects of owner’s property protection not
required by the NZBC. Specific design guidance is given below, with references.
1 For multi-storey car parking buildings, the nature of the fire exposure and its effect
on the steel structure has been extensively determined, both experimentally and
analytically. A design solution is given by HERA (2006a) which involves providing
specified fire resistance ratings for each element, to levels which have been deter-
mined by testing and modelling. The required FRRs range from 15 to 30 mins, and
the fire resistance provided is calculated using NZS 3404 Clause 11.3. If the re-
quired FRR is no more than 15 minutes, unprotected steel members should always
be considered.
2 For normal design of multi-storey apartments and hotels, all supporting steel beams
and columns must be hidden behind fixed wall and ceiling linings to satisfy acous-
tic insulation requirements. In the event of a fire, these linings will shield the steel
members from direct fire exposure and, as noted above, if they remain in place they
may keep the steel temperatures well below the limiting temperature. Following
research by Brown (2007), which established appropriate failure criteria for fixed
gypsum plasterboard linings, a design procedure and computer program have been
developed by HERA (2006c) for design of steel members hidden behind these
linings in both unsprinklered and sprinklered apartment and hotel buildings. For
unsprinklered buildings, the structural system and materials should meet the
requirements of Clifton (2006) to ensure that they have dependable deformation
capacity in the event of local barrier failure. The design involves selecting a radia-
tion barrier sufficient to keep the individual steel member below the limiting
temperature given by Equation 6.14.
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3 The most generally applicable and widely used of the three alternative methods is
the Slab Panel Method (SPM) (Clifton, 2006). It is applicable for FHC 1 to 4, for
FRRs from 30 to 240 minutes and for most types of concrete floor system which act
compositely with supporting steel beams. The procedure is applicable for large re-
gions of flooring incorporating unprotected steel beams, where these members may
be subjected to very high temperatures and the floor system subjected to consider-
able inelastic deformation in the event of a fully developed fire. The design proce-
dure determines the extent of this inelastic deformation and allows for a dependable
proportion of the additional reserve of strength available from the rest of the build-
ing when the floor system undergoes this deformation. It is recommended that the
SPM is used in conjunction with sprinklers or radiation barriers to prevent struc-
tural damage immediately following the onset of full fire development.
The SPM is based on the tension membrane concept developed by Bailey (2000) fol-
lowing the Cardington steel frame fire tests (Kirby, 1998). The SPM design and detail-
ing provisions have been developed from a multi-year research programme (Clifton,
2006).
The SPM procedure requires estimation of the design fire severity, typically the equiva-
lent fire severity te as given by Equation 6.9 with km = 1.0 and the adequacy of the floor
system to support the design vertical load for this time. The SPM procedure also speci-
fies minimum detailing and material requirements to ensure that the expected deforma-
tions can be achieved without premature failure.
Limiting steel temperature
General
The limiting steel temperature is the temperature at which the steel element in a struc-
ture (or steel component of a composite element) is expected to yield. Up to the limit-
ing steel temperature, the individual member will continue to support the applied load.
There will be deflection due to thermal gradients, but little load sharing due to fire
induced effects.  Beyond the limiting steel temperature, load sharing and a degree of
inelastic action takes place, with these effects increasing as the temperature rises. Load
sharing due to continuity, redundancy and ductility is very important, as it allows some
individual elements in the structure to be heated beyond their limiting temperature with-
out affecting overall structural stability.
Determination of limiting steel temperature
For steel members with 4-sided fire exposure, the limiting temperature applies to the
entire cross section. For members with partial exposure, the limiting temperature ap-
plies to the area furthest away from the source of the protection, for example, the bot-
tom flange of a down-stand beam supporting a concrete floor slab.
The limiting steel temperature Tl (˚C) can be calculated from:
Tl = 905 - 690rf [6.14]
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where rf  is the load ratio, defined in Section 6.5.
This formula has been derived directly from the equation of the dotted line in Figure
6.6. It is also given in NZS 3404 Clause 11.5. It is slightly unconservative around
720˚C to 800˚C and becomes increasingly conservative for temperatures above 850˚C.
A more accurate and complex equation is given in Eurocode 3 (EC3, 2005),  which
generates higher limiting temperatures, however these are associated with increased
inelastic behaviour.
The support conditions of a beam can have a significant effect on calculation of the
load ratio.  Some details are given by HERA (2006a) and Clifton (2006). In general the
greater the moment restraint from the supports, the higher the limiting temperature Tl.
For beams supporting concrete slabs on profiled trapezoidal steel decks, where the
deck runs across the beam, there will be voids between the top flange of the beam. The
effect of these is to reduce the limiting temperature and the extent of this reduction is
given by section 2.3 of ASFP (2007).
Upper limits on Tl are specified by NZS 3404 (2007) and HERA (2006a) for steel
sections that are within the scope of NZS 3404 Clause 11.4; principally those with an
element thickness ≥ 3 mm. These upper limits are:
1. For columns where the effects of fire are localised, such as in car parking buildings
and hotels, where only localised columns at a time will be subject to severe heating,
Tl ≤ 600˚C
2. For columns that are part of a seismic-resisting system Tl ≤ 550˚C
3. For other columns:
– if column is compact/category 2 to NZS 3404 and has λn ≤ 120 based on Lactual,
Tl ≤ 550˚C; otherwise
– Tl ≤ 400˚C
4. For transfer beams and trusses, Tl ≤ 400˚C
5. For other members, Tl ≤ 850˚C
For items 1 to 4, which have lower limits than the 850˚C specified in Clause 11.6 of
NZS 3404, these lower limits are to incorporate the increase in loading due to system
restraint effects previously discussed (HERA, 2006a).
Determination of time to reach limiting steel temperature in standard fire
exposure
For all steel members, protected or unprotected, the rate of temperature increase de-
pends on the section factor, or Hp/A ratio (m
-1) where:
Hp is the heated perimeter of the steel section (m) and A is the cross section area of
the steel section (m2).
Steel members with a low Hp/A ratio have a less rapid temperature rise than members
with a high Hp/A ratio, as shown in Figure 6.7. Some publications use a surface area to
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mass ratio, ksm (m
2/tonne). Both ratios are recognised in NZS 3404, which defines the
Section Factor (SF) as equal to ksm or (Hp/A)/7.85, but AS 4100 (Standards Australia,
1998) refers only to the surface area to mass ratio. Hp/A values for standard UB and UC
sections are given in Appendix D, with a wider range given in ASFP (2007).
NZS 3404 and AS 4100 give methods for determination of the time to reach the limit-
ing steel temperature in standard fire exposure. This is called the Period of Structural
Adequacy (PSA) from NZS 3404 Clause 11.3 and is also the fire resistance rating tr in
Section 6.6. These methods are based on the performance of an individual element
exposed to the standard fire test and so are suitable to be compared with a FRR in
design. The numerical value of the fire resistance rating may be the design fire severity
given by Equation 6.13, for example, in which case the design requirement is for each
element of construction to satisfy Equation 6.12.
For unprotected steel members, approximate formulae to calculate the time to reach the
limiting temperature are given in Clause 11.6 of NZS 3404 or Clause 10.6 of AS 4100.
The range of validity of these formulae is 400˚C to 850˚C. In NZS 3404, equation
11.6.1 is principally used for beams and equation 11.6.2 principally used for columns.
The equations can also be used, conservatively, for beams or columns with partial en-
casement into a floor or wall system by calculating the section factor Hp/A  appropriate
to the exposure condition, where the heated perimeter, Hp (m), is that exposed to the
fire and the area, A (m2), is the full cross section area of the steel section. When the
encasement is with concrete, the concrete must be reinforced adequately to remain in
place under the expected deformations.








































Figure 6.6: Variation of mechanical properties of steel with
 temperature (NZS 3404, 1997)
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Equation 11.6.1 from NZS 3404, with t defined as tr, is:
t T T SFr l l= − + ( ) + ( )5 2 0 0221 0 43. . .
where:
Tl = limiting steel temperature from Equation 6.14.
SF ksm=  or H Ap( )[ ]7 85.
Large Hp/A
(Large surface area to
mass ratio)
= fast temperature rise
Low Hp/A
(Low surface area to
mass ratio)
= slow temperature rise
Figure 6.7: Effect of Hp/A on temperature rise
For protected steel members, NZS 3404 and AS 4100 specify methods of calculating
the time to reach the limiting temperature based on an experimental testing protocol.
Examples of product specific design tables for a wide range of products based on such
testing protocols are given by ASFP (2007). In the absence of such test results, equa-
tions are given by Eurocode 3 (2005). For example, the following approximate equa-
tion from Buchanan (2001) may be used for predicting the time t (minutes) to reach the
limiting temperature for a steel member protected with light, dry insulation, however



















λ is the thermal conductivity of the insulation (W/mK)
d is the thickness of the insulation (m)
This equation is valid in the range of t between 30 and 240 mins, Tl between 400˚C and
800˚C, Hp/A between 10 and 300 m
-1, and λ/d between 3 and 10 W/m2K. The thermal
conductivity for a range of insulation materials is given in Table 6.5. When used on
steel columns where the limiting temperature is governed by the upper limits given
previously, Equation 6.15 is conservative compared with experimentally derived pub-
lished tables.
For insulation with a significant equilibrium moisture content, such as gypsum plaster,
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or with sufficient thickness to have a high thermal inertia, the more complex equations
from Eurocode 3 (EC3, 2005) can be used. These require the density, specific heat and
equilibrium moisture content of the insulation material as well as the thermal conduc-
tivity, all as given in Table 6.5.
The section factor (ksm or Hp/A) is dependent on the exposure configuration of the steel
section to the fire. It is easiest to visualise this for the Hp/A of an I section member,
where the heated perimeter, Hp, for an unprotected steel section is effectively the same
as that for a section with spray applied material. The heated perimeter, Hp, is much less
for a board protection system, which is applied around the outside of the section only,
giving a lower and more beneficial Hp/A. Formulae for Hp for a wide range of exposure
configurations are given in Figure 6 of (ASFP, 2007) and Hp/A values for a range of I
sections are given in Appendix D herein and illustrated in the worked examples.
A computer program (HERA, 2006c) is available which calculates the temperatures
reached in unprotected and protected steel beams and columns, using the above proce-
dures. For concrete filled steel tubular columns, see Kodur and MacKinnon (2000) in
conjunction with Clifton (2000).
Design of light gauge cold rolled sections for fire resistance should be undertaken to a
specialist publication such as SCI (1993) because of their high element slenderness
ratio and complex cross section shape which makes them susceptible to failure at lower
temperatures than for hot rolled sections. As an alternative for unprotected sections,
equations 11.6.1 and 11.6.2 from NZS 3404 can be used, however the limiting tempera-
ture must not be taken as higher than 500˚C for beams and 400˚C for columns. Typical
light gauge steel will reach the limiting temperature in less than 10 minutes if calcu-
lated by this method.
Passive fire protection
There are many methods of protecting structural steel to limit the temperature rise in
post-flashover fires. These include:
• sprayed on cement-based material;

















Sprayed mineral fibre 300 0.12 1200 1 
Perlite or vermiculite plaster 670 0.18 1200 3 
Fibre silicate sheets 600 0.15 1200 3 
Gypsum plaster 800 0.20 1700 20 
Mineral wool slabs 150 0.20 1200 2 
Data principally from ECCS (1995). Note that 20% mc for gypsum includes water of crystallisation. 
Table 6.5: Properties of typical insulating materials under fire conditions
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• concrete encasement (full or partial);
• intumescent paint (termed “reactive fire protection” in ASFP, 2007);
• water filling of hollow steel sections; and
• sprinkler spray directly on to steel members.
General guidance on the range of passive fire protection systems available, their appli-
cation and specification is given in by HERA (2006a) and by ASFP (2007).
Any fire protection material must be able to remain in place during the maximum de-
formation that could occur during a post-flashover fire. This is termed stickability and
is one reason why the standard fire test regime is formulated to generate large deforma-
tions in tested steel members. A testing protocol for determining stickability is speci-
fied in section 11.7 of NZS 3404. It is important to use only products for which stickability
has been established, and to ensure that they are used in accordance with the fixing
specification which must form part of the contract documents. The construction re-
viewer must check that the specification has been followed. Guidance for a wide range
of products is given by ASFP (2007).
Design tables for passive fire protection
Design tables for passive fire protection products give the required thickness of applied
protection to achieve a certain FRR. These charts should include a specification for
installation which becomes part of the contract documents. The most comprehensive
source of design tables for a wide range of products is ASFP (2007). Some manufactur-
ers, e.g. Winstone Wallboards (2006) also publish charts for their products.
As described in NZS 3404 Clause 11.7, design tables for passive protection products
are either developed for a range of limiting temperatures (called critical temperatures in
ASFP (2007)) or for a specific limiting temperature of typically 550˚C for 4-sided
exposure or 620˚C for three sided exposure. The lower the limiting temperature, the
more insulation is required, so design data developed for a lower limiting temperature
than that determined for a particular member can be used without modification on that
member. This means that design tables will always be available for those members with
limiting temperatures equal to or greater than 550˚C. However, if the limiting tempera-
ture is less than 550˚C, then there may not be published data for a product and so one of
the following options would be required (HERA, 2006a):
• If the product application data is available for the lower limiting temperature, use
this in conjunction with the specified FRR.
• If the product application data is only available down to a limiting temperature of
550˚C, increase the thickness of material required by the ratio of (550/Tl), or in-
crease the FRR by the same amount, whichever is appropriate, e.g. the former for
spray applied materials and the latter for boards or blankets.
• Use a heat transfer analysis to determine the required thickness of protection to
ensure that the limiting temperature is not reached. See the program FaST in HERA
(2006c) for an example of heat transfer analysis.
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Intumescent paint systems should be inspected for thickness and required quality of
application by a suitably qualified third party inspector, such as a CBIP Certified Coat-
ings Inspector or NACE Certified Coating Inspector. Contact HERA for a New Zea-
land list of inspectors.
Worked examples of simple application
The following examples cover the design of an individual steel beam using the proce-
dure in NZS 3404. This is the most commonly used method for determining the ad-
equacy of individual members for designs to C/AS1 (DBH, 2005) and for two of the
alternative methods described earlier.
Problem:
A 530UB82 Grade 300 beam with a span of L = 8.2 metres spans between supporting
columns. It is a simply supported primary composite beam supporting incoming sec-
ondary beams on each side as part of a composite floor system. The secondary beams
span 8.9 metres. The primary beam is connected to the columns with WP (simple)
connections as described in HERA (2006b). Because the beam is a primary beam, it has
no voids above the top flange, irrespective of the steel deck profile used for the com-
posite slab and hence no reduction in limiting temperature for voids is required.
Design the member to provide a FRR of 30 minutes and a FRR of 60 minutes, using
unprotected steel or passive fire protection.
(1) Fire emergency design load, simply supported moment
Loads acting on the beam:
Slab dead load = 2.46 kPa
Superimposed dead load = 0.5 kPa
Self-weight of secondary beams = 0.21 kPa
Dead load ωG = 2.46 + 0.50 + 0.21 = 3.17 kPa
Live load ωL = 3.5 kPa
Fire design load ωf =  ωG + 0.4ωL = 3.17 + 0.4 x 3.5 = 4.57 kPa
Include self-weight of the primary beam = 0.8 kN/m
Total load ωu = 4.57 x 8.9 + 0.8 = 41.5 kN/m







  = 349 kNm
(2) Determination of rf
This is as defined in section 6.5 or in Clause 11.5 of NZS 3404. For a simply supported
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Mpos is the  nominal positive moment capacity of the composite beam and M*ss is the






  .   .   
.




φMsx is the design section moment capacity and is obtained from published design
capacity tables for the bare steel beam. For a 530UB82 Grade 300 beam it is 558 kNm.
1.5 is a factor that can be conservatively used to determine the strength increase from
composite action for positive moment, in lieu of undertaking a full composite moment
capacity calculation (Clifton, 1994).
φfire = (φ /0.85) ≤ 1.0 = 1.0 (NZS 3404 Amendment No 1)
(3) Determination of Tl (Equation 6.1)
Tl = 905 – 690rf  = 646˚C
(4) Design to develop the FRR required (30 mins and 60 mins)
The methods for developing the required fire resistance rating are:
a. Design for bare steel beam to check if the inherent steel beam fire properties can
provide the required FRR:
For a 530UB82 (533 x 210 mm, 82kg/m run):
Hp /Aactual = 158 m
-1 (with 3 sides exposed, profile configuration) (from Appendix
D or ASFP, 2007)
SF = (Hp /Aactual) /7.85 = 158/7.85 = 20.13
t = -5.2 + 0.0221(Tl) + (0.43Tl /SF)
(from NZS 3404 equation 11.6.1)
t = -5.2 + 0.0221 x 646 + (0.43 x 646/20.13)  = 22.9 minutes
22.9 min < 30 min  Not satisfactory.
The 530UB82 bare steel beam does not meet the required fire rating, therefore for a
bare steel member to work, increase the member size to a 550CWB130 and recheck.
For a 550CWB130 beam:  Hp /Aactual  = 96 m
-1      ∴ t = 32 min  > 30 min  OK
          < 60 min NG
The 550CWB130 provides the 30 min FRR but not the 60 min FRR, and it would be
uneconomical to try and achieve a 60 min FRR with a bare steel beam, three sided
exposure. Thus to achieve a 60 min FRR, passive protection is required and this may
also be more economical for the 30 min FRR. See HERA (2006a) for costing advice
and HERA (1996) for supplier availability in New Zealand.
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b. Consider a board system, such as the calcium silicate/Vermiculite board, Vermiculux.
Determination of thickness, number of layers required, first using design tables and
then by calculation. Note that the calculation option should only be used when de-
sign tables are not available:
Hp/Aactual  = 120 m
-1 (with 3 sides exposed, box configuration) (from Appendix D
or ASFP, 2007).
From the Vermiculux product data application pages (ASFP, 2007) pages 113 and
114, use the table for a critical temperature of 620˚C, being the table for the closest
critical temperature below the 646˚C limiting temperature calculated for this beam.
From that table;
one  layer  of 20 mm  OK  for 30 min FRR up to Hp/A = 260 m
-1
one  layer  of 20 mm  OK  for 60 min FRR up to Hp/A = 260 m
-1
Hp/Aactual < Hp/Alimit from the table, this thickness is satisfactory, so use one layer
20 mm Vermiculux board on this beam for both 30 min and 60 min FRR, fixed in
accordance with the specification, page 114 of ASFP (2007).
By calculation:
Try one layer of 20 mm Vermiculux board. Calculate the time to reach limiting
temperature under standard fire for this material using the approximate Equation
6.15:














= 108 min > 60 min OK
 λ = 0.15 from Table 6.5 for fibre silicate sheets.
Use one layer of 20 mm Vermiculux board on this beam for 30 min and 60 min FRR.
c. Consider the mineral fibre spray system, Monokote MK6,  first using the design
tables and then by calculation. Determination of spray thickness required by using
the product specification tables from ASFP (2007) pages 131 and 132.
For a 530UB82 with the top flange shielded by the floor slab, and profile configura-
tion as appropriate for a spray applied product: Hp/A = 158 m
-1 (from Appendix D
or ASFP, 2007).
From the product specification table for the critical temperature of 620˚C and for
this value of Hp/A:
10 mm dry thickness for 30 min FRR is required.
10 mm dry thickness for 60 min FRR is required.
Use 10 mm dry thickness Monokote MK6 for both 30 min and 60 min FRR. See
details in Figure 14 of ASFP (2007) for treatment of corners with spray applied
coatings.
By calculation:
Try 10 mm dry thickness mineral fibre spray. Calculate the time to reach limiting
temperature under standard fire for this material using the approximate Equation
6.15:
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= 62 min > 60 min OK
λ = 0.12 from Table 6.5 for sprayed mineral fibre, however note that λ/d = 10 is the
validity limit for this equation.
Use 10 mm dry thickness sprayed mineral fibre for 30 min and 60 min FRR.
d. Using an intumescent coating, such as Steelguard FM560. As stated on page 220 of
(ASFP, 2007) the coating thicknesses given in the tables have been developed for a
critical temperature of 620˚C for 3-sided I beams. As the limiting temperature of the
beam under design is greater than this, the tables can be used without modification.
For a 530UB82, with top flange shielded by the floor slab, profile configuration:
Hp/A = 155 m
-1 (from Appendix D or ASFP, 2007).
From the tables in ASFP (2007), page 220 for 30 minutes and page 221 for 60
minutes:
0.25 mm (dry film thickness) for 30 min FRR
0.53 mm (dry film thickness) for 60 min FRR.
6.8 Reinforced Concrete and Masonry
Introduction
Reinforced concrete and masonry structures generally have good resistance to fire.
Concrete is non-combustible and often remains in place during a fire, providing protec-
tion to the reinforcing steel or pre-stressing strand buried within the concrete. The level
of fire resistance largely depends on the depth of cover protection to the steel and the
type of concrete. Buchanan (2001) and fib Bulletin 38 (fib, 2007) give detailed descrip-
tions of the design methods and behaviour of concrete structures in fire.
The New Zealand Concrete Design Code NZS 3101 (Standards New Zealand, 2006)
and the Australian Concrete Design Code AS 3600 (Standards Australia, 2001) give
generic approvals for reinforced and pre-stressed concrete structures exposed to fire.
NZS 3101 and AS 3600 give approval to the calculation method proposed by Wade
(1991). Generic fire resistance ratings for concrete and concrete masonry structures are
also given by MP9 and the Building Code of Australia. In the United States, the ap-
proved method for calculating fire resistance ratings of concrete is described in ACI/
TMS 216 (ACI, 1997).
Simple design methods
Specific design for fire is not necessary if the generic requirements for cover and mini-
mum dimension meet those specified in NZS 3101. Where specific design is needed,
the NZS 3101 and AS 3600 suggest to use the design methods in the Eurocode 2. These
codes permit fire design to be done either by test, by extrapolation from tests results, or
by calculation from first principles using any recognised method, such as those out-
lined by Wade (1991).
The simple calculation method recommended in NZS 3101 is that by Wade (1991),
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Figure 6.8: Typical performance of reinforced concrete building in a
post-flashover fire, resulting in surface damage but no collapse
based largely on overseas practice. The method as it applies to simply supported beams
or slabs is summarised below.
Temperatures and material properties
The temperature at various depths within a slab or wall exposed to the standard fire are
shown in Figure 6.9. Any reinforcing steel within the concrete may be assumed to be at
the same temperature as the surrounding concrete. For several bars with different cover,
the weighted average of the distances from the centre of each bar to the nearest surface
should be used.
Temperatures within reinforced concrete beams exposed to the standard fire are shown
in Figure 6.10. The properties of typical reinforcing steels at elevated temperatures and
the properties of typical concrete at elevated temperatures are shown in Figure 6.11(a)
and (b) respectively, from Eurocode 2 (EC2, 2005).
Structural calculation
The information above can be used to calculate the flexural capacity of a beam or slab
after any time of standard fire exposure, to compare with the actual moment resulting
from the applied loads at the time of a fire.
For simply supported slabs or T-beams where the compression zone is unaffected by
heat, only the reduction in steel strength need be considered. For situations such as
continuous beams where the concrete compression block is heated, the effect of el-
evated temperatures can be considered by ignoring any concrete with a temperature
greater than 500˚C assuming that the remaining concrete is at room temperature. This
method is known as the ‘500˚C Isotherm Method’.
Flexural continuity and axial restraint can greatly increase the fire resistance of rein-
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Figure 6.9: Temperatures within a fire-exposed slab
forced concrete members under certain conditions. Wade (1991) and Buchanan (2001)
give procedures for assessing these factors.
Worked example
Reinforced concrete beam (Refer to Figure 6.12). For a simply supported reinforced
concrete beam with known span, load, geometry and reinforcing, check the positive
flexural capacity after 90 minutes exposure to the standard fire.
Given information
Beam span  L = 15.0 m Dead load  ωG 1 =  6.0 kN/m (excluding self weight)
Beam width  b = 300 mm Beam depth  h = 600 mm
Live load  ωL = 3.0 kN/m Bottom cover  cv = 25 mm
Concrete density ρ = 24 kN/m3 Bar diameter  Db = 32 mm
Concrete compressive strength ′fc  = 30 MPa
Number of bars n = 8 (2 rows of 4 bars) Steel yield stress  fy = 300 MPa
Calculations
Area of one bar A rs1 = =π
2 804 mm2
Total steel area A n rs = =π
2 6432 mm2
Effective depth d h c Dv b= − − = − =1 5 600 25 48 527. mm
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Figure 6.10: Temperatures within a concrete beam exposed to the standard fire
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Figure 6.11 (b): Properties of concrete at elevated temperatures (EC2, 2005)
Self weight ω ρG bh2 24 0 3 0 6 4 3= = × × =. . . kN m
Total dead load ω ω ωG G G= + = =1 2 6 0 4 3 10 3. . .+ kN m
Cold Calculations
Strength reduction factor ϕ = 0 85.
Stress block depth         a A f f bs y c= ′ = × × ×( ) =0 85 6434 300 0 85 30 300 252. . mm
Internal lever arm jd d a= − = − =2 527 252 2 401 mm
Design load ω ω ωc G L= + = × + × =1 2 1 5 1 2 10 3 1 5 3 0 16 9. . . . . . . kN m
Bending moment M Lcold c
* .= = × =ω 2 28 16 9 15 8 474 kNm
Bending strength M A f jdn s y= = × × =6434 300 401 10 774
6 kNm
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Figure 6.12: Concrete beam for the worked example
M Mcold n
* < ϕ   so design is OK.
Fire Calculations
Design load (fire) ω ω ωf G L= + = + × =0 4 10 3 0 4 3 0 11 5. . . . . kN m
Bending moment M Lfire f
* .= = × =ω 2 28 11 5 15 8 323 kNm
Fire duration t = 90 min
Depth of 500˚C isotherm c f = 33 mm      (From Figure 6.9 assuming one
            dimensional heat transfer at side of beam)
Reduced width b b cf f= − = − × =2 300 2 33 234 mm
Steel temperatures from the isotherms in Figure 6.10:
Bar group (1): 450˚C
Bar group (2): < 200˚C
Bar group (3): 580˚C
Reduced yield strength of reinforcing bars at elevated temperatures (from Figure 6.11(a)
for hot-rolled tension reinforcement):
fy T, .1 = × =0 9 300 270 MPa
fy T, 2 = 300 MPa
fy T, .3 = × =0 5 300 150 MPa
Yield strength of all bars A f A f A f A fs y T s y T s y T s y T, , , ,= + +( )4 2 21 1 2 2 3 3
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= × × + × + ×( )
=
804 4 270 2 300 2 150 1000
1591 kN
Assume that the concrete with temperature above 500˚C has no compressive strength
and concrete below 500˚C has full compressive strength.
Stress block depth
         a A f f bf s y T c T f= = × × ×( ) =, ,. .0 85 1591 1000 0 85 30 234 267 mm
Internal lever arm jd af f= = − =2 527 267 2 394 mm
Bending strength M A f jdnf s y T f= = × × =, 1591 1000 394 10 627
6 kNm
M Mfire nf
* <  so design is OK
Advanced calculation methods
Sometimes the support conditions, structural restraint, or the cross sectional geometry
of the structural element is complex, or the material properties of some specific types
of concrete (ultra-high strength concrete, fibre reinforced concrete) are not readily avail-
able from the codes, so that advanced calculation methods are needed. Advanced calcu-
lation methods are too complicated to carry out by hand and require specific computer
programs, described in Chapter 12. Advanced calculation methods for concrete struc-
tures must include the different strain components induced at elevated temperatures,
namely shrinkage, creep, thermal strain, cracking and transient thermal strain (thermal
strain under loads). Each of these components differs with the composition of concrete;
therefore, the designer must understand the type of concrete used for the structural
element and their material properties before carrying out advanced calculation meth-
ods as suggested by fib (2007).
6.9 Structural Timber
Introduction
Because wood burns, many people mistakenly assume that timber structures have poor
behaviour in fires. However, timber structures can be designed to perform very well in
fires, either by using heavy timber members that have significant residual fire resist-
ance after charring or by protecting light timber members with fire resisting material,
such as gypsum plaster board. Manufacturer’s literature lists many proprietary approv-
als for light timber framed wall and floor systems.
Recommended design methods
The recommended design methods for structural timber exposed to fire are described in
the Timber Design Codes NZS 3603 (Standards New Zealand, 1993) and AS 1720
(Standards Australia, 2006). These timber codes permit fire design to be done either by
test, by extrapolation from standard tests using well established criteria, by a simple
prescribed calculation method, or by providing sufficient protective material to prevent
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Figure 6.13: Charring of glulam frames being removed by sandblasting for re-use
after a severe fire in a factory
onset of charring during the required fire resistance rating time.
Heavy timber
For heavy timber construction, the calculation methods in NZS 3603 and AS 1702 are
recommended. Glue laminated timber (glulam, Figure 6.13) and laminated veneer lum-
ber (LVL) behave in the same way as solid timber.
These design methods are based on a constant rate of charring of timber beams, col-
umns and floor units exposed to the standard fire. In the New Zealand code, the nomi-
nal charring rate is 0.65 mm per minute, as measured in standard tests of radiata pine
beams at BRANZ (Buchanan, 1994). For timber members at least 90 mm thick, it is
assumed that the wood below the char is not affected by elevated temperatures. Struc-
tural calculations are based on the loads at the time of the fire being resisted by the
residual cross section, assuming short duration loads and a strength reduction factor  ϕ
= 1.0. For small members, allowance should be made for charring at the corners of the
cross section, as shown in Figure 6.14. Lateral stability of beam and columns must be
taken into account using the dimensions of the reduced cross section.
Charring rates are different for timber with more or less density than that of radiata
pine, with denser wood charring at a slower rate. AS 1702.4 gives an equation for
calculating the charring rate β (mm/min):
β ρ= + ( )0 4 280 2. [6.16]
where ρ is the timber density at a moisture content of 12% (kg/m3).
Design methods have been developed for heavy timber construction exposed to real
fires. The design equations, which appear in Eurocode 5 (EC5, 2004), are summarised
by Buchanan (2001).
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The radius of arris rounding, r,
equals the calculated depth of
charring.
The area of the section lost due
to rounding will be A = 0.215r 2
and the centre of gravity of this
area will lie at a distance from
either side of y = 0.223r
CL
Figure 6.14: Charring of heavy timber beam exposed to fire (NZS 3603)
Equation 6.16 gives the same charring rate as the New Zealand Code for a density of
550 kg/m3. The Australian design method specifies a 7.5 mm thickness of zero strength
heated wood below the char layer, which is not included in the New Zealand Code.
Connections
The weakest link in many fire exposed timber systems is the connection system
(Buchanan, 2001). Metal fasteners should be embedded within the timber or should be
protected by an applied layer of wood or fire resisting material such as gypsum plaster
board, as described by Buchanan and King (1991).
Worked example
For a simply supported glulam beam with known span, size and load, check the flexural
capacity after 60 minutes of exposure to the standard fire. Use the charring rate from
NZS 3603. Assume the beam has full lateral restraint. The grade of the beam is GL8.
The beam is shown in Figure 6.15.
Beam span  L = 10.0 m Dead load ωG1 = 4.0 kN/m (excl. self weight)
Beam width  b = 180 mm Live load ωL = 6.0 kN/m
Lamination thickness t1 = 45 mm Number of laminations n = 17
Beam depth d = nt1 = 765 mm
Beam area A bd= = 138 000, mm2
Density of wood ρ = 5 0. kN m2


















Figure 6.15: Glulam beam in worked example
Total dead load ω ω ωG G G= + =1 2 4 69. kN m
Section modulus Z bd= = ×2 66 17 6 10. mm3
Cold Calculations
Characteristic stress fb = 19 0. MPa
Duration of load factor k1 = 0 8.  (medium duration loading)
Strength reduction factor ϕ = 0 8.
Design load (cold) ω ω ωc G L= + =1 2 1 5 14 6. . . kN m
Bending moment M Lcold c
* = =ω 2 8 183 kNm
Bending strength M k f Zn b= =1 268 kNm
ϕ Mn = 214 kNm           M Mcold n
* < ϕ  so design is OK
Fire Calculations (three-sided charring, ignore corner rounding)
Fire duration t = 60 min
Char thickness c t= =0 65 39. mm
Reduced dimensions b b c= − =2 102 mm          d d c= − = 726 mm
Section modulus Z bdfire = = ×
2 66 8 96 10. mm3
Revised factors for fire ϕ = 1 0.           k1 = 1 0.  (short duration loading)
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Design load (fire) ω ω ωf G L= + =0 4 7 09. . kN m
Bending moment M Lfire f
* .= =ω 2 8 88 6 kNm
Bending strength M k f Znf b fire= =1 170 kNm           ϕ Mnf = 170 kNm
M Mfire nf
* < ϕ   so design is OK
The calculation ignores the layer of zero strength wood specified in AS 1720.4.
Fire Calculations (with corner rounding)
Section modulus         Z b c d c c d cfire = −( ) −( ) − −( )[ ] = ×1 6 2 1 29 8 72 102 2 6. . mm3
Bending strength M k f Znf b fire= =1 166 kNm       ϕ Mnf = 166 kNm
M Mfire nf
* < ϕ   so design is OK
6.10 Lightweight Drywall Systems
Drywall construction consists of sheets of lining material fixed to lightweight timber or
steel framing. The lining most often consists of sheets of gypsum plasterboard which
are available in various qualities and thicknesses. Lightweight floor-ceiling systems
usually have sheets of gypsum plasterboard as the ceiling material, supported by timber
or steel joists. Gypsum plasterboard linings provide excellent passive fire resistance, as
well as thermal and acoustic separation.
Gypsum plaster is mostly calcium sulphate dihydrate CaSO4.2H2O. When gypsum plas-
ter is heated in a fire the water of crystallisation is driven off between 100˚C and 120˚C,
accompanied by a loss of strength, producing calcium sulphate hemihydrate
CaSO4.2H2O (Plaster of Paris). The chemical reaction is:
CaSO4 .2H2O  CaSO4.2H2O + 12H2O
The moisture in gypsum plaster is very important because it contributes to the excellent
fire resisting behaviour. Significant energy is required to evaporate the free water and
make the chemical change that releases the water in the crystal structure. The reverse
reaction occurs when the plasterboard is manufactured by adding water to Plaster of
Paris, which is obtained by grinding gypsum rock into powder and heating to drive off
the water of crystallisation.
Most gypsum boards consist of a sandwich with a gypsum plaster core between two
layers of paper, chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. Common thicknesses
are from 10 mm to 19 mm. The external paper provides tensile reinforcing to the board.
Special fire rated boards contain glass fibres and other additives to reduce shrinkage
and maintain integrity after the paper burns off in a fire and after dehydration occurs.
Some boards, known as fibrous plaster, have no paper facing, relying only on glass
fibre reinforcing within the plaster to provide strength.
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The main New Zealand manufacturer of paper-faced gypsum plasterboard is Winstone
Wallboards Ltd, who provide an extensive range of fire rated systems lined with Stand-
ard GIB® plasterboard and GIB Fyreline®, achieving fire resistance ratings ranging
from 15 minutes to 4 hours. Published details include the protection of penetrations and
closures (Winstone Wallboards, 2006). Main Australian manufacturers are CSR, Lafarge
and Boral, who also provide detailed design guides.
The main categories of lightweight gypsum plasterboard construction are:
(a) timber framed walls (non-load-bearing and load-bearing);
(b) steel framed walls (non-load-bearing and load-bearing); and
(c) floor/ceiling systems.
Timber framed walls
For both non-load-bearing and load-bearing walls, the fire resistance ratings published
by manufacturers are suitable for construction in accordance with the design tables
published in the Code of Practice for Light Timber Frame Buildings, NZS 3604 (Stand-
ards New Zealand, 1999). Walls in taller buildings or with greater stud heights will
require specific engineering design. For more information on fire performance of light
timber frame construction, see Buchanan (2001).
A typical example of a tested specification for a fire resisting timber framed wall is
given in Figure 6.16. For Australia, the Building Code only permits timber-framed
construction for low rise buildings (Type C buildings).
Steel framed walls
Wall heights for non-load-bearing steel stud systems are currently limited to the height
of the tested specimens (hence limited to the height of the test furnace). Manufacturers
can offer guidance for heights greater than the tested height, based on research carried
out by BRANZ. For load-bearing steel stud walls, the fire resistance may be derived by
full-scale test, by conservatively limiting the temperature of the steel studs to 300°C, or
by calculation (Gerlich et al, 1996). Manufacturers offer both conservative systems and
a more accurate, method which can be used with knowledge of the applied stud load in
fire emergency conditions and the load capacity of the stud at room temperature
(Winstone Wallboards, 2006). SCI (1993) gives additional information on the behav-
iour and design of light steel frame wall and floor systems for fire.
Floor/ceiling systems
Tests of floor/ceiling systems are limited by the size of the test furnace. The only suit-
able furnace in New Zealand is the BRANZ furnace which has a maximum span of 4
metres. In Australia, suitable furnaces are operated by Warrington Fire Research and
CSIRO. During testing, the imposed loads on the test specimen are intended to induce
maximum design stresses which should not be exceeded in applications where the span
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In order for GIB® systems to perform as tested, all components must be installed exactly as prescribed. Substituting components 




FIRE RATED WALL SYSTEMS – SECTION 2.1










GBT 60a NLB -/60/60 1 x 13mm 
GIB Fyreline®
each side
 STC 36 27kg/m2
GBTL 60 LB 60/60/60
FRAMING
Framing to comply with,
•  NZBC B1 – Structure: AS1 Clause 3 – Timber (NZS 3604) or 
VM1 Clause 6 – Timber (NZS 3603)
• NZBC B2 – Durability: AS1 Clause 3.2 – Timber (NZS 3602).
• Studs at 600mm centres maximum.
• Nogs at 800mm centres maximum for Vertical fixing.
• Nogs at 1200mm centres for Horizontal fixing.
WALL HEIGHTS AND FRAMING 
DIMENSIONS
GBT60a Non Loadbearing – Framing dimensions and height 
as determined by NZS 3604 stud tables for non loadbearing 
partitions.
GBTL60 Loadbearing – Framing dimensions and height 
as determined by NZS 3604 stud and top plate tables for 
loadbearing walls.
LINING
1 layer of 13mm GIB Fyreline® each side of the frame.
Vertical or Horizontal fixing permitted.
Sheets shall be touch fitted.
When fixing vertically, full height sheets shall be used 
where possible.
All sheet joints must be formed over solid timber framing.
FASTENING THE LINING
Fasteners
41mm x 6g GIB® Grabber® High Thread Drywall Screws or 
40mm x 2.8mm GIB® Nails.
Fastener Centres
300mm centres around the sheet perimeter. 
Place fasteners 12mm from sheet edges.
Single screws or nails at 300mm centres to intermediate studs.
JOINTING
All fastener heads stopped and all sheet joints tape 
reinforced and stopped in accordance with the publication 










FOR FURTHER INFORMATION VISIT WWW.GIB.CO.NZ AND SEARCH SPECIFICATION CODES: GBT60a OR GBTL60. ISSUE DATE: JANUARY 2006 
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or load is different from that tested. Guidance for extrapolation is given by Collier
(1991).
Predicting fire resistance of drywall construction exposed to
compartment fires
Fire resistance of building elements has traditionally been determined using standard
furnace testing as described earlier in this Chapter. Test methods are similar around the
world and generally based on ISO 834 time-temperature conditions. Fires in real build-
ings are commonly hotter than the standard test fire, hence failure of building elements
exposed to real building fires may be significantly earlier than implied by standard
furnace testing. This is particularly the case for well-insulated compartments where
modern synthetic materials are available as a fuel source.
Nyman (2002) quantified the variation in performance between a building element ex-
posed to a design fire and the same element exposed to a standard furnace test, based on
cumulative radiant energy received. The time to failure of a drywall assembly exposed
to a design fire can be predicted by comparing the cumulative radiant energy exposure
in the compartment with the energy received in the furnace test. The method gives good
agreement for systems that fail by insulation (Gerlich et al, 2004; Nyman et al, 2008).
The cumulative radiant energy is the area under a plot of radiant energy versus time,
expressed as:
 E Q dt T dt
t t






 E is the cumulative radiant energy on the assembly over a period of time (J/m2)
˙ ′′Q is the radiant heat flux incident upon the assembly at any point in time (W/m2)
ε is the emissivity (conservatively taken as 1)
σ is the Stefan Boltzman constant (5 67 10 8. × − W m K2 4 )
 t is the time from the start of the test (s)
T is the compartment gas temperature (K)
The method assumes that compartment and standard furnace fires have similar heat
transfer coefficients and that convective components of heat transfer in the compart-
ment and furnace are of equal proportion to the total energy transfer. Figure 6.17 shows
how the method works. The curves show the cumulative radiant heat energy to which a
wall is exposed. If tISOfail
 is the time to failure of an assembly in the standard fire
resistance test, the dotted line can be used to predict tfail, which is the predicted time to
failure of the same assembly in the compartment fire.
Alternatively, the dotted line can be used in the other direction, so that if the desired
minimum failure time is tfail the required fire resistance rating to achieve this failure
time is given by tISOfail.
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Figure: 6.17: Cumulative radiant energy approach for equivalent fire severity
Design guidelines
The design procedure involves the following steps:
• Determine relevant input data such as geometry, compartment fuel load, thermal
inertia values and ventilation condition (opening factor).
• Compute the predicted time-temperature history for the compartment (e.g. the
Eurocode parametric fire equation, from  Eurocode 1 (2002) or Buchanan (2001)).
• Obtain the time-temperature curve to which the assembly was tested (typically this
is the standard ISO 834 curve from Equation 6.13).
• For each curve, calculate the cumulative radiant heat energy with time.
• Determine the predicted failure time for equal amounts of cumulative radiant en-
ergy from each curve.
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The objective of design for fire spread is to ensure that no spread of fire or smoke
prevents the compartment (or ‘firecell’) performance requirements from being achieved.
This includes spread of fire or smoke within the firecell of origin, to other firecells, at
the same level, to other levels in the fire building and to other buildings.
It is desirable to resist fire and smoke spread within a firecell, firstly to slow the devel-
opment of a fire allowing occupants more time to escape and secondly to potentially
reduce the amount of damage. Fire and smoke separations within buildings are used to
separate floors, protect stairs and other escape routes so occupants can quickly reach a
space where they are protected from the effects of fire and smoke as they escape from
the building. Fire and smoke separations also slow the spread of fire, allowing fire
fighting to be more effective, reducing damage. They may also prevent the spread of
fire within the building. Fire spread between buildings is prevented to protect other
property avoiding large scale urban fires and conflagrations.
Fire compartmentation is a practical and reliable form of fire control. Prior to the intro-
duction of automatic sprinklers, compartmentation was the only way of limiting fire
spread within a building without active fire fighting. The concepts outlined in this sec-
tion are all applicable in Australia and New Zealand.
7.2 Fire spread within a firecell
Objective
The form of construction and type of materials inside a firecell must be such that the
spread of fire and smoke within the firecell can be controlled to meet the performance
requirements.
Surface spread of flame
Flames can spread very rapidly across certain combustible surfaces, greatly increasing
the danger to occupants. Interior finishes are required to resist the spread of fire, as
stated in the New Zealand Building Code.
C.3.3.1 Interior surface finishes on walls, floors, ceilings and suspended building
elements, shall resist the spread of fire and limit the generation of toxic gases, smoke
and heat, to a degree appropriate to:
(a) the travel distance;
(b) the number of occupants;
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(c) the fire hazard; and
(d) the active fire safety systems installed in the building.
Surface spread of flame can be controlled by using materials that have desirable prop-
erties, as measured in the Early Fire Hazard Test (AS 1530 Part 3 Standards Australia,
1999). It is recommended that the requirements of the Acceptable Solution C/AS1 be
complied with in regard to acceptable Early Fire Hazard Indices. Australia now uses an
alternative approach to control spread of fire by interior walls and ceilings under the
Building Code of Australia based on time to flashover in the ISO 9705 (International
Organization for Standardization, 1993) room corner test. Compliance can be achieved
by testing either to AS/NZS 3837 (Standards New Zealand, 1998) or ISO 9705. This
new approach has merit and is being considered by the Department of Building and
Housing (DBH) for application in New Zealand. Further information can be found in
Collier et al (2006).
Most acrylic paints (water based) on standard linings such as paper faced gypsum plas-
terboard meet these requirements. Clear finishes such as polyurethane on timber or
timber based products can be problematic. The surface spread of flame requirements
are not applicable to items with small surface areas such as timber mouldings and doors.
Large expanses of areas with a high Spread of Flame Index must be avoided. Very high
rates of flame spread occur when walls and ceilings face each other in corners and
flames radiate to the other surfaces and vice versa so in this case limiting flame spread
rates is essential.
Multiple paint layers have a much higher Spread of Flame Index than the paint system
on a bare substrate and it is unlikely that the Spread of Flame Index would be consid-
ered when redecorating. However if requirements were not in place then very poor
materials such as softboard (low density fibreboard) with a solvent based clear finish
(e.g. polyurethane) could be used.
Some materials, particularly foamed plastics, burn extremely rapidly and produce large
quantities of toxic smoke. These should not be used and if their use cannot be avoided,
foamed plastics must be encapsulated within a fire resistant barrier.
Although building materials are restricted in terms of spread of flame, any moveable
items such as furniture rarely have any such restrictions.
Concealed spaces
Prevention of spread of fire and smoke through concealed spaces is a major part of fire
engineering design. Many buildings contain concealed spaces through which fire can
spread to other parts of a firecell, or to other firecells, creating danger to occupants and
presenting serious difficulties to fire fighters (Figure 7.1).
The New Zealand Building Code requires that:
C.3.3.4 Concealed spaces and cavities within buildings shall be sealed and subdi-
vided where necessary to inhibit the unseen spread of fire and smoke.
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In this context, concealed spaces include
ceiling voids, spaces within hollow
construction, under floors, under exte-
rior cladding, or any others where un-
seen spread of fire and smoke can oc-
cur. Any concealed spaces within walls
or floors should be sealed off at common junctions, as described in C/AS1.
Large concealed spaces above suspended ceilings can create a serious hazard. Fire and
smoke can travel large distances undetected, as shown in Figure 7.2. Partitions in of-
fices that end at the suspended ceiling, that would otherwise be expected to signifi-
cantly slow spread of fire and smoke are ineffective. These partitions should be contin-
ued right up through the ceiling to the roof or floor above. Subdivisions should provide
at least a half hour fire resistance rating. This is not feasible if the partitions are move-
able, if there are many small spaces or if the ceiling is being used as an air plenum, in
which case all exposed surfaces in the space should not support spread of flame, and
large spaces should be sprinkler protected in accordance with NZS 4541 (Standards
New Zealand, 2007) or NZS 4515 (Standards New Zealand, 2003).
Figure 7.2: Spread of fire and smoke in concealed spaces
Concealed spaces are used for running building services such as plumbing, ventilation,
electrical, telephone and data cabling. Whenever these are moved or altered there is
potential for fire rating to be removed or damaged. Careful design and planning can
minimise the possibility of this occurring but making tradesman and technicians work-
ing on the building aware of these issues and monitoring through the life of the building
is essential.
Partitions
Internal walls or partitions within a firecell are generally not required to have any re-
sistance to the spread of fire or smoke unless they have a special function, such as
protecting a safe egress path. However, designers may wish to provide certain internal
partitions with fire resistance to meet the design objectives. Many internal partitions
Figure 7.1: Linings removed by
fire fighters showing fire spread
in concealed spaces
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have significant fire resistance even though they have not been specifically designed
for that purpose. Fire spread within a partitioned firecell only occurs quickly through
open doors and in highly compartmented buildings (residential or fully partitioned of-
fices), a fire duration of more than 20 minutes suggest that the fire has spread beyond
the room of origin.
7.3 Fire separations
Objective
Fire separations are provided between floors and to escape routes, particularly stairs in
order to allow occupants more time to escape. Without fire rated floors fire would
spread quickly throughout the height of a building and occupants of the upper floors
may not have time to escape from their floor with the stairs congested with occupants
from the lower floors. In unsprinklered buildings, fire separations may be provided to
resist the spread of fire for the duration of a complete burnout of a firecell to provide for
protection of the owners property.
Separations
Firecells or fire compartments are areas within a building that are contained within fire
separations to prevent spread of fire to other firecells or fire compartments. Figures 7.4
to 7.6 illustrate how a fire separation successfully achieves this goal.
The New Zealand Building Code requires that fire separations be provided as follows:
C3.3.2 Buildings shall be provided with safeguards against fire spread so that:
(a) Occupants have time to escape to a safe place without being overcome by
the effects of fire,
(b) Firefighters may undertake rescue operations and protect property,
(c) Adjacent household units and other property are protected from damage,
and
(d) Significant quantities of hazardous substances are not released to the
environment during fire.
The Building Code of Australia has similar requirements.
To prevent spread of fire from one firecell to another on the same level, walls which are
separations between firecells must have sufficient fire resistance. Floor-ceiling systems
act as fire separations between firecells on adjacent storeys to prevent spread of fire
from floor to floor, as shown in Figure 7.3.
The level of fire resistance for separations depends on the performance requirements.
C/AS1 requires that fire separations within a building have a specified minimum fire
rating to allow occupants time to escape and to allow for fire fighting and rescue opera-
tions. This rating depends on the height of the building, fuel load and whether the
building has sprinklers. It is not the same as the fire resistance required to resist a
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complete burnout of the firecell and is usually less. Ideally in unsprinklered buildings,
fire separations should be capable of containing a complete burnout of the firecell, in
which case the fire resistance should exceed the expected severity of the fire, described
in Chapter 6. In most instances, it is possible to meet the performance requirements of
a building code in terms of life safety with lesser fire resistance, but provision for a
complete burnout is strongly recommended. A reduction factor of 0.5 is recommended
if sprinklers are present. Although it can be argued that if the sprinklers work a nominal
fire separation would prevent fire spread, having more fire resistance will aid in fire
fighting, reducing the potential for property damage. Any supporting members such as
beams, columns and walls must have at least the same fire resistance as the fire separa-
tions. If the supporting structure has a lesser fire resistance then it will fail before the
fire separation causing the fire separation to also fail.
It must be emphasised that although the fire resistance rating (FRR) is expressed in
minutes, it is not the time that a fire separation will survive in a real fire. The fire
resistance rating is the time a
test specimen survives in a
standard furnace test and for
most ventilation controlled
compartment fires is longer
than the time a specimen will
survive in a real fire. The re-
lationship between the fire se-
verity and the fire resistance
rating for the complete burn-
out of a firecell is described in
Chapter 6. If a fire separation
is designed to protect occu-
pants for the time it is esti-
mated to take for them to es-
Fire
Fire separations
Figure 7.3: Floor ceiling system acting as fire separations
Figure 7.4: Severe fire in a warehouse for
stored plastic materials
106
Fire Engineering Design Guide
cape, and this is less than the time for a complete burn-out of the firecell, the fire
resistance rating must not be used as the time available to escape. This is because in
most ventilation controlled compartment fires the FRR is greater than the actual time
the fire separation will survive.
There are four methods of calculating the actual time a barrier will survive listed below
in increasing order of complexity and increasing order of accuracy. With all these methods
the fire severity of the compartment or compartments adjoining the fire separation in
question, and that of the firecell as a whole should be checked. These methods are
better suited for insulation and stability, but the integrity in a real fire may be reduced
due to thermal shock at flashover.
Method 1 FRR/3
The first method is to simply divide the FRR by a factor of 3. This is conservative in all
known cases and it is unlikely that the actual time to failure is less than this (Thomas
and Lloydd, 2004).
Figure 7.5: Collapsed steel rafters and damaged concrete masonry wall after the fire.
The wall remained standing, preventing fire spread to adjacent properties
Figure 7.6: Damaged timber frame wall between the warehouse and offices. This wall
remained standing, preventing fire spread to other parts of the building
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Method 2 Hand Calculation Method
This method relates the duration of burning for a ventilation controlled fire with a given
fire severity to the time equivalence. This method assumes that the severity of the fire is
constant throughout the duration of burning. As the early part of the fire is dominated to
a larger extent by the growth phase, when the fire severity is less than the average fire
severity for the duration of the fire this assumption is almost always conservative
(Nyman, 2002). The time to failure of a barrier with a FRR less than the time equivalent
fire severity is a simple ratio of the actual FRR over the time equivalent multiplied by
the calculated duration of the actual fire. The method is outlined as follows:
1. Determine the total fuel load. Multiply the floor area by the fuel load energy density
using Equation 6.2.
2. Determine the window area and height (or total window area and a weighted aver-
age of the window heights if there is more than one opening). As fire resistance is a
post-flashover phenomenon, assume that all windows are broken.
3. Calculate the burning rate based on the ventilation using Equation 6.4.
4. Calculate the burn time by dividing 90% of the total fuel load by the burning rate
(assumes 10% of fuel present is not burnt within the compartment)
t Q Qb v= ×0 9. ˙
5. Calculate the time equivalent, te. The Eurocode 1996 formula is recommended with
values for the conversion factor as used in C/AS1, and given in Equation 6.9.
Ascertain the FRR of the assembly being considered. If the FRR is significantly
greater than the time equivalent for the compartment, then the assembly will not fail
and is therefore adequate.
Multiply the FRR by the ratio of the burn time over the time equivalent to give a
more realistic indication of the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET)
ASET FRR= × ( )t tb e
Example
An apartment entrance lobby is separated from a corridor with a door that has an FRR
of 15 minutes. The room is 4.0 m long, 2.4 m high and 2.4 m wide. There is a window
at one end 2.0 m high and 1.0 m long. A hotel room has a fire hazard category of 1,
hence C/AS1 assumes a design fire load energy density of 400 MJ/m2.
Running though the steps above:
1. Total fuel load, Q A ef f=  = 4.0 x 2.4 x 400 = 3840 MJ
2. Av = 2.0 x 1.0 = 2.0 m
2, h = 2.0 m
3. Burning rate, ˙ . . . . .Q A hv v= = × × =1 5 1 5 2 0 2 0 4 2 MW
4. Burn time, t Q Qb v= ×0 9. ˙  = 0.9 x 3840 / 4.2 = 914 s (or 15.2 minutes)
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5. time equivalent, te
ef  = 400 MJ/m
2
k b = 0.065 (normal concrete ceiling and floor, plasterboard walls)
αv v fA A=  = 2.0 / (4.0 x 2.4) = 0.21
αh h fA A=  = 0 / (8.0 x 3.6) = 0
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t e k we f b f=  = 400 x 0.065 x 0.97 = 25.2 minutes or 1514 seconds
6. FRR is 15 minutes
7. ASET = FRR x t tb e( )  = 15 x 914 / 1514 = 9 minutes.
Method 3 Radiant Exposure Area Method
This is a more complex and more accurate, although generally less conservative method
than the previous one and requires the development of a compartment time-tempera-
ture curve (Nyman, 2002). Unlike the previous method it takes into account the varia-
tion of severity of exposure through a fire as the temperature changes in the growth
phase, fully developed phase and decay phase.
The severity is defined as the area under the curve of the fourth power of the absolute
temperature over time using Equation 6.17. This severity is then compared with that for
a standard ISO 834 furnace test to give an equivalent fire resistance rating. The value of
the integral can be calculated piecewise from a time temperature curve using a
spreadsheet, but is included as an option in the compartment fire computer model
BRANZFIRE (Wade, 2004)(see Section 12.8).
Method 4 Numerical modelling
The most complex method is to develop compartment time temperature curve and model
the heat transfer through boundaries. Compartment fire models tend to have simple
input for heat transfer properties of the walls but the thermal properties of building
materials are dependant on temperature and moisture. This process will therefore be
iterative with the heat transfer characteristics of the compartment boundaries being
simplified for input into the compartment fire model, then modelled accurately, then
simplified and fed back into the compartment fire model. This process is described in
detail in Thomas (1997). Although this method is potentially the most accurate it is
highly complex and may not predict integrity failures (Nyman, 2002).
Penetrations and closures
If fire separations are fire rated to exceed the level of fire severity described in Chapter
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5, then fire should not spread beyond the firecell where the fire started. However with-
out manual suppression fires do spread beyond the firecell and fires of more than 1 hour
duration almost certainly indicate that a fire has spread (Harmathy, 1979). Fire is as-
sumed to spread by structural failure and heat transmission through walls, but actually
occurs via windows and open doors (Figure 7.7).
As well as fire spread via doors and open windows fire can spread between firecells
through concealed spaces as described in Section 7.2. Fire separations are compro-
mised by closures (doors, windows and hatches) and penetrations for services. If there
are non fire rated penetrations or closures, or closures that do not close, then a fire
separation is useless. An open fire door does not resist spread of fire and smoke, neither
does a wall or floor with a hole in it.
Openings or penetrations through fire separations are covered by the New Zealand
Building Code as follows:
C3.3.3 Fire separations shall:
(a) Where openings occur, be provided with fire resisting closures to maintain
the integrity of the fire separations for an adequate time, and
(b) Where penetrations occur, maintain the fire resistance rating of the fire
separation.
Some penetration treatments, even though there are no visible gaps can dramatically
decrease the fire resistance rating. For example back to back electrical flush boxes for















Figure 7.7: Mechanisms of fire spread (a) assumed mechanisms,
(b) actual mechanisms (Harmathy, 1979)
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There are some generic methods for fire rating penetrations however most fire rating is
carried out using proprietary systems such as intumescent collars and mastic (Figure
7.8). In New Zealand there is a good summary of products for gypsum plasterboard
walls produced by Winstone Wallboards (2003). Other suppliers with technical litera-
ture include Forman Insulation (2007) and Firepro (2007).
Penetrations are also made in fire and smoke separations for ventilation and air condi-
tioning systems. These systems are fitted with fire dampers, activated by heat in the
duct. These will prevent spread of fire when activated, but unless maintained may be
unreliable. They do not prevent the spread of warm smoke that is not hot enough to
activate the heat sensing element so alternative strategies for smoke control in air-
handling systems must be used. These are described in Chapter 9.
Fire performance of penetrations, and fire tests of protected penetrations, are described
by England et al (2000).
Doors
Doors are often the weakest point in fire separations. In compartment tests light hollow
core doors can burn through in about 2 minutes, so doors designed for fire and/or smoke
resistance are required in fire separations. Control over door openings is partly a matter
of design and partly a matter of good housekeeping during the life of the building.
Doors can be specified as smoke stop doors or fire doors. In either case, the manufac-
ture and installation should be in accordance with  AS/NZS 1905.1 (Standards New
Zealand, 1997). Doors are of no use to control fire or smoke if they are open at the time
of the fire. Doors are often wedged open or door closers disabled by building occupants
to allow easy movement, and prevention of this is very difficult, especially if the occu-
pants are not aware of the importance of the doors in the event of a fire.
Figure 7.8: Pipes and ducts passing through fire barriers yet to be fire rated.
Many proprietary systems are available for these applications.
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Modern systems allow doors to be held open by electromagnetic catches that automati-
cally release when a smoke detector is activated or the power fails and are strongly
recommended where doors are likely to be wedged open. The fire alarm system must
have automatic detection and incorporate smoked detection at least in the area on either
side of the doors to ensure they close before large volumes of smoke can pass through
prior to a heat detector or sprinkler activating.
Fire doors in Australia are tested to AS/NZS 1905.1 and listed by certifiers for quality
in manufacture. Fire testing of fire doors is described by England et al (2000).
7.4 Fire Spread to Other Storeys
Fire and smoke can spread from storey to storey by a variety of paths, including:
• Failure of floor/ceiling fire separation
• Concealed spaces




Floors, or floor-ceiling separations, prevent fire spreading to adjacent storeys. Many
services pass through floors, hence these penetrations must be fire rated to at least the
same level as the floor. Waste water pipe-work tends to be the most problematic as
pipe-work routes are constrained by the location of plumbing fixtures, many immedi-
ately above the floor, and the requirement for the gravity driven waste water system to
have minimum falls or slopes.
Service ducts and shafts
All multi-storey buildings have vertical ducts or shafts for transporting services or peo-
ple. These must be designed so that the fire resistance of the fire separations is not
compromised (England et al, 2000).
For vertical service ducts, there are two possible approaches: either provide fire resist-
ing walls around the duct so that fire cannot get into or out of the duct, as shown in
Figure 7.9 (a); or alternatively, seal all the openings within the duct at every floor level,
as shown in Figure 7.9 (b). Careful design of service runs will reduce the number of
penetrations requiring fire rating and shafts should be easily accessible to allow for
inspection and servicing and replacing of fire resistant penetration treatments after work
is carried out on the services.
Vertical shafts such as lift shafts must be protected by fire resisting walls over their full
height. The structural fire resistance of the walls (stability rating) should be no less than
that required for any elements being supported. The fire resistance for containment
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Figure 7.9: Fire separation of vertical service ducts
(insulation and integrity ratings) should be at least that required for the floor or wall
separations on the basis that fire must first enter the shaft, then exit the shaft for fire to
spread to an upper level. Lift shafts may be fire rated with fire rated lift door sets or the
entire shaft located within a fire rated enclosure including the lobbies and possibly a set
of stairs. The lobby doors then need to be fire and smoke rated.
Lift door sets are not normally smoke sealed as these are prone to damage and provide
ineffective seals. Smoke can spread via the lift shafts and this was traditionally dealt
with by requiring smoke lobbies around lifts. With open plan offices this is not desir-
able, however the affect of smoke spread via the lift shaft on egress depends on the
height of the building, the floor level at which the fire occurs, whether the building has
heat detectors, smoke detectors or sprinklers and the planning of all the floors. With
sprinklered buildings with a confined fire size and cooler smoke it tends not to be a
problem. Similarly, with smoke coming out onto an upper open plan floor with a large
smoke reservoir, occupants normally have time to escape.
If the lower floors in a building are open plan and higher floors have lift lobbies through
which occupants need to travel to get to the egress stairs, then these lift lobbies may
become smoke logged very quickly hindering or preventing escape. Smoke spread via
the lift shaft to firecells and escape routes used in a progressive evacuation must be
prevented. The extent of this problem can be analysed with calculation methods de-
scribed in Klote and Milke (2002). A lift shaft without smoke lobbies can also be pres-




Any concealed spaces on the facade of the building or elsewhere that could permit
spread of fire or smoke to upper storeys must be fire stopped to prevent spread of fire or
smoke, as shown in Figure 7.10 (a) and described previously in this Chapter.
Stairways
Stairways must be open shafts to allow occupants to use them to travel up and down the
building. Not only must fire spread via a stairwell be prevented, but more importantly,
fire and smoke must be prevented from entering the stairwells so they can be used
safely by occupants evacuating the building. In order for fire spread via stairways to be
prevented, there must be doors at every level with the same fire resistance as the en-
closing walls, and the doors must be closed when a fire occurs. The fire and smoke
resistance of stairwells is often improved by providing two sets of fire doors, or a set of
fire and a set of smoke doors in the entry to the stairwell. Stairs may be pressurised
(Chapter 9) to help prevent spread of smoke into them. These improvements are often
used in buildings with single stairs to compensate for the reduction in safety of having
only one stair.
Combustible cladding materials
Fire can spread vertically up a building via combustible cladding materials. It is recom-
mended that combustible cladding not be used on buildings greater than two storeys in
height without controls on the surface spread of flame classification.
Exterior windows
Spread of fire via exterior windows is a major hazard in multi-storey buildings, as
shown in Figure 7.10 (b).
Building codes have traditionally specified vertical spandrels or horizontal apron pro-
jections to limit vertical flame spread. Aprons are often not desirable architecturally or
because they reduce the allowable floor area of a building on a site. Vertical spandrels
may be so deep that they severely restrict window openings. Horizontal apron projec-
tions are much more effective, with a 600 mm apron reducing incident radiation from
flame projections by 50% from that just above an unprotected opening, the same reduc-
tion as that achieved with a 2.5 m deep spandrel (Oleszkiewicz, 1991). A 2.5 m spandrel
or 600 mm apron will not necessarily prevent spread of fire; it only reduces the incident
radiation by 50%. In New Zealand these are only required by  C/AS1 in unsprinklered
residential buildings or buildings where the floors have separate ‘unit’ titles. A combi-
nation of apron and spandrel is permitted, although no guidance is given to where the
apron should be relative to the height of the spandrel. It is recommended that the apron
be immediately above the window, similar to the original research conducted by
Oleszkiewicz (1991).
The apron or spandrel requirements do not take into account the size and shape of
windows. Tall narrow windows allow air to get in behind the flames forcing the flames
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Figure 7.10: Spread of fire from storey to storey
outward, whereas wide windows have flame projections that hug the sides of buildings
(Butcher and Parnell, 1983). Windows can be designed to avoid the flames hugging the
wall and the radiation back to the building via the window above. Approximate flame
size calculations are given below (Drysdale, 1998). Flame sizes from windows are
extremely variable, depending on room geometry, fuel orientation and especially wind
conditions, so these calculations should be used with caution.
For a window opening in a wall that continues above the opening, the flame height z (in
metres above the soffit) is given by:
z m w h= ( ) −12 8 2 3. ˙ [7.1]
where ṁ  is the peak burning rate in the room (kg/s)
w is the width of the window (m) and
h is the height of the window opening (m).
An approximate value of ṁ  (kg/s) can be obtained from
˙ . ˙ /m Q Hc= 1 5 ∆ [7.2]
where Q̇  is the average rate of heat release (MW) and
∆Hc  is the effective heat of combustion of the fuel (MJ/kg).
The factor of 1.5 is an estimate of the ratio between the peak burning rate and the
average burning rate.
The projection P of the flame tip from the wall (in metres) is given by:
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P h w= −0 314 1 53 0 53. . . [7.3]
Radiation back to the building can be calculated using the flame area calculated above,
with a flame temperature of 600˚C and an emissivity of 0.5. Fire is likely to spread if
the incident radiation on combustible materials is sufficiently high. Sprinklers can be
used to control the fire in the storey of origin or as external drenchers to restrict flame
projection from windows and prevent ignition at upper storeys.
Worked example
Given a fire cell with known geometry, fuel and size of one window, calculate the size
of flame from the window and radiation from the flame back to the face of the building.
Floor area Af = 25.0 m
2
Window openings Height  h = 2.0 m Width  w = 3.0 m
Area of openings Av = hw = 6 m
2
Fire load energy density e f  = 800 MJ/m2
Total fuel load Q A ef f=  = 20, 000 MJ   (Equation 6.2)
Heat of combustion of fuel ∆Hc  = 16 MJ/kg
Mass of fuel m Q Hc= ∆  = 1250 kg
Calculate wood equivalent burning rate
Average burning rate ˙ .m A hv= 5 5  = 46.7 kg/min = 0.778 kg/s
Peak burning rate ˙ . .m = ×1 5 0 778  = 1.17 kg /s   (Equation 7.2)
Duration of burning period t m mb = ˙  =1250/46.7 = 26.8 min
Average heat release rate Q̇ Q tb= 60 =12.4 MW   (Equation 6.7)
Flame size from window
Height above soffit z m w h= ( ) −12 8 2 3. ˙   = 4.83 m   (Equation 7.1)
Horizontal projection P h w= −0 314 1 53 0 53. . .  = 0.51 m   (Equation 7.3)
Radiation back to the building from the flame (see Section 7.5)
Stefan-Boltzmann constant σ = × −56 7 10 12. kW m .K2 4
Flame emissivity εf  = 0 5
Flame temperature Tf = 600˚C
Ambient temperature To = 20˚C
Configuration factor Φ = 1
Radiant heat ˙′′ = +( ) − +( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥




 = 16.3 kW/m2
116
Fire Engineering Design Guide
˙′′qR  is greater than the minimum radiation of ˙′′qRm  = 12.5 kW/m
2 to cause ignition of
combustible cladding or curtains, so fire spread is likely.
7.5 Fire Spread to Other Buildings
Spread of fire to other buildings can be prevented by providing walls with sufficient
fire resistance to remain in place for the duration of the fire, with window openings
small enough to control radiation to neighbouring property (Barnett, 1988). In build-
ings protected with sprinkler systems, flashover is not expected; hence spread to other
buildings is not such a problem.
Fire resistance
Fire spread to other buildings is prevented or minimised by fire rating external walls
close to boundaries or other buildings. These walls should be provided with sufficient
fire resistance to withstand a complete burnout of the firecell, using the methods de-
scribed in Chapter 6.
Unprotected openings, that is windows and other construction that are not fire rated are
limited close to boundaries. The size, number and spacing of unprotected openings is
dependant on the distance to the boundary, the fire load in the building, whether the
building is sprinklered and in some cases the type of glazing.
Modes of fire spread
Fire can spread from building to building by three modes:
1. Direct contact, flames can emerge from a building and contact combustible claddings
or through windows of a building next door igniting it.
2. Radiation, which can cause another building to ignite by:
a. spontaneous ignition. Radiant heat is severe enough to ignite combustible claddings
or ignite objects through windows;
b. piloted ignition. Lower levels of radiation may be sufficient for a small spark or
ember to ignite combustible claddings.
3. Branding or flying brands. The convective heat of a large fire may provide suffi-
cient buoyancy for larger burning objects to rise into the air. These then drift down-
wind and can ignite combustibles that they land on. Burning items from taller build-
ings can also fall onto lower buildings below.
Direct contact
Building codes prohibit openings or combustible claddings close to a boundary, usually
within 1.0 m. Direct contact is therefore unlikely, except when fire burns through a non
–fire rated roof and there are higher buildings with unprotected openings nearby (Fig-
ure 7.11)





Figure 7.11: Fire spread from lower
roof to adjacent building
(courtesy Robin Schmid)
windows in the higher building and may
affect other property whereas building
controls cannot reasonably be imposed
on an existing building due to construc-
tion of a building next door.
Apart from the problem with roofs there
is no need to design for direct contact as
it occurs at smaller separations than
spread by spontaneous or piloted igni-
tion due to radiation. If the level of ra-
diation is limited, then fire spread from
direct contact will almost certainly not
occur.
Radiation
For a fire in a building such as that shown
in Figure 7.12, the radiant heat intensity
˙′′qR  (kW/m
2) from a single opening of a
burning building to a point some distance away is given by:
˙′′ = +( ) − +( )[ ]q k T TR e r1 4 4273 273Φεσ [7.4]
where k1 is the radiation reduction factor
Φ is the configuration factor (value between 0 and 1.0)
ε is the emissivity of emitter and absorptivity of receiving surface (value between 0
and 1.0). It is conservative to take ε = 1.0.
σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant = 56.7 x 10-12 (kW/m2 K4)
Te is the temperature of emitting surface (maximum firecell temperature) (˚C)
Tr is the temperature of receiving surface (˚C)
The maximum firecell temperature should be obtained from an assessment of the ex-
pected time-temperature curve over the duration of the fire, using information such as
that shown in Figure 4.8, or curves such as those produced by Feasey (1999). The ISO
834 curve gives lower temperatures and should not be used. In a small compartment
that has reached flashover, temperatures of 1000˚C-1100˚C are likely (Thomas, 1997).
Values of between 800˚C and 1200˚C are expected in larger compartment fires (Butcher
and Parnell, 1983). If no other information is available or can be justified a temperature
of 1000˚C should be used, which most compartment fires are expected to reach
(Buchanan, 2001).
Reported values of emissivity for fires in the open cover a wide range of values from
0.5 to 1.0 (Drysdale, 1998) Most of the literature is focused on compartment fires or
furnaces where the emissivity values are a combination of emissivity and the absorptiv-
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ity of bounding surfaces. A conservative value of 1.0 may be used, however a value of
0.9 would be reasonable.
In industrial or warehouse fires often the buildings are designed so that the roof is not
fire rated and can be expected to collapse. In this situation the temperature reached in
the fire is much lower. There is little information on temperatures in a large scale fires,
apart from hydrocarbon pool fires. A computer and model study by Ingerson (1996)
showed that centreline temperatures in rack storage fires were approximately 800˚C-
900˚C at low centreline heights and rapidly decreases after that. An average tempera-
ture of 800˚C would be reasonable in this sort of fire. In these sorts of fires in buildings
that contain plastics or other products that could be expected to produce sooty flames a
value of emissivity of 0.7 would be reasonable. Drysdale reports values of emmisivity
for some common plastics range from 0.05 to 0.81 (Drysdale, 1998). A combination of
a flame temperature of 800˚C and an emissivity of 0.7 gives an emitted radiant heat
flux of 53 kW/m2. This compares favourably with the emitted radiation from kerosene
fires on land and gasoline fires on water of 42 kW/m2 (Mudan and Croce, 1995).
In Australia, the verification methods CV1 and CV2 are available for radiative fire
spread between buildings to demonstrate compliance with Performance Requirement
CP2, but these methods are somewhat subject to interpretation.
Glazing
When the burning building has normal glass in the windows, it can be assumed that the
glass will break and fall out by the time of flashover, allowing flames to project from
the openings. In this case the radiation reduction factor k1 should be taken as 1.0 and
the radiation calculations can include the effect of the flames projecting from the win-
dow opening. Radiation from the opening itself and the flames can be considered sepa-
rately and combined, or a calculation can be based on a notional radiating surface the
size of the window, shifted away from the building by a suitable distance D to allow for
the flames, as shown in Figure 7.12. It is common to ignore the flame projection, using
D = 0. As the temperature of the flame projection is much less than that of the fire
within the compartment this assumption is reasonable. More information on flame pro-
jections from openings is given by Law and O’Brien (1983) and Drysdale (1998).
When the burning building has fire resistant glazing which will remain in place for the
duration of the fire, a conservative value of k1 = 0.5 may be used and the radiating
surface should be taken at the glazing line. Fire resistant glazing can be provided with
Georgian wired glass or proprietary fire resistant glass in a suitable window frame
which is usually constructed from steel.
If the receiving building shown in Figure 7.12 has non-combustible cladding, the re-
ceived radiation inside the window should be checked. Unless more information is
available, it is conservative to assume that any normal glass in the window will break,
but fire resistant glass will remain in place, reducing the received radiation by an addi-




When the facade of the burning building has several openings, all emitting radiation at
the same temperature, the incident radiation can be calculated by considering the emit-
ting surface to be a rectangle enclosing all the openings. The calculated incident radia-
tion should be multiplied by a facade factor Ff given by:
F A Af o e= [7.5]
where Ae is the area of an enclosing rectangle on the facade, containing all of the
emitting openings (m2)
Ao = area of openings within the enclosing rectangle (m
2)
Configuration factor
To determine the intensity of radiation received by a surface remote from an emitter, a
configuration factor is needed to take into account the geometrical relationship be-
tween the emitting surface and the receiver.
An approximate value of the configuration factor for radiation at a distance R from a






where Av = Wr Hr is the area of the radiating surface and R is the radiation distance
between the emitting and receiving surfaces (m). The exact value of the configuration












































where    x H Rr= 2 [7.8]
     y W Rr= 2 [7.9]
Hr is the height of enclosing rectangle (m)
Wr is the width of enclosing rectangle (m)
tan-1 is the inverse tangent (in degrees).
For non-parallel surfaces, configuration factors can be obtained from a standard text on
heat transfer, or computer programs can be used.
Separation distances for calculations
For fire spread across a legal boundary, two separate calculations should be made:
1. The radiation should be checked at the boundary, assuming that a new building with
non-combustible cladding is constructed right on the boundary.
2. The radiation should be checked at a point 1.0 m over the boundary, assuming that
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Figure 7.12: Radiation to adjacent buildings
Table 7.1: Minimum values of received radiation to cause ignition
Condition Value (kW/m2) 
Neighbour’s building or contents combustible 
   – plastic 




Neighbour’s wall non-combustible 30.0 
a new building with combustible cladding or significant windows is constructed at
that location.
In New Zealand there is no legal requirement to protect a building on the same property
from a fire in another building on that property unless the building being protected
contains sleeping accommodation. With several buildings on one site, the separation
distances can be taken as the actual distances between the buildings. For radiation from
the neighbour’s building to the owner’s building, the calculations should be repeated to
verify that the owner’s building is safe from a fire in the neighbour’s building.
Received radiation
The values of received radiation at the wall surface or inside the window should not
exceed the values given in Table 7.1, unless further information is available. The value
of critical received radiation is from Lawson and Simms (1954). The calculated value
of received radiation inside the window should include a radiation reduction factor of
k1 = 0.5 if the window is fitted with fire resistant glass.
These calculations assume that in urban areas there will be no intervention by the fire
service to reduce fire spread from building to building. In most fires there will be at-
tendance by the fire service who can apply water to exposed buildings to reduce the
likelihood of fire spread, depending on availability of water and ease of access (see









Figure 7.13: Emitting and receiving surfaces for radiation
Worked example
For the same fire considered previously in this Chapter, calculate the compartment
temperature assuming a standard fire for the duration of the burning period and the
radiation from the window to another building 5.0 m away.
Assume a standard fire for the duration of the burning period, tb = 26.8 min and
To = 20˚C
Compartment temperature (using Eqn. 6.13) T t Te b o= +( ) +345 8 110log  = 825˚C
Compartment emissivity εc =1.0
Configuration factor for window:
Distance between buildings R = 5.0 m
Assume no flame projection from opening
Height ratio x H Rr= 2  = 0.20












































tan tan  = 0.0703
Radiation reduction factor k1 =1.0
Radiant heat   ˙′′ = +( ) − +( )[ ]q k T TR e o1 4 4273 273Φεσ  = 5.8 kW/m2
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˙′′qR  is less than the minimum radiation to cause ignition, so the fire will not spread.
Flying brands
Fire spread by flying brands is not normally a problem as they occur after a fire is very
well developed and the fire service has responded to the fire. The fire service can pro-
tect exposures by pre-wetting neighbouring combustible buildings and extinguish any
fires that start before they grow. If the fire service cannot gain access, cannot respond or
have insufficient resources, for example after an earthquake or during a severe bush
fire, then flying brands are a serious problem. Large fires in the open, such as bush fires
or large warehouses after the roof collapse, produce brands which are lofted with the
very strong and buoyant convective currents above such a fire. The extent of spread of
flying brands is dependant on wind strength and the buoyancy of the fire plume. Smaller
brands are more likely to extinguish as they are being blown though the air and are less
likely to have enough energy to ignite combustibles, but for brands to be large enough
to stay alight while being blown larger distances requires a very strong convective fire
plume to loft them into the air.
Significant fire spread by flying brands occurs only in winds higher than about 30 km/
hr (Todd et al, 1994). Flying brands can spread fire large distances for example 38 m
across Van Nees Ave after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake with a wind speed of
40 km/hr (Thomas et al, 2002). Spread distances of up to 200 m have been recorded in
some instances during urban fires and significantly further in Australian bush fires. The
extent and likelihood of spread by flying brands is extremely difficult to predict as it
depends on the fire size, type whether the fuel is likely to produce brands, wind speed
and direction and the probability that a brand will land on combustible material.
The best way to protect buildings against flying brands is to ensure that roofs are non
combustible and ensure dry matter such as leaf litter is cleaned out of rain gutters and
other areas it may accumulate.
7.6 Urban Conflagrations and Fire Following Earthquake
Conflagrations occurred in many New Zealand towns in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, but few details are known (McLean, 1992). Timber buildings with timber
claddings, lack of building separation, large numbers of ignition sources, and lack of
ability to control the fires as a result of damaged water supplies and lack of adequate
fire fighting equipment resulted in fire spread destroying large areas of towns and cit-
ies. A survey of buildings in the central business district of Wellington in 2003 found
that many buildings did not comply in terms of boundary distance and/or size of win-
dows (Heron et al, 2003a). Even if buildings are designed to current Acceptable Solu-
tion requirements, fire spread may occur as the temperatures used for the radiation
calculations in C/AS1 is based on the ISO 834 furnace test time-temperature curve
rather than more realistic compartment temperatures.
In Australia bush fires have the potential to spread into the outer suburbs of towns and
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cities and due to the large number of fire starts within buildings, fire fighting resources
may be overstretched and urban conflagrations could result. See Chapter 16 for further
details regarding fire spread to urban areas from bushfires.
In New Zealand many urban areas are subject to earthquakes. Fire ignitions are likely
immediately after an earthquake as a result of damage to infrastructure. Typical post-
earthquake ignition sources include damaged:
• gas and electricity;
• heating and cooking appliances; and
• industrial equipment.
Fire service resources are likely to be engaged in rescue and fire fighting following
earthquakes, stretching resources. Additionally, due to widespread damage, communi-
cations, transport routes and water supplies are likely to be compromised, inhibiting
response capability. These impediments to extinguishing urban conflagrations may re-
sult in greater fire growth and spread than would normally occur.
A good example of these problems occurred after the Kobe earthquake of 1995 even
though they had fire fighting resources available from the nearby larger City of Osaka
and the similar sized cities of Kyoto and Okoyama (Thomas, 2005). Interestingly a
large proportion of fires were extinguished by the public in Kobe, although in New
Zealand hand held fire fighting appliances are no longer required in most buildings.
Many fires start soon after services, such as electricity are restored.
Mitigation measures
The probability of all active fire protection systems operating after a major earthquake
is remote due to the likelihood of power failure, water supply failure, structural or non-
structural damage. Control of fires in buildings after earthquakes is only possible if the
buildings are designed with adequate earthquake resistance, adequate fire protection
and good overlap between the two. Even if both are provided separately, the necessary
coordination is often missing. Coordination between seismic design and fire design
includes earthquake resistance of both active and passive fire protection systems, fire
protection of items such as seismic gaps, and secure local and city water supplies. The
New Zealand sprinkler standard NZS 4541 specifies seismic restraints and an inde-
pendent water supply for buildings in regions of moderate or high seismicity.
Mitigation measures for post earthquake fire and urban conflagrations in general is
problematic as it is an extremely rare event and there is little point in providing a few
more resources, as significantly more resources are required (Cousins et al, 2002).  The
probability of major loss in fire following earthquake can be reduced with:
1 Seismic restraint of potential ignition items and liquid fuels.
2 Install seismic shut-off valves for gas supplies.
3 Reliability of stairs and escape routes for both earthquake loading and fire safety,
especially in tall buildings.
124
Fire Engineering Design Guide
4 Seismic restraint for passive and active fire safety equipment.
5 Provide extinguishers for first-aid fire fighting.
6 Insure power and gas is turned off to damaged buildings.
7 Do not reinstate power supplies until damaged circuits have been restored or iso-
lated.
8 Provide secondary water supplies for sprinkler systems.
9 Provision of adequate earthquake resistance and adequate fire protection for all
buildings.
10 Increase building separations.
11 Earthquake resistant fire stations and communications facilities.
12 Provision for alternative water supplies for fire fighting.
13 Identify other water supplies, e.g. rivers, streams and swimming pools.
14 Pre determine locations where ‘firebreaks’ exist or can be easily created.
15 Use rural fire fighting techniques such as using dirt to extinguish small fires from
branding before they spread.
16 Use spatial models such as GIS to allocate resources, predict fire spread and select
‘firebreaks’.
With limited fire fighting resources these must be allocated in such a way as to mini-
mise losses. If a fire starts in an isolated building or will only spread to a few buildings
it is better to send the resources to where a larger fire is likely to develop. A dynamic
GIS model is suitable for doing this and such models are used by the Tokyo Fire depart-
ment and Kobe City Fire Department (Thomas, 2005) and being developed by GNS
Science and Victoria University of Wellington (Cousins et al, 2002; Heron et al, 2003a;
Heron et al, 2003b).
The risk of earthquakes in Australia is considerably lower compared with New Zea-
land, but not insignificant, as evidenced by the Newcastle earthquake in 1989. Consid-
eration of seismic requirements under the Building Code of Australia must be followed.
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The objective of the design and installation of fire detection and suppression systems is
to ensure that these active fire safety systems meet the declared functional (perform-
ance) requirements and will continue to operate automatically as intended in the event
of a fire throughout their intended lifetime.
8.2 Fire Alarm Systems
The purpose of a fire detection and alarm system (“declared functional requirements”
in NZS 4512 (Standards New Zealand, 2003)) is to automatically (or manually) detect
a fire, or the effects of fire, and perform one or more of the following functions:
1. Notify the building occupants via alerting devices to effect prompt evacuation.
2. Automatically summon the fire service (if remotely connected).
3. Indicate the location/zone of the activated detector or manual call point.
4. Self-supervise for fault conditions.
5. Resist false activation due to typical non-fire phenomena.
6. Initiate ancillary fire-related control functions in the building (e.g. lift recall, air
conditioning shutdown, smoke-stop door release, smoke extraction system).
A key design objective is to detect fire as early as possible consistent with good toler-
ance to adverse environmental influences and other potential sources of false activa-
tion. Once a fire is detected, the actions taken by the system need to be consistent with
the building’s overall design, its evacuation plan, and the integrated fire protection
strategy for the premises.
A fire alarm system will typically include manual call points, detectors, control and
indicating equipment, fire alerting devices, interconnections, safety control outputs,
power supplies and wiring. If connected to a remote receiving centre it will also include
remote signalling equipment.
Figure 8.1 shows the range of typical inputs and outputs of fire detection and alarm
systems.
The protected premises will generally be subdivided into detection ‘zones’, and alarm
indication of these will be provided to attending fire fighters in an ‘index’. Zone area is
usually limited to what can readily be searched in a short period of time. NZS 4512
permits a larger search zone if point identification information (alphanumeric) display
is provided to attending fire fighters.
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Fire alarm control and detection equipment is constructed to high reliability standards
and a design life of 15-25 years – the typical interval between building refurbishments.
This is achieved by careful choice of materials and conservative use of components and
designs. A fire event may occur many years after installation and the system must oper-
ate as intended and without failure at that time. This design lifetime is much greater
than that expected for security, telecommunications or IT network equipment that may
be installed in the same premises. See Sections 10.6 and 10.7 for discussions of aspects
of fire alarm reliability.
Building fire alarm systems in New Zealand are almost invariably installed in accord-
ance with NZS 4512, which covers design, installation, extension, modification, com-
missioning, testing and maintenance. This standard also sets down minimum levels of
trade qualification for those working on fire alarm systems, and requires independent
third-party inspection/audit of all new systems, and all significant system alterations
and extensions.
Extensions of and alterations to existing systems should be performed with the same
attention to design, but must also consider the originally installed fire alarm system,
and more than likely will need to be proprietary to match the existing equipment. De-
tectors and the like which are designed for use with one control panel may not be
compatible with other types of panel. NZS 4512 has requirements for independent third
party inspection of system extensions.
In Australia, fire detection and alarm control and indicating equipment is required to be
designed to AS 4428.1 (Standards Australia, 1998) or AS 7240.2 (Standards Australia,
2004) with associated power supplies complying with AS 4428.5  (Standards Australia,
1998) or AS 7240.4  (Standards Australia, 2004), and with the overall system designed,
installed and commissioned to AS 1670.1 (Standards Australia, 2004) and maintained
to the relevant sections of AS 1851 (Standards Australia, 2005).
Detector technology is very specialised. Items used in New Zealand are manufactured
in many countries, under a wide range of national and international standards, as listed




























Figure 8.1: Typical inputs and outputs of an alarm system
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internationally accepted codes and by manufacturers’ instructions. AS 1670, NFPA 72
(NFPA, 2007) and BS 5839 (BSI, 2002) are useful references to augment NZS 4512 for
advice on detector positioning. Additional guidance on design of fire detection systems
is given by Schifiliti et al (2002) and Bukowski et al (2003).
8.3 Detectable Effects of Fire
The effects seen in the early stages of a fire vary from risk to risk. The rate of develop-
ment, ignition mechanism, and the fuel type all contribute to early development charac-
teristics.
Products of combustion are grouped as aerosols, vapours and gases.
• An aerosol consists of particulate matter suspended in air. Aerosols are produced
by nearly all combustible materials - wood products, hydrocarbons and insulating
materials. They may be solid matter or tiny fluid droplets. Depending on the con-
centration and particle size, they may or may not have light obscuration or light
scattering properties.
• A vapour results from overheating of some materials before true combustion oc-
curs, or as a side-effect to the combustion process. The cooling vapours condense to
form droplets which can be detected effectively by their light-scattering property
when using visible light for analysis.
• A gas results from the chemical reactions of combustion. The principal (detectable)
combustion gases of carbonaceous materials are carbon dioxide (CO2) and carbon
monoxide (CO). Other toxic and corrosive gases will be present in varying degrees
dependant on the materials involved.
Many fires start with smouldering and produce abundant gases and then aerosols as the
first detectable. The area of interest is about 2 micron diameter and less. Vapours are
rarely found without aerosols.
Specific electromagnetic radiation occurs when flames break out. The flames will grow
and recede with the supply of oxygen and have a typical flicker rate of 0.5 to 30 Hz. The
radiation has a number of other distinctive characteristics. The yellow body of the flame
is generally incandescent carbon and looks like a black body source of continuous
radiation with a peak radiation temperature of 800˚C. There will be infrared line spec-
tral emissions that are associated with CO, CO2 and H2O water vapour. Any other
‘colour’ seen in the flame will also indicate a line emission associated with that mate-
rial. The presence of CO, CO2 and H2O emissions are important correlation details in
separating out signals that are not due to a fire event, but which exist in everyday life.
Other radiation effects are apparent in the ultraviolet (UV) region (blue end of the
visible spectrum).
The open flame condition marks the initiation of rapid growth of the fire and consider-
able quantities of heat are then generated. This heat is transferred to the ceiling environ-
ment by a well-defined (in still air) plume of rising air and combustion products. Heat
detectors absorb heat from the convected air and operate once sufficient energy transfer
has taken place.
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Human beings, with our well-developed senses of smell, vision, and hearing can reli-
ably (if conscious and physically present) detect any or all of these effects and initiate
an alarm manually.
8.4 Detector Response
A key design objective is to detect fires early, so as to minimise the effects of smoke
during the evacuation phase. Smoke is the collective word for the many products of
combustion detailed above. It includes a wide range of particle sizes that will be more
or less buoyant in the surrounding air. Many products of combustion are toxic and
highly corrosive, presenting life-threatening conditions (see Section 11.8).
Smoke generated by small smouldering fires is difficult to model. Gases, however,
spread by well-modelled diffusion laws. After flame breaks out, the dynamics can be
described and smoke generation and movement can be modelled. The generation of
















Figure 8.2: Cold and hot smoke generation in fires
Detectors are usually pre-set to particular sensitivities and distributed on the ceiling
according to spacing rules known to achieve acceptable response times to standardised
test fires. If the cold smoke phase is not recognised by detectors, then the alarm must
wait for the hot fire phase to activate the sensors. Table 8.1 shows the expectations of
fire size in the early growth phase for various detectors.
Figure 8.3 shows the important time variables in detecting and suppressing fires. The
impediments in t1 and t2 are subject to wide variation of effect. Ceiling slopes, profiles
and beams hinder smoke movement compared to flat ceilings. Air conditioning and
natural ventilation air movements may also reduce or increase the times. See Section
5.5 for further discussions regarding detector response times.
8.5 Thermal (heat) Detectors
Thermal (‘heat’) detectors have been commercially available since the early 1900s.
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The use of heat detectors is widespread in New Zealand, and they were almost the only
detector type installed prior to the introduction of the New Zealand Building Code
(NZBC) in 1992, with its emphasis on smoke detection and sprinkler protection for life
safety.
Thermal detectors respond to heated air that has risen by convection to the detector’s
location. Depending on the type of detector, once the device’s set temperature is reached
the response time is dependent on the sensing element mass to be heated, the surface
area effecting the heat transfer, and the thermal transfer coefficient between them. Indi-
vidual sensing devices are called point type heat detectors, and continuously sensitive
material such as heat-sensitive cable is called a linear heat sensing (LHS) detector.





Aspirating smoke detector 
system 
up to 2000 <1 10-100 W 
Point smoke detector up to 90 1-3 100 W-1 kW 
Heat detector up to 30 2-5 5-10 kW 
Standard response 
sprinkler 
between 9 and 21 5-10 10-15 kW 
Fast response sprinkler between 9 and 21 1-5 1-5 kW 
Extended coverage 
sprinkler 
up to 35 5-10 10-15 kW 
Gas detector up to 90 1-3 10 W-1 kW 
* Responses listed are generalisations for a Medium to Fast fire. Actual response times vary enormously. 










t6 t1 is the transit time, floor to ceiling
t2 is the transit time, across ceiling to detector
t3 is the detector response time
— evaluation or energy transfer
t4 is the control equipment evaluation time
— confirmation procedures
t5 is the mobilisation time for assistance
— local and remote resources
t6 is the time to control growth of fire
Figure 8.3: Time processes in fire development, detection and control
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A variation on fixed temperature response detectors is the ‘rate of rise’ (ROR) or ‘rate-
compensated’ thermal detector. In addition to the usual fixed alarm threshold, these
devices will give an earlier alarm if the temperature rises rapidly. They are useful for
applications (e.g. liquid fuel) where fire growth is very rapid, but are susceptible to
false activation with sudden temperature rises (e.g. oven, laundry, boiler).
Commonly-used point and linear heat detector technologies are as follows:
Point Sensitive Heat Detectors Linear Heat Sensing Devices
Bi-metal (thermostat) switch Digital thermoplastic switch
Thermistor-based electronic Analogue thermoresistive material
Differential expansion switch Nylon tube/pneumatic switch




Eutectic metal (low melting point solder) switch point type heat detectors were histori-
cally in widespread use in New Zealand, however are now prohibited by NZS 4512 due
to durability issues related to corrosion and thermal ‘creep’.
Industry has defined (in NZS 4512) a range of colour-coded (fixed) operating tempera-
tures that allow a choice of sensitivity to temperature (e.g. 57˚C ‘blue’, 77˚C ‘yellow’,
93˚C ‘green’, 107˚C ‘white’, etc.)
Heat detectors and heat detection systems should meet the design, performance and
installation requirements of NZS 4512, which lists a range of acceptable design stand-
ards. In Australia, heat detectors should meet the design and performance requirements
of AS 7240.5 (Standards Australia, 2005) or AS 1603.1 (Standards Australia, 1997) and
systems are installed to AS 1670.1.
8.6 Smoke Detectors
There are four commonly-available types of smoke detecting devices:
1. Photoelectric/light scatter detector;
2. Ionisation chamber;
3. Linear beam detector – obscuration sensitive; and
4. Aspirating smoke detector.
Linear beam and ionisation chamber smoke detectors have been in commercial use
since the 1940s. Photoelectric detectors have progressed with advances in LED and
digital signal processing technology. General advances in technology have made all
forms of smoke detector progressively more reliable and cost-effective to manufacture.
This is still a fertile area for technological developments to improve sensitivity to smoke
whilst simultaneous reducing susceptibility to deceptive phenomena in the detector’s
environment.
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Smoke detectors and smoke detection systems should meet the design, performance
and installation requirements of NZS 4512, which lists a range of acceptable design
standards. In Australia, smoke detectors should meet the design and performance re-
quirements of one or more of AS 7240.7 (Standards Australia, 2004), AS 7240.15 (Stand-
ards Australia, 2004), AS 1603.2 (Standards Australia, 1997), AS 1603.7 (Standards
Australia, 1996), AS 1603.8 (Standards Australia, 1996) (and AS 7240.12 (Standards
Australia, 2007) pending) and systems are installed to AS 1670.1.
Photoelectric smoke detectors (light scatter/Tyndall effect)
These rely on the principle of light scatter from smoke particles in an analysing cham-
ber as shown in Figure 8.4. Light scatter is dependent in a complex way on surface
conditions and particle size. This detector typically responds to the function m/d where
m is the mass density and d the particle diameter. When using visible light from, say, an
LED source there is a response cut off below about half the wavelength of light (0.5
micron size).
Photoelectric detectors are most responsive to larger (visible) smoke particles. By care-




Figure 8.4: Photoelectric smoke detector
To minimise operating current the light source is usually pulsed and the receiver syn-
chronised to the light pulse. Alarm sensitivity is easily related to the observed level of
visible smoke present due to the larger particle sizes. Typical default sensitivities for
normal occupancies are in the range 4% to 12% obscuration per metre. Care must be
taken in comparing obscuration values as these can vary with the methods defined by
different standards.
The development of high intensity LED/laser sources has increased the available de-
sign sensitivity of photoelectric smoke detectors by as much as 100 times (from 10% to
0.1% obscuration per metre). High sensitivities must be used with particular care, as
the normal background levels of smoke, dust and airborne particles need to be ignored.
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Ionisation chamber smoke
These consist of a sensing chamber open to the atmosphere to sense aerosols and va-
pours. A second chamber is sealed against the entry of smoke and connected electri-
cally in series with the first, as shown in Figure 8.5. It forms a voltage divider across the
electrical supply when a small (balanced) current is allowed to flow through the two
chambers, enabled by a very small (Americium 241) radioactive source that ionises
oxygen and nitrogen molecules present within the two chambers. The steady-state cur-
rent is defined by the rate at which these charged particles (ions) traverse the space
between the poles of the chamber. When combustion products enter the open chamber,
they attach themselves to the ions, which has a twofold effect - slowing the movement
of the ions (due to the increased mass) and neutralising the ions due to surface recom-
bination. These effects are apparent as a reduction on outer chamber current which is
sensed as a change in voltage seen at the junction of the two chambers.
This type of detector responds to the product N x d where N is the number of particles
present in a unit volume of air and d their mean diameter. Converting to mass density
gives response related to m/d2 where m is the total mass of particles in a unit volume of
air. These detectors respond to particles around 1 micron and below. There is no practi-
cal cut off as the particle size diminishes, but the concentration has to increase drasti-
cally if the detector is to respond. Alarm sensitivity is not directly expressed in smoke
obscuration but is measured and characterised against the response of a standardised
Measuring Ionisation Chamber (MIC).
As the particle size is not visible, there is a practical difficulty of assessing smoke
conditions when testing. This gives rise to considerable variation in commissioning
tests because there is an unspecified relationship between visible and non-visible parti-
cle generation.
Ionisation detectors are becoming far less widely used, primarily because of advances
in manufacturing that have improved both the performance and economics of photo-









Figure 8.5: Ionisation chamber smoke detector
135
Detection & Supression System Design
Linear beam (obscuration) detectors
Linear beam (obscuration) detectors typically use a pulsed infrared light beam travers-
ing an open space, with photo transmitter / receiver at one end and a passive reflector at
the other. Their main application is to detect smoke in large and high areas (e.g. airport
concourse, atrium) where point detection has a poor response due to dilution of the fire
plume at greater heights, or where mounting and/or service access for point detectors is
difficult.
Obscuration of a few percent per metre accumulates to a large factor over distance. The
usual application limit is about 100 m of beam length and 14 m beam separation. The
alarm threshold is typically 40-60% of set level (depends on separation distance), and a
variety of signal processing procedures are available to improve the integrity of alarms.
Lower-level beam detectors are sometimes required to overcome stratification and lack
of smoke plume buoyancy in very high spaces.
There are some important design factors to consider and accommodate in the success-
ful use of these detectors, including the fact that the optical beam is narrow and, there-
fore, close alignment must be maintained on a long-term basis, and water vapour, con-
densation, dust clouds, refractive index, building deformation, birds, insects, and some
human activities may all adversely affect the beam. Close design attention is required
when buildings are subject to movement due to thermal expansion, wind loading, and
the like. Nevertheless, their reliability and ease of use have been improved significantly
with modern technology, especially with the use of microprismatic reflectors and vari-
ous proprietary auto-alignment mechanisms.
Aspirating smoke detector
The method of sampling the atmosphere for products of combustion by drawing air
through sampling holes in a network of tubing has been used in industry and shipping
for many years. This system, shown schematically in Figure 8.6, can be regarded as a
specialised variant of photoelectric detection and is generically referred to as HSSD








Figure 8.6: Aspirating smoke detector
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Australia and New Zealand is the proprietary VESDA® system (Very Early Smoke
Detecting Apparatus), however a range of other aspirated detection products are now
available.
The sampling pipe network is operated by a low-pressure fan-driven pump. Air sam-
ples are drawn from the coverage area into a series of small sampling holes, which are
spaced and sized in the pipe network according to computer-aided design software to
give balanced coverage (consistent sampling point sensitivity) and an acceptable re-
sponse time. The pipe network design must be closely matched to the detector and
pump capabilities, with actual air/smoke transport times and point sensitivity being
confirmed at commissioning.
Air samples from all holes aggregate as they traverse the piping network and feed via a
dust filter to the analysis chamber. HSSD equipment typically uses a laser source (or,
historically, a xenon flash tube) for illumination of the chamber, which analyses light
scatter characteristic of smoke particles. The combination of controlled spectral band-
width and intensity of the laser light pulse results in a reliable increase in sensitivity of
around 800 times compared with a typical point sensitive photoelectric detector (to as
low as 0.01% obscuration per metre). In practice much lower (less sensitive) settings
will typically be used.
The diluting effect of the pipe network and its multiple sampling holes makes the single
‘sampling point sensitivity’ much lower than the analysis chamber setting; however
there is a useful aggregation effect for early detection of a fire that supplies smoke to
several sampling points (e.g. in an atrium or machine hall).
HSSD systems will typically offer two or three progressive levels of alarm – the earli-
est triggering a local investigative response, an intermediate possibly triggering local
equipment shutdown, and the highest (most smoke) triggering a full alarm and response.
Domestic (residential) smoke alarms
Smoke alarms are primarily used in domestic residential situations. They are different
from the smoke detectors used in fire detection and alarm systems because they have a
built-in alerting device, usually an audible sounder, and are designed, tested, and manu-
factured to different standards. For more details see Chapter 15.
The most common form of smoke alarms for residential occupancies are the stand-
alone 9-volt battery-powered ionisation or photoelectric units available in many hard-
ware stores. A higher level of safety can be achieved using mains-powered intercon-
nected smoke alarms which cannot be disabled by removing the battery and which
sound at all locations when only one is triggered by smoke.
‘Type 1’ smoke alarms are mandatory under the NZBC Approved Documents for new
installations in domestic residential situations, including detached dwellings. Often stand-
alone battery operated units are sufficient, however for some larger multi-level dwell-
ings interconnected mains-powered units may be required to meet sounder audibility
requirements.
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New Zealand Standard NZS 4514 (Standards New Zealand, 2002) exists, however it is
not mandatory. Under the current ‘Type 1’ Approved Document regime, the require-
ments are contained in section F7/AS1, and installation is required to be to AS 1670.6
(Standards Australia, 1997) and the manufacturer’s instructions.
In Australia AS 3786 (Standards Australia, 1993) covers the design of smoke alarms
and AS 1670.6 specifies requirements for their installation.
8.7 Other Detection Types
Manual call points
Manual call points (MCPs) allow people to manually activate the fire alarm. These are
usually located near exits and on exit routes within the premises so that building occu-
pants will be able to locate one within a reasonable travel distance after discovering (or
causing) a fire.
New Zealand design and testing requirements for MCPs are specified in an appendix to
NZS 4512, with installation also specified in NZS 4512. This mandates two-stage op-
eration (“the breaking of a frangible element followed by the manual operation of a
switch”). In Australia, manual call points must meet the design and performance re-
quirements of AS 1603.5 (Standards Australia, 1996) or EN 54-11 (BSI, 2001) (Type
A-direct operation), both of which specify single-stage operation. Systems are installed
to AS 1670.1.
Electro-magnetic radiation flame detectors
Flame detectors have a major advantage in that they do not rely on convection to carry
the fire signal. Radiation from a flaming fire is instantaneously available at a detector
and the challenge is to discriminate this radiation from that present in the everyday
world. For example, the sun is a major source of infrared (IR) radiation, as are hot
machinery parts.
Atmospheric absorption effects result in regions of little solar radiation at certain wave-
lengths at the earth’s surface. These quiet areas of solar radiation are good places to
look for radiation signals from nearby fires, particularly as they correspond well to the
spectral peak of radiation from carbonaceous fires.
Most commercial flame detectors are sensitive to fires involving carbonaceous materi-
als. They are typically used to rapidly detect fast flaming fires in specialised risks, such
as in aircraft hangars, tunnels, machine halls, refineries and chemical plants. They are
unsuitable for fires in specialist materials (e.g. hydrogen, sulphur, phosphorous) or for
detecting electrical arcing.
Radiation sensitive detectors are now very reliable. These detectors are high-technol-
ogy items generally used for long distance and open area flaming fire detection. Con-
siderable care is needed in their application to minimise background effects and to
ensure clear line-of-sight to all likely fire locations. Multiple detectors are usually re-
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quired for complete coverage of an area and to eliminate the effects of shadowing (e.g.
from plant and equipment).
The signal correlation techniques include phase and amplitude comparison from more
than one photosensor, usually two or three for solar blindness and black-body immu-
nity, though single sensor devices are still used for some indoor applications. These
sensor(s) may be responsive in the IR, UV, or both IR and UV regions. This type of
detector responds to f/d2 where f is the area of visible flame front and d the distance to
the detector. Sensitivity to a liquid fuel test fire is typically 3 seconds to respond to a
0.1 m2 flame front at a distance of 50 m within a 90˚ field of view.
Specialised variants are also available for spark and explosion detection for use with
suppression systems within confined spaces (e.g. military vehicles, ducted extraction
systems). These have extremely rapid response times in the order of milliseconds.
Flame detectors and associated detection systems should meet the design, performance
and installation requirements of NZS 4512, which lists a range of acceptable design stand-
ards and/or approvals. In Australia, flame detectors should meet the design and perform-
ance requirements of EN 54-10 (BSI, 2002)  and systems are installed to AS 1670.1.
Gas detectors
Gas detection has long been recognised as a potential means for reliable and early
detection of fires. Combustion gases are produced in all stages of fire growth. In the
case of slow smouldering fires, gases appear long before significant aerosols or va-
pours. Gases also diffuse readily, so do not require the convection of a fire plume to
transport them to a detector (though this helps).
CO is the most readily and uniquely identifiable signature gas from typical fires involv-
ing carbonaceous materials. This toxic, odourless, colourless and tasteless gas is re-
sponsible for a very high proportion of fire deaths. Recent advances in electrochemical
cell technology have allowed the commercial release of fire detectors that sense CO
gas. These detectors have overcome historical problems with high power consumption,
sensor deterioration, slow response and low sensitivity.
CO fire detectors typically operate on the principle of the oxidisation of CO gas to CO2.
This oxidisation reaction occurs on catalytic surfaces within a sensing cell and requires
an exchange of electrons, which generates a detectable electrical current. CO fire de-
tectors are immune to virtually all common false activation phenomena affecting ioni-
sation and photoelectric smoke detectors – steam, dirt, dust and cooking fumes. This,
coupled with their superior response to slow smouldering fires, makes them particu-
larly suitable for life-safety protection in sleeping occupancies.
For the highest level of life safety, especially where rapid flaming fires are likely, CO
fire detectors are usually employed in conjunction with heat or other smoke detection
(e.g. multi-sensor detectors), or sprinklers. Detectors are now commercially available
which combine other sensing devices with CO detection cells to give a broad response
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to the standard ranges of EN/ISO test fires.
CO detectors and associated detection systems should meet the design, performance
and installation requirements of NZS 4512, which lists a range of acceptable design
standards. In Australia, CO detectors should meet the design and performance require-
ments of AS 7240.6 (Standards Australia, 2006) or AS 1603.14 (Standards Australia,
2001) and systems are installed to AS 1670.1.
Duct smoke detector housings
Specialised duct housings are used for smoke detection in air-handling ducts (see also
Chapter 9). Typically these housings are passive devices which utilise the venturi effect
to sample moving air from across the duct and feed this through the sampling chamber
of a smoke detector (usually photoelectric) housed in an enclosure on the outside of the
duct. There is no specific New Zealand standard for duct housings. In Australia AS
1603.13 (Standards Australia, 1998) applies.
Fire sprinkler system
Water flow switches are devices which detect when water is flowing through the fire
sprinkler system. These will typically indicate on the fire alarm system to assist fire
fighters in locating the source of a fire, but are not generally permitted to initiate alert-
ing (building evacuation) or a fire service call.
The main alarm valve output from a fire sprinkler system will generally indicate on the
fire alarm system and initiate alerting (general building evacuation). The sprinkler sys-
tem is generally required to have its own remote connection to the fire service.
Multiple-criteria (multi-sensor) detectors
Single-sensor smoke and fire detectors respond differently to different fire signatures.
Each type of sensor is required to respond to a specific range of standard test fires, or
specified fire-simulating phenomena. With smoke detectors in particular, the need to
respond to a range of test fires results in higher sensitivity settings than would be re-
quired for selective response to just a fast fire, or a slow fire. The use of combinations
of sensors within a single detector housing allows a more even response to a wider
range of fire characteristics, potentially with greater immunity to deceptive (non-fire)
phenomena.
Intelligent real-time signal processing is required to combine the signals from the vari-
ous sensors to draw conclusions about the presence of a fire – the ‘alarm decision’.
While this functionality can (and has) been incorporated into conventional point detec-
tors, it is most suited to analogue addressable systems (see Section 8.8) where the process-
ing power of complex algorithms can be harnessed centrally.
The manufacturers of fire detectors are experimenting with various combinations of
heat, smoke, gas, and flame sensors, with different algorithms combining them. Sev-
eral combinations are in widespread commercial use and several new combinations
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have recently been launched. Design goals are reliability of detection, rejection of false
activation alarms, and acceptable cost. It is anticipated there is much ongoing work still
to be done in this area. Standards in the ISO 7240 (International Organization for Stand-
ardization, 2005) series covering the most common combinations are either recently
published or under active development.
Video smoke and fire detection
Recent advancements in computer-based image processing capabilities have allowed
the commercial release of video CCTV smoke and fire detection products. These use
computer-based algorithms to analyse the video images provided by standard CCTV
cameras, automatically identifying the particular signature pattern of smoke and/or flame.
Typical applications are in high-ceiling atriums, voluminous spaces, machine halls,
high value assets, tunnels, high airflow, and even outdoors (e.g. detection of forest
fires).
Video smoke and fire detection should be considered an early warning detection sys-
tem in addition to primary heat and/or smoke detection devices. It is particularly suit-
able for specific types of risks where damage would be significant by the time smoke or
heat reaches a conventional detector and/or where the integral video facilities provide
additional response capability (e.g. deluge system in tunnel).
8.8 Fire Detection and Alarm System Types
Fire detection and alarm systems include detectors, alerting devices, manual call points,
control and indication panels, and any other equipment. Devices are typically con-
nected with wires, although systems may consist of radio-linked devices or a mixture
of wire and radio connections. The reliability of fire detection and alarm systems is
discussed in Section 10.7.
‘Conventional’ fire detection and alarm systems are connected to each group (circuit)
of detection devices. The control and indicating equipment is unable to distinguish
alarm and fault conditions from individual detection devices within the group, and the
actual alarm decision is made at each device. At best the general type of activated
detection device (heat detector/manual call point versus smoke detector) can be differ-
entiated. A wiring fault will almost invariably block detection signals from more than
one detection device, and may trigger an alarm condition. Dirty detectors either give
false activation alarms or stop working.
‘Analogue Addressable’ systems provide an enhanced signalling path to detection
devices, allowing unique identification of every device at the control and indicating
equipment. These detectors, more precisely described as sensors, typically report ana-
logue levels of smoke, heat, CO, and/or flame on an individual basis. The alarm deci-
sion is generally made by the control equipment, rather than the detection device itself.
In general, analogue addressable detection systems offer the following distinct advan-
tages over their conventional counterparts:
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• Pre-alarm Indication – Analogue sensor thresholds below the alarm level can be
set. Incidents can therefore be investigated by on-site staff, and possibly resolved,
before the fire service is called.
• Maintenance Alert – dirty detectors can increase false alarms, but unnecessary
cleaning wastes money. Maintenance alert facilities show which detectors need clean-
ing and automatic compensation algorithms can enhance detector life.
• Individual Detector Identification – each detector is uniquely identified. A full
description of a detector’s precise location can be displayed at the fire control panel,
or on remote annunciators. This speeds the location of, and response to, a fire or a
fault condition.
• Wiring Faults – cut wires or short circuits on wiring do not generate alarm condi-
tions, may not result in loss of detection coverage, and are easier to locate.
• Adjustable Sensitivity – within the system configuration, each detection device
can be individually tailored to its environment to give optimum sensitivity to fire
phenomena and resistance to environmental influences or permitted activities (e.g.
food preparation).
• Multi-Sensor Detectors – multi-sensor/multi-criteria detectors use sophisticated
algorithms to make them less likely to generate a false activation alarm, but more
likely to respond promptly to a real fire.
Overall, these technical advantages increase system performance and reduce unwanted
building evacuations and calls to the fire service. Although analogue addressable sys-
tems typically cost a little more initially, this can usually be recovered in reduced main-
tenance and false alarm costs, while offering the benefits of superior performance (re-
duced ‘whole of life’ costs).
‘Hybrid’ systems include both conventional and analogue addressable techniques. Most
commercial analogue addressable systems have at least some capability for connecting
conventional devices. While this can be useful (e.g. for retrofit/upgrade situations, or
concealed space heat detectors where individual point addresses are not strictly neces-
sary), care must be taken to ensure there is no significant loss of useful information by
over-use of this technology.
So-called ‘Intelligent’ systems are also available. This terminology tends to refer to the
increasingly-comprehensive input/output programmability (control capability) of fire
alarm control and indicating equipment and may or may not accompany analogue
addressable functionality. Some typical functions of such systems are:
• Distributed/networked system architecture;
• Control of smoke management (see also Chapters 9 and 10);
• Active/adaptive control of evacuation alerting devices (Section 8.12);
• Interface with building management systems (BMS);
• Control of active suppression systems (gas flooding and the like);
• Plant shutdown; and
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• Remote operation/interrogation via data networks (e.g. Internet Protocol).
Integration of fire and other building services
There are increasing moves towards the integration of fire, security, and other building
services over shared data networks and services. Problematical issues cluster around
the integrity and priority of fire data and transmission paths in an emergency, the risk of
inadvertent fire system impairment by staff from other trades, security of fire protec-
tion during power outages and fire standards compliance (which tend to be more rigor-
ous than other disciplines in particular respects).
Type 5 and Type 7 systems
The NZBC Approved Documents specify ‘Type 5’ and ‘Type 7’ systems in certain
residential occupancies such as apartments and suites. In these system types, sleeping
firecells must be covered by both smoke and heat detectors (Type 5) or both smoke
detectors and sprinklers (Type 7) plus manual call points. The smoke detection compo-
nent is non-latching and provides a local alarm within the firecell of origin only (plus
an optional management signal). This local alarm is usually able to be hushed by apart-
ment occupants. Activation of a manual call point, heat detector, or sprinkler generates
a latching, non hush-able general evacuation.
Under NZS 4512 substitution rules, heat detectors (or sprinklers) may be used instead
of smoke detectors in certain areas (e.g. bathrooms, kitchens, places where unwanted
activations are likely), however such substitution is not permitted in sleeping spaces
and escape routes from sleeping spaces.
Smoke detectors in common egress paths will typically generate a fire service call and
latching general evacuation, however this is sometimes modified by the specific evacu-
ation scheme adopted in the building.
8.9 False (nuisance) Activation Alarms
No one wants false activation alarms as they are annoying, disruptive and desensitise
people to genuine alarms. They also cost money, both for the fire service and for busi-
nesses that are disrupted. The New Zealand Fire Service has the option to levy callout
charges for systems which repeatedly false alarm.
Genuine fires make up just a small percentage of fire alarm and sprinkler activations.
Based on figures received from the New Zealand Fire Service, only 4.5% of fire alarm
system activations are due to fires. This percentage has remained remarkably stable
over the last 20 years across several countries in the face of significant changes in both
building practice and fire detection technology. Table 8.2 summarises the more usual
causes of alarm activity.
Due to information-gathering limitations, some categories (e.g. building work) are most
likely to be under-reported, and the “unknown” category is over-large. Nevertheless it
can be seen that there are a variety of reasons for false alarms. However, there are some
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simple strategies that will greatly diminish these. One is to ensure that each detector is
selected and installed appropriately for the environmental conditions and likely human
or industrial process activities it will encounter. Other strategies include education of
building occupants, management of building work, and attention to regular building
maintenance.
Location of detectors in relation to their type and characteristics can have a significant
impact on false alarm rates. Examples are to ensure ionisation detectors are placed
away from potential draughts or cooking processes, and photoelectric detectors are
placed away from sources of steam. Table 8.3 summarises common detector types and
their characteristics.
Changing the response of the system to match changing conditions can also help false
alarm performance. In its simplest form this may some form of switch to give pre-alert
to the occupants or change detector sensitivities during normal business hours. Some
detectors on the market dynamically adjust to the environmental conditions.
Perhaps the best false alarm performance using current technology can be obtained by
the use of analogue addressable systems with multi-sensor detectors. This combina-
tion, correctly configured, provides excellent false alarm performance and has advan-
tages in terms of ongoing system maintenance.
8.10 Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems
General
This Section is intended to provide an overview of automatic fire sprinkler systems and
the New Zealand and Australian Standards for these systems, and to provide the fire
Cause % 
Unknown or no apparent cause  29.5 
Component failure 15.1 
Occupant activity 13.2 
Poor design / installation 7.8 
Poor building maintenance 7.0 
Building work 5.9 
Alarm service agent error 5.3 
Genuine fire 4.5 
Environmental effects 4.4 
Malicious 3.7 
Other emergency / good intent 1.9 
Mechanical damage 1.6 
Table 8.2: Causes of fire alarm activations (NZFS 2006/7)
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Table 8.3: Characteristics of common detector types
Detector Type Suitable for Not suitable for Susceptible to 
Heat detector  
(fixed temperature 
or rate of rise) 
General use 
Utility areas 
High humidity environments 
Dirty or smoky 
environments 
Porches, verandahs etc. 
Sleeping areas or 







encapsulate to reduce) 
Physical damage 
Sudden temperature 
rise (ROR only) 
Photoelectric 
smoke 
General indoor use 
Dense visible smoke 
Electrical cable fires 
Areas with high air flows 
Air handling ducts 
Areas where vehicles 
operate 
Clean flaming fires 
Wet areas 
Insects 
Dust and dirt 
Water and steam 
Moisture/condensation 
Tobacco smoke 
Ionisation smoke General indoor use 
Open flaming fires 
Slow smouldering 
fires 













High (e.g. atrium) areas 
Large open (indoor) spaces 
Stratified smoke detection 
Limited access areas 
Heritage ceilings 
Small fires 





Strong light sources 
Thermal turbulence 
Dust and dirt 
Insects 
Moisture/condensation 
Blockage by objects 
Aspirated smoke Large open (indoor) spaces 
Limited access areas 












Flame Flaming fires 
Large open spaces 








Other lighting sources 
Vibrating hot bodies 
Blockage by objects 
Dust and dirt 
Gas (CO) Smouldering fires 
False alarm minimisation 
Places with theatrical 
smoke 
High value risks (in 
combination with other 
types) 





High humidity areas 
Vehicle exhaust 
Heavy tobacco smoke 
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engineer guidance in specifying these systems.
New Zealand publishes three standards for sprinkler systems:
• NZS 4541 (Standards New Zealand, 2007) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems”. This
standard is predominately intended for commercial and industrial buildings.
• NZS 4515 (Standards New Zealand, 2003) “Fire sprinkler systems for residential
occupancies”. This standard is predominately intended to be used in smaller build-
ings used primarily for sleeping occupancies.
• NZS 4517 (Standards New Zealand, 2002) “Fire sprinkler systems for houses”.
This standard is intended to be used for single family dwellings.
Australia has a similar suite of standards for sprinkler systems, including
• AS 2118.1 (Standards Australia, 2006) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems, Part 1
General systems”. This is equivalent to NZS 4541, and used predominately to pro-
vide the design basis for commercial and industrial sprinkler systems.
• AS 2118.2 (Standards Australia, 1995) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems, Part 2
Drenchers”. This is a standalone standard for external drencher systems. There is no
New Zealand equivalent.
• AS 2118.3 (Standards Australia, 1997) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems, Part 3
Deluge”. This is a stand alone standard for deluge systems. Practice in New Zea-
land would be to use NFPA 15 “Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection”.
• AS 2118.4 (Standards Australia, 1995) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems, Part 4
Residential”. This is equivalent to NZS 4515.
• AS 2118.5 (Standards Australia, 2008) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems, Part 5
Home”. This is equivalent to NZS 4517.
• AS 2118.6 (Standards Australia, 1995) “Automatic fire sprinkler systems, Part 6
Combined sprinklers and hydrants”. This allows the combination of water supplies
and infrastructure for sprinkler and riser systems. This practice is not allowed in
New Zealand, as hydrants are seen primarily as a redundancy to sprinklers, should
the sprinkler system be decommissioned for maintenance, or otherwise fail.
Other codes and standards often used, when required by off-shore insurers, or to pro-
vide design options for specialised risks include those published by the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) in the USA, the Loss Prevention Council (LPC) in the
UK, or by insurance companies, such as Factory Mutual Global Data Sheets, which are
often used as de facto standards.
The New Zealand and Australian Standards were originally based on the Fire Officer’s
Committee rules that were developed in the UK during the last century. As most sprin-
kler technology is now being developed in USA, the sprinkler standards for both Aus-
tralia and New Zealand are changing to an American based approach, particularly with
respect to high challenge fire risks.
Sprinklers were first installed in Australia and New Zealand over 100 years ago. The
first system commissioned in Australia was at a firm of bedding manufacturers in Mel-
bourne, Laycock Son and Nettleton, in February 1886. This system controlled a fire in
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these premises on 21st December that year. In New Zealand, the first system was in-
stalled at the Northern Roller Mills site, in Fort Street in Auckland. Records indicate
that sprinklers operated in 9 fires on this site between 1941 and 1980.
Sprinkler systems are the most reliable general protection systems available. They con-
sist of a water supply connected to a system of pipes and heat-operated valves (sprin-
klers) which allow a fire to be automatically detected, the alarm given, and water deliv-
ered directly to the seat of the fire. By this means, a fire is extinguished or kept under
control until the fire service arrives.
Only the sprinklers in the fire area operate. It is shown from statistics for the years
1886-1986 (Marryatt, 1988) that 65% of the fires were controlled by one sprinkler,
92% were controlled by 1-5 sprinklers, 96.3% were controlled by 1-10 sprinklers and
only 3.7% required more than 10 sprinklers to operate.
Automatic sprinkler systems in all buildings other than small residential buildings or
houses should be designed and installed in accordance with NZS 4541, which specifies
the design, performance, installation and maintenance of sprinkler systems in buildings
or structures. In Australia, systems should be installed generally to AS 2118.1. These
standards cover classes of system, water supply requirements, sprinklers, pipework,
valves, pumps and other ancillary equipment.
For small residential buildings, automatic sprinkler systems should be designed and
installed in accordance with NZS 4515. This standard specifies design, installation and
maintenance requirements for automatic fire sprinkler systems for use in domestic and
other residential buildings not exceeding four stories, or 2000 m2 floor area under cer-
tain conditions. Within Australia, the equivalent standard for residential sprinkler sys-
tems is AS 2118.4. Sprinkler systems in houses can be designed and installed in accord-
ance with either NZS 4517 or AS 2118.5, which provide minimalist requirements to
ensure that domestic systems are installed at the lowest possible cost.
Water supply requirements for sprinkler systems are discussed in Chapter 14.
Sprinklers
Sprinkler systems are designed around the performance characteristics of sprinklers. A
sprinkler is a thermally operated valve, with a fusible element to hold a valve shut.
When the fusible element reaches a specific temperature, the sprinkler operates, open-
ing the valve and producing a spray of water. The water distribution pattern depends on
the type of deflector fitted.
Sprinklers can be generally described by a number of characteristics:
• Water distribution characteristics, e.g. Spray type, extended coverage, etc;
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• Thermal sensitivity;
• Finishes – e.g. natural brass, chrome plated, painted finishes; and
• Special service characteristics, e.g. corrosion protection coatings.
Modern sprinklers are marked with “Sprinkler Identification Numbers” (SIN numbers),
which allows the manufacturer of the sprinkler to be identified, and the installation and
performance requirements of the sprinklers to be identified. This information is par-
ticularly useful when attempting to modify an existing system, for which no design
information is available.
Method of operation
There are two basic types of fusible elements for sprinklers, these being the frangible
bulb and the fusible link. As a generalisation, frangible bulb sprinklers are most com-
monly used in Australia and New Zealand.
The frangible bulb is a sealed glass bulb that contains an alcohol-based solution that
contains an air bubble within it (see Figure 8.7a). As the temperature rises, the liquid
expands to fill the volume. When it is heated further, the pressure in the liquid rises
which bursts the glass bulb, allowing the valve to leave the orifice and the water to
flow. The operating temperature is controlled by controlling the size of the air bubble.
Sprinkler head operating temperatures range from 57˚C to 260˚C. The operating tem-
perature is identified by the colour of the liquid in the bulbs.
All bulbs are individually tested to ensure that the bubble disappears at a set tempera-
ture below its rated temperature, and that the bulb itself does not burst below the rated
temperature. In addition, a proportion of bulbs are tested to ensure that they do burst
within a specified tolerance. As such, there is an extremely high confidence that sprin-
klers will operate within specified tolerances.
Fusible link (eutectic metal) sprinklers (see Figure 8.7b) operate when the element
melts and separates at a specific temperature, allowing the valve to leave the orifice and
the water to flow. The operating temperature is controlled by the composition of the
metals used in forming the eutectic solder. The sprinklers are identified by coloured
markings on the sprinkler frame and stampings on the sprinkler casting. Again, fusible
link sprinklers undergo non-destructive and destructive tests, to provide confidence
that they will operate within specified tolerance limits.
Sprinkler response
In addition to the sprinkler’s operating temperature, its thermal characteristics are meas-
ured by its responsiveness. Its responsiveness is measured by the time the sprinkler
takes to operate when plunged into a heated air stream. The most common measure of
responsiveness is termed its Response Time Index (RTI). RTI is independent of the
sprinkler’s rated operating temperature.
For calculation purposes, it is normal to use RTI values of:
148
Fire Engineering Design Guide
Figure 8.7: Cross section of bulb and fusible link type sprinklers






























• fast 50 (m.s)1/2
• intermediate 80 (m.s)1/2
• standard 135 (m.s)1/2
Actual test values for specific sprinklers should not be used for calculation purposes as
they are a laboratory test for classification and the RTI of a sprinkler under test can vary
significantly depending on orientation, dust loadings and the like.
A second measure of responsiveness is its Conductivity (or Conduction) factor (C fac-
tor), which is a measure of the heat transfer between the sprinkler and the water filled
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pipe it is connected to. In fire engineering calculations, the factor is usually ignored, as
it only has a significant impact on very slow growth rate fires.
Sprinklers are defined as fast, intermediate (or special) or standard response based on
both its RTI and factor.
In addition to the characteristics of the sprinkler, including its operating temperature,
RTI and C factor, the actual operating time for the sprinkler is influenced by its instal-
lation criteria. This includes its distance below the ceiling and its distance from other
sprinklers. Thus, if sprinklers are installed at a maximum distance below the ceiling,
they will operate significantly slower than if sprinklers are installed at the optimum
distance below the ceiling of approximately 50 mm to 150 mm.
When discussing sprinkler sensitivity, the terms Quick Response and Fast Response
are often incorrectly interchanged. Fast Response is purely a measure of the sensitivity
of the sprinkler’s thermal element, and is only determined by a plunge test in an RTI
testing tunnel. Quick Response is a measure of the sprinkler as whole, as is measured
by a full scale fire test, where the sprinkler must operate within predetermined limits.
Hence, not all Fast Response sprinklers are Quick Response sprinklers.
Sprinkler charateristics can be used to model their response to give designers an esti-
mate of time to operate given sprinkler spacing, ceiling height, fire size and RTI. It is
important to understand the limitations of these calculations, as if incorrectly used, they
can provide significantly erroneous results.
Control versus suppression
The majority of sprinkler systems are designed to control a fire by pre-wetting sur-
rounding material and stop it spreading. The design intent is that the fire is finally
extinguished by the fire service or staff using portable equipment. In reality, in many
cases, the design intent is exceeded, and the fire is actually extinguished by the sprin-
kler system. Common exceptions include fires in storage occupancies, or where fires
are shielded from direct water spray, such as a fire under a desk. As such, most sprin-
klers are referred to as ‘Control Mode’ sprinklers.
In the early 1980s sprinklers which are intended to extinguish fires in high piled storage
occupancies were developed. These sprinklers are termed ‘Suppression Mode’ sprin-
klers, previously known as Early Suppression Fast Response sprinklers. Currently, Sup-
pression Mode sprinklers are only manufactured for storage occupancies. NFPA 13 (NFPA,
2007) has a heading ‘Quick Response Early Suppression’ sprinklers which is to intro-
duce the concept of suppression mode sprinklers for manufacturing and office type areas.
Such sprinklers are not at the stage of development that will allow them to be released to
the market.
Distribution patterns
There are three common types of deflectors fitted to sprinklers. These are conventional
pattern, spray pattern and sidewall pattern. Each produces a slightly different distribution
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pattern. Conventional pattern sprinklers are designed to produce a spherical discharge
pattern with some water being thrown up to the ceiling. They are usually made with a
universal deflector, allowing the head to be fitted in a pendant or upright position (CU/P).
Spray pattern sprinklers produce a hemispherical discharge below the plane of the de-
flector, with little or no water being discharged onto the ceiling. They are made in two
types, one for upright use (SSU) and the other for pendant (SSP).
Sidewall pattern sprinklers are designed for installation along the walls of a room close
to the ceiling. The deflector discharges the water to one side, somewhat resembling a
quarter of a sphere, with some water discharging on the wall behind the sprinkler. These
come in two types, vertical (VSW) and horizontal (HSW).
In addition, there are a number of special sprinklers for specific applications, including
window sprinklers, attic sprinklers and the like.
Recessed sprinklers
Recessed sprinklers are standard pendant spray sprinklers that have been installed us-
ing an adjustable recessed escutcheon to be positioned just below the ceiling surface
with the body above, and thus be less obtrusive. However, this means that baffling from
light fittings, etc., is a greater problem. This is the style of sprinkler most commonly
installed in New Zealand.
The impact of installing the sprinkler in this application on responsiveness is not well
understood, and usually ignored. A semi-recessed head is stated to be equivalent in
performance to a standard head installed approximately 200 mm below the ceiling.
Given this, the UK approvals body, the LPC, will not list heads installed in this manner
as Quick Response. However, the other major listing bodies, Underwriters Laborato-
ries (UL) and Factory Mutual Global (FM), do not place such restrictions on their list-
ings or approvals.
Concealed sprinklers
Concealed sprinklers are a specially constructed unit that is mounted above the ceiling
surface, with a flush cover plate on the ceiling. The cover plate is held with fusible tabs
that release at a lower temperature than the sprinkler bulb rating. When the cover plate
releases, the sprinkler deflector (which is on sliding pins) drops below the ceiling ready
to spray water when the sprinkler bulb fuses fuses. These sprinklers may not be used
where the ceiling space is used as a supply air plenum.
UL do list some concealed heads as Quick Response, but FM and LPC do not. This is as
the UL listing is based on comparative fire tests, comparing the performance of a quick
response spray sprinkler mounted 300 mm below the ceiling as against a concealed
sprinkler mounted in the ceiling. As such, if a comparative test was carried out with a
Quick Response sprinkler mounted at ceiling height, as against a concealed head, the
concealed head would operate considerably later than the ceiling mounted sprinkler. If
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the fire design requires the use of Quick Response sprinklers to achieve the design
objectivities, the validity of the design assumptions in the model need to be verified if
concealed sprinklers are being proposed.
Residential sprinklers
Residential sprinklers are designed and tested to control fire in a residential room. They
have a more sensitive bulb or fusible element and a discharge trajectory that wets the
walls much higher than a standard spray type sprinkler. They are available in pendant
and horizontal sidewall types. Recessed and concealed residential sprinklers are also
available. The location and use of these sprinklers is model specific and the manufac-
turer’s data sheet must be followed exactly and takes precedence over obstruction rules
and location rules in the design standards. Because of the flat trajectory and low water
flows, residential heads are particularly sensitive to ceiling obstructions, construction
and geometry, including lights and ceiling fans.
Suppression mode sprinklers
Suppression Mode sprinklers are special, large orifice sprinklers designed to deliver a
water discharge that is intended to suppress fires. Until recently, they were designated
as Early Suppression Fast Response (ESFR) sprinklers.
The rapid operation, coupled with the high volume discharge, enable these sprinklers to
suppress fires in high-pile storage racks without in-rack sprinklers. Specific rules con-
cerning building construction, spacing, location, category of combustibles and operat-
ing pressures apply to these sprinklers. They are sensitive to obstructions, and their
installation rules must be carefully adhered to, to ensure that they will successfully
suppress any fires.
Control mode specific application sprinklers
Control Mode Specific Application (CSMA) sprinklers were previously described as
Large Drop sprinklers. The new designation reflects an increase in the range of heads
that can be used in Large Drop applications. CSMA sprinklers are designed to discharge
larger water droplets than conventional or spray sprinklers. This enables the sprinkler
discharge to penetrate the fire plume of high challenge fires, such as those in vertical
rolled paper or rack storage without in-rack sprinklers. Specific rules concerning build-
ing construction, spacing, location and operating pressures apply to these sprinklers.
The design requirements for CSMA heads have been reviewed following calibration
tests in Factory Mutual Global’s new test centre, which has made them an uneconomi-
cal choice in many applications.
Extended coverage sprinklers
Extended coverage sprinklers are a spray pattern sprinkler that are designed to protect
areas larger than standard coverage areas using standard spray sprinklers. The installa-
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tion of these sprinklers must be in strict accordance with the manufacturer’s data sheet
and the listing information. The use of these sprinklers may offer a reduction in the
costs in installing sprinkler systems. However, their use may not be practicable, due to
coordination issues with structural and architectural features, or services such as lights
and the like. Extended coverage sprinklers are also available in horizontal sidewall
style deflectors. Table 8.4 provides an indication of the increases in coverage areas
using these sprinklers.
Comparison of Standard and Extended Coverage Sprinklers 
Occupancy Classification Standard Coverage Area (m2) Extended Coverage Area (m2) 
Extra Light Hazard 21 36 
Ordinary Hazard 12 36 
Extra High Hazard 9 to 12 18.5 
Table 8.4: Comparison of standard and extended coverage sprinklers
Dry sprinklers
These sprinklers have the water valve separated from the heat sensitive element and the
deflector by a drop pipe. This allows the sprinkler to be in a low temperature area while
the water filled pipework is in a space outside the cold area so the water will not freeze.
They are used for the protection of freezers and unheated concealed spaces on wet pipe
systems, and can also be used for low-level sprinklers on dry pipe and pre-action sys-
tems.
They are available in a wide range of deflector patterns and orifice sizes. The range
includes pendent and upright spray, and vertical and horizontal sidewall patterns. They
are also available in concealed pattern, albeit, these cannot be used in freezer environ-
ments.
It is important that the penetration between the sprinkler barrel and the freezer panel is
adequately sealed, and that the length of drop above the freezer is long enough to en-
sure that the top of the drop does not freeze through thermal conduction.
On-off sprinklers
These sprinklers were designed to open at a set temperature and then shut off when the
temperature drops once the fire is controlled. They can open again if the fire increases.
On-off sprinklers were often used where water sensitive equipment is protected.
There are no currently listed or approved on-off sprinklers. A change in sprinkler manu-
facturing standards has precluded the use of o-ring seals, and the manufacturers of
sprinklers have not been able to design a sprinkler without such seals.
Special application sprinklers
When market opportunities are recognised, sprinkler manufacturers may identify the
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need for sprinklers to protect specialised risks. Examples of such sprinklers include:
• Window Sprinklers – which have been fire tested to provide equivalents to fire
ratings on glazed surfaces
• Attic Sprinklers – designed to protect long narrow pitched storage spaces, as often
encountered in American homes
• Corridor Sprinklers – designed to minimise the numbers of sprinklers required to
protect hotel or apartment building corridors.
Of the examples described above, only Window Sprinklers have been used in any ap-
preciable extent in New Zealand.
Orifice size
Water flow through an orifice Q (litres/min) can be calculated from:
Q K P= [8.1]
where K is the discharge coefficient (L/min/(kPa)1/2) and P is the pressure (kPa).
Sprinkler K Factors vary from a nominal 2.0 to 36.3. Table 8.5 shows the standard
nominal K Factors, the allowable range, and the percentage of discharge when com-
pared to the most commonly used 15 mm K = 8 sprinkler.
When the K factors fall within the specified range, it is important to use the nominal K
Nominal K factor 
(L/min/(kPa)1/2) 
K Factor Range 
(L/min/(kPa)1/2) 
Percent of 
nominal K = 8 
Discharge 
2.0 1.9 – 2.2 25 
2.7 2.6 – 2.9 33.3 
4.0 3.8 – 4.2 50 
5.7 5.6 – 5.9 70 
6.0 5.9 – 6.4 75 
8.0 7.6 – 8.4 100 
11.5 10.7 – 11.8 140 
16 15.9 – 16.6 200 
20 19.5 – 20.9 250 
24 21.1 – 25.4 300 
27 27.2 – 30.1 350 
32 31.1 – 34.3 400 
36 34.9 – 38.7 450 
Table 8.5: Standard sprinkler discharge characteristics
(Extracted from Dubay,  2007)
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Factor, and not the specific K Factor that may be published in the manufacturer’s data
sheet, to ensure that replacement sprinklers are compatible with the design.
The impact of orifice size on sprinkler performance has been well researched. Sprin-
klers with smaller orifices produce smaller droplets, which have lower momentum, and
a lesser ability to penetrate the fire plume. It is for this reason that as the size of the
expected fire increases, the need to use larger orifice sprinklers arises. The size of the
fire is subject to the expected fire growth rate, and the height of the sprinklers above the
fire. These requirements have been implicitly incorporated in NZS 4541 and AS 2118.1.
Types of sprinkler systems
Wet pipe
A wet pipe sprinkler installation is one that has all pipes from the water supply through
the control valves to sprinklers permanently filled with water under pressure. This is
the usual type of sprinkler system and as water is available throughout the system, it
can effectively control a fire with the least delay. As long as ambient temperatures do
not fall below 4˚C consistently, a wet pipe system should be installed. Where tempera-
tures are expected to fall below 4˚C, provisions need to be made for freeze protection.
Dry pipe
The dry pipe sprinkler installation has the pipes above the control valves charged with
air or nitrogen under sufficient pressure to prevent the entry of water. On the operation
of a sprinkler, the compressed gas escapes, allowing the control valves to operate and
fill the system with water. They are generally used where the ambient temperature will
allow freezing, and in some cases, may be installed where elevated temperatures exist
that would cause vapourisation of water and increased corrosion.
When a sprinkler operates in a dry system, there is a time delay before water reaches
the open sprinkler, and starts to control the fire. This time delay is influenced by many
variables, such as system air pressure, the time for the dry valve to open, the size of the
sprinkler orifices, and the transit time delay for water to flow along the pipes to the
open sprinklers. Given that the water filling the pipe is two-phase flow, the time delay
can only be calculated using computer software.
Given that the delay will result in a larger fire, which will require greater volumes of
water to effect control, most sprinkler standards require that the designer accounts for
this by increasing the design area of discharge.
Antifreeze systems
Antifreeze systems are systems that are filled with a solution of antifreeze and water, at
a proportion to depress the freezing point to below the expected minimum ambient
temperature. The most common antifreeze agent used is mono propylene glycol, al-
though in the past, glycerin was also widely used. While they can appear inherently
simple, poor design or installation practices can lead to significant service issues. Until
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recently, they were the de facto choice for the protection of storage freezers, as the New
Zealand standards did not require any increase over design densities or areas of opera-
tion when compared to wet pipe systems. Fire testing carried out in the 1990s indicated
that most common antifreeze agents are flammable, and as such, increases is design
flows are required to cater for the increased size of fire before suppression or control
can be achieved. To reflect this research, the New Zealand sprinkler standard only al-
lows the use of antifreeze systems in storage occupancies, when they are listed for this
purpose.
Pre-action sprinklers
Pre-action systems are a specialised form of sprinkler system which is installed in areas
where there is an unacceptable risk of accidental water damage. This may include elec-
tronic rooms, critical document storage rooms and freezers. The sprinkler system is air
filled, with water held back by a specialised deluge valve. A parallel detection system is
installed in conjunction with the sprinkler system. The detection system must operate,
and open the valve, and a sprinkler operate for water to discharge from the sprinklers.
The common types of detection systems include wet pilot or dry pilot lines, which
consist of a parallel small bore sprinkler line, smoke detection, or linear thermal detec-
tion cable.
The common types of pre-action systems are single interlock and double interlock. A
single interlock system valve opens on activation of the detection system, and is used in
most applications. A double interlock system valve opens only when both the detection
system and a sprinkler operates. These systems should be used only where there is a
risk of freezing if the detection system false alarms. There is a perception that double
interlock systems offer increased security against accidental water damage when com-
pared against single interlock systems. This is incorrect, and in a real fire situation, fire
and smoke damage using these systems is increased, due to the time delay between the
valve opening and water discharging onto the fire.
Deluge systems
A deluge system uses specialised nozzles or open sprinklers on dry pipework, which all
discharge at the same time in a zoned area.
The deluge valves hold back the water until it is released by a detector system. The
detector system is often a series of closed sprinklers on a separate array of air-filled or
water-filled pipes in the same area as the open sprinklers. Alternative arrangements may
include electronic releasing systems, which could include heat detectors, smoke detec-
tors or flame detectors. Manually operated deluge systems may also be appropriate.
Deluge systems are used where very rapid fires can occur, such as aircraft hangars,
fireworks factories, etc. Aircraft hangers are usually designed to NFPA 409 (NFPA,
2004) while other systems are designed to other NFPA standards, such as NFPA 15
(NFPA, 2007).
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NFPA 15 requires that the designer evaluate the design objective for the system, which
could include:
• cooling a pressure vessel to prevent a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour
Explosion) occurring;
• cooling surrounding plant and equipment to prevent damage from an exposure fire;
• extinguishing the fire; or
• a combination of the above.
One example of deluge system application is a High Velocity Water Spray system, to
protect an oil filled transformer, where the nozzles are design to be projected onto
burning oil, and extinguish the oil fire. If there are adjacent transformers, operation of
the system will prevent damage to that transformer from the exposure from the burning
transformer.
Drencher systems
Drencher systems are designed to project a spray of water on to a wall to completely
wet the area exposed to fire, thereby reducing the likelihood of ignition from exposure
to a fire in an adjacent building. Drencher systems may simply be external sprinklers if
a fire sprinkler system is installed in a building. They are similar to sprinkler systems
but may be equipped with either open or fusible-type drencher sprinklers.
It is essential to design drencher systems to ensure that all surfaces are wetted by water
run down. This is especially critical with glazing, where dry areas will allow the glaz-
ing to fail. As such, drencher designs need to be carefully coordinated with building
design, to ensure that obstructions such as vertical mullions and horizontal transoms do
not disrupt water run-down.
Marryatt (1988) reports that there is plenty of empirical evidence that standard sprin-
klers will provide acceptable levels of protection from exposure fires. However, where
drenchers are required to be used as part of meeting NZBC requirements they need to
be formally listed for this purpose (BIA, 2003).
Foam water systems
Where large quantities of flammable liquids are stored or handled, the performance of
sprinkler, deluge or water spray systems can be enhanced by the addition of foam con-
centrates.
Foam is stored in specialised containers and is inducted at the control valves. The most
common forms of foam induction used include bladder tank balance pressure systems,
in-line induction or balanced pressure pump based systems. Specialist knowledge is
required to specify these systems. Typically, foam solution is made up of either 1%, 3%
or 6% foam concentrate, with the balance of the solution being water.
There are three general types of foam blankets formed – low, medium and high-expan-
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sion solutions. Low expansion foam solutions are used to protect two-dimensional fires,
such as fires expected in aircraft hangars, or in fuel storage depots. High expansion
foam solutions can be used to protect three dimensional risks, such as flammable liquid
stores, and rubber tyre storage areas. Medium expansion foam solutions are generally
used by the fire service in hand line induction systems.
Many types of foam concentrates are available, including Aqueous Film Forming Foams
(AFFF), Alcohol Resistant Concentrates (ARC) and protein based foams. Each type of
concentrate has its own specific advantages.
Not withstanding the type of foam concentrate, foam solution extinguishes a fire by
sealing of the fuel vapours from the oxygen in the air. Depending on the type of concen-
trate used, the foam solution may also insulate the fuel surface and provide some meas-
ure of cooling.
Design parameters are specified in the applicable standard, which can include various
NFPA standards.
Water mist systems
These systems apply very fine droplets to areas of combustion and the surrounding
atmosphere to achieve rapid cooling with minimal water. Mist systems require very
specific design backed by extensive testing data. There was considerable emphasis on
their development in the 1990s, primarily driven by the need to retrofit off-shore pas-
senger vessels
They can be used to protection machinery rooms, (such as ship’s engine rooms), inter-
nal oil filled transformer enclosures, flammable liquid stores and many other risks.
Water mist systems generally operate by the fine droplets being entrained into the base
of the fire, and expanding to vapour. As the expansion ratio of water to vapour is in the
order of 1700:1 (Figure 14.2), this displaces the oxygen from the fire. Other mecha-
nisms involved include energy absorption during the change in phase to vapour, and
pre-wetting of surrounding combustible products.
The fine droplets may also scrub some of the products of combustion from the atmos-
phere, thereby reducing the amount of smoke damage to the surrounding area.
In some cases, water mist systems have been promoted as an alternative to gas flood
systems, in electronic equipment areas and the like. While the level of water damage to
the area will be reduced when compared to that from a normal sprinkler system, the
level of fire damage to equipment inside the cabinets will be greater than if a gas flood
system was installed, as the water mist cannot be described as a true 3 dimensional
agent, but more of a ‘22-D’ agent (Andersson et al, 1999).
Equivalency with automatic sprinkler systems to cater with risks of up to Ordinary
Hazard Group 3 occupancies has been demonstrated.
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Hazard classification
It is necessary to classify the fire hazard of occupancy to establish the design param-
eters for a satisfactory sprinkler system. The density of water discharge and expected
maximum area of operation are the main criteria for a sprinkler system that will control
and/or extinguish a fire. In NZS 4541, occupancies have been divided into three main
hazard classes based on past sprinkler experience, fire tests and statistics. The follow-
ing hazard classifications are those of NZS 4541. AS 2118 classifications are similar.
Extra Light Hazard (ELH)
Extra light hazard occupancies are non-industrial premises where the amount and com-
bustibility of the contents is low.
Ordinary Hazard (OH)
Ordinary hazard occupancies are commercial and industrial premises involved in the
handling, processing and storage of mainly ordinary combustible materials unlikely to
develop intensely burning fires in the initial stages. The range of occupancies in this
class has been subdivided into four groups, based on the expected maximum number of
sprinklers required to operate:
• Group One (OH1) 6 sprinklers.
• Group Two (OH2) 12 sprinklers.
• Group Three (OH3) 18 sprinklers.
• Group Three Special (OH3S) 30 sprinklers.
If goods are stored above certain heights listed in the sprinkler standard, then the
occupancy should shift into the Extra High Hazard group.
Extra High Hazard (EHH)
Extra high hazard risks are those commercial and industrial occupancies having high
fire loads. These are divided into two groups:
• Process risks – where materials handled or processed are likely to develop rapid and
intensely burning fires; and
• High piled storage risks – where goods are stacked above acceptable limits for fire
protection by Ordinary Hazard sprinkler systems.
As the height of goods is increased, the density of water application has to be increased
to cope with the expected fire. NZS 4541 contains lists of typical occupancies in each
class or group; however, the classification of occupancies is subject to interpretation
and need to be confirmed with the Sprinkler System Certifier. The occupancy classifi-
cation is the most important item, as it determines the basis of design for any fire sprin-
kler system. One property could have a large number of occupancies. For example, a
hotel is ELH but can include a liquor store that is OH3 or EHH, depending on storage
heights, and a restaurant that is OH2.
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Residential
Residential buildings include rest homes, hotels or motels and boarding houses. Resi-
dential systems can be installed to NZS 4515 at a lower cost compared to a system
complying with NZS 4541, if they are four stories of less, and of a floor area not greater
than 2000 m2. Cost savings result from design criteria, water supply requirements, and
valving arrangement. If they do not comply with these limitations, they are required to
be installed to NZS 4541.
Domestic sprinkler systems
While the installation of sprinkler systems into houses in USA has been reasonably
wide spread, and driven by building codes, the installation of sprinkler systems into
New Zealand’s single-family homes is an emerging trend, without the added impetuous
of legislative requirements.
A New Zealand Standard NZS 4517 has been developed to ensure that the minimum
level of protection is provided to provide reasonable surety of life safety, at a minimum
cost. The Standard allows the domestic cold water reticulation to be combined with the
sprinkler reticulation to reduce the marginal cost in installing sprinklers. The system
also allows stand alone systems, which would be used in the retrofit market, and if
enhanced features such as water flow alarms are required.
Since NZS 4517 has been published, two key lessons have emerged. The first is the
need to ensure that the water supply is adequately sized. Reliance cannot be placed on
the ability of standard sized (20 mm and 25 mm) water meters and supply pipes to feed
the system. The other lesson is the need to ensure that the pipe sizes used in calculations
are not confused. The calculations are carried out on the internal diameter of the pipe,
which has been confused with the outside diameter of the pipe.
Design calculations
Sprinkler systems are hydraulically calculated to ensure that either a design density is
achieved over a design area, or alternatively, that a design number of sprinklers operate
at a minimum head pressure. Design density is the volume rate of water that is dis-
charged over an area, and is usually measured in L/min/m2 or mm/min.
Simple systems can be calculated by hand, however, generally, systems are calculated
by specialised sprinkler system calculation software, which can cater for gridded sys-
tems and the like.
Generally, calculations use the Hazen-Williams formula for friction loss, due to its
simplicity. This formula is reproduced in virtually every sprinkler standard, so it has
not been repeated here.
As the Hazen-Williams formula only relates to clean cold water, and cannot cater for
fluids with differing densities or viscosities, in some cases it is necessary to use alterna-
tive methods of calculating friction loss, such as the Darcy-Weisbach method. Exam-
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ples include calculations carried out for foam concentrates and antifreeze based sys-
tems. Many of the commonly used sprinkler hydraulic software packages do not cater
for Darcy-Weisbach based calculations.
It is important to recognise that the calculations are only a method of determining pipe
sizes and water supply requirements, and not a measure of system operational expecta-
tions in a fire. Hence, as an example, while an Ordinary Hazard system may be based
on, say,18 sprinklers operating, and statistics gleaned from sources such as Marryatt
(1988) indicate a significantly lower number of sprinklers that have operated in real
fires, there is no assurance that the system will operate if the system is designed for a
lower number of sprinklers to operate. Given that fewer sprinklers have operated, the
densities are higher, and may be closer to those required to actually control a fire, as
against the arbitrary number used in the design. Given the growth of full-scale testing
in sprinkler designs, new technologies tend to indicate the number of sprinklers re-
quired to operate, and the minimum sprinkler pressure, which is a more accurate repre-
sentation of the number of sprinklers expected to operate in a fire.
Sprinkler spacing
The spacing of sprinklers is dependent on which class of system is to be installed, and
the type of sprinklers to be used. The installation criteria may be nominated in stand-
ards, or may be defined in the sprinkler manufacturer’s data sheet.
Sprinkler location
Sprinklers perform two functions. They both detect the fire and spray water. The pri-
mary means of activation is via convection from the ceiling jet. To gain best detection
the sprinklers should be within 50 to 150 mm of the ceiling. If the sprinklers are located
a greater distance below the ceiling, they will operate later. Standards will define the
maximum distance that a sprinkler can be installed below a ceiling for this reason.
It is often necessary to position sprinklers at a greater distance, depending on ceiling or
roof construction. The spacing of sprinklers in relation to beams is governed by the
depth of the beam and the allowable distances are often given in tabular form in a
standard. The maximum distance of sprinklers from walls is normally half the design
spacing. The requirements of the listing data (for special sprinklers) must be followed
and not varied.
Approval of sprinkler systems
New Zealand has operated a third party sprinkler system certification system for many
years. The Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) for sprinklers systems was tradition-
ally the Insurance Council of New Zealand, Incorporated (ICONZ). ICONZ approved
basic design decisions, sprinkler equipment, contractors, and the final approval of the
completed system. This third party inspection and approval process by an expert in
sprinkler system design is often recognised as one key reason that New Zealand sprin-
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kler systems are more reliable than those installed in other parts of the world. New
Zealand claims a success rate of some 99.8% for systems installed, while in USA,
success rates can be quoted as low as 85% to 90%.
In the early part of this century, ICONZ withdrew from the role of approving sprinkler
systems. A system of Sprinkler System Certifiers was introduced, which allowed com-
petition in certification of sprinkler systems.
The approvals process operates in parallel to the Building Consent process, and usually
relied on by Building Consent Authorities as providing expert advice as to the status of
a sprinkler system, when ascertaining whether a Code Compliance certificate should be
issued for the building.
Sprinkler system failures
As sprinkler systems are often relied on in fire engineering designs, it is important to
understand why they may fail to meet their design objectives on occasions. The term
failure is difficult to define, as with respect to property damage, it is hard to quantify
what is a success and what is a failure. As such, any discussion can only be subjective.
With respect to life safety, the definition of failure is also hard to define. One measure
is when a person not ‘intimate’ with flames dies as a result of fire, or another measure is
when multiple fatalities occur in a sprinklered building.
There are six recorded deaths (Mears, 2006) from fire in sprinklered buildings in New
Zealand. Three are in rest-homes or care facilities. In two cases, the deceased set fire to
their clothes or furniture in which they were sitting while smoking. In the third case, the
deceased appears to have poured petrol over himself, and used a lighter to ignite him-
self. Two deaths are recorded in prisons. In one, it appears that the deceased had inter-
fered with the sprinkler in his cell, by wrapping strips of blanket around it, and then
setting the contents of his cell alight. In the second case, the inmate was doused in
petrol and then set alight by another inmate. The last case recorded was when the syn-
thetic grass skirt that the deceased was wearing at a Christmas party was set alight by a
fellow workmate within a closed toilet cubicle. All these cases are deemed to be be-
yond the capability of a sprinkler system, as the deceased was in direct contact with
flames.
With respect to property damage, there have been a number of well reported fires in
which the sprinkler system performance was questionable. Marryatt (1988) reports the
cause of these losses for the period 1886 to 1986. The key issue is that failures have led
to enhancements in the Standard to ensure that the failures do not reoccur in the future.
In recent years, there have been a number of high profile fires within New Zealand,
where sprinkler performance was questioned. In one fire, every sprinkler in a retail area
opened. The cause of this was attributed to a shielded fire within foamed mattresses,
which resulted in a redesign of storage arrangements. The second fire of interest oc-
curred in which approximately sixty sprinklers opened at roof level, albeit there was
little structural damage. The cause of an excessive number of sprinklers was attributed
to the impact that the air-conditioning plant had on blowing the fire plume away from
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the sprinklers over the fire itself. This resulted in a change in the New Zealand Standard
that required that the impact of such plant needs to be evaluated in the fire design.
In summary, the performance of sprinkler systems is being constantly evaluated by
those writing standards. If there is any question of ineffective performance, it is likely
to lead to a change in the rules, to ensure that system performance can be relied on in
the future.
Design alternatives
In the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC, certain design alternatives are available for
the use of fire sprinkler systems, such as a reduction in fire resistance ratings and an
increase in the maximum firecell size. These alternatives originated as an incentive to
install sprinklers in recognition of their effectiveness.
Caution must be exercised when applying design alternatives using sprinklers because
of the possibility of the sprinklers not operating, in which case an uncontrolled fire
would be likely to occur.
Design alternatives should always be thoroughly investigated by building designers, as
they may result in greater levels of protection without the expected increase in cost.
8.11 Other Systems
Hydrant mains systems
Hydrant mains systems consist of permanently installed pipework to allow the fire
service to get water on to a fire much more quickly than would be possible by laying
hose, especially in multi-storey buildings. Design and installation of hydrant mains
systems in New Zealand should be in accordance with NZS 4510 (Standards New Zea-
land, 2008), which specifies the design, construction, performance testing and water
supply requirements for riser mains systems for use by fire service personnel.
AS 2419.1 (Standards Australia, 1994) should be used within Australia. More informa-
tion on hydrant mains systems is given in Chapter 15.
Gas flood fire extinguishing systems
Gas flood fire extinguishing systems are used for special applications where water would
cause problems. They are most often used in electronic data processing rooms, motor
control rooms, switch rooms and ship machinery spaces. They can be used in areas
housing delicate or rare artifacts, such as library rare book rooms. They can also be
used to protect localised special risks, such as printing presses and cooking plant.
Systems are classified as either local application or total flooding systems. Localised
application systems generally use carbon dioxide as an agent, and consist of storage
vessels, pipework and nozzles used to extinguish a localised fire. Such systems would
be typically used to protect printing presses using flammable inks. Total flood systems
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are used to protect the contents of a room, and are typically used in electronic data
processing (EDP) rooms and the like.
Gas flood agents are generally classified as either chemical agents or inert agents. The
chemical agents most commonly available in New Zealand include HFC227a, (which
includes Great Lakes’ FM200TM agent), and 3M’s NOVEC 1230TM agents. The most
commonly used inerting agent used in New Zealand is INERGENTM, which is a pat-
ented mixture of nitrogen, carbon dioxide and argon gases, which is used to reduce the
oxygen content of a room to below the limits of combustion but still enables a person to
breathe (Figure 8.8).  AS 4214 (Standards Australia, 2002) is commonly used in New
Zealand and Australia or NFPA 2001 (NFPA, 2008). The manufacturer’s design and

































INERGEN® Fire Suppression System
Figure 8.8: Typical INERGENTM gas flood installation protecting EDP room
(Image courtesy of Ansul Incorporated)
Factors that should be considered when choosing between chemical agents and inert
agents can include:
• Initial capital cost.
• Cost of recharging cylinders after discharge.
• Time to recharge system when chemical agents are used.
• Environmental impact of agent, including Atmospheric Life Time, and Global Warm-
ing Potential.
• Footprint required for cylinder installation.
• Ability to locate cylinders away from protected area.
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• Damage to protected equipment from decomposition of agent.
These factors should not be reviewed in isolation. For example, systems with the low-
est capital cost will often have high recharge costs, when chemical agents are consid-
ered. In addition, the time taken to procure the replacement agent may be a factor.
The footprint required for agent storage may be an issue, especially in leasable space,
such as adjacent to computer installations in high rise buildings. However, the impact
of this may be able to be discounted, if the agent cylinders can be stored remotely.
Environmental factors should also be reviewed. Modern agents have been developed to
replace the halons which had a significant impact on the ozone layer. Under controls
imposed by the Ozone Layer Protection Act, agents that have Ozone Depletion Poten-
tial cannot be imported. Australia has enacted legislation which requires that agents
with significant Global Warming Potential be controlled, including the requirements to
report any losses to the atmosphere, in an aid to help protect the environment. New
Zealand does not currently have such controls.
In addition to the new generation agents, in some cases, use of older systems such as
carbon dioxide is possible. Carbon dioxide is hazardous for total flooding systems be-
cause the concentrations needed (34% to 75%) for fire extinguishment are life threaten-
ing. For this reason, carbon dioxide should normally only be considered for local applica-
tion systems, such as protecting printing presses or deep fryer production cooking lines.
Carbon dioxide systems are generally installed in accordance with NFPA 12 (NFPA, 2008).
Other factors which need to be considered in the design of total flood gas flood systems
include the ability of the room to hold the design concentration of the gas, and the
desire to have discharge testing carried out. Room integrity should be proven by a fan
test, which pressurises the room, and measures the leakage of gas from the room. The
results of this testing are entered into a computer model, which will predict the holding
time of the room, for which the design concentration is maintained. Sometimes, a full
discharge test is specified, to prove the results of the fan integrity testing that had been
carried out.
Other specialised fire protection systems
An analysis of a building, and its contents and process may result in the need to provide
special fire protection to protect unique risks. In addition to the gas flood systems de-
scribed above, there are a number of other special hazard systems to protect against
such risks.
Kitchens in restaurants pose a real fire risk, especially where the cooking process in-
cludes deep fat fryers. Fires in such equipment can quickly spread up the extraction
ducts and pose a threat to the complete building. Specialised wet chemical based sys-
tems have been developed, which discharge an agent which forms a soapy insulating
blanket over hot surfaces, including the cooking surfaces and the inside of the extrac-
tion duct duct (Figure 8.9). NFPA 17A (NFPA, 2002) is an applicable standard for wet
chemical systems.
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Dry chemical systems usually consist of compressed nitrogen cylinders that pressurise
a large powder vessel, allowing dry powder to be discharged through fixed nozzles
shortly after the detection system operates. Dry chemical systems are usually designed
in accordance with NFPA 17 (NFPA, 2002). A typical example where such a system
could be used is to protect a flammable liquids store within a factory.
Hand-held fire extinguishers
Hand-held fire extinguishers fall into several categories, depending on the fire fighting
medium. The most common are dry powder, water, carbon dioxide, foam or wet chemi-
cals. Fire extinguishers are categorised according to the extinguishing agent and the
types of fire on which they can safely be used:
• Class A — ordinary combustibles (wood, paper, plastic, textiles etc.)
• Class B — flammable liquids
• Class C — flammable gases
• Class D — flammable metals
• Class E — energised electrical equipment
• Class F — cooking fats and oils.
Extinguishing agents






















R-102™ Fire Suppression System
Figure 8.9: Kitchen fire suppression system
(Image courtesy of Ansul Incorporated)
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Water – Class A risks
Dry powder (standard) – Class B, C and E
Dry powder – Class A, B, C and E or Class B and E (subject to chemical
agent used.)
Dry powder (specialised) – Class D
Carbon dioxide – Class B and E
Foam – Class A and B (Note, if polar solvents are present,
specialised alcohol resistant foams are required.)
Wet chemical – cooking oils and fats
Halon 1211 (obsolete) – Class B and E.
Installation and maintenance of fire extinguishers should meet the requirements of NZS
4503 (Standards New Zealand, 2005) or AS 2444 (Standards Australia, 2001) and AS
1851 (Standards Australia, 2005).
Fire hose reels
Fire hose reels consist of a coiled flexible hose permanently fixed on a reel attached to
a wall of a building. Fire hose reels are intended to be operated by the occupants of a
building in the event of a fire. Fire hose reels should be able to project a jet of water 6
metres when two adjacent reels are operating. They must be installed so that the nozzle
end of at least one hose can reach any part of the building when it is occupied.
Fire hose reels should be manufactured in accordance with AS/NZS 1221  (Standards
New Zealand, 1997) and installed in accordance with NZS 4503, or AS 2441 in Australia.
Installation of fire extinguishers and hose reels
The documents published as a means of complying with the NZBC place little empha-
sis on first attack fire fighting using hose reels or extinguishers. This may be partially
based on the premise that occupants should evacuate a building and not attempt to
extinguish a fire. Not withstanding this, there is plenty of evidence to establish that
hand operated fire fighting equipment has a significant role to play in limiting fire
damage, with at least one study carried out in the UK and Europe  (Fire Extinguishing
Trades Association, 2003) indicating that some 80% of fires are extinguished using
such equipment without fire service intervention. Before a fire engineer decides not to
install such equipment the potential impacts of recommending against it in a building
design should be evaluated. It should be noted that under heath and safety in employ-
ment legislation that training needs to be provided to those in the work force who may
be expected to use this equipment.
8.12 EWIS Systems
An EWIS (Emergency Warning and Intercommunication System) is an enhanced sys-
tem for fire alarm alerting and evacuation control in very large, tall, or complex build-
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ings. Instead of the whole building receiving the (evacuation) alerting signal simultane-
ously, the premises are subdivided into multiple evacuation zones, each zone having a
separate (supervised) amplifier and loudspeaker circuit. In response to area-specific
signals from the fire detection system, the EWIS automatically controls a zone-by-zone
progressive evacuation according to a pre-programmed ‘cascade’ scheme. Time delays
between cascade phases are selected to suit the particular building, but would typically
be in the range 2-10 minutes.
The rationale behind audio/voice evacuation systems is that although conventional fire
alarm notification devices alert occupants of a building of the presence of an emer-
gency, they do not provide detailed information to the occupants, such as evacuation
routes or instructions. Nor do they allow occupants in the greatest danger to have
unimpeded access to escape routes, or for an evacuation strategy to be changed midway
through the process. EWIS only works correctly if the management processes and training
are in place.
Because a full progressive evacuation of a large building may take a significant time,
EWIS field wiring which traverses another evacuation zone is required to be fire rated.
System battery capacity must also allow for at least 1.5 hours in full emergency opera-
tion with no mains supply.
As with ‘all out’ evacuation, an EWIS system automatically generates the standard
‘rising whoop’ evacuation signal interspersed with a voice message conveying specific
evacuation instructions. With an EWIS these messages can be customised for various
types of installations, and multi-lingual capabilities are usually available. In addition
an earlier ‘Alert’ tone, with optional (different) interspersed verbal message, can be
automatically played to zones that have not (yet) reached the evacuation stage. Visual
signals can also be provided, where appropriate, either for alert, evacuation, or both. A
typical New Zealand style phased evacuation cascade is shown in Table 8.6.
EWIS systems are also designed with Emergency Control Panels (ECPs) to enable
either attending fire fighters or designated building wardens to take manual control of
Zone N + 5 
(top) 
 Alert Alert Alert Alert Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N + 4  Alert Alert Alert Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N + 3  Alert Alert Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N + 2  Alert Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N + 1  Alert Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N  Alert Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N – 1  Alert Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 
Zone N – 2  Alert Alert Alert Alert Alert Evacuate 














  Time 
Table 8.6: Typical New Zealand style multi-storey EWIS evacuation cascade – initial
activation in zone N
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the evacuation, and to direct emergency Public Address (PA) announcements to all or
selected evacuation zones. Multiple control locations are also common – ‘Master’
(MECP) and ‘Slave’ (SECP).
The (optional) Emergency Intercommunication (warden fire-phone) system compo-
nent allows building wardens or fire fighting personnel to communicate, under master
warden control, from within the zones to the master evacuation control panel to coordi-
nate evacuation efforts. These red WIP (Warden Intercommunication Point) phones are
typically located at the exit points from each zone.
The components of a typical EWIS system are shown diagrammatically in Figure 8.10.
Commercial EWIS systems usually permit multiple messages. For instance, ‘non fire’
messages can be programmed for situations such as a hazardous material spill, gas
leaks, security breaches, etc. Time clocks can also be interfaced to play regular mes-
sages, e.g. “The library will be closing in 15 minutes…”, to all or selected zones. EWIS
systems are also regularly used to provide non-emergency building PA facilities. This
Figure 8.10: Typical EWIS system configuration (Tyco Safety Products 2007)
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is generally to be encouraged as any problems (coverage, volume and intelligibility)
are more likely to be remedied before the system is required in an emergency.
Under the NZBC Approved Documents, EWIS systems are designated as ‘Type 8’ Voice
Evacuation Systems and are mandated for certain types of new buildings, primarily in
healthcare, high-rise, and large crowd occupancies (cinemas, stadiums, shopping malls).
They are required to comply with AS 2220 Part 1: and to be installed to AS 2220 Part 2
(Standards Australia, 1989).
In Australia EWIS systems are used in a much larger range of premises. Permitted
design standards are AS 4428.4 (Standards Australia, 2004) or AS 60849/AS 1670.4
(Standards Australia, 2004). A ‘Temporal 3’ evacuation signal to ISO 8201 (Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, 1987) with ‘emergency’ and ‘evacuate now’
interspersed keywords has recently been introduced along with specific requirements
for voice message intelligibility.
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Worldwide, codes on fire safety systems in buildings recognise the danger to life from
smoke (Figure 9.1) and require that buildings be designed and operated to prevent mi-
gration of smoke through the building.
Occupant safety can be greatly improved by providing efficient smoke control and
exhaust systems. Moreover, such systems can limit property damage by limiting the
spread of smoke and by providing better visibility and thus easier access to the seat of
the fire for fire fighters.
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide basic guidance and information to the designers
of active mechanical systems for smoke control. It should be noted, however, that as
buildings can differ widely, building design for smoke control involves experienced
engineering judgement to tailor all the systems involved to the building and specific
design objectives. Additional design guidance is given by Butcher and Parnell (1979),
CIBSE, TM19 (CIBSE, 1995), BRE 368 (Morgan et al, 1999), Klote and Milke (2002)
and Klote (2002).
9.2 Mechanics of Smoke Production
General description
Smoke is a hot buoyant gas — basically hot air plus contamination. As such, it obeys
the fundamental laws of fluid mechanics. Several basic principles should be under-
stood by designers of smoke control and extract systems. A smoke extract system does
Figure 9.1: Smoke billowing from the MGM Grand Hotel, Las Vegas. Most of the 84
people who died were overcome by smoke remote from the fire
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not ‘push’ or ‘suck’ the smoke from an area being protected. Instead, it merely exhausts
smoke which has migrated to the area of the extract opening under the influence of its
own buoyancy.
The amount of smoke produced by a fire will vary both from fire to fire and from time
to time in the same fire. It is a function of its size (and heat release rate) and the path
through which the smoke flows. In particular, it is related to the size and geometry of
the rising smoke plume, i.e. its perimeter and height. This is because the turbulence
around the perimeter of the rising plume entrains the surrounding air as it rises. This air
is then incorporated into the plume, increasing the total volume of smoke but reducing
its temperature and concentration. Conversely, a non-turbulent smoke layer, such as
may be formed beneath a horizontal ceiling, does not entrain significant quantities of
air unless excessive horizontal travel occurs.
Constituents of smoke
The plume of hot gases above a fire will have many constituent parts, which will gen-
erally fall into three groups:
(a) hot vapours and gases given off by the burning material;
(b) unburned decomposition and condensation matter (which may vary from
light-coloured to black and sooty);
(c) a quantity of air heated by the fire and entrained into the rising plume.
Smoke consists of a well-mixed combination of these three groups and it will contain
gases, vapours and dispersed solid particles (see Section 9.3).
The density and toxicity of the smoke produced will depend on the fuel burning, but the
total volume of smoke produced will depend on the size of the fire and the geometry of
the building in which it occurs. The nature of the fuel only affects the quantity of smoke
produced in so far as the size of the fire depends on what is burning and the rate at
which it is burning. This smoke may, therefore, be very dense or not so dense, but in
any case it will be hot and will probably contain enough toxic products to be a danger to
life.
The combustion of the solid materials in a fire involves the heating of those materials,
usually by the adjacent burning material. Hot volatile combustible vapours are given
off, which ignite so that above the fire there rises a column of flames and hot smoky
gases, which, because its density is lower than the cold surrounding air, will have a
definite upward movement. As a result, the surrounding air is entrained into the rising
stream and mixes with it, as shown in Figure 9.2.
Smoke formation
Part of the entrained air will supply the oxygen needed for the combustion of the gases
evolved by the decomposing fuel, and flames will be produced. However, because the
temperature in the plume is not high enough and the mixing of the oxygen into it is not
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complete, the combustion of these gases will be incomplete and dispersed solid parti-
cles which form the sooty component of the smoke will be produced.
At the height of the tips of the flames, the column of rising hot gases invariably con-
tains much more air than is required or used for the combustion of the fuel gases, but by
this time the excess air has been heated and well mixed with the hot smoky products of
combustion and so forms a large inseparable component of the smoke.
As smoke production is largely related to fire size, it is obviously not directly related to
floor area nor compartment volume except as far as this affects fire size and height of
smoke rise. Simple approaches relating extract requirements to a percentage of floor
area or number of air changes per hour cannot, therefore, generally be justified, with
the exception of the work done by the National Research Council in Canada into re-
quired extract rates from sprinkler protected office floors (see Section 9.7).
Smoke exhaust
Smoke removed by a smoke exhaust system must be replaced by an equivalent volume
of inlet or make-up air. This air must enter at a sufficiently low velocity where it en-
counters a smoke layer. If it enters at high velocity, it can induce turbulence and mix air
into an otherwise stable smoke layer and cause downward mixing of the layer.
To maintain a smoke layer at a given height, the mass flow rate of smoke entering the
layer must equal the mass flow rate of smoke being extracted from that layer.
As certain types of exhaust systems rely on the buoyancy of the smoke, there is a limit
to the size of a ‘reservoir’ from which smoke can be extracted as smoke in a very large
reservoir may cool and lose its buoyancy. Large areas may, therefore, require division













Figure 9.2: Smoke production (Butcher and Parnell, 1979)
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Fundamentals of design
The first question to be answered before attempting any smoke control and extraction
design is “What is the purpose of this system?”. There are three basic possibilities:
(a) Life safety — The system is to be designed to maintain tenable conditions on es-
cape routes and in other areas throughout the period they are likely to be in use by
occupants of the building.
(b) Fire fighting access/property protection — The system is to be designed to increase
visibility for, and reduce heat exposure to, trained fire fighters, thus allowing earlier
and less hazardous attack on the fire. Such systems will help to reduce property
damage by increasing fire service effectiveness.
(c) Smoke purging — The system is to be designed to enable smoke to be cleared from
a building after the fire has been brought under control.
It is necessary to decide which of these, or combination of the three objectives (if any),
is to be achieved before commencing a design. However, a system designed for life
safety will usually provide a secondary benefit in terms of fire-fighting and property
protection functions.
Estimating the volume of smoke produced by a fire
Compared with the total volume of air entrained by the fire, the volume of the fuel
gases is relatively small and it is, therefore, possible to say that the rate of production of
smoke by a fire is approximately the rate at which air is entrained (and contaminated)
by the rising column of hot gases and flames. This rate of air entrainment will depend
on:
• the perimeter of the fire;
• the plume geometry
• the heat release rate of the fire; and
• the distance between the floor and the bottom of the hot layer of smoke and hot
gases that forms under the ceiling.
For an axis-symmetric plume typical of what might be found in a large open space
where the fire and smoke plume is remote from obstructions such as walls Hinkley
(1986) showed that the mass flow of gas ṁs (kg/s) entrained in a fire (and, therefore, the
quantity of smoke produced) can be estimated using the following relation:
˙ . /
/













where: p is the perimeter of fire (m)
Y is the distance between floor and bottom smoke layer under ceiling (m)
0ρ  is the density of the ambient air (1.22 kg/m
3 at 17˚C)
T0 is the absolute temperature of ambient air (290 K)
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Tf is the absolute temperature of flames in the smoke plume (1100 K)
g is the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m/s2)
Using the numerical values listed, the expression for estimating the rate of smoke pro-
duction reduces to:
˙ . /m pYs = 0 188
3 2 [9.2]
This expression shows clearly that the rate of smoke production is directly proportional
to the dimensions of the fire (p) and dependent upon the height of clear space (Y) above
it.
Similarly Zukoski et al (1981) showed that
˙ . ˙ /
/
m Q Y Ys c= −( )0 071 1 3 0
5 3 [9.3]
where Q̇c  is the convective heat release in kW and Y0 is the height above the base of the
fire to the virtual origin of the smoke plume in metres. The convective heat release Q̇c
is typically taken to be ~70% of the total heat release. The value for Y0 can be found
from:
Y D Qc0
2 51 02 0 083= − +. . ˙ / [9.4]
where D is the diameter of the fire in metres. Although Equation 9.4 has only been
validated for pool-type fires, it is likely that Y0 is similar for most solid fuels found in
buildings.
Butcher and Parnell (1979) outlined that the conversion of the mass rate of production
of smoke to a volume rate can be made by calculation using the following information:
• the density of air at 17˚C is 1.22 kg/m3














• the rate of smoke production in kg/s can be changed into m3/s by dividing by the
density appropriate to the smoke temperature.
Equations to calculate the entrainment into plumes other than axis-symmetric plumes
such as window plumes, balcony spill plumes, line plumes and plumes constrained by
walls can be found in Klote and Milke (2002) and BRE 368 (Morgan et al., 1999).
Determining the size of the fire
While the amount of smoke produced depends to a large extent on the size of the fire, it
is simply not practical to design a smoke extract system to cope with any size of fire.
Careful consideration should be given to determining a fire size for design purposes.
Smoke control and extraction systems cannot be designed to cope with a post-flashover,
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fully-developed fires involving the whole fire compartment because the rate of smoke
production is exceedingly large. One case where fire size is not relevant is a smoke
purging system where the rate of smoke extraction is not critical and a ‘rule-of-thumb’
approach can be adopted. A design based on six air changes per hour is often used.
With systems for life and property safety, the choice of an appropriate design fire is
essential. The most satisfactory way of arriving at this size is by direct consideration of
the building contents.
The strategy in sprinklered buildings is to relate design fire size to sprinkler operation.
Experience has shown that fires in ‘normal’ combustibles rarely exceed a heat output of
0.5 MW/m2. In sprinklered premises, it is a reasonable design assumption that the maxi-
mum fire area will be the area defined by the spacing of sprinklers, i.e. 4.6 m x 4.6 m or
4 m x 3 m etc., depending on the hazard category. If there are no sprinklers and no
obvious fire centres, choosing a fixed design fire size becomes unrealistic. It must be
expected that, barring fire service intervention, the fire will continue to grow until
flashover occurs, in which case a smoke extract system cannot generally be expected to
cope.
A common approach is to assume a growing fire. Using a fire growth computer pro-
gram (Chapter 12), the designer can select the size of fire expected after a set time
interval related to sprinkler or automatic fire alarm activation, escape time, smoke layer
level or other tenability limits.
Automatic fire control based on the operation of sprinkler systems relates directly to
three distinct delay periods between fire initiation and sprinkler discharge.
Mowrer (1990) defines these three periods as:
(i) Transport time — the time between the actual generation of heat or other fire
signature and the transport of that signature to the fire detection device.
(ii) Detection time lag — the time period from the first transport of a fire signature to
the sprinkler or fire detector until the device activates.
(iii) Suppression time lag — the time from fire detection until water discharges from
the sprinkler head.
Mowrer illustrates these three lag periods schematically on the representative heat re-
lease curve, shown in Figure 9.3. The suppression curve in Figure 9.3 illustrates an
example of satisfactory performance because the total lag period is less than the time to
critical condition. Critical condition could be structural damage, no tenable space con-
ditions or total egress times, depending upon the specific requirements of the design.
9.3 Smoke Migration
In its simple form, the prevention of smoke migration between firecells is called smoke
control. The principal expectation from all smoke control systems is that smoke is kept
on one side of a well-defined plane within a building. The plane may be horizontal or
vertical and is usually simply defined by the construction features of the building, e.g.
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the plane of an opening in a wall or a floor. If smoke migrates across the boundary
represented by the plane, a degree of failure of the smoke control provisions has oc-
curred.
In multi-storey buildings, smoke can and does cross the boundary represented by the
plane and can rise through the building’s many leakage paths to floors which may be
well above the actual fire.
Figure 9.4 shows the variety of paths along which smoke may migrate in a simple
multi-storey building. Smoke’s natural buoyancy enables it to rise quickly through the
building, blocking stairwells, lift shafts, reducing visibility, making egress more diffi-
cult and fire fighting more hazardous. Typically such paths include:
• Air ducts connecting floors




• Gaps between curtain wall glazing and floor.
ts





















Figure 9.3: Schematic illustration of the influence of transport, detection and
suppression lag periods in terms of a representative heat release rate curve
(Mowrer, 1990)
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9.4 Wind and Stack Effect
The stack effect, shown in Figure 9.5, is due to the differences between the external and
internal climates. These temperature differentials cause movement of smoke either up-
wards (winter) or downwards (summer) until a neutral plane is reached and lateral
smoke movement is induced.
Stack effects in buildings are typically most pronounced in countries where there is a
significant difference in the indoor and outdoor temperatures, i.e. North America, where
in winter outdoor temperatures fall below 0˚C, whilst indoor temperatures are artifi-
cially maintained at around 20˚C, or Australia, where external temperatures may ex-
ceed 40˚C while maintaining 22˚C to 23˚C internally. Stack effect will occur to a lesser








































A Leakage between floors via air ductwork
B Leakage between floors via ductwork of minor exhaust, e.g. toilet exhaust
C Leakage between floors via lift shaft
D Leakage into fire stairs and then onto other floors from fire stairs
E Leakage between floors via service duct or riser shaft
F Leakage between floors via poorly sealed spandrel
G Leakage between floors via relief or return air path
Figure 9.4:Typical smoke migration routes
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is greater than the exterior temperature.
Wind can have a pronounced effect on smoke movement within a building. The pres-
sure Pw (Pa) that wind exerts on a surface can be expressed as:
P C vw w= 0 5 0
2. ρ [9.6]
where: Cw is a pressure coefficient
ρ0 is the outside air density (kg/m
3)
v is the wind velocity (m/s)
The pressure coefficients Cw  range from -0.8 to 0.8, with positive values for windward
walls and negative values for leeward walls.
Figure 9.6 shows typical air flow patterns around a building on its own and the com-
pound effect of adjacent buildings. Because the air flow pattern and, hence, the wind
effect on the building has been changed, there could well need to be a change in the way
the smoke control system in the building operates to compensate for that change.
If a window breaks in a fire, the wind effect, positive or negative, can be large and can
dominate air movement throughout the building. Wind effects do need to be considered














Figure 9.5: Pressure difference between a building shaft and the outside
due to stack effect
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Stairways and lift shafts that have doors opening into external conditions also need
careful attention to compensate for wind effects. Draft stop lobbies are often used to
prevent wind effects from creating pressure differentials within the shafts.
9.5 Smoke Clearance Systems
General
Smoke clearance systems are specifically designed only to operate when a fire occurs.
Such systems are usually included in buildings that, because of the building configura-
tion and fire load, present particular life safety problems. Buildings in this category
would include:
• large shopping malls;
• buildings containing atria;
• large concert halls and convention centres; and
• large airport terminals.
System components
The basic components of a smoke clearance system are:
• Smoke reservoirs — areas within the building designed to allow smoke to accumu-
late. Extraction occurs from the reservoir (Figure 9.7).
• Smoke screens/curtains.
Figure 9.6: Airflow patterns around buildings
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• Smoke extraction fans.
• Natural smoke ventilators.
• Duct work — required if either the smoke extraction fans or the discharge louvres,
or both are located remote from smoke reservoir.
• Smoke exhaust discharge louvres.
• Outdoor air inlets.
• Automatic controls and activation systems.
System design
Design commences with calculation of fire size and, hence, smoke production rate. As
in Section 9.2, the fire size would typically be determined on the basis of a sprinkler
controlled fire.
Location of extract points requires careful consideration since extracting too much smoke
through one vent can result in a ‘plug-hole’ in the underlying smoke layer and, hence,
fresh air and a reduced quantity of smoke being extracted. Extract points should be
spaced evenly over the smoke reservoir.
Required fan sizes are those necessary to remove the calculated volume of smoke at the
system pressure loss. Fans should be rated to operate at a temperature equal to the smoke
temperature plus the ambient temperature. AS/NZS 1668, Part 1 (Standards New Zea-
land, 1998) requires fans, complete with drive, flexible connections and control gear, to
be constructed and installed such that they are capable of continuous operation when
handling smoke at 200˚C for a period equal to the fire rating of the shaft. This is consid-
ered reasonable for most situations unless specific calculations show that a more strin-
gent specification is necessary.
Careful selection of fans is needed and certification should be provided by the manu-
facturer to demonstrate that the fans have been successfully tested and rated for the
required operating conditions.
Adequate outdoor air must be provided to the area affected by the fire to provide re-
placement air for that removed via the smoke extract system. Replacement air must
enter the area below the smoke layer and at a velocity that avoids disturbing the smoke
layer. Fan selection must allow for incoming air resistance. It is suggested here that the
velocity of the incoming air should not exceed 3 m/s where air is drawn through exit
routes and not more than 5 m/s elsewhere. Guidance in the UK (Morgan et al., 1999)
limits air velocities to 5 m/s through exits, whereas AS 1668, Part 3 (Standards Aus-
tralia, 2001), only allows a velocity of 1 m/s for inlet air velocity and recommends that
a value of 0.5 m/s is ideally required for open doorways, etc.
Typical inlet air routes are:
• External doors — automatic doors arranged to open on a fire alarm and fail open.
(Note that for security reasons, this is usually only during building operating hours.)
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• Permanently open or automatically opening louvres in walls or roof.
• Central plant air conditioning configured to full outdoor air supply on a fire alarm.
• Drawing from adjacent unaffected spaces, provided outdoor air is able to enter these
adjacent spaces.
Care must be taken to separate smoke exhaust discharge and outdoor air inlet points to
avoid recirculation of smoke.
9.6 Typical HVAC Systems
Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems can create significant smoke
migration paths between floors. It is essential in buildings with HVAC systems that
these systems be designed to control smoke and prevent the spread of fire. HVAC sys-
tems can be described as follows:
• Central plant HVAC
In a central plant HVAC system, air handling and conditioning equipment is housed
in central plant room with air ducted to floors by vertical supply and return air duct
risers. Plant rooms can be located at the top, bottom and at intervals throughout the
building height, depending upon building size and floor area to be served by each
plant. Because central plant HVAC systems link a number of floors, they present an
ideal path for smoke to be circulated from the affected area to unaffected areas of










In a floor-by-floor system, the air handling and conditioning equipment is housed
on the floor that it serves. Floor-by-floor systems can allow smoke to be circulated
from the affected area of the floor to unaffected areas on the same floor (Figure
9.8b).
• Local air conditioning
Local air conditioning systems utilise ceiling or exposed mounted fan coils, or wa-
ter-cooled heat pump systems to provide air handling and conditioning local to the
floor area where the equipment is located. Local air conditioning systems typically
do not assist in circulating smoke from the affected area on the floor to unaffected
areas on the same floor (Figure 9.8c).
There are many variations to the three basic systems outlined, each variation allowing
smoke migration to a greater or lesser extent, depending upon system configuration.
Each HVAC system requires careful analysis to identify and deal with the potential
paths for smoke migration.
9.7 Configuring HVAC Systems to Control Smoke Migration
Fire spread can be controlled by subdividing a building into fire compartments with
fire resistant physical barriers, but effective smoke control is not as simple. Where fans
etc., are used to modify smoke movement in buildings, this is generally referred to as a
smoke control system. Smoke control systems use the air flow generated by the fans,
generally in conjunction with the building’s physical barriers, to modify the natural
movement of the smoke. HVAC systems used to control smoke movement in buildings
would typically be configured as follows:
A Central plant HVAC (Figure 9.9a)
• Smoke from the fire floor is diluted with uncontaminated air and the air/smoke
mixture is exhausted via the return air shaft and the smoke extract fan.
• Return air fan (1) stops, return air damper (2) and spill air damper (3) shut.
• Outdoor air (4) is supplied to all floors via the central plant air handling unit (AHU).
• Dampers (5) in the return air openings on the non-fire floors close, which causes a
rise in pressure on these floors.
• Supply air damper (6) to fire floor, closes.
• Stairwell pressurisation fans, if installed, (7) start.
• Damper (5) on the fire floor remains open, the smoke spill fan (8) operates exhaust-
ing the air/smoke mixture from this floor.
B Floor-by-floor AHU (Figure 9.9b)
• Smoke is removed from the fire floor via the outdoor air shaft and the smoke extract
fan.
• Dampers (1) in the outdoor air openings to the AHU rooms on the non-fire floors
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close. AHUs on the non-fire floors shut down.
• Outdoor air plant (2) shuts down and outdoor air damper (3) shuts.
• Smoke extract damper (4) opens on the fire floor only.
• Stairwell pressurisation fans, if installed, start.
• Smoke extract damper (5) opens and smoke extract fan starts.
Considerable work on this type of system has been carried out by Tamura (1982). Sys-
tems have been tested in multi-storey buildings in North America determining that,
with the fire being controlled by sprinklers, an extract rate of six air changes per hour is
required on the fire floor. For an office with a 2.7 metre ceiling, this equates to an
exhaust rate of 4.5 L/s/m2.
Make-up air is from stair and lift shafts, providing a forced air flow across stair and lift
doorways thus helping to prevent smoke from entering the stairs or lift shafts.
C Local air conditioning systems (Figure 9.9c)
Smoke removal can be achieved in a similar way to that described in B above provided
additional smoke removal dampers are provided between the floor and the outdoor air
shaft.
However, typical systems in New Zealand have not included this feature and in smoke
removal mode, they have tended to draw air from the non-fire floors as well as air and
smoke from the fire floor, as shown in Figure 9.9c. As the ductwork is designed for
normal ventilation of around one air change per floor per hour (0.75 to 1.0 L/s/m2 floor
area), this restricts the smoke extract rate to approximately the same volume.
The smoke production rate of a fire of, say, 1.5 MW with a perimeter of 7 m for a
typical commercial office and, assuming a smoke layer at 2.5 metres, is in the order of
5 m3/s. If the fire occurred on an office floor of, say, 1000 m2, the extract rate would
have to be 5.0 L/s/m2 to remove the smoke produced, or five times the volume for
which the ventilation duct work is designed.
The system design would need reconfiguring to enable the design smoke volumes to be
extracted if smoke migration is to be controlled.
The system in Figure 9.9c would typically operate as follows:
— Fan coil units (FCUs) shut down.
— Outdoor air plant (1) stops and outdoor air damper (2) shuts.
— Stairwell pressurisation fans, if installed, start.
— Smoke extract damper (3) opens and smoke extract fan (4) starts.
9.8 Escape Route Pressurisation
General
The objective of escape route design is that occupants should be able to reach a place of
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safety, unharmed, in the event of a fire occurring.
The fire safety Compliance Document for New Zealand Building Code defines a safe
place as:
“A place of safety in the vicinity of a building from which people may
safely disperse after escaping the effects of a fire. It may be a place such
as a street, open space, public space or an adjacent building”.
For occupants in a building, a place of safety may also be:
1.  a protected corridor;
2.  a protected stair;
3.  a place of refuge within the building.
Note: ‘Protected’ as used in the context of this chapter should not be confused with
“protected path” as defined by the Acceptable Solution C/AS1.
Once in a protected route, people should be able to make their way to a final exit and,
hence, safety. For an escape route to remain useable in an emergency, it must be pro-
tected from fire and the products of combustion.
Passive fire protection in the form of fire-resisting construction forms one part of the
protection. However, the passive fire protection will not always prevent the movement
of smoke from the fire area into the escape route because of open doors and leakage
around closed doors.
There are two main factors that determine the movement of smoke arising from a fire in
a building. These are:
• the mobility of smoke due to it consisting of hot gases less dense than the surround-
ing air;
• the normal air movement (which may have nothing to do with the fire) that can
move smoke from affected to unaffected parts of the building.
Air movement is itself controlled by:
• the stack effect;
• wind — all buildings have some air leaks and wind action will contribute to air
movement through the leaks;
• the building HVAC and ventilation systems.
Pressurisation provides pressure differences that oppose and overcome those generated
by the factors causing movement of smoke.
Pressurisation systems design
Pressurisation of escape routes is achieved by pumping air into the protected space. In
this way, a pressure difference across doors and divisions between the protected and
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adjacent spaces is created. If the maintained pressure differential is sufficiently large,
the pressure forcing the smoke from the fire area towards the protected area will be
insufficient to overcome this differential.
A pressurisation system, if it is to be effective, must be an integral part of the building
design and not something imposed upon the design afterwards. There are two basic
types of pressurisation systems, positive and negative. Figure 9.10a illustrates the posi-
tive type where clear air is forced into the protected space. This method is typically
used for protecting stairways and may also be used for lift shafts.
Figure 9.10b illustrates the negative type where smoke extraction occurs in the fire
area, thereby creating a pressure differential and an air flow between the protected
space and the fire area. This method is typically used for protecting lift shafts. Air flow
is via gaps around doors, construction cracks and doors opened during egress. One or
both of these systems may be used in buildings.
Air leakage via door gaps etc.
To calculate air leakage flow rates, Klote and Milke (2002) express air flow rate through
a door gap as proportional to the pressure difference across the gap raised to the power
n. For a gap of fixed geometry, n is, theoretically, in the range of 0.5 to 1.0.
For gaps in doors, except extremely narrow gaps, n can be taken as 0.5, and the volu-
metric flow rate V̇ f  (m
3/s) can be expressed as:
˙ /V CA Pf l= ( )2
1 2∆ ρ [9.7]
where: C is a flow coefficient
Al is the flow area (m
3) (also called leakage path)
∆P = pressure difference across the flow path (Pa)
ρ = density of air entering the flow path (kg/m3)
The flow area is generally taken as the cross-sectional area of the flow path.
For stair, lift doors etc., taking C = 0.65 and  ρ = 1.2 kg/m3:
˙ .
/
V A Pf l= ( )0 839
1 2∆ [9.8]
Air leakage via door gaps, construction gaps and the like must be included in the design
air flow to maintain the required pressure difference between the escape route and the
fire area.
Open doors
The number of doors that may be open simultaneously must also be considered in the
design process. For open stairwell doors, Cresci (1973) found that complex flow pat-
terns exist and that the resulting flow was considerably below the flow calculated by
using the area of the door way as the flow area ‘Al’ in Equation 9.8. Based on this
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research, it is recommended that the design flow area of an open stairwell door be taken
as half the actual area.
Deciding how many doors will be open simultaneously depends largely upon building
occupancy. In densely populated buildings or buildings with a total evacuation policy,
it is likely that a large number of the doors will be open. For buildings where progres-
sive evacuation is the policy, only a few doors may be open during a fire. AS/NZS
1668:Part 1 gives guidance on the number of open doors that should be considered
although buildings may need to be individually assessed.
Door opening forces
The door opening forces resulting from pressurisation of the stairwell must be consid-
ered. Unreasonably high door-opening forces can result in occupants having difficulty
or being unable to open the doors.
The force required to open a door is the sum of the forces to overcome the pressure








where:  Fdc is the force to overcome the door closer (N)
W is the door width (m)
Ad is the door area (m
2)
∆P is the pressure difference across the door (Pa)
D is the distance from door knob to edge of knob side of door (m).
This relationship assumes that the door opening force is applied at the knob. Door
opening forces due to pressure difference can be determined from Figure 9.11. It is
suggested that the total force required to be applied at the knob should not exceed
120 N.
EN 12106-6 (BSI, 2005) recommends that the level of pressurisation used for design
purposes for any pressurised space in a building should not exceed 60 Pa (50 Pa is
typically used as the design pressurisation level).
For a door 1.0 m wide by 1.98 m high, with the knob 75 mm from the edge of the door,
and a pressure difference of 60 Pa, the force to overcome the door closer, Fdc, and
hence the force exerted on the door by the closer, can be calculated from Equation 9.9
as:
120
1 0 1 98 1 0 60
2 1 0 0 075
= +




. . i.e. Fdc ≤ 89  N
Buildings used for the very young or old or for disabled people may need special con-
sideration to ensure that doors can be opened against the combined force of the closer
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and the pressure differential resulting from pressurisation of the escape route. Design-
ers must check and coordinate the self-closing mechanisms on doors opening into pressu-
rised spaces to ensure that the closing mechanisms are adjusted to the minimum force
required for the effective closing of the door in normal use (a simple spring balance can
be used).
Positive pressurisation of exit ways
Objective
The objective of positive pressurisation of stairways is to establish a pressure gradient
pattern which will ensure that exit ways are kept free of smoke. To do this, the exit way
is maintained at an excess pressure with respect to other areas of the building in a fire
emergency.
During a fire emergency, all protected staircases and associated lobbies and corridors
forming part of the whole pressurisation scheme should be simultaneously pressurised.
System components include:
• A mechanically driven supply of outdoor air supplied directly or via ductwork to


















Figure 9.11: Door opening force due to pressure differences
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• Relief venting or other pressure control devices to maintain the design pressure in
the pressurised space, depending upon the various combinations of doors open and
closed.
• Automatic control system integrated with the smoke removal system and interfaced
with the fire alarm and suppression system.
Single-stage pressurisation
Single-stage pressurisation is designed to be operated only in an emergency. This type
of system is most commonly used.
Two-stage pressurisation
Two-stage pressurisation is incorporated as part of the building’s normal ventilation
system and operates continuously during normal occupancy hours to provide a low
level of pressurisation. There is provision for an increased level of pressurisation to be
brought into operation in an emergency. A two-stage system may be considered prefer-
able in buildings such as hospitals, rest homes and hotels because some measure of
protection is always operating, thus helping to prevent smoke spread in the early stages
of a fire.
Pressurisation of stairwells
The protection is confined to the stairwell only and in general is used when the stair is
accessed directly, or via a simple lobby, from the occupied floor. If access is via a
simple lobby, the lobby should not contain access to lifts or toilets etc., as these would
add leakage paths, allowing the pressurising air to bypass the designed direction of
flow (Figure 9.12).
Supply of outdoor pressurisation air to the stairwell can be achieved by either single-
point injection or multiple-point injection. A single-point supply system is one that has
pressurisation air supplied to the stairwell at one location. The most common supply
point is at the top (Figure 9.13). Single supply systems can fail when a few doors are
open near the air supply point and the system may fail to maintain the design pressure
further down the stairwell.
Multiple-point supply systems utilise supply air ductwork running in a separate fire-
rated shaft adjacent to the stairwell, with air being supplied to the stairwells at regular
intervals through the height of the stair. The actual number of supply points requires
careful analysis for each stair. The optimum is to supply at each floor where this can be
easily and economically achieved, as shown in Figure 9.14.
As the design requires a specific pressure to be maintained when a specific number of
doors are open, over-pressurisation can occur when all doors are closed. Control of the
pressure in the stairwell can be achieved by relief venting directly to outside using
barometric dampers set to the desired pressure, venting to outside via barometric dampers
and an exhaust duct, or by controlling fan speed. Klote and Milke (2002) also suggest
venting to the occupied space, provided vents are configured to prevent smoke or fire
entering the stairwell.
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Pressurisation of lobbies and corridors
Lobbies, other than simple lobbies, and corridors should be pressurised independently
of the stairwell. The pressure in the lobby or corridor should be less than the pressure in
the stairwell, by an amount not more than 5 Pa (Figure 9.15).
Summary
When designing pressurisation systems for a building, the following steps should be
taken:
1. Consider the design use of the building and the possible changes in use during the
design life of systems installed (until major refurbishment would be considered
necessary).
2. Identify the spaces to be pressurised and evaluate possible interaction between pres-
surised and unpressurised space, and HVAC and smoke removal systems.
3. Decide whether the system is to be single-stage or two-stage and select pressurisa-
tion levels to be used for emergency operation and, if appropriate, for reduced ca-
pacity operation.
4. Decide whether single-point supply or multiple-point supply is required and deter-
mine the method for handling over-pressurisation. This will affect vertical duct space
requirements.
5. Identify all the leakage paths through which air can escape from the pressurised
spaces and determine the rate of air leakage through each. Total all air flows out of
each pressurised space. Since leakage through cracks, gaps etc., in the building
structure cannot be quantified in the same way, it is necessary to increase the total
calculated air flow. An increase of 1.5 times is suggested by EN 12106-6.
6. Calculate the air flow through the design number of open doors.
Pressure in lobby will rise above
pressure in occupied floor due to
leakage from stairwell





















Figure 9.13: Stairwell pressurisation — single-point supply















Figure 9.14: Stairwell pressurisation — multiple-point supply
(Klote and Milke, 2002)
7. The air supply, 5 plus 6, must be provided in each pressurised space. Locate air
supply points to achieve the required air flows.
8. System dynamic design, i.e. fan capacity, duct size, pressure and relief, should be
carried out by a suitably qualified HVAC engineer.
9. The location of outdoor air intakes and relief vent outlets requires careful consid-
eration of wind effects and must be located away from any exhaust systems to pre-
vent recirculation of contaminated air or smoke into the building.
10. The interface between HVAC and fire alarm and suppression systems requires care-
ful analysis. The controls system must be programmed to operate all devices re-
quired for the system to function correctly.
11. The architect needs to be advised of:
• Maximum door closer force allowed for in the design of the system.
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• Leakage areas assumed with the note that these should not be exceeded in the
finished building.
12. A measurement procedure needs to be determined so that the satisfactory operation
of the installation in the completed building can be established.
13. To meet the Compliance Schedule requirements of the New Zealand Building Code,
a maintenance and testing procedure needs to be determined and agreed with the
owner and the Building Control Authority.
9.9 HVAC Equipment Testing and Rating
Codes require smoke handling equipment to be suitable for operating in the expected
emergency conditions, i.e. in a hot smoky environment, perhaps with flames or with
water vapour. Designers should pay particular attention to the requirement for properly
rated equipment and manufacturers should demonstrate that the equipment they are
offering has been successfully tested and rated for the operating conditions. Equipment
that operates in fire mode should be treated no differently to, say, fire rated doors and
other fire-rated building elements which require certification.
Typical examples of equipment requiring testing and rating would include:
• fans;










Direction of air flow
Occupied floor
Lobby and corridor
pressurised to 45 Pa
Lobby and corridor
pressurisation air shaft
Figure 9.15: Stairwell and lobby/corridor pressurisation — single-point supply
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• flexible connections — between fan and ductwork;
• motorised dampers — including smoke seals, actuating motors, bearings, etc. which
should be tested and certified as an assembly.
9.10 Emergency Control of HVAC Systems
Automatically-controlled smoke control systems greatly assist fire fighting and search
operations by improving visibility and maintaining tenable conditions for evacuating
occupants.  Nevertheless there are many scenarios where manual control of such sys-
tems is required.
In such situations a Fire Fan Control Panel (FFCP) should be provided for the use of
authorised emergency response personnel. Typically FFCPs would allow for ON-AUTO-
OFF manual control and RUN-FAULT-OFF status indication of the functions of each
supply air fan, exhaust fan, smoke spill fan, and such zone smoke control dampers as
are necessary to implement the building’s smoke control strategy.
The FFCP should either be incorporated into the fire alarm control panel, or located
adjacent to it. Appropriate standards are AS/NZS 1668.1 and AS 4428.7 (Standards
Australia, 1999).
9.11 Conclusions
All fires produce smoke which, if not controlled, will spread throughout the building,
or portions of the building, thereby endangering life and damaging property.
HVAC, smoke clearance and escape route pressurisation systems can and should be
used to control smoke movement in buildings.
Designers should be aware of the reliability limitations of components (Chapter 10) in
these systems and take steps to enhance the reliability in a sensible and cost effective
manner.
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The objective of design of fire safety system interfaces is to ensure that all building
element systems, including fire safety systems, are functionally compatible and will
transmit all the required signals in an emergency.
10.2 Methodology
During the development of the fire safety concepts for a building, the design of the
overall fire safety system should consider a variety of possible methods of producing
functionally compatible systems without incorporating excessive redundancy or be-
coming unnecessarily complex. The suggested method of achieving this is to employ
fire engineering principles to determine the most cost-effective approach so that a cus-
tomised programme can be incorporated as an integral part of the conceptual and de-
tailed design.
Modern developments allow the choice of either integrating or interfacing the fire safety
system with other control and communication systems. With the reduction in cost of
control systems, and to maintain product approvals, there is little advantage in the total
integration of all systems. It is recommended that the optimal solution is the interfacing
of dedicated fire safety systems with other building control systems, while ensuring
that compatibility exists.
The New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) requires a Compliance Schedule for life safety
systems in buildings and to comply it will be necessary to carry out routine servicing,
testing and surveying of the life safety systems, including all initiating devices and
controls, and the interconnections between systems.
10.3 Systems
The following fire safety systems must be incorporated cohesively into the conceptual
and detailed design of the whole building to remove any disruptive impact they may
have on each other and to ensure compatibility of operation of the fire safety systems
and all other related equipment.
• Passive fire control:
Compartmentation;
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Fire service access;
Surface finish selection; and
Structural fire resistance.





— risers and hydrants;
— hose reels; and
— fire extinguishers.
Information management
— emergency communication visible, audible and informative;
— ‘all out’ or progressive evacuation;
— fire service communication;
— fire systems centres;
— fire detection and alarm; and
— supervision of suppression, detection, emergency power, mobile





— mobile separation; and
— fuel sources.
Smoke control
— active smoke barriers;
— extract systems;
— air inlet;
— emergency power supplies; and








Internal beam or passive detection;
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Note: The integration of the fire egress requirements with security access
control is essential to ensure that the requirements of both are met.
10.4 Interfaces
A method of determining the initial interfaces and responses is to produce a logic ma-
trix with ‘alarm cause’ on one axis, and ‘alarm effect’ on the other, as shown in Table
10.1. This matrix does not necessarily show all of the items required to operate on a fire
signal. In many cases, there will be additional items, many of them additional to the
requirements of NZS 4541 (Standards New Zealand, 2007) or AS 2118 (Standards
Australia, 2006) and NZS 4512 (Standards New Zealand, 2003) or AS 1670  (Stand-
ards Australia, 1997).
The matrix system shown in Table 10.1 is applicable to site-wide application, but is not
recommended to incorporate complex smoke control systems. These systems require a
different approach, as follows:
(a) List all fans;
(b) List all operational dampers;
(c) List all air handling safety features;
(d) Determine feasible fire locations for each level, and for all communicating levels;
(e) Determine required air flow patterns for smoke migration control;
(f) Determine required air supply sources, volumes and paths for smoke entrainment.
Using a similar matrix to that for alarm cause/effect, determine the required responses
for each of the fans, dampers and air handling safety features for each fire scenario. The
complexity of this task can be great if, say, 200 fans, dampers etc. are interfaced with,
say, 100 fire locations. This interface may directly determine the type of HVAC con-
troller which can be selected for a project. Sandwich pressurisation systems may make
the interface even more complex.
The more complex the site and the smoke control matrices, the more important it is to
ensure that an acceptable level of reliability is built into the system. This may take the
simple form of such items as backup power supplies, pre-selected damper positions set
by spring actuators, or protected cabling to components, right through to redundant
componentry, voting logical system and full determination of the level of reliability as
practised in the nuclear power and petrochemical industries. The determination of an
acceptable level of reliability should be undertaken by the client and the client’s advis-
ers, including the fire engineer.
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1 Plant Ex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Plant Ex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Ceiling Void 0 0 - - - - - - - - -
4 Ceiling Void 0 0 - - - - - - - - -
5 Fresh Air R 1 R 1 R 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Lt. Duct - - - - - - - - - - -
7 Lt. Duct - - - - - - - - - - -
8 Toilet Ex Sth 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 Spill Orca - 0 - - - 0 - - - - -
10 Fresh Air 1 1 1 1 1 R 1 1 1 1 1
11 Fresh Air 1 1 1 1 1 R 1 1 1 1 1
12 Workshop Ex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 IA Supply 0 0 0 0 0 R 0 0 0 0 0
16 Batt Ex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 ABS re-circ - - - - - 0 - - - - -
19 Orca re-circ - 0 - - - 0 - - - - -
20 Compressor - 0 - - - 0 - - - - -
21 Kiosk 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 Loading - 0 - - 0 0 0 - - - -
23 Cod tank - - - - - 0 0 - 0 - -
24 Projector - 0 - - - 0 - - - - -
25 Projector - 0 - - - 0 - - - - -
26 IA Spill 0 0 0 0 0 R 1 0 0 0 0
27 IA Spill 0 0 0 0 0 R 1 0 0 0 0
Tank Ex Sth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Tank Ex Nth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Quarantine Inlet 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Quarantine Ex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Kitchen Ex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Toilet Ex Nth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Theatre Ex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
NW Inlet 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Toilet Sth MFD S 1 1 1 S 1 1 1 1 1 1
Penguin/Plant Damper S 1 S S S S S S S S S
Queueing MFD S 1 1 1 S 1 1 1 1 1 1
Scott 1911 MFD S 1 S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Orca MFD 1 S 1 1 1 S 1 1 1 1 1
Evap Fans A,B,C 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Key
1 = On - normal direction and Open (dampers) R = On - reverse direction
O = Off S = Shut (dampers) - = Does not matter
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10.5 HVAC and Active Fire Systems
General
The HVAC system controls will have pre-programmed sequences that will initiate the
fire mode configuration on receipt of a signal from the fire alarm system identifying
fire on a particular floor. If the HVAC, smoke clearance and escape route pressurisation
systems are to be reliable, the controls need to be monitored to alert building users of a
malfunction.
Configuring HVAC systems to control smoke, activation of smoke extract systems and
activation of escape route pressurisation systems requires identification that a fire has
occurred and the location of the affected areas of the building. Typically, the fire detec-
tion and suppression system installed in the building is used to identify the fire affected
area. For interface with smoke control systems, it is recommended that the detection
device be a smoke detector, but detection devices may be any one, or a combination of,
the following:
• Fire sprinklers, including main alarm valve pressure switch and floor flow switch
(alarm signal and discharge of water on to the fire);
• Heat detectors, of various types and method of operation (alarm only);
• Smoke or gas detectors, various types and methods of operation (alarm only); and/or
• Flame detectors (alarm only).
Fire safety codes differ on which device or devices should be used to initiate the ‘fire
mode’ operation of smoke control systems. In addition to identifying the fire floor for
the HVAC control, the fire detecting devices may also initiate a fire alarm signal to:
• Lifts;
• Escalators;
• Emergency lighting; and/or
• Security.
The operation of each of these systems, and the HVAC systems, in ‘fire mode’ would
be controlled by the systems’ own control logic and not by the fire alarm initiating
device. It follows then that any fire alarm initiating device should be part of the build-
ing fire alarm system (which includes sprinkler systems) and be serviced, tested and
surveyed as required by the New Zealand or Australian Standards applicable to the
particular system, in accordance with the Compliance Schedule requirements of the
NZBC, or the Essential Services requirement in Australia.
Identifying the fire floor
Smoke control design and mechanical plant control logic requires that the floor on
which the fire has occurred (not to be confused with a floor on which the fire alarm has
occurred) be identified. The logic to determine the fire floor, from the alarm sources,
should be contained within the fire alarm panel such that signals identifying the fire
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floor can be initiated to the HVAC control system the building evacuation system and
any other of the building management systems requiring this information.
For the alarm system to identify the fire floor, alarm source reliability needs to be
considered. Alarm source reliability is listed below in order of decreasing reliability:
1. Sprinkler pressure switch (with floor verification by flow switch) — A time delay
should be installed to prevent simultaneous activation on all floors.
2. Smoke detectors and/or heat detectors.
3. Smoke detectors in HVAC plant — type, location and installation require careful
consideration if detectors are to achieve their required function. There is a danger of
smoke dilution reducing the effectiveness of detectors.
4. Manual call points — Should not be used to initiate HVAC plant or smoke clear-
ance systems as these require manual activation and are very likely to be operated
somewhere outside the fire-affected area.
It is essential to identify the fire floor correctly. Consider the HVAC system shown in
Figure 9.9a with a fire on level 4. In fire mode, the following sequence should occur
within the HVAC system:
1. Return air fan stops.
2. Damper from return air shaft to return air fan shuts.
3. Outdoor air damper to return air shuts.
4. Outdoor air damper to supply air fan opens.
5. Return air dampers to return air shaft, on floors 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 shut.
6. Supply air dampers on 4th floor shut.
7. Stairwell pressurisation fans start.
8. Smoke exhaust fan starts.
Note that similar control operations will occur with the HVAC systems shown in Fig-
ures 9.9b and 9.9c when operating in fire mode. If the fire floor is wrongly identified,
i.e. if the fire is on level 4 but the fire is identified as being on level 5, the systems will
configure to remove smoke from level 5 where there is no fire, while smoke from the
fire on level 4 continues unvented. Pressurisation of level 4 by air from the supply air
system may cause smoke to migrate via lift shafts and stairwells, creating a very dan-
gerous situation.
10.6 Fire Sprinklers
In New Zealand, fire sprinkler systems have a very good reliability record, due in the
main to the strict requirements for routine servicing, testing and surveying. Consider a
simplified sprinkler system as shown in Figure 10.1. All the system above the alarm
valve is pressured to a predetermined pressure by the jockey pump (pump normally
switched off). When heat causes a sprinkler to operate, pressure immediately falls and
the following occurs:
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1. The fire service alarm pressure switch operates, signalling the fire service via a
continuously monitored signalling circuit.
2. The fire alarm system activates evacuation alarms as programmed. This circuit is
continuously monitored by the fire alarm panel and a defect is signalled if a fault
occurs.
3. The pump pressure switch operates and the pump starts automatically (via a control
unit).









































Figure 10.1: Fire sprinkler system (single boosted towns main supply)
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activates, thereby identifying the fire floor.
Fire sprinklers give simple, effective signalling using system pressure and monitored
circuits. Because false activation of sprinklers is rare, they provide very reliable detec-
tion. Flow switches must be correctly selected, installed and maintained in order to
operate correctly and to reliably identify the fire floor.
Sprinkler systems are designed on the basis that the fire has occurred in one area only
and is contained by the sprinklers in that area. Sprinkler systems are not designed to
cope with two simultaneous fires in different parts of the same building. Where the
sprinkler system is connected, via an automatic alarm connection, to the New Zealand
Fire Service alarm receiving equipment, operation of the system will call the Fire Serv-
ice, so that the probability of a subsequent fire overtaxing the sprinkler system capabili-
ties is greatly reduced.
It follows that smoke control and life safety systems in sprinkler-protected buildings can
be considered as only operating in the same area as the sprinklers; thus identification of
the fire floor will enable the systems operating simultaneously to be determined.
10.7 Automatic Fire Alarms
Heat operated fire alarms have a good reliability record, again mainly due to strict
requirements for routine servicing, testing and surveying. Smoke detectors tend to be
less reliable due to the many potential false actuation mechanisms. Consider a simpli-
fied automatic fire alarm system as shown in Figure 10.2. When the detector is acti-
vated by a fire, the following occurs:
1. A signal is sent to the fire alarm panel. The circuit to the detectors is monitored and
a fault is signalled if a fault occurs in the circuit.
2. The fire alarm panel sends a signal to the fire service via a monitored signalling
circuit.
3. The fire alarm panel activates alerting devices. Circuits to alerting devices are now
required to be monitored for faults.
Again, there is simple, effective signalling with monitored circuits. However, where
detectors are used, (which do not have the suppressive power of sprinklers), smoke
and heat migration to other floors can result in other floors being identified as the fire
floor in addition to the actual fire floor. Alarm reliability has, therefore, been assessed
as less reliable than sprinkler reliability.
Developments in detector technology have produced new generation control technol-
ogy in the form of analogue addressable detection devices as described in Chapter 8.
In HVAC terminology, this is referred to as communicating controls. These advances
provide a number of benefits to improve system reliability and reduce the incidence of
false alarms.
Monitoring and control of detector status, identifying need for service and sensitivity
adjustment to suit occupancy or environment are some of the enhanced reliability func-
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tions available with analogue addressable alarm systems. Accurate identification of
which detector has activated also enables HVAC and smoke control operations to be
optimised.
Fire engineering designs utilise intelligent fire detection and alarm systems that com-
municate with a central controller to enhance life and property safety and reliability.
Such systems also simplify maintenance by regular automatic status checking of all
devices in the system. Intelligent communicating fire alarm systems used as part of the
smoke control system should contain the smoke control logic within the fire alarm
panel. Initiation of HVAC plant should be via signals from the fire alarm panel trans-
ported by the alarm system communications wiring to the motor control centre con-




















Figure 10.2:Typical (conventional) automatic fire alarm system
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Using the fire alarm communications wiring is preferred to using the HVAC control
cabling as the fire alarm wiring is monitored, whereas the HVAC control cabling is
generally not monitored. Failure of the fire alarm wiring will be recorded by the alarm
panel as a fault and the fire alarm service company will be notified. The communica-
tion wiring, generally referred to as ‘loops’, can also be fitted with fault isolation
modules which enable isolation of the failed section of the loop whilst maintaining
communication via the unaffected portion of the loop. If used for HVAC control, the
fire alarm communication loops should be installed in fire-resistant cabling to increase
system reliability in a fire.
Building codes typically require that in the event of a fire, air handling systems shut
down or change to smoke control mode, smoke control and removal systems operate as
programmed, and exit way pressurisation systems operate as programmed. It follows
that such systems, including controls, power supplies and any other devices necessary
for correct operation in ‘fire mode’, should be serviced, tested and surveyed in a similar
manner to fire protection systems (for reference refer NFPA 92A.4-4 (NFPA, 2006)).
The Building Code of Australia recommends testing and maintenance to AS 1851 (Stand-
ards Australia, 2005) and other equipment maintenance codes as appropriate.
10.8 Emergency Electrical Power Supply
Building codes typically require life safety systems to have standby emergency power.
The NZBC Acceptable Solution C/AS1 specifies an emergency power supply to ensure
the continued operation of essential equipment such as smoke control systems, emer-
gency lighting and lifts. NFPA 92A advises that “standby power should be considered
for dedicated smoke control systems and their control systems”
The requirement to provide emergency power seems, on the face of it, to be quite
sensible and reasonable, but if it does not have the same reliability as the life safety
systems it supplies, they may not operate when required. The question is whether the
emergency power supply can provide the level of reliability required and whether that
same reliability can be achieved via the normal power supply to the building.
Consider a typical electrical power schematic diagram, as shown in Figure 10.3. The
generator control panel senses failure of mains power to the essential side of the mains
switchboard and disconnects the transformer by opening ACB 1. The generator supply
breaker 2 would close and, with interlocks on 1, 2 and 3, a start signal would be
confirmed and the generator started.
Power would then be fed through the normal building electrical distribution (essential
section only) to the various HVAC and smoke clearance systems. A number of questions
arise:
• How reliable are all the electric and electronic controls that have to operate before
the start signal is confirmed?
• Is the generator start reliable?
215
Fire Safety System Interfaces
• How often is the automatic change-over from mains supply to the generator supply
tested?
• Is the normal building electrical distribution as reliable as, say, the fire protection
systems?
• How is the normal load shed when emergency supply is operating so that supply is
adequate for the smoke control systems?
• What if load is excessive due to failure of load shedding to operate?
• Where there are numerous smoke control and other life safety systems within a
major building complex, how does one determine which systems are deemed to be
operating simultaneously?
The controls for an HVAC system may be designed to initiate a change in state (i.e. an
open damper to close), but if the power supply is isolated, damaged or otherwise inop-
erative, the system may not work as intended. There are also design issues regarding
the reliability of the power supplies to HVAC systems, as the wiring may be damaged
in a fire

























BUS SECTIONACB 3BUS SECTION
Figure 10.3: Typical electrical power diagram
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Where emergency power is provided, it may be necessary to test all the life safety
systems on both emergency power and normal power. Designers should carefully
consider all the options for power supply and the reliability of all components in the
decision making process regarding whether or not provision of emergency power is
required.
10.9 Commissioning and Certification
One of the consequences of a complex interface system is the determination of the
person who takes responsibility for certification of the completed installation. This is
commonly the fire engineering consultant, who becomes responsible for observation
of the entire commissioning procedure. Each of the subsystems is required to be
completely tested and approved as a stand alone entity, and all interface scenarios then
require testing. This phase, particularly in regard to air handling plant, can take a large
amount of time. The provision of air flow switches downstream of fans and independ-
ent damper position indicators can shorten this period substantially. The Building
Warrant of Fitness requirements of the New Zealand Building Act requires that these
scenarios be certified annually.
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The objective of design for escape is to ensure that the life safety performance require-
ments can be met.
The New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) specifies the performance requirements for
means of escape in Clause C2. Means of escape provisions form Section D of the per-
formance requirements of the Building Code of Australia. It should not be necessary to
exceed these requirements unless the client has an express wish to make the building
safer than required by the Building Code. The objective of Clause C2 is to safeguard
people from injury or illness from a fire while escaping to a safe place and to facilitate
fire rescue operations. This is also the objective of Section D of the Building Code of
Australia.
Design in accordance with Acceptable Solution C/AS1 is deemed to satisfy the mini-
mum requirements of the NZBC, while design in accordance with the Deemed-to-Sat-
isfy provisions of BCA Section D is sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of
the Building Code of Australia. Most other countries have similar prescriptive solu-
tions for design of escape routes.
This Chapter provides a framework for specific fire engineering design of escape routes.
In many cases, an acceptable solution can be used as guidance for the specific design.
11.2 Occupant Behaviour
Background information on occupant behaviour in fire situations is given by Bryan
(2002). The behaviour of people depends on many factors such as the person’s age;
education, experience and training; culture; mental and physical capabilities; whether
they are under the influence of drugs or alcohol; social situation; and responsibilities of
individuals and groups. The particular behaviour of individual persons may depend on
whether they are at home, at work or part of the general public. Their behaviour might
be further influenced by whether they are on their own, with their family, with work
colleagues or with a group of strangers. The time of day, the activities that the person is
involved in or their mood will also have an influence on their behaviour.
Fires in buildings are quite different to ‘controlled’ fires people normally experience. A
fire emergency is a rapidly changing event that most people only rarely experience in
their lifetime. When people in a building fire are intimate with smoke and flames they
are put in a stressful and unfamiliar situation. There is often the need for rapid decision
making which requires the people to quickly assess information that is available. To an
outsider this information collection and decision making process might appear to indi-
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cate ‘panic’. However research has shown that in most cases people do not panic but
act in a logical and often altruistic manner. Panic may occur when people are under
immediate and extreme life threatening conditions.
Often if there is a fire in a building it is possible that the majority of the occupants will not
come into contact with the flames and smoke. The design of many large commercial and
public buildings tries to avoid the need for people to escape through smoke by providing
alternative escape routes, physical barriers between areas of the building or measures to
remove smoke from affected spaces. This remoteness from the effects of fire will result
in behaviours that differ from those in which people are intimate with fire products.
11.3 Basis for Engineered Design of Escape Routes
A flow chart for specific engineering design of escape routes is shown in Figure 11.1.
For all spaces in a building, the time taken to evacuate the space must be less than the
time for the environment in that space to become life-threatening, inclusive of a safety
margin, so that:
tev + ts < tlt [11.1]
where tev is the calculated evacuation time measured from ignition.
tlt  is the time for conditions to become life threatening, again measured from ignition.
ts is the safety margin.
Evacuation time and time for conditions to become life-threatening are both measured
from the time of ignition. Evacuation time tev is given by:
tev = td + ta + to + ti + tt + tq [11.2]
where: td  is the time from ignition until detection of the fire (by a building occupant
or by an automatic detection system).
ta is the time from detection until an alarm is sounded.
to is the time from alarm until the time occupants make a decision to respond.
ti is the time for occupants to investigate the fire, collect belongings, fight the fire.
tt is the travel time, being the actual time required to traverse the escape route until
a place of safety is reached, including way-finding.
tq is the queuing time at doorways or other obstructions.
The term td may be determined from computer fire growth and detector response mod-
els. The term ta should be obtained from knowledge of the alarm system or from knowl-
edge of human behaviour. The terms to and ti are more difficult to calculate. In many
real fires, these times have been much more significant than the actual travel time.
Calculation of travel time tt is described below.
The safety margin in Equation 11.1 is required to provide an additional level of safety
between the calculated evacuation time and the time by which occupants must have
escaped. Calculations of evacuation time can only be approximate and may vary con-
siderably depending on the nature and mobility of the occupants.
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The safety margin is required to account for uncertainties in calculating the likely
evacuation and tenability times, difficulties in way finding, and other unforeseen cir-
cumstances. The safety margin selected may vary depending on occupant characteris-
tics (age, disability, sleeping or active occupancies), presence of suppression systems,
and building size or complexity. In the absence of better information, a safety margin of
not less than tev is suggested for alert able-bodied people. A more detailed analysis may
be carried out as justification for using a different safety margin. Selection of the safety
margin depends on whether the compared times are expected values or extreme values
of the parent distributions used in a sensitivity analysis.
11.4 Number of Occupants
Occupant load can be determined by multiplying the area available for occupation by
the occupant density appropriate to the activity and nature of the space. Table 11.1
shows the occupant density for various activities from the 2001 version of the New

































Figure 11.1: Procedure for an engineered means of escape
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it may be appropriate to base calculations on more accurate values from detailed stud-
ies or field surveys. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to specify the maxi-
mum occupant design load for a room or a building in which cases there must be a
mechanism to ensure that occupant load is monitored and not exceeded during the life
of the building. For example, an occupant load plaque could be affixed to a wall.
Crowd activities  Occupant Density 
(users/m2)  
Maximum Travel 
Speed (m/min)  
Airports - baggage claim  0.50 73 
Airports - concourses  0.10 73 
Airports - waiting areas, check in  0.70 68 
Area without seating or aisles  1.00 62 
Art galleries, museums  0.25 73 
Bar sitting areas  1.00 62 
Bar standing area  2.00 39 
Bleachers, pews or similar bench type seating  2.2 users per linear metre  
Classrooms  0.5 73 
Dance floors  1.7 46 
Day care centres  0.25 73 
Dining, beverage and cafetaria spaces  0.8 66 
Exhibition areas, trade fairs  0.7 68 
Fitness centres  0.2 73 
Gymnasia  0.35 73 
Indoor games areas/bowling alleys, etc  0.1 73 
Libraries - stack areas  0.1 73 
Libraries - other areas  0.15 73 
Lobbies and foyers  1.0 62 
Mall areas used for assembly purposes  1.0 62 
Reading or writing rooms and lounges  0.5 73 
Restaurants, dining rooms and lounges  0.9 64 
Shop spaces and shopping arcades  0.3 73 
Shop spaces for furniture, floor coverings, large 
appliances, building supplies and manchester 
0.1 73 
Showrooms  0.2 73 
Space with fixed seating  as number of seats n/a 
Space with loose seating  1.3 55 
Spaces with loose seating and tables  0.9 64 
Stadia and grandstands  1.8 44 
Stages for theatrical performances  1.3 55 
Standing space  2.6 26 
Swimming pools (water surface area)  0.2 73 
Swimming pools (surrounds and seating)  0.35 73 
Teaching laboratories  0.2 73 
Vocational training rooms in schools  0.1 73 
Sleeping activities  as number of beds n/a 
Working, storage etc  <0.5 73 
Intermittent activities  <0.5 73 
General densities  0.5 73 
 1.0 62 
 1.5 50 
 2.0 39 
 2.5 28 
 3.0 17 
 3.5 6 
Table 11.1: Occupant densities and travel speeds
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11.5 Escape Route Geometry
Escape route geometry should be kept as simple as possible. Corridors that frequently
change direction and large numbers of doors make it more difficult for people to find
their way. The number, width, separation and slope of exits need to be appropriate for
the safe evacuation of building occupants (Figure 11.2).
Number and use of escape routes
The general principle is to provide occupants with at least two escape routes from any
space. There will, naturally, be exceptions to this for very small spaces. The require-
ments given in C/AS1 for minimum number of escape routes are recommended. For
unsprinklered buildings, C/AS1 requires that one exit be considered unusable when
calculating the required width of escape routes. If this approach is included in specific
design calculations, a correspondingly lower safety margin may be appropriate. If the
building is protected by an automatic sprinkler system, it is most unlikely that an exit
will be blocked due to fire.
The use of escape routes is also subject to behavioural aspects. Exit route signage is
important and often provided in buildings by reflective signs, lighted signs or other means.
In buildings unfamiliar to occupants, people are more likely to exit by the same route as
they came in even where alternative routes such as fire exits are available. Where people
are familiar with a building they are likely to be aware and know the various alternative
pathways out of the building due to those routes being used in normal activities.
Separation of exits
Where alternative escape routes are provided, they
must be adequately separated such that a fire could
not block both escape routes simultaneously. C/
AS1 specifies adequate separation by requiring al-
ternative escape routes to diverge from one another
by at least 90° until they become separated by a
certain distance or by smoke separations.
Exit width
Required exit widths are typically specified as a
function of the type of building, the number of
occupants and the physical capabilities of the oc-
cupants. An alternative method for determining the
required width of an exit, and which takes into ac-
count stair geometry, is given by Wade (1992). It
is designed to evacuate the occupants in the same
time as achieved by using Acceptable Solution C2/
A1 in combination with the steepest common stair
permissible in Acceptable Solution D1/AS1
Figure 11.2: Narrow and steep
external fire escape allowing
egress from upper stories.
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Access Routes (DBH, 2006). It gives the designer more flexibility by allowing for
increased flow on stairs that are well-proportioned. It is not applicable if a complete
analysis of travel time in accordance with Section 11.6 is to be carried out and should
only be used for assessing capacity in existing – not new – buildings.
Where ‘flow time’ is nominated separately and differs from the times implicit in the
Acceptable Solution, then the model by Proulx (2002) may be used to calculate the
required width of an exit way using appropriate densities, flows and speeds.
11.6 Decision and Investigation Time
Once people are made aware of a fire, they then enter the pre-evacuation (or sometimes
referred to as the pre-movement) stage. This stage may last anywhere from a few sec-
onds to several hours. During this stage people assess the information available and
decide upon what actions to take such as they may wait for further cues before taking
further action, they may decide that the alarm is due to a nuisance source and ignore it,
or they may consider the fire to be non-life threatening. The range and order of behav-
iours during this stage is very complex and a subject of continued research.
The response of people at this stage can be quite different depending on circumstances.
If people can see the fire or smoke then they are more likely to respond immediately.
However, there are many documented cases in which the visible cues associated with a
fire were not sufficient for people to respond.
The decision to begin evacuation is influenced by group behaviour and people are
sometimes reluctant to be seen to be the first person to start to leave. The presence of
authority figures or people with specific training can reduce this reluctance. Similarly,
previous experience, training and preparedness will likely reduce the reluctance to
evacuate. In some cases people will first complete their current actions before starting
to consider escaping. The likelihood of carrying on their current actions depends on
their level of commitment to that activity.
Where cues are ambiguous or the person suspects that there is a false activation a likely
response is for people to investigate the source of the fire cue. This investigation might
involve moving towards the visual, audible or olfactory cue. Investigation might also
involve seeking out further information from other building occupants. Other activities
during the decision and investigate time might include warning other building occu-
pants, contacting the fire service or attempting first-aid fire fighting using hand held
extinguishers, hose reels or other non-conventional methods.
11.7 Travel Time
This Section describes a way of relating the open path distance to be traversed by the
occupants to reach a place of relative safety to the time until the space is likely to
become life threatening due to smoke and fire. The open path is the route traversed by
the occupants while escaping until they exit the building or enter a safe place, such as
an exitway that protects them from the effects of fire and smoke.
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The length of travel Lt (m) is related to travel speed S (m/min) and traversal time ttr
(min) by:
L S tt tr= × [11.3]
Speed of travel depends on the occupant density, age and mobility and where occupants
are in hospitals or aged care facilities, for example, then slower travel speeds are appro-
priate. In some types of occupancy it is likely that people will move in social groups
and wait for the slowest member of that group. Family groups are an obvious social
group and there are documented cases in which adults will move counter to the evacu-
ation flow in order to collect other family members.
For typical able-bodied, independently moving adults at an occupant density less than
about 0.5 persons per square metre, the flow will be uncongested and speeds of about
70 m/min have been achieved for level travel and 51-63 m/min down stairs. Conversely,
when the occupant density exceeds about 3.5 persons per square metre, flow is very
congested and little, if any, movement is possible. Nelson and Mowrer (2002) give
expressions relating speed of travel, occupant density and flow. Figure 11.3 shows a
relationship between evacuation speed and occupant density. There is much debate as
to whether suggested people flows are appropriate for current and future building us-
ers. Pauls (2007) has noted the increase in the number of people who have some form
of temporary or permanent physical disability through the effects of obesity, old age,
illness and/or accidents. He suggests that new research is required to determine whether
previous data is still valid or needs modification.
The relationship between speed of travel S (m/min) and density of occupants Do (peo-
ple per m2) is given by:
S k Dt o= −( )1 0 266. [11.4]
for density Do greater than 0.5 persons per square metre, where
kt = 84.0 for level corridors or doorways and
kt = 51.8 (G/R)
0.5 for stairs, where G is the length of the stair tread going and R is
the riser height of each step.
For any value of occupant density and corresponding value of speed from Equation
11.4, there is a unique value of specific flow Fs (people/min/metre) given by:
F S Ds o= × [11.5]
Values of specific flow are plotted in Figure 11.4. It can be seen that the maximum
specific flow on a flat corridor is approximately 75 persons per minute per metre at an
occupant density of 1.88 persons per square metre.
Note that the occupant density Do in Equation 11.4 is the density of people as they are
moving through a space or queuing at a doorway, which may be much greater than the
design density given in Table 11.1.
The above information can be used to calculate the speed of travel, hence the traversal
time for a group of people to travel along a space such as a corridor. The time for people
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to pass through a restriction such as a stairway or door of given width can also be
calculated (Nelson and Mowrer, 2002).
For a stairway or door of width W (m), the effective width We (m) is given by:
W W Be = − [11.6]
where B (m) is the boundary layer width, usually taken to be 0.15 m on each side of
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Figure 11.3: Evacuation speed for egress calculations
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Figure 11.4: Specific flow (Nelson and Mowrer, 2002)
225
Means of Escape
The actual flow of people Fa (people/min) through the stairway or door is given by:
F F Wa s e= × [11.7]
The time tts in minutes for a number of people N to pass through the stairway or door is
given by:
t N Fts a= [11.8]
This can be used to determine the queuing time that may occur.
Calculations can become complicated for an exitway with a series of doors, corridors,
stairs etc., particularly when several flows of people are coming into the exitway at
different levels of the building. Nelson and Mowrer (2002) give some example calcula-
tions.
11.8 Time for Conditions to become Life Threatening
The time to clear a space of people must be less than the time for life-threatening condi-
tions to develop within that space with an appropriate margin of safety.
Fire growth computer models can be used to calculate the time for conditions to become
life-threatening. That time is the time when certain tenability limits are exceeded.
11.9 Tenability Limits
The effect of fire environments on humans is an exceptionally difficult subject to
quantify. Harm can be psychological, physiological or physical. Accurate data on
humans is rarely available from real-fire incidents. Experiments on humans under the
effects of fire are fraught with difficulties, even if such experiments were to be
condoned.
For some forms of incapacitation, particularly partial asphyxia such as that induced by
exposure to environments containing low oxygen concentrations or carbon monoxide,
experiments have been carried out on humans or non-human primates and well-defined
endpoints of functional impairment are easily measured. However, due to variations in
susceptibility, some individuals may be completely overcome well before other indi-
viduals are even mildly incapacitated.
With irritant products there is no sharp cut-off pain point, since the severity of the
effects increases continuously with concentration, from mild eye irritation to severe
eye and respiratory tract pain. The response of individuals would vary depending upon
such factors as their pain thresholds, their lung function characteristics and the
perceived danger.
Where fire growth models are used to predict smoke filling in compartments, tenability
criteria are usually required to establish the acceptability (or not) of the design. These
tenability criteria are measures of the time for life-threatening conditions to develop.
Tenability criteria will generally be concerned with the effect that one or more of the
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• Visibility through a smoke layer (or smoke obscuration).
• Concentration of narcotic gases.
• Concentration of irritant gases.
When evaluating these phenomena in conjunction with output from a computer model,
a nominal reference or monitoring height will normally be assumed. This height corre-
sponds to the position at which the conditions are to be evaluated and would normally
be above nose or head height. When the smoke layer height is above this reference
height, conditions in the lower layer are applicable and when the smoke layer height is
below the reference height conditions in the upper layer are applicable. A height of
2.0 m or greater is recommended for design purposes.
Convection
High levels of convective heat can lead to skin pain and hyperthermia. The degree of
hyperthermia depends on the activity of the person and the type of clothing they are
wearing. Critical temperatures for convective heat depend on the exposure time and the
moisture content of the fire gases. A conservative tenability criterion for exposure to
convected heat is 60˚C (saturated, exposure time 30 minutes). Purser (2002) provides
an expression for time to incapacitation as a function of the gas temperature.
Radiant heat
Radiant heat causes erythema (reddening of the skin and pain), partial skin burns and
eventually full thickness skin burns. Beyler (2002) gives an equation for the onset of
pain as a function of exposure time.
A conservative tenability criterion for
exposure to radiant heat is that radi-
ant heat flux from the upper layer
should not exceed 2.5 kW/m2 at head
height (this corresponds to an upper
layer temperature of approximately
200˚C). Above this, the tolerance time
is less than 20 seconds.
Visibility
Visibility through smoke depends on
the optical density of the smoke, the
type of smoke and the characteristics
Figure 11.5: Floor level lights marking
escape route in modern airport building
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of the target object to be viewed. Some people may refuse to pass through even dilute
smoke, while others will attempt to move through dense smoke, particularly in extreme
situations. People that do travel through smoke will move slower that in clear condi-
tions (Jin, 2002).
Appropriate design of escape routes and the visibility of signs can aid evacuation. Exit
signs that are illuminated are easier to see in smoky conditions. Floor level markings or
lighting (Figure 11.5) reduces the need for occupants to look through smoke to follow
exit paths.
Some computer models may calculate the visibility (in metres) directly while others
determine an optical density (in 1/metres). The calculated visibility is greatly influ-
enced by the soot (or carbon) yield (g/g) selected as input to the computer model and
this value should be carefully selected and justified. FCRC (1996) recommend the vis-
ibility tenability criteria shown in Table 11.2.
Location  Minimum visibility (m)  Optical density (1/m)  
Small rooms  5  0.2  
Other rooms  10  0.1  
Table 11.2: Tenability criteria for visibility
Narcotic or asphyxiant gases
Narcotic gases may cause loss of consciousness or death by depriving the brain tissues
of oxygen. Narcotic gases that are products of combustion include carbon monoxide,
hydrogen cyanide, carbon dioxide and reduced oxygen.
For an ‘average’ healthy person the following gas concentrations lead to incapacitation
in approximately 30 minutes (Purser, 2002):
CO not > 1400 ppm or greater (small children incapacitated in half the time)
HCN not > 80 ppm  or greater
O2 not < 12 % or less
CO2 not > 5 % or greater.
The time to incapacitation or the suggested limits may need adjusting for vulnerable
members of the population.
A more detailed method to evaluate the hazard of narcotic gases involves the use of the
‘fractional effective dose (FED)’ approach. This is described by Purser (2002) and in-
volves accounting for the cumulative effect of exposure to multiple narcotic gases. When
the FED reaches unity, incapacitation is assumed to occur although FED values of be-
tween 0.1 and 0.3 are used as typical criteria for design purposes (BS 7974-6, 2004).
The FED approach also allows for a specified exposure period to be considered rather
than the more conservative assumption of the space remaining occupied for the full
duration of the analysis.
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Irritant gases
Irritant gases cause discomfort, pain or tissue damage to the mucous membranes eyes,
nose, throat and lungs, which may lead to incapacitation or death. Irritant gases that are
products of combustion include inorganic acid gases (such as hydrogen chloride) and
organic compounds such as formaldehyde and acrolein, to name a few. Purser (2000)
suggests that a smoke density of 0.5 1/m may be used as an indication of irritancy likely
to impair escape efficiency. FCRC (1996) suggest a simplified approach where limiting
conditions for all toxic products (narcotic and irritants) are unlikely to be exceeded if
the smoke optical density does not exceed 0.1 1/m or produce less than 10 m visibility.
11.10 Other Issues
Discounting of exits
When determining exit width in unsprinklered buildings, each exit should be excluded
in turn, with the remaining exits being able to accommodate the full occupant load.
That is, if only two exits are provided, they must each individually cater for the full
occupant load. It is recommended that this concept be applied in fire engineered design
of unsprinklered buildings where it is practical to do so. This is not required under
Section D of the Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions of the Building Code of Australia, but is
common practice in fire engineered design in New Zealand.
People with disabilities
The NZBC requires that in certain buildings, people with disabilities should be able
to enter and carry out normal activities and functions. Means of escape may, there-
fore, also need to meet the requirements of NZBC Clause D1 Access Routes. In addi-
tion, C/AS1 requires refuge areas in vertical safe paths of tall buildings. These pro-
vide additional space within a safe path to allow slow moving persons to rest and
others to pass.
Multi-storey buildings
A useful summary of means of escape from multi-storey buildings is given by Wade
(1991). In very large or very tall buildings, it is recommended that some form of evacu-
ation management (such as progressive evacuation) be included to avoid unnecessary
congestion resulting from an excessive number of people all attempting to evacuate at
one time. Proposed managed evacuation systems should be designed in consultation
with the New Zealand Fire Service. Guidance is given in the Fire Safety and Evacua-
tion of Buildings Regulations, 2006.
Under the Building Code of Australia, buildings over 25 m in height are normally
expected to have a managed evacuation plan, including the use of an  Emergency
Warning and Intercommunication System (as described in Section 8.12). These sys-




Worked example – egress design
Problem 1
Given a room with known occupant load and the dimensions shown in Figure 11.6,
calculate the time for the occupants to evacuate the room and the time to evacuate the
protected stairway. Compare with the time to reach life-threatening conditions.
Length of the room Lr = 10 m
Width of the room Wr = 10 m
Length of the protected stair Ls = 10 m
Floor area of room A L Wf r r= × = × =10 10 100 m
2
Occupant density Do = 0.9 people/m
2 (from Table 11.1)
Number of occupants N A Do f o= = × =100 0 9 90. people
kt factor kt = 84
Travel speed S = kt (1 - 0.266Do) = 63.9 m/min
Length of the escape route from
the furthest point to exit B Lt = 20 m
Traversal time ttr= Le / S = 0.30 min
Detection time td = 0.8 min (from appropriate calculation)
Alarm time after detection ta = 0.1 min (from appropriate calculation or
      specification)
Occupant decision time to = 2 min (from appropriate reference such







travel distance 20 m
10 m
exit clear opening = 1000 mm
10 m
exit clear opening = 1000 mm
protected or safe path
(width = 1200 mm)
Figure 11.6: Room and stairs for worked example
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Occupant investigation time ti = 2 min (from appropriate reference such
        as BS 7974)
Evacuation starts at td + ta + to + ti = 0.8 + 0.1 + 2.0 + 2.0 = 4.9 minutes and the first
person is assumed to enter exit B at this time.
Time for the last person to reach exit B tev = td + ta + to + ti + ttr = 5.2 min
This is the predicted time for the last person to reach exit B considering the predicted
travel speed in the open path, and assuming no extra time is required for way-finding. It
is not necessarily the time for all the people to be in the stairway.
Queuing effects at the doorway must first be considered as shown below:
Width of the door W = 1.0 m
Width of the boundary layer B = 0.15 m
Effective width We = W - 2B = 0.7 m
Specific flow through door Fs = SDo = 63.9 x 0.9 = 57.5 people/min/m
Actual flow through door Fa = FsWe = 57.5 x 0.7 = 40.3 people/min
Queuing time to travel through exit B tq = N / Fa = 90 / 40.3 = 2.2 min
The last person enters exit B 2.2 min after the first person entered exit B, i.e. tt = 5.2
min, hence evacuation time  tev = td + ta + to + ti + tq  = 1.9 + 5.2 = 7.1 min. Take safety
margin ts = 7.1 min.
Design time to escape td = tev  + ts  = 7.1 + 7.1 = 14.2 min
Evacuation is acceptable if the design time is less than the time for untenable limits in
the room to be exceeded.
Problem 2
Extend problem 1 to calculate the time for the occupants to evacuate the stairway.
Width of the stairs W = 1.2 m
Width of boundary layer B = 0.15 m
Effective width We = W - 2B = 0.9 m
Using the actual flow of people as they pass through exit B and the width of the space
they enter, the specific flow in the stairway can be determined.
Specific flow Fs = Fa / We
      = 40.3 / 0.9 = 44.8 persons/min/m
Length of stair tread going G = 280 mm
Height of the stair riser R = 180 mm
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kt factor kt = 51.8 (G/Rs)
0.5 = 64.6
The specific flow and people density can be related as follows to determine the density
of people in the stair.
Density of occupants S = kt (1-0.266Ds) and Fs = S Ds
so Fs = kt Ds (1 - 0.266Ds)
0.266 kt Ds
2 - kt Ds + Fs = 0
This is a quadratic equation in the form ax2 + bx + c = 0, where a = 0.266 kt, b = -kt,
c = Fs and x = Ds. Solve for Ds.
 D b b ac as = − ± −( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
=2 4 2 0 92 2 84. .or people/m2
Sensibly choose Ds = 0.92 people/m
2
Travel speed in stair S = kt (1-0.266Ds) = 48.8 m/min
Length of stair Ls = 10.0 m
Time to traverse the stairs tts = Ls / S = 10 / 48.8 = 0.20 min
The first person reaches and enters exit C at 4.9 + 0.2 = 5.1 minutes. The last person
reaches exit C at 7.1 + 0.2 = 7.3 minutes.
Specific flow at exit C      F S Ds o= = × =48 8 0 92 44 8. . . people/min/m
Actual flow through exit C           F F Wa s e= = × =44 8 0 7 31 4. . . people/min
Time to travel through exit C  tqc = N / Fa = 90 / 31.4 = 2.9 min
The last person enters exit C 2.9 minutes after the first person has entered exit C, there-
fore the stairway is clear and the evacuation time for the ‘building’ is 5.1 + 2.9 = 8.0
minutes. The design time for escape for the protected stairway is tdesign = 2 x tev = 2 x
8.0 = 16 minutes.
This time should be compared with time for untenable conditions in the stairway. A
timeline for the escape design is shown in Figure 11.7.
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The objective of this Chapter is to give a brief discussion of the advantages, disadvan-
tages and limitations of using computers for fire engineering calculations, and a brief
description of two commonly used computer-based fire modelling programs.
There are a large number of computer packages for a wide range of fire engineering
applications (Olenick et al, 2003) including egress design, sprinkler design, smoke man-
agement and structural performance. This Chapter describes a few of the available mod-
els, with an emphasis on fire growth models. Fire simulation computer programs are
most useful for modelling the fire growth stage. They are not capable of modelling fire
initiation or smouldering fires, which are inherently unpredictable, both in terms of the
rate of fire growth, and the times at which they may develop into flaming combustion.
The use of a computer model in fire engineering design is likely to be seen as an alter-
native solution to an acceptable solution to meet the requirements of a building code.
The fire engineer will therefore need to justify the rationale for selecting a particular
model, provide exact details of the version of the model used, justify any inputs or
assumptions and be able to interpret results appropriately.
12.2 Warnings
Fire modelling with computers is still at an early stage of development, and therefore
all the computer programs for modelling the impact of a fire must be used carefully,
and only by persons experienced with fire behaviour. Computer fire models are no
substitute for actual experience of real fire behaviour in buildings.
As with all computer models, output should be checked to see that it is realistic. Simple
hand calculations should be used to check that the output is consistent with the input
data for the real physical situation being modelled. All computer models should be
fully ‘transparent’. That means that the input data, the basic methods of calculation,
and the formulas and mathematical models on which they are based, should be readily
available for reference and cross-checking by all parties.
All computer models should have their limits of application clearly defined to avoid
using them outside the range of accurate application of the mathematical models on
which they are based. For example, many formulae used in fire engineering are the
result of study only on small test rooms so their application to large spaces needs to be
carefully considered to ensure that the models are still applicable and the results
reliable. The output from computer fire models can often be very sensitive to seem-
ingly minor changes in the input data, which is sometimes difficult to assess accurately.
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Sensitivity analysis should be carried out as part of the normal use of computer models,
to identify which variables are of most significance.
In the pre-flashover phase, most fire models require the user to input a design fire,
which is estimated from the fuel type, ventilation, growth rates and peak burning
rates, all of which can vary considerably, and require a fair degree of experience and
judgment to evaluate. Design fires are discussed in Section 4.10. Some fire models
have been extended to cover the post-flashover stage in which available fuel surface
area and fire ventilation are important, but results from analysis of post-flashover fire
periods are normally less accurate than for the pre-flashover period.
Most models do not understand fire growth and are entirely dependent on the input of a
user defined ‘fire’, typically expressed as a varying heat release rate as a function of
time. By their very nature, the models’ output is highly sensitive to the form of this
input fire and practitioners need to be constantly aware of this limitation.
As computers continue to improve and software development becomes more user
friendly, many new computer models are becoming available. This ever-expanding
array of fire modelling programs has the potential to increase analytical capabilities
and lead to improved designs. However, the practitioner should be warned that many of
these models have not been extensively scrutinised by independent third party users.
Before using a complex computer-based compartment fire model in design applica-
tions, it is essential that there be an extensive beta testing programme conducted and
that the model be validated against independent data. It is far too easy for errors to
creep into the code during development and go undetected. Indeed, the FAST model
was an extensively beta tested fire model before final release, yet there were five
revisions to the code since 1997 when it was officially released. Prior to independent
beta testing, a model should only be considered useful for research.
12.3 Categories of Models
Probabilistic models
In these types models probabilities are ascribed to the input values resulting in statistical
output predictions. Some models of this type do not make direct use of the physical and
chemical principles involved in fires, but make statistical predictions about the transition
from one stage of fire growth to another. The course of a fire is described as a series of
discrete stages that summarise the nature of the fire. Time dependent probabilities are
ascribed to the possibility of the fire changing from one stage to another. These are deter-
mined from a knowledge of extensive experimental data and fire incident statistics.
Deterministic models
Deterministic models are so called because a given set of input values will lead to
a determined set of outputs. Deterministic fire growth models use the physics and chem-
istry associated with the fire environment to make predictions about fire
development and can be further classified into two main sub-groups; field models and
zone models.
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12.4 Fire growth models
General
Design of buildings for life safety requires the ability to predict the growth of a fire in
a room, from ignition to full room involvement. In an effort to bring some of the
advances in fire science and related technology to the market place, and thereby assist
fire safety engineering professionals to efficiently achieve their objectives, a number
of fire research organisations have produced fire simulation computer models for use
with personal computers.
Computer fire models are useful for investigating the effects of alternative fire scenarios,
as a small part of a comprehensive fire engineering design process.
Zone models
Zone models divide an enclosure into a small number of distinct regions, each of which
is characterised by a set of time dependent variables that describe its physical state.
Each zone is considered isothermal and homogeneous.
Conservation equations for mass and energy are applied to each zone so that the
relationships between the physically significant parameters and their evolution can be
determined. Whilst zone models are more primitive in conception than field models,
they are easier to apply and provide results far more economically in terms of compu-
tational requirements. They are the most practical method for achieving first order
approximations to real fire behaviour.
Zone models assume a hot upper layer (or zone) and a cool lower layer (or zone) as
shown in Figure 4.4. Interaction between the two zones takes place through the fire
plume above the burning object. The fire plume rises through buoyancy to the ceiling,
entraining cool air as it rises. The combustion products and entrained air then spread
across the ceiling. Once the walls are reached, the hot layer increases in thickness until
such time as its depth is controlled by the ventilation through the openings. The fire
then stabilises its burning rate to match the available air supply.
If there are no large openings the hot layer will descend to the level of the fire, and the
rate of combustion will drop as the fire is starved of oxygen.
There are a number of zone models that are or have been available to users. Examples
include the FIRE SIMULATOR single room model in FPETool (Nelson, 1990; Deal,
1993), the CFAST family of models (Peacock et al, 1997; Jones et al, 1999) and
BRANZFIRE which is described in more detail in Section 12.8.
Field models
In field modelling the compartment is divided into many thousands of computational
cells throughout the enclosure. Field models, often called Computational Fluid Dy-
namics (CFD) models solve the conservation mass momentum, energy and species in
each cell, thus giving a 3-dimensional field of the dependent variables including tem-
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perature, velocity, concentration, etc. Field models use complex fluid mechanics algo-
rithms such as the k-ε method to solve for the turbulant flow present in fires. The k-ε
method is a time averaging technique, which smears out much of the complex flow
details that are sometimes required for detailed flow modelling. The JASMINE CFD
code (Markatos and Cox, 1981) is one particular example of the use of the k-ε method.
An alternative technique is to use the Large Eddy Simulation (LES) technique to deal
with unsolved, sub-grid scale motion. The Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) model can
use the LES approach and this model is discussed in more detail in Section 12.9.
Field models require a great deal of experience on the part of the user and place great
demands on computational facilities. Field models have been developed to a stage where
they can be applied for design purposes although there is still much research required
and so must be used with great care.
12.5 Structural fire models
If the circumstances allow, it is recommended to use finite element analysis programs
to assess the fire resistance of part or all of a structure. There are typically two steps
required for the analysis: a thermal analysis followed by a mechanical analysis. The
complexity of the analyses are reduced by dividing structural components into small
elements on which thermal and mechanical conditions are calculated. Boundary
temperature conditions are normally specified by the user either as a standard time-
temperature curve or as the result of a separate analysis such as from a fire growth
model.
To conduct thermal analysis it is necessary to include the material thermal properties
such as thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity and specific heat. All thermal proper-
ties are influenced by temperature to a different extent, and their relationships with
temperature can be found in national standards such as the Eurocodes (EC2, 2004; EC3,
2005; EC5, 2004), or by carrying out laboratory tests. The thermal gradients determined
from the thermal analysis are then in conjunction with the non-linear temperature
dependent mechanical properties such as strength, stiffness and thermal expansion to
predict the performance of the structure in fire. The mechanical analysis must be able to
include the effects of thermal expansion, loading and unloading and large deformations.
There are several commercially available programs for assessing the fire resistance of
structures. Some combine thermal and mechanical analyses in one package, such as
SAFIR (Franssen, 2005), while others can only conduct either thermal analysis or me-
chanical analysis, such as the commercial version of Vulcan (Huang et al., 2003). Some
general purpose finite element analysis programs, such as ABAQUS (Hibbitt, Karlsson
and Sorensen Inc., 2002) and DIANA (TNO, 1999), require users to define the relation-
ships between temperature and material properties. They are not very user-friendly, but
the codes are transparent. There are other programs written specifically for analysing
structural performance in fire, namely SAFIR and Vulcan, and these have temperature
and material property relationships included. These programs are easier to use but the
complexity of the assumptions made by the programmers means that they need to be
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applied by suitably experienced practitioners.
The rapid development of computer technology means it is likely that more structural
fire engineering will be carried out using finite element analysis programs. Structural
fire models may not predict integrity failures and the reaction to fire of composite
structures composed of materials with different or opposite rates of thermal expansion
and contraction.
12.6 Evacuation modelling
Sime (1994) has identified two different ways to model people moving around build-
ings, in terms of movement of occupants or their behaviour. The first is called a ‘physi-
cal science’ or ‘ball-bearing’ model of human movement. The second is called a ‘social
science’ or psychological model of human reactions. People are assumed to be behaving
mechanically in ‘physical science’ model whereas people in ‘social science’ model are
thinking and acting accordingly.
Gwynne et al (2002) investigated the behavioural aspects required for evacuation
modelling. They have categorised four major factors that influenced evacuation per-
formance and suggested those to be represented within an evacuation model. The four
broad areas are: configuration of enclosure, environmental factors inside the structure,
procedures implemented within the enclosure, and most important of all, behaviour of
the occupants. The influence of an occupant’s personal attributes, such as physical,
psychological and sociological, will be affected by the other three broad areas. Gwynne
et al (2002) conclude that a model should consider the factors on which these decisions
are based, rather than treating occupants as instinctive entities as would be the case in a
‘ball-bearing’ model. In terms of the methodologies of evacuation models, there are
different approaches to the evacuation analysis and different ways of representing the
enclosure, the occupants and their behaviour (Gwynne et al, 1999).
There are two ways to represent a building space, using either a fine network approach or
a coarse network approach. The former represents a space as an extensive network of
nodes. Each node corresponds to a small area of the building space and allows a
detailed description to be implemented in an evacuation model. This approach is
usually an accurate representation of the building geometry and it often requires detailed
drawings. The second approach represents a space as a node and an arc to connect to the
next node. An arc represents the actual connection of the building space. Typically each
node is used to represent a distinct space in the building such as a room. However, it is
sometimes more appropriate to represent a space such as for a long corridor with more
than one node.
The building population can be represented in either a global or an individual perspec-
tive. With the global perspective, the occupants are treated as a group, where each
occupant is identical and has no individual characteristics. With the individual perspec-
tive, each occupant is assigned personal attributes, either randomly or by the user.
Optimisation models ignore non-evacuation activities and assume the occupants evacuate
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in an efficient manner. An example of this type of model is EVACNET+ (Kisko and
Francis, 1985). Simulation models endeavour to embody the behaviour and movement
exhibited during evacuations to predict the decision-making and escape routes. There
are several simulation-type evacuation models including Simulex (Thompson and
Marchant, 1994), BuildingEXODUS (Owen et al, 1997), EXIT89 (Fahy, 1996) and
EXITT (Kostreva and Lancaster, 1998). Although the coarse network and global build-
ing population approaches generally require less computational effort, they may not
take into account the local physical and psychological interactions of people. A more
complete list of computer evacuation models is available in Kuligowski (2005).
12.7 Risk Assessment Models
There are several risk-based tools available for assessing fire safety in buildings
and they use some combination of probabilistic modelling to specify their inputs and
deterministic models to perform their calculations. Programs such as these are most
useful as comparative tools for comparing one design with another, or for establishing
equivalent safety compared with a code-complying design.
One model of this type is FIRECAM, which can be used to assess the fire safety
performance of a building in terms of two parameters; the expected risk to life and the
fire cost expectation (Yung et al, 1997). FIRECAM considers the time-dependent inter-
action of fire growth, fire spread, smoke movement, human behaviour, and fire service
response, in a probabilistic format. A similar risk-cost model developed at Victoria
University of Technology (VUT) is called CESARE-RISK and the Building Research
Establishment in the UK has the CRISP model (Ghosh and Fraser-Mitchell, 1999).
12.8 BRANZFIRE
BRANZFIRE is an enclosure zone model with an optional fire growth model for com-
bustible linings. It is used to calculate the time dependent distribution of smoke and
heat throughout a collection of connected compartments during a fire. In BRANZFIRE
each compartment is divided into two layers. The modelling equations used take the
mathematical form of an initial value problem for a system of ordinary differential
equations. They are derived using the conservation of mass, the conservation of energy,
the ideal gas law and relations for density and internal energy. They predict as functions
of time, quantities such as pressure, layer heights and temperatures given the accumu-
lation of mass and enthalpy in each of the two layers. Smoke transport between rooms
is driven by the hydrostatic pressure profiles over the height of the openings.
The model solves the set of ordinary differential equations to compute the environment
in each compartment incorporating the production of species, such as carbon monoxide
and soot, which are important to the safety of individuals subjected to a fire environ-
ment.
BRANZFIRE was developed by BRANZ (Wade, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). The program
requires a personal computer running Microsoft Windows 95 or later. The BRANZFIRE
program is available from BRANZ at http://www.branzfire.com.
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Features
The model simulates smoke spread within and between compartments and includes
some of the following general features:
• vents connecting compartments or outside spaces may be in walls or in ceilings/
floors;
• mechanical ventilation (extraction and pressurisation) in a compartment including
consideration of plug-holing effects;
• sprinkler, thermal and smoke detector response time predictions;
• flame spread and fire growth contribution from combustible wall and ceiling lin-
ings based on small-scale cone calorimeter test data;
• tenability assessment, including determination of fractional effective dose for toxic
gases, thermal radiation doses, and visibility calculations;
• detailed vent flow analysis;
• prediction of glass fracture times; and
• direct export and automatic charting of results to Microsoft Excel.
Limitations
BRANZFIRE is subject to the general limitations of zone models with the most impor-
tant assumption being the uniform properties (temperature, concentration, density) of
both gas layers. Omitting momentum and gas transport effects leads to the assumption
of instantaneous spread of smoke across the area of an enclosure and immediate smoke
filling from the ceiling downwards. In large volumes/areas this may not be the case as,
in practice, the ceiling jet is cooled losing buoyancy before reaching the extremes of
the enclosure. This leads to non-uniformity in the properties of the smoke layer around
the enclosure. For this reason, particular caution is required when applying BRANZFIRE
(and other zone models) to large enclosures, particularly if variations in the layer prop-
erties and layer height across the compartment are likely to influence conclusions drawn
from the analysis. Many submodels within BRANZFIRE contain further assumptions
and constraints due to the limits of application of the correlations or physics upon which
they are based. It is necessary for users to be familiar with the technical details of the
submodels so they are able to identify the circumstances where BRANZFIRE may not
be appropriate.
The user is required to provide details about the characteristics (rate of heat release,
species yields etc) of the design fire, although some data is available for selection from
the program’s fire and materials databases. The model results are highly sensitive to
this input data, along with the area of ventilation openings in the enclosure, therefore
the user must ensure that the inputs used are appropriate to the situation being mod-
elled.
Validation
Relevant publications discussing specific submodels and their validation include:
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• Modelling flame spread and fire growth on combustible linings in room-corner fires
(Wade and Barnett, 1997; Apte et al, 2004; Wade, 2006);
• Modelling glass fracture times (Parry et al, 2003); and
• Modelling sprinkler response time (Wade et al, 2007).
• Modelling smoke/soot production (Robbins and Wade, 2007).
The basis for many of the underlying zone model algorithms used within BRANZFIRE
has been previously published in the literature including:
• vent flow through wall openings using the CCFM code (Cooper and Forney, 1990);
• vent flow through ceiling openings using the VENTCF2A code (Cooper, 1997);
• radiation/heat exchange between room surfaces and gas layers (Forney, 1994); and
• sprinkler response algorithm using the JET model (Davis, 1999).
Additional comparative studies of model predictions with experiments are described in
Wade (2004c).
12.9 Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS)
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) has been developed at the National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology (NIST). It solves an approximate form of the Navier-Stokes equa-
tions for low-speed, thermally driven flows to simulate the mixing and transport phe-
nomenon of combustion products. The spatial resolution of the model is fine enough
that it is able to predict the large eddy structures that will develop within the flow. The
FDS code has gone through several development phases and users must be aware of
that there are major differences between versions. The latest version is release 5 but
release 4 (McGrattan, 2005, McGrattan and Forney, 2005) is still in common use at the
time of writing.
Building enclosure elements and solid objects are specified as a series of orthogonal
solid rectangular blocks or cuboids representing flow obstacles, whereas doors and
windows are viewed as holes allowing fluid and particles to flow through. Parameters
can be used in conjunction with a void to specify the time at which the voids are to be
created or removed, simulating the opening and closing of doors or windows.
A mixture fraction-based combustion model is used for the LES approach. The com-
bustion model assumes infinitely fast chemistry kinetics which means that reactions
consume fuel and oxidiser so that they cannot co-exist simultaneously. The fuel and
oxidiser reaction zone defines the flame surface.
Radiation heat transfer through soot is modelled a grey medium and the energy emitted
from the flame zone is dealt with using a specific sub-model. Heat transfer to surfaces
is obtained from a combination of natural and forced convection correlations that de-
pend on characteristics of the gas flowing around the surface.
Sub-models for ignition and flame spread are included. The energy release of a fire can
be specified by the user in the form of a heat release rate per unit area of burning
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surface or by letting the burning rate be predicted from the fuel properties. Thermally
thin or thermally thick heat conduction conditions can be accounted for. FDS includes
sub-models to predict the activation of smoke detectors and the effect of a suppression
system on a fire although these are subject to further research and development.
The simulation outputs from FDS can be visualised graphically in an interactive 3D
environment using a companion application called SmokeView (Forney and McGrattan,
2006). FDS can produce graphical output files containing the 3D model geometry, ani-
mated quantities per unit time (i.e. isosurface, slice or boundary files) as well as static
pictures of the flow field which can be accessed and visualised using SmokeView. The
type of output quantities include space and boundary conditions such as the tempera-
ture profile, heat flux and mass flow rate, the history of heat release rates, the levels of
oxygen, carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, and other combustion products.
The setting up and use of FDS requires specialised knowledge which cannot be cov-
ered in this Design Guide.
Limitations
Although FDS is a very sophisticated model it has a number of limitations that users
must be aware of. Some of these limitations are listed below although it is possible that
further work and newer releases of the code will overcome these:
• Numerical grids must conform to a rectilinear co-ordinate system making curved
and sloping surfaces more difficult to represent,
• Only a single combustion reaction can be modelled regardless of the number of
fuels represented,
• Under-ventilated fires or fires subject to a suppression agent are not well modelled
by the instantaneous combustion reaction model,
• The accuracy of the fuel transport and combustion process is limited by the grid
resolution,
• The computer resources required for large and/or complex simulations can mean
that run-times can last several days or weeks.
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The objective of provisions for fire service operations is to ensure that the fire service is
able to perform those functions they are required to complete by legislation and those
functions required to meet the specified performance criteria for the building.
Fire emergencies require the fire service to operate within potentially dangerous situ-
ations. Time constraints and physically stressful environments require effective deci-
sion-making and deployment of resources. The design and construction of the built
environment plays a significant role in contributing to successful fire emergency out-
comes (Figure 13.1). Fire fighters interact with buildings on a daily basis and as such,
some design and construction features can impose unnecessary restrictions to fire
service operations. Designing with the fire service in mind, however, not only allows
for more effective intervention, but it also allows for higher occupant and fire service
personnel safety.
13.2 Scope
Various factors are important in the design of buildings to facilitate fire service opera-
tions in the event of fire and other emergencies. In New Zealand, the Building Act and
Figure 13.1: Fire emergencies require fire service personnel to frequently
interact with the built environment
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the Building Code place functional requirements on buildings to enable New Zealand
Fire Service (NZFS) rescue and fire suppression operations to take place, with require-
ments to safeguard fire fighters. The Approved Documents to the Building Code set out
some of these requirements in the Acceptable Solutions in a prescriptive fashion as one
means of meeting the objectives of the Building Code.
The Fire Service Act empowers the New Zealand Fire Service Commission to recom-
mend that the Minister issue codes of practice relating to building fire safety and sets out
the basis for the NZFS to provide advice to territorial authorities on fire safety issues.
The Act also requires the National Commander of the NZFS to issue a Code of Practice
for fire fighting water supplies to enable effective fire fighting operations to take place.
This Chapter describes areas where the NZFS Chief Fire Officer should be consulted for
information on particular aspects relating to building design and fire service operations.
Building designers, owners and managers are encouraged to contact the fire service for
advice and information on any other issues relating to building fire safety and fire protec-
tion. Further details about Australian Fire Brigade Acts are given in Chapter 17.
13.3 Fire Service Access and Water Supplies
Access for fire fighters needs to be considered when planning buildings and building
complexes. The provision of a master key system can offer considerable flexibility.
Of critical importance to the fire service in performing its role, is the presence of ad-
equate water supplies for fire attack and the protection of exposures (Figure 13.2) as
well as suitable access to buildings and building complexes. The presence of ground
hydrants and reticulated water supplies enable fire fighters to quickly establish an ad-
equate water supply. The provision of unobstructed, clear access to buildings and suit-
able hard standing areas, allows the fire service to supply fire appliances (pumps, aeri-
als etc) to within an adequate and safe working distance of the building. It also allows
fire fighters to easily locate and access any fire service inlets.
Fire service access
The fire service requires vehicle access to buildings in order to provide rescue equip-
ment and fire fighting water in the event of a fire. Examples of vehicular access infor-
mation required by the fire service are:
• minimum access road load bearing capacity;
• all weather traffic use;
• minimum access route widths, clearances and turning circles;
• hard standing areas;
• maximum distances from buildings to access roads; and
• access to fire service inlets, fire alarm panels and building entrances.
Pumping appliances should be able to approach a building. Aerial appliances however,
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are generally positioned at a corner of the building for several reasons; in case of build-
ing face collapse, it allows for two faces of the building to be worked upon, it maxim-
ises rescue capability, and is safer overall from a fire operations point of view. Fire
fighting and rescue operations are greatly enhanced when access can be provided to
entrances on more than one side of the building.
Requirements for NZFS access to buildings for fire fighting purposes are set out in the
Acceptable Solution (C/AS1) to the New Zealand Building Code. The Acceptable So-
lution to the Building Code requires that access be provided to within 18 m of at least
one side of each building, except that when a building is sprinkler protected and has a
fire riser main installed, access need only be provided to within 18 m of the inlets to
these systems. Buildings that provide sleeping care and sleeping detention greater than
seven metres high, require hard standing areas adjacent to the buildings so as to provide
access.
The Building Code of Australia outlines requirements for fire service access under
Performance Requirement CP9.
Fire Fighting Water Supplies
The principal method of fighting fires in New Zealand is by manual fire fighting by the
NZFS. The fire service needs significant quantities of water to carry out fire fighting
duties.
The NZFS has developed SNZ PAS 4509 (Standards New Zealand, 2008) New Zea-
land Fire Service Fire Fighting Water Supplies Code of Practice, as is required under
Clause 30(3) of the Fire Service Act 1975. It has been developed to provide direction
Figure 13.2: Adequate access and water supplies allows for quicker and
more effective fire service intervention
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on what constitutes an adequate supply of water for fire fighting in urban fire districts.
It establishes the minimum fire fighting water supply that is required for the fire hazard
being considered and is based on an assessment of the water supplies needed to fight a
fire and to limit fire spread.
The Code of Practice also sets out minimum fire service performance requirements,
fire service testing requirements, and other requirements for fire fighting water sup-
plies. In this regard, the Code of Practice requires the matching of water supplies to the
specific building and its fire risk and takes into account the fire safety features fitted
within the building, the size of the firecells and the type and density of building occu-
pants. Contents also include:
• Risk classifications.
• Minimum flows required and number of hydrants to be used for flow testing for
each classification.
• Minimum running pressure.
• Specification for fire hydrants to the requirements of NZS/BS 750.
• Spacing of hydrants.
• Installation of hydrants to the requirements of NZS/BS 750 (Standards New Zea-
land, 1984).
• Marking of hydrants to the requirements of NZS 4501(Standards New Zealand,
1972) or BS 3251 (BSI British Standards, 1976).
• Consideration of the flow requirements for fire protection systems when determin-
ing the required water flows, including auxiliary water supplies.
• Consultation between Regional Commanders and Territorial Authorities on water
supply schemes.
• Minimum reserve storage capacities for water supply schemes.
• Limitation on dead end mains.
• Procedure and performance requirements for testing the adequacy of water supplies.
• Maintenance of water supplies.
13.4 New Zealand Fire Service Operations Guide
Specific operational fire fighting requirements may be identified in consultation with
the local Regional Commander. In addition, the NZFS have published a guideline on
operational considerations (NZFS, 2008). This guide will be used by the NZFS as a
guidance document for giving advice to the fire industry in New Zealand. The NZFS
has designed this guide for use by fire safety engineers, fire protection engineers, Building
Consent Authorities, architects, building owners and other interested parties. The guide
is intended to outline how the NZFS operate within the built environment and how they
interact with building systems. This information will greatly aid those more intimately
involved in the building design process.
In addition to the need to deploy and coordinate fire service personnel and resources,
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fire emergencies frequently require a multi-agency response (Figure 13.3). A greater
appreciation of fire service operations will assist the NZFS and others to operate more
efficiently and effectively in and around the built environment where it has become
necessary to exercise its operational fire fighting functions.
13.5 Fire Brigade Intervention Model
The Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC, 2004), on which the NZFS is repre-
sented, has produced a document describing a quantitative model of fire service opera-
tions. This model is suitable for use in conjunction with performance-based fire engi-
neering design. The model incorporates a wide range of factors including the following:
• Time to fire detection both by automatic systems and by human factors. Human
factors are uncertain and very subjective, depending on building occupancy and
times when occupied.
• Time to notification of the fire service.
• Fire service travel time to arrive at the incident.
• Access and search times for all floors.
• Fire attack time.
13.6 Fire Resistance Ratings
Certain building components need to be provided with fire resistance ratings for speci-
fied minimum times in order to safeguard fire fighting personnel who enter the build-
Figure 13.3: In addition to the need to deploy and coordinate fire service personnel
and resources, fire emergencies frequently require a multi-agency response.
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ing to carry out rescue and fire suppression operations.
Many factors have an impact on the time taken to control and extinguish a particular
fire. Times may range from a few minutes for small fires involving few combustibles
and not having reached flashover, to a day or more for large deep-seated fires involving
large quantities of fuels with limited access. It is not possible to predict with any cer-
tainty how long it will take the fire service to control and extinguish a fire in a given
building.
There are a number of factors that must be taken into consideration when determining
the minimum structural fire resistance time needed to allow egress and fire service
operations to safely take place and to meet a building code requirements for firefighter
protection. These include:
• Time factors from the start of a fire to the time of fire service notification, including
the effects of fire alarm systems.
• Fire service response time and set up time at the fire ground, including the time
required to establish water supplies.
• Search and rescue time.
• Time to locate the fire.
• Floor access time.
• Fire fighting time, including control of fire spread both internally and externally,
protection of fire fighters and time limits for self-contained breathing apparatus
use.
• Equivalent fire resistance rating compared to real time fire growth.
To allow for these factors, it is recommended that safe paths of exitways be protected in
accordance with the Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 in New Zealand or Section C of the
deemed-to-satisfy provisions of the Building Code of Australia. Specific fire engineering
design is required to meet the performance requirements of the Building Codes should
variations to these values occur.
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The objective of this Chapter is to ensure that sufficient and proximate water supply
suitable for mitigating the risk of fire outbreak is available; be it for fire service opera-
tions or the successful operation of any automatic or manual fire suppression systems.
To provide an acceptable level of safety a conservative approach should provide a com-
bination of both, in case any automatic system should fail to control a fire outbreak.
14.2 Scope
Water is, and is expected to remain, the principal medium used for fire control. The
purpose of this chapter is to identify the relevant parameters and outline the design
procedures required to ensure the satisfactory performance of water supply systems for
fire fighting purposes. This Chapter provides guidance on the water supply aspects of
fixed fire protection systems, an outline of fire service operational procedures and nec-
essary facilities, and parameters for the design of the fire fighting aspects of water
supply network systems. Within this scope, the objectives are to:
(a) Promote the best possible standard of fire control water supplies to ensure that fires
can be controlled and extinguished;
(b) Promote water conservation and limit the release of hazardous substances to the
environment as a result of fire;
(c) Provide guidance to the designers of fixed fire protection systems using water as the
extinguishing medium;
(d) Set out the important parameters and procedures for wauü  supply facilities that
enable the fire service to effectively fight building fires;
(e) Identify the important parameters and procedures necessary for the design of water
supply network systems for fire fighting purposes; and
(f) Provide reference material to enable designers to locate the detailed information
necessary to design water supply systems for fire fighting purposes.
14.3 Principal Considerations
Water is an excellent fire control medium because it is widely available, clean, cheap,
has a large cooling capacity and the resulting steam can assist extinguishment by dis-
placing oxygen from the fire proximity.
Fire will only be effectively suppressed by water application if the rate of cooling through
water application exceeds the rate of heat output of the fire. Not all the water applied to
the fire will be converted to steam and achieve the maximum possible cooling effect.
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The extent to which the applied water exceeds the required water is a measure of the
efficiency of the water application system (Barnett, 1979).
The cooling power of water is illustrated in Figure 14.1, which shows that 2.605 MJ of
energy are absorbed by one kilogram (or litre) of water as it is heated from 0°C to steam
at 100°C. This is equivalent to a cooling power of 2.605 MW for each litre/second of
water applied to a fire and heated to steam. Additional heat is required to heat the steam
to higher temperatures.
These figures can be used to calculate the flow of water required to cool a fire burning
at a known heat release rate (in MW), taking into account that not all the water at the
fire incident will be put on the fire itself and not all of that water will be heated into
steam. The proportion of water that actually cools the fire compared to the proportion
that is not put onto the fire or heated to steam is referred to as the cooling efficiency kc.
Due to the difficulties of effective fire fighting, there is considerable debate as to what
is appropriate for this and values of 0.5, 0.35 or lower have been suggested (Barnett,
2004; SNZ PAS 4509 (Standards New Zealand, 2008)).
An additional benefit of water is its ability to expand and displace oxygen after it has
been turned into steam by the heat of the fire. Figure 14.2 shows that steam at 100°C
occupies 1700 times the volume of water, which increases to 4000 times at 600°C.
Automatic fire sprinkler systems and water spray systems are the most efficient means
currently available for suppressing fires by use of water in most types of occupancies.
This is because they operate when the fire is small and only over the immediate area
affected by fire.
Fire service operational fire fighting is most often less efficient, due mainly to the delay
in being able to commence suppression activities that allows the fire to grow to a larger
size. In addition, streams of water from fire hoses that have to be directed from outside
the structure through openings, are considerably less efficient than a well-directed spray
of water, such as from a proximate sprinkler, and generally result in considerably greater
water supply demands in the order of 10 to 100 times the minimum rate needed for
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Figure 14.1: Cooling power of water (Barnett, 1989)
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extinguishment (Yu and Newman, 2008). This also gives greater runoff of water and
where hazardous materials are involved, can be a greater source of pollution.
14.4 Water Supply Requirements
Water quantity
In order to determine the necessary performance characteristics of a fire fighting water
supply, the following must be determined or calculated:
(a) the expected fire growth rate curve;
(b) the fire intensity at the time the fire is attacked;
(c) the expected duration of the fire and the peak heat release rate;
(d) the water supply required to match the peak heat release rate; and
(e) the ratio of applied water to required water for the intended fire fighting water ap-
plication system.
If the anticipated point of fire attack on the fire growth curve precedes the peak heat
release rate, then it is necessary to understand and allow for the response time variables
involved in the chosen method of water application. For safety considerations it is vital
that these calculations are conservative and a sensitivity analysis is conducted to allow
for redundancy of system performance. Fire engineering calculation methods for deter-
mining the flow and storage of water needed to fight a fire are given by Barnett (2004,
2005) and SNZ 4509 (Standards New Zealand, 2008).
Worldwide there are not many codes of practice for determining fire flows for fire
fighting purposes. A useful comparison on eleven different methods is given by Barnett
(2007).
Reliability
Reliability must be considered so that assumptions concerning the availability of water
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Figure 14.2: Expansion ratio of water (Barnett, 1989)
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at a particular point in the fire growth curve will prove valid at the time of the fire.
Reliability issues include the following:
(a) mechanical reliability;
(b) vulnerability to damage from either malicious or other causes;
(c) planned shutdowns of the system;
(d) uses of the water supply not related to fire, which may increase over time;
(e) gradual deterioration in the water supply due to corrosion and deposition in pipes,
and other reasons;
(f) ability to make repairs;
(g) earthquake damage; and
(h) climatic or other natural phenomena.
Uncertainty factors need to be allowed for by incorporating appropriate safety margins
in the water supply design.
Water conservation
The widespread use of automatic fire sprinklers has important implications in terms of
water conservation and limiting the release of hazardous substances to the environ-
ment, by rapidly controlling fires while they are small.
Analysis of the statistics given by Marryatt (1988) gives a predictable average total
water consumption of approximately 5000 litres to control each fire. In comparison, for
fires in unsprinklered commercial and industrial buildings controlled by fire service
intervention, much greater volumes of water per fire will generally be used. This
implies that a much greater volume needs to be available from the water supply reticu-
lation for unsprinklered buildings.
If sprinkler systems were made mandatory in all buildings, savings in water supply
system costs, water consumption and fire fighting costs could be achieved. This has
been demonstrated in some places in North America, where authorities are required to
provide fire fighting services.
Water quality
Water of a wide range of purity is effective as a coolant, but the characteristics of the
water delivery system (including those of any additives used to improve fire suppression
properties) may require that water quality is within specific limits. The corrosive effects
of seawater on fire protection systems and excessive water damage after a fire due to
corrosion normally precludes the use of seawater, except where no other water source is
available.
Statutory requirements
A variety of statutory requirements apply to some forms of fire control water supplies,
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and in the case of particular types of water application systems technical codes, such as
New Zealand or other standards, may impose requirements on the water supply
upstream of the system under consideration.
Where a proposed development will result in a fire risk considerably greater than the
normal fire risk for the available water supply in a particular area, the responsibility
for providing sufficient fire control water supplies to protect the proposed risk should
be established. The Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) may be prepared to provide
an adequate fire fighting water supply or may require that the developer provides suit-
able fire fighting water supplies. The developer may be required to upgrade the water
mains or provide on site water storage and pumping capacity sufficient to protect the
fire risk of the proposed development.
Worked example: water supplies for a small building
For a ventilation-controlled wood fuel fire, calculate the amount of water to give cool-
ing power equal to the heat release rate. Assume a small room with one window.
Window width w = 4 0. m
Window height h = 2 0. m
Window area A whv = = 8 m
2
Rate of burning ˙ . . /minm A hv= × =0 092 60 62 5 kg     (eqn 6.5)
Heat combustion of wood ∆Hc = 16 MJ/kg
Heat release rate ˙ ˙Q m Hv c= = =∆ 1000 MJ/min 16.7 MW  (eqn. 6.6)
Cooling power of water ˙ .Qw = 2 605 MW/(L/s)
Cooling efficiency, say kc = 0 35.









18 2 L s
Worked examples: water supplies for a large building
For a larger building the calculation method requires two more factors being the venti-
lation factor Fv (m
2.5) and the opening factor FO2  (m
1.5) following the method by Barnett
(2002).
Building width W = 44 0. m
Building depth D = 44 0. m
Stud height H = 4 0. m
Window width w = 67 0. m
Window height h = 2 0. m
Window area Av = 134 m
2
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Floor area A W Df = × = =44 1936
2 m2
Wall area A W D Hw = +( ) = × +( ) × =2 2 44 44 4 704 m2
Internal area surface 1 A A A xT f w1 = + = + =2 2 1936 704 4576 m
2
Internal area surface 2 A A AT T v2 1= − = − =4576 134 4442 m
2
Ventilation factor F A hv v= = × =134 2 190 m
2.5
Opening factor F F AO v T2 190 4442 0 043= = =2 . m
1.5














Rate of burning ˙ . .m k A hp v= × = × =0 099 134 2 18 7 kg s
Heat combustion of fuel ∆Hc = 18 MJ kg
Heat release rate ˙ ˙Q m Hv c= =∆ 337 MW
Cooling power of water ˙ .Qw = 2 605 MW L s
Cooling efficiency, say kc = 0 50.










14.5 Fire Service 0perational Fire Fighting
The requirements for fire fighting water supplies are specified in the NZFS Fire Fight-
ing Water Supplies Code of Practice (PAS SNZ 4509), which are discussed in Section
13.3. Australian fire brigades have similar operational procedures and requirements.
Fire hydrant systems
Fire hydrant systems are necessary in tall buildings to allow the fire service to provide
water on the fire floor without having to lay hoses and carry portable booster pumps up
stairs; a slow and laborious procedure. Fire hydrant systems are also needed in large
low rise buildings such as shopping malls and airport terminals for similar reasons.
Fire hydrant system design and installation requirements are specified in the applicable
standards such as NZS 4510 (Standards New Zealand, 2008) and AS 2419 (Standards
Australia, 1994). Fire hydrant systems will not function adequately if the water supply
is deficient. When designing hydrant systems thought should be given as how to best
provide fire fighting water in a safe, easily recognisable and prompt manner to those
who need to use it. Thus for high rise buildings, hydrant outlets should be located in
stairwells, whilst for low rise complexes, hydrants should be connected to a ring main
surrounding the building (Figure 14.3) and located near entrances.
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14.6 Testing of Water Supplies
Timing of water supply tests
The timing of water supply tests should be
set in consultation with any AHJ. The AHJ is
unlikely to agree to undertake a full mains
flow test during times of peak domestic and
industrial demand due to a probable reduc-
tion in supply to other consumers. However,
the AHJ will generally be able to provide in-
formation on the domestic and industrial wa-
ter supply demand under normal conditions
at different times of the day. This informa-
tion should be taken into account when cal-
culating the available fire fighting water
flows. On the other hand, when evaluating
flow tests on water supplies for sprinkler sys-
tems, ensure that acceptable flows and pres-
sures are available at all times, even during
times of peak domestic and industrial demand.
Major fluctuations in water supply flows and pressures occur during a day and during a
year. These fluctuations are not detected by flow tests because these are carried out
infrequently. To ensure that essential services are protected during a natural disaster,
such as an earthquake, many water reservoirs now have automatic shut-off valves which
are triggered to close on greater than anticipated water flows (simulating a broken wa-
ter main). Although these trigger values are unlikely to be reached in most normal fire
fighting operations, larger multi-appliance call out fires very well could, and should be
checked with the local water supply authority.
Fire sprinkler system flow tests
Fire sprinkler system water supplies are normally flow tested by using a flow meter
connected to the fire service inlet coupling (Figure 14.4). A special connecting pipe
between the fire service inlet coupling and
the flow meter, which has a projection that
opens the non-return valve that normally
prevents flow out of the fire service inlet, is
used. The flow is regulated by the valve pro-
vided in the pipe connecting the fire service
inlet to the sprinkler system. Normally, the
flow is increased in steps up to the highest
flow that the system has been designed for
and pressure readings are taken in conjunc-
tion with the flow readings. The flow tests
are normally carried out by sprinkler con-
Figure 14.4: Testing of water
supply for sprinkler system
Figure 14.3: Fire hydrant connection
from street main to fire service hose
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tractors or other agents. Accuracy of pressure gauges is extremely important and these
must be certified regularly.
The pressures and flows must be above the minimum levels calculated for the correct
functioning of the particular sprinkler system using the procedure specified in stand-
ards such as NZS 4541 (Standards New Zealand, 2007) and NZS 4515 (Standards New
Zealand, 2003) or AS 2118:Parts 1 - 6 (Standards Australia, 2006) in Australia.
When designing sprinkler systems, it is unwise to design for the use of all of the allow-
able percentage from NZS 4541of the available water pressure and flow, because the
performance of water supply networks tends to deteriorate over time due to corrosion
and deposition in the pipes and a gradual increase in domestic and industrial demand. If
allowance is not made for these factors, it is likely that the water supply will become
deficient in the future. It is usual to design using somewhat less than 80% of the avail-
able pressure at the design flow.
Flow tests for fire hydrant systems in buildings
Fire hydrant systems are tested by flowing water from the highest outlet, which is com-
monly found on the roof. They are flow tested from the fire service inlet using a water
supply from a street hydrant through a pump. The flow and pressure available are meas-
ured as the highest outlet. Wet hydrant systems, which have a permanent water supply
from a town main connection, are flow tested using the installed water supply and
pumps. The flow and pressure are recorded at the outlet and the pressure at the water
supply inlet is also measured. These pressures and flows must be within the limits
specified in NZS 4510 or AS 2419 in Australia.
Fire hose reel system flow tests
Fire hose reel systems are flow tested at each hose reel to verify that the flow specified
in NZS 4503 (Standards New Zealand, 2005) is achieved. The Standard does not specify
the minimum pressure required at the hose nozzle, although this standard specifies that
the nozzle must produce a jet of at least 6 metres at a discharge rate of 14, 27 or 33 L/
min depending on the size of the hose reel. A simple flow test is normally performed by
timing how long it takes to flow a measured quantity of water with the hose valve and
nozzle fully open and two adjacent hose reels in simultaneous operation. Each reel
must produce its required design flow, so the total flow required for a hose reel system
is at least 28, 54 or 66 L/min depending on the size of the hose reels. The test flow must
be above the minimum specified for the particular hose and nozzle combination used.
Fire service water flow tests
In New Zealand, the requirements and the procedures to be used for flow testing water
mains for fire fighting water flows are set out in the PAS SNZ 4509. The NZFS (in
consultation with AHJs) currently tests water supplies in urban Fire Districts as re-
quired by the Fire Service Act. These tests take the form of flow tests from street hy-
drants with a simultaneous pressure reading. The NZFS procedure is to simultaneously
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flow test the mains within a radius of 270 m while taking pressure readings at the same
time. As there are likely to be several hydrants within the 270 m radius, the number of
hydrants that need to be flow tested to assess the required total water flow are specified
in PAS SNZ 4509. The pressure reading must be taken from a non-flowing hydrant or
from another take-off on the main.
Water supply system computer simulation
Some AHJs use computer programs to model their water supply reticulation systems.
These programs have yet to be properly verified and thus may not be used to predict
available water supply pressures and flows. Once validated, these programs for water
supply system simulation may reduce the need to perform flow tests with consequent
savings in water usage, time and labour.
14.7 Design of Fire Fighting Water Supply Networks
General
Design of fire fighting water supplies must recognise the relevant physical laws,
including pressure losses due to hydraulic friction, the effects of elevation and altitude,
specific gravity, vapour pressure and other fluid mechanics and mechanical engineer-
ing principles.
Many factors must be taken into account when specifying the performance required
from mains water supplies used for fire fighting purposes. For the vast majority of fires
controlled by the fire service, water from a reticulated mains supply is the only extin-
guishing medium used. In urban areas, the underground water mains are the primary
water supply. In rural areas and as a secondary supply in urban areas, water supplies
pumped from natural or constructed bodies of water are used. Another factor which
should be taken into account is seasonal variations in water supply performance. In
some areas, the available water pressure and flow is less in summer than in winter due
to lower river flows and higher domestic demand.
Sources of supply
The predominant water supplies are underground reticulated mains. The sources of
supply for most systems are bores or rivers with the water extracted from dams or
intake structures. The raw water normally requires treatment and is then pumped to
elevated storage reservoirs. Storage reservoir capacity sufficient for at least two days
average consumption is normally provided to allow for the supply pumps being tempo-
rarily out of service and to allow for sudden excessive demands. For fire fighting, the
water source, reservoirs and pumping systems must be as reliable as possible all the
year round. This can be a problem where smaller rivers are the source and river flows
are low in summer. It is preferable to have at least two sources of supply for greater
reliability and security of supply.
The water is piped from the reservoirs to the reticulation network, and a relatively
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constant pressure is attained in well-designed networks due to the gravity head pro-
vided by the elevated reservoirs. In undulating areas, the network may be divided up
into pressure zones controlled by pressure control valves to avoid excessive pressures
in low lying areas. Flat areas are sometimes pressurised by continuously running pumps
where gravity storage reservoirs are not used. These pumped systems are satisfactory
for fire fighting purposes provided that standby pumps are installed and the pumps are
not dependent solely on the mains electrical supply.
Water supply network design criteria
In the design of water supply networks two demand criteria must be met. These are:
(a) potable water demand for domestic and industrial consumption; and
(b) water demand for fire fighting purposes.
Domestic and industrial water supply design
Factors the designer must take into account in designing for the domestic and industrial
water demand come under the following categories (Barnett, 1979):
(a) hydraulic design of the network to provide for the estimated present and future
water demand;
(b) the provision of pressure zones with minimum and maximum allowable pressures
under all demand conditions;
(c) provision of sufficient number and capacities of storage reservoirs to cope with
demand fluctuations and temporary interruptions to the supply from the water sources;
and
(d) selection of materials and installation techniques to provide the required levels of
durability and life from the system. It should be noted that plastic or fibreglass pipes
may provide a considerably longer service life than metallic pipes in corrosive ground
conditions and they do not suffer from corrosion or significant flow reduction due
to internal deposition. The use of asbestos cement pipes has been discontinued due
to concerns about safety with asbestos both during installation and use.
Fire fighting water supply design
For fire fighting purposes, a minimum running pressure of 100 kPa from street hy-
drants should be attained and minimum flows of from 12.5 to 200 L/s in Classes FW1
to FW7, based on the fire risk, from a specified number of hydrants within a distance of
62 m and 135 m (PAS SNZ 4509). Water supply systems are normally designed to Part
6 of NZS 4404 (Standards New Zealand, 2004), or the local Subdivision and Develop-
ment Principles and Requirements (SDPR). Note that the practice in New Zealand for
the design of water supply networks is to design for the maximum potable and fire
fighting water demand.
Factors that must be taken into consideration when designing for the fire fighting water
demand are as follows:
(a) Hydraulic design to provide for the required fire fighting water flows – these flows
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may be greater or less than the domestic and industrial water demand in different
circumstances.
(b) Selection of the required locations, spacing and marking of street fire hydrants – the
requirements for street hydrants and surface boxes are specified in NZS/BS 750
(Standards New Zealand, 1984).
(c) The provision of sufficient flow capacity for known and probable future fixed fire
protection systems.
Hydraulic design procedure
The hydraulic design of the water supply network is normally performed with the
assistance of computer programs capable of performing a detailed hydraulic analysis
under all flow conditions. The hydraulic calculation method normally used is the Hardy
Cross method. While the designer must have a full understanding of hydraulic design
calculation procedures, practical manual calculations can only provide estimated re-
sults due to the number of simultaneous equations to be solved. The design parameters
are based on accepted municipal water supply design practice and statistics of the water
demand in areas similar to those under consideration. A representative value for the
domestic water demand in New Zealand is approximately 220 litres per person per day
and total demand is increasing at a rate of approximately 2% per year.
14.8 Design of Water Supplies for Fixed Fire Fighting Systems
General
The procedure used for sprinkler system water supply design consists of deciding what
design flow is required to protect the risk, the water sources and classes of water supply
to use, whether pumps and water storage tanks are required and, finally, the required
pump performance. The pipework must be designed to ensure that the minimum pres-
sures required at the sprinklers are achieved at the design flows with the required safety
margins. Four classes of water supplies are recognised in NZS 4541 and these provide
different levels of reliability and availability in the water supply.
The four classes of water supplies are as follows:
• Class A –  Dual superior supply;
• Class B2 –  Private site fire main;
• Class C2 – Single superior supply;
• Class C1 – Single supply.
Dual water supplies are specified in NZS 4541 for large buildings used for crowd or
sleeping occupancies and for buildings over 25 m high in active seismic areas having a
‘risk  factor’ greater than 0.13. The NZBC only mandates a C1 water supply however
an owners insurers may require a superior water supply. For a single town main, it is
preferable for it to be fed from two directions.
Where insufficient water pressure is available, an approved automatic starting diesel
pump must be used. Such a pump may be designed to pump from the town main, a tank,
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a well, an artesian bore or open water, provided that the supply is reliable and the pump
always operates under flooded suction conditions. On a Class A, B2 or C2 system, one
supply may have an electric powered pump. All sprinkler systems, except some resi-
dential systems, are also required to have a fire service inlet to enable the NZFS to
boost the water supply with their pumps. The installation of a water meter is discour-
aged by the sprinkler rules; however, it is acceptable to install an approved full bore
meter that has no working parts or obstructions in the water way. Backflow prevention
in the incoming sprinkler main is also required where the secondary water supply is
from a non-potable water source; this means that strainers and pressure gauges may be
required to be installed upstream of the backflow prevention and any additional stop
valves must be monitored.
Pipework design for fire sprinkler systems
The pipe friction losses for sprinkler system pipework are calculated using the Hazen
Williams formula, and sprinkler flows are calculated using the sprinkler discharge
formula. The applicable standard will specify the required hydraulic calculation
procedure. Sprinkler system design standards used are NZS 4541 and NZS 4515. Some
American companies use NFPA 13 (NFPA, 2007) as a standard for all their installa-
tions throughout the world, including New Zealand. Alternatively AS 2118 from Aus-
tralia can be used. NZS 4541 specifies the method for calculating the design pressures
and flows for sprinkler systems.
Full hydraulic calculation is normally used to calculate the pressures and flows from all
the sprinklers operating in the design area and the pressure losses back to the control
valves. This method provides an accurate result for the required water demand, but it is
normally necessary to use a computer program to determine the pressure losses and the
optimum pipe sizes from both a hydraulic and economic point of view.
The required pressure and flow from the water supply is the minimum pressure and
flow which is required at the control valves to supply the hydraulically most remote
design area of sprinkler operation and the minimum flowing pressure to the most re-
mote sprinkler. NZS 4541 specifies two methods for determining the allowable water
demand from town main supplies. Up to 80% of the available pressure from a single
flow test at the design flow may be used or, alternatively, up to 90% of the minimum
available pressure at the design flow based on a pressure recorder test taken over not
less than 14 consecutive days. However, it is prudent to design for less than those
maximums, as the performance of town mains deteriorates over time due to  pipe corro-
sion and increasing overall water demand.
Fire hydrant systems in buildings
Hydrant main systems are installed in multi-storey buildings and certain other large
buildings to provide a water supply for operational fire fighting at all levels of the
building. Pressures and flows at the outlets are specified in NZS 4510. Hydraulic calcu-
lation is used to determine the required pressure and flow from the water supply at the
fire service inlet or at the pump inlets for wet fire hydrant systems.
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The designer of the system must ensure that the pressures and flows required at the fire
service inlet meet the requirements of the New Zealand standard. Provided minimum
pressure criteria can be met, this means that the normal fire fighting water supply for
fire hydrant systems and the secondary supply for wet fire hydrant systems comes from
street fire hydrants through fire service pumping appliances.
Fire hose reel systems
Fire hose reels are intended for use on small fires by the building occupants before the
arrival of the fire service. Sufficient water pressure and flow must be available at each
of the hose reels for them to be an effective fire fighting tool. Fire hose reels will also be
used by the fire service on small fires or to extinguish fires already controlled by a
sprinkler system.
Fire hose reel systems can be supplied from any water supply system capable of reli-
ably providing the necessary pressure and flow, and that has metallic pipe for all of the
above-ground pipework. The flows required for hose reels are considerably lower than
those required for most other fixed fire protection systems; this normally means that
the fire hose reels can be supplied from the normal building potable water supply
system.
NZS 4503 specifies the minimum flow required at the hose reels and hydraulic calcula-
tion is used to calculate the required pressure and flow from the water supply. The
pressure required to achieve the flow is given in the hose reel manufacturer’s data and
is printed on the reels. Note that some AHJs may insist that the water supply to fire hose
reel systems be metered to account for water used for purposes other than fire fighting.
The flows required for hose reels are not significantly reduced by the presence of a
water meter, but positive displacement type water meters provide an unacceptable re-
striction in the supply to sprinklers or wet hydrant systems.
Notification to the New Zealand Fire Service
After designing or modifying a fixed fire protection system, the designer should notify
the local Chief Fire Officer of the NZFS of the water flows and pressures required for
that system, so that the NZFS can incorporate this information in their operational plan
for the water supply in the area. The designer must also consult with the NZFS when
deciding the location of fire service inlets and sprinkler valve sets to ensure that they
meet NZFS operational requirements. Most fixed fire protection systems, such as fire
sprinkler systems, must be continuously monitored by the NZFS, normally by means of
the telephone network.
14.9 Operational Fire Fighting
Fire service procedure
Mains water supplies are used for operational fire fighting in the following manner.
Feeder hoses are connected to standpipes fitted to street fire hydrants. These hoses are
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then connected to fire appliance pumps. This provides the fire service with the ability to
boost and control pressures. Low pressure delivery hoses (LPD) or high pressure (HPD)
hose reels are run out from the pumps, to be used by fire fighters to fight the fire. Fire
appliances are equipped with water tanks to enable faster fire attack, but these tanks can
be rapidly depleted and other supplies are required to suppress all but very small fires.
As a guideline, an HPD uses between 0.6-2 L/s, a LPD uses between 8 to 16 L/s and a
fixed deck or turntable monitor between 10-78 L/s. As a general guide (assuming pres-
sure and capacity of the water main are not limited) a single standpipe (which has an
internal diameter of 57 mm) connected to a hydrant will not be able to safely supply more
than 35 L/s. Thus if additional water flow is needed more hydrants will need to be accessed.
Some industrial sites are equipped with pressurised fire fighting water supplies to enable
fire fighting operations to take place directly from hydrants without having to boost the
supply using a fire appliance pump. However, this is not a substitute for normal fire
service procedures. Private fire mains are often designed to NFPA 24 (NFPA, 2007).
For successful operational fire fighting, the water supply must be capable of producing
sufficient water flows to provide the extinguishing capacity necessary to control the
largest fire that can be reasonably predicted without subjecting the mains to suction
pressures close to atmospheric pressures. For some occupancies, due to the fire load
and possible fire intensity, it may be necessary to install a sprinkler system to ensure
that fires can be controlled.
Fire service access and facilities
In order for the fire service to be able to effectively fight building fires, suitable access
and facilities must be provided. First, sufficient street fire hydrants must be provided
within a reasonable distance to enable the fire fighters to quickly establish an adequate
water supply. Second, suitable access and hard standing areas need to be provided to
enable the fire service appliances to approach to within a reasonable distance of the
burning building.
14.10 New Zealand Legislation
The legislation relating to fire fighting water supplies comprises sections of various
acts of parliament. There is no direct legislation that requires AHJs to provide fire
fighting water supplies, but where reticulated mains water supplies are provided, fire
hydrants must also be provided.
The Local Government Act 1974 sections 647 and 648 state the requirements for AHJs
to fix fire hydrants to water mains with the approval of the New Zealand Fire Service
Commission, to mark and maintain them to an acceptable standard and to keep the
pipes charged with water at all times.
The Fire Service Act 1975 section 28(4)(g) states that the NZFS has the power to cause
the water supply to other users to be shut off to conserve the supply for fire fighting.
The Fire Service Act Section 30 states that the NZFS shall have full use of the available
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water supply for fire
fighting free of charge.
They may test water
supplies to determine
their adequacy for fire
fighting and fixed fire
protection systems and
shall advise the Territo-
rial Authority of the re-
sults of these tests. The National Commander shall prepare a code of practice for fire
fighting water supplies setting out the volumes and pressures required for fire fighting
and fixed fire protection systems. The requirement to include the pressures and flows
for fixed fire protection systems was included in the Fire Service Act in an amendment
made in 1990. Under the Fire Service Act (2) Section 30, AHJs are entitled to charge
for the costs of installing and maintaining fire protection water supplies as well as
annual fees for the connections.
The Building Act 2004 and the Building Regulations 2005 indirectly create require-
ments for water supplies for fire fighting purposes. For example, Section 6(2)(c) of the
Building Act 1991 states that effects on the environment caused by fire in buildings
containing hazardous substances be controlled. Although this is not replicated in the
Building Act 2004 it is considered in the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms
Act 1996. In practice, this means that adequate water supplies must be available, either
from the reticulated supply or from an on site supply, to rapidly control fires. Provision
may also need to be made to contain contaminated fire fighting water runoff. The use of
automatic sprinkler systems in these cases may reduce the water supply demands and
the size of any required water containment provisions. The Compliance Documents to
the Building Codes also specifies that some buildings must be provided with fixed fire
protection systems; this implies that suitable water supplies must be provided for those
buildings. Acceptable Solution C/AS1 states that one of the factors affecting the re-
quired fire resistance is the availability of an adequate water supply.
The Water Supplies Protection Regulations 1961 Section 7 states the requirements for
back flow preventers and other requirements to prevent contamination of mains water
supplies. These requirements must be met by all water users, including fire fighting and
fixed fire protection systems. The requirements for maintenance and testing of backflow
preventers are included in the Compliance Schedules listed in the Compliance Docu-
ments to the NZBC.
Fire sprinkler system alarm valves, with the addition of a check valve, have been con-
sidered to be adequate back flow prevention. However, some AHJs are now demanding
a separate back flow preventer in the supply pipework. NZS 4541 addresses this issue
Figure 14.5: Use of
water in fire fighting
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and gives additional requirements when backflow preventers are installed. These re-
quirements can be different to what some AHJs expect and must be followed to obtain
system approval.
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The objective of this Chapter is to provide fire safety guidance for designers, owners
and residents of single family homes and attached townhouses. New Zealand and Aus-
tralian Building Codes do not have any significant fire safety requirements for these
types of occupancies. Larger residential buildings such as apartment buildings, hostels
and hotels are covered by the Building Codes, but some of the recommendations in this
Chapter, such as for upholstered furniture, apply to all types of residential buildings,
large or small.
The Chapter describes a wide range of strategies for improving domestic fire safety.
Much of this Chapter is based on studies carried out in Australia and New Zealand. A
report carried out for the Building Control Commission of Victoria (Beever and Britton,
1999) examined the ability of fire safety measures to impact on reducing the risk of loss
of life, property and injuries in Victoria. Various fire safety measures were evaluated
using a calculation of ‘cost per life saved’. Duncan et al (2000) made a similar study for
New Zealand, following an earlier analysis of New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) statis-
tics by Irwin (1997). A similar study using an alternative benefit-cost ratio was carried
out by Byrne (2000).
15.2 Scale of the Domestic Fire Problem
In Australia, about 30% of fire fatalities and fire injuries occur in one and two family
dwellings, most of these fires starting in a bedroom or living room (Beever and Britton,
1999). The NZFS attends about 22,000 fires each year. Of these, 21% are in domestic
premises, but these fires result in about 60% of all fire deaths and injuries (Irwin, 1997).
Most fatal domestic fires occur in the early hours of the morning, when people are
asleep. There are more fires on weekends than during the week. The most likely room
for fires to start in is the kitchen, but fatal fires are more likely to start in a bedroom.
Cultural issues are an influence on fire safety. It is well known that the number of fires,
fire deaths and injuries tend to be greater (per capita) in areas of lower socioeconomic
activity (Beever and Britton, 1999). Fire losses are significantly greater in rented than
in owned accommodation. A study (Thomas et al, 2000) carried out interviews with
300 Maori families in the central North Island area in an effort to propose new strate-
gies for improving fire safety in this particular risk group.
15.3 Prevention of Ignition
The fire safety problem can be eliminated if ignitions can be prevented. It is impossible
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to prevent all ignitions, but any measures which reduce the probability of ignition have
the potential to reduce national fire losses. Most fire ignitions are attributed to people’s
activities. A smaller number are caused by equipment malfunction.
Human activities
Smoking is a major cause of fatal fires. Other major sources are heaters, candles,
children playing with matches, and cooking accidents. Simple precautions such as keep-
ing matches from children and requiring child-proof cigarette lighters can reduce the
probability of fire ignitions. Other simple precautions include education regarding dry-
ing of clothes near space heaters or open fires, and unattended open flames of any sort.
Equipment failure
Electrical equipment malfunction can cause fires. The home-owner can reduce the
likelihood of fire by keeping equipment well maintained, avoiding the overload of
electrical outlets, and turning off appliances when not in use. Poorly maintained elec-
tric under-blankets are a major cause of fatalities of elderly people in colder areas.
15.4 Domestic Smoke Alarms
Smoke alarms are primarily used in domestic residential situations (Figure 15.1). They
are different from the smoke detectors used in fire detection and alarm systems because
they have a built-in alerting device, usually an audible sounder, and are designed, tested,
and manufactured to different standards. The
most common examples are the inexpensive bat-
tery-operated units available in many hardware
stores.
These are of two main types, ionisation cham-
ber and photoelectric, as described in Chapter 8.
There is considerable international opinion pre-
ferring photoelectric over the ionisation. Com-
bined ionisation/photoelectric smoke alarms are
available from some manufacturers.
Early warning of the presence of smoke in a
building is critical to life safety. Some fires can
grow rapidly making escape very difficult, espe-
cially if the occupants are asleep, and/or the es-
cape routes are smoke-logged. The time differ-
ence between escaping from a building or dying
in a fire can often be measured in seconds. Some-
times fires can smoulder for hours, filling the
premises with toxic fumes. Without the early
warning provided by a smoke alarm, occupants
can perish as they sleep without ever waking.
Figure 15.1: Modern apartment
with smoke detectors and auto-




‘Type 1’ smoke alarms are mandatory under the New Zealand Building Code Approved
Documents for consented building work in domestic residential situations, including
detached dwellings. Often stand-alone battery operated units are sufficient, however
for some larger multi-level dwellings interconnected mains-powered units may be
required to meet sounder audibility requirements.
NZS 4514 (Standards New Zealand, 2002) exists, however it is not mandatory. Under
the current ‘Type 1’ Approved Document regime, the requirements are contained in
section F7/AS1, and installation is required to be to AS 1670.6 (Standards Australia,
1997) and the manufacturer’s instructions. In Australia AS 3786 (Standards Australia,
1993) covers the design of smoke alarms and AS 1670.6 specifies requirements for
their installation.
Location of smoke alarms
Some home-owners believe that they are safe if they have a single battery powered
smoke alarm in the hallway. It is much preferred to have smoke alarms well distributed
throughout the house, including one in each bedroom, in the hallways and on every
level of the house including any basement. The closer the smoke alarm is to the source
of the fire, the sooner the alarm will be given. Smoke alarms should not be located in
kitchens or other areas where frequent false alarms are likely as this leads to compla-
cency or disabling of alarms.
Interconnected smoke alarms
With an interconnected smoke alarm system, activation of one smoke alarm causes all
the devices to give a warning signal. These provide much better safety than stand-alone
alarms, because people throughout the house are alerted at the same time, regardless of
the fire location.
Battery powered versus mains-wired
The biggest problem with stand-alone smoke alarms is maintaining batteries. Numer-
ous international studies have reported a large percentage of installed alarms have no
batteries. For this reason, many overseas authorities are recommending that smoke alarms
be hard-wired to the mains electricity in the house. This is more expensive, but offers a
much more reliable system. Mains wired smoke alarms should also have battery backup
so that they will operate in the event of a power cut.
Taking all of these factors into account, Beever and Britton (1999) found that mains
powered smoke alarms were more cost-effective than battery powered alarms. They
reported that legislation in Victoria which requires new households to have a mains
powered smoke alarm system is both appropriate and cost-effective.
Maintenance of smoke alarms
A properly installed and maintained smoke alarm greatly increases the chances of
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surviving a fire, however, a faulty smoke alarm is worse than no smoke alarm because
it provides a false sense of security. Because smoke alarms have none of the inherent
self-supervision or maintenance regimes of commercial fire detection and alarm
systems, it is imperative that the dwelling owners conduct their own regular mainte-
nance and testing of their smoke alarms. The maintenance of a smoke alarm is
relatively simple:
• Test the smoke alarm monthly, by pressing the test button or according to manufac-
turers’ recommendations.
• Follow the manufacturer’s recommendations for cleaning. As a minimum, gently
vacuum the alarm twice a year.
• Replace the battery once a year. It is recommended that you pick a holiday or birth-
day to help you remember. A campaign of changing batteries when changing the
clock for daylight savings has served as a useful reminder for many people.
• If the smoke alarm starts to ‘beep’ or ‘chirp’ replace the battery immediately with a
new one. Do not remove the old battery until a new one is installed.
Special strategies may be necessary for elderly or disabled people, and those with
impaired hearing. It is recommended that smoke alarms be replaced with new ones
every ten years.
Waking effectiveness of alarms
Audible smoke alarms are not any use unless someone hears them. There is a wide
variation in people’s response to alarms, and a wide range of audible alarm signals on
the market (Grace, 1997). Confirming other studies, Duncan (1999) found that some
people are not woken by alarms because of factors including location, age (teenage and
younger often do not wake), hearing disability, and drugs or alcohol. Correct placement
of sufficient alarms can provide greater probability of alerting the occupants.
15.5 Suppression Systems
Sprinklers
By far the most effective fire protection device in almost every situation is an automatic
sprinkler system. This certainly applies in domestic premises. In many North American
jurisdictions, sprinklers are mandatory in all new residential construction. This is par-
ticularly true for multi-storey residential construction. There are benefits of reduced
fire fighting costs if entire neighbourhoods are fitted with sprinkler systems.
Despite the immediate and obvious benefits, several cost-benefit studies found it diffi-
cult to justify sprinkler installations to then-existing standards in domestic premises
because of the high cost of installation (Strategos, 1989; Rahmanian, 1995; Beever and
Britton, 1999). The perceived difficulty is the cost of installation, and there is a difficult
trade-off between cost and quality.
NZS 4517 (Standards New Zealand, 2002) has been developed for low-cost sprinkler
systems, based on the work by Duncan et al. (2000), which are operated directly off the
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cold water pipe network in the house. These sprinkler systems may not have the reliability
of systems based on comprehensive standards, but they offer potential for greatly im-
proved life safety if the cost can be low enough to encourage widespread installation. The
risk assessment in Duncan’s report shows very large projected reductions in fire injuries
and fire deaths. Multi-purpose fire sprinkler/plumbing systems of this type are best suited
for new construction and are within the current scope of NFPA 13D (NFPA, 2007).
Hand-held fire fighting devices
Fire extinguishers
The installation of dry-powder fire extinguishers in kitchens is recommended, with the
primary objective of reducing property losses rather than reducing fatalities. Beever
and Britton (1999) quote a Norwegian report which shows that portable fire extinguish-
ers in single family houses reduces fire losses by 26%.
Hoses
Fixed fire hose reels are often installed in commercial and industrial buildings. They
are not required in most buildings covered by the Approved Documents to the New
Zealand Building Code, because of the perceived additional risk of inadequately trained
occupants staying in a building too long to fight a growing fire, and they are not widely
promoted for use in family homes (Byrne, 2000). A significant number of house fires
result from burning of cooking fat in a deep-fat fryer, in which case use of a hose reel
could assist spread of the fire. However, it is recommended that garden hoses should
always be left connected to taps outside houses so that they are available in the case of
a fire emergency.
Fire blankets
Small fire blankets are useful around the home. Fire blankets are made of fire retardant
material such as fibreglass and are used to cut off the oxygen supply to the fire by
surrounding or covering the fuel. Fire blankets can be used for cooking related fires, to
smother a fire on people’s clothes or for protection while escaping through flames.
15.6 Materials
For many years there has been the belief that a brick house is safer from fire than a
timber house. The fact is that both types of house are equally dangerous when it comes
to fire, because it is not the structure that is important but rather the contents that are
brought into the home that creates the fire hazard. By the time the building structure
becomes involved it is far too late for the occupants of a single family home to do
anything.
Upholstered furniture
Few people realise how quickly upholstered furniture can ignite and burn. Figure 15.2
shows a typical armchair less than 2 minutes after ignition. This figure was taken in a
274
Fire Engineering Design Guide
fire research laboratory in which 4 m3/s of smoke and toxic gases were being removed
by the laboratory extraction system. If this were in a real lounge the flames would be
reaching across the ceiling and the entire room would be filled with hot toxic smoke.
Enright and Fleischmann (1999) found that compared with typical European furniture,
New Zealand furniture items exhibit higher peak heat release rates for similar total
energy content. Further, typical New Zealand furniture presents a higher fire hazard
than its European counterparts by reaching these higher peak heat release rates in shorter
periods of time.
Results from research focusing on different combinations of common foams and fab-
rics (Denize, 2000) indicated that natural fibres such as cotton and wool have higher
ignition resistance and lower heat release rates when compared to synthetic fabrics
such as polyester and polypropylene. Beever and Britton (1999) recommend that the
development of suitable low cost fillings be promoted, information on the flammability
of combinations of fillings and fabrics be distributed to the furniture industry, and that
public education be increased.
Plastics materials
Increased use of plastics in many household items over the past few decades has greatly
increased the fuel load energy density in houses. All plastics materials burn, so plastics
in any item should be considered a potential fire load. Most plastics materials are much
more dangerous in fires than traditional materials such as wood, wool, cotton or kapok.
Many plastics are marketed as ‘fire retardant’ or ‘combustion modified’. Such materi-
als are more resistant to initial ignition and flame spread than unmodified materials, but
they all burn if subjected to sufficient heat
flux, and the implied increase in fire safety
may be illusory.
Curtain fabrics and carpets
Many new synthetic fabrics are very dan-
gerous in fires. Curtains are a particular
problem because they are easily ignited,
and they can result in very rapid vertical
flame spread. There are no controls on the
flammability of home furnishing fabrics in
New Zealand or Australia.
Wool is the traditional material for carpets
in New Zealand and Australia. Synthetic
carpets are cheaper and are hence popular.
Synthetic carpets are more dangerous in fire
than wool carpets, although carpets are not
such a big hazard as other items because
they usually become involved in the fire
Figure 15.2: Typical polyurethane foam
furniture produces rapid fire growth and




later than upholstered furniture or curtains. Synthetic carpet applied as a decorative
finish to walls can be very dangerous because of rapid vertical flame spread.
15.7 House Construction
There are some important design decisions which can influence occupant safety in the
event of a fire, but Byrne (2000) found that none of these construction items provided
an attractive cost-benefit ratio.
Linings
Flammable wall and ceiling linings can contribute to rapid initial fire growth, especially
if a fire starts near the corner of a room. Many experimental studies have shown that
time to flashover is greatly reduced if the lining materials support rapid flame spread.
The safest lining material is a non-combustible material such as gypsum; wood based
lining materials provide moderate safety and most plastics materials are very dangerous.
Paper-faced gypsum plaster board is by far the most common lining material in
domestic construction. Gypsum is a very good material in fire situations, because it is
non-combustible and it contains water of crystallisation which slows the rate of tem-
perature increase when it is heated. Gypsum plaster board is a very safe material for
wall and ceiling linings because it does not support surface flame spread. Multiple
layers of paint or wallpaper can promote flame spread if the heat flux is large enough.
The only exception is that many multiple layers of wallpaper in very old buildings can
result in rapid fire growth.
Wood based materials are the traditional lining materials, providing a moderate level of
safety which has been accepted for many years. However, large areas of wood-based
lining materials can lead to rapid fire growth, especially if on the ceilings. This applies
to sawn timber, hardboard, medium density fibreboard (MDF) or plywood, all of which
have similar thermal properties. Low density fibreboard (‘pin-board’) supports much
faster flame spread because of its lower thermal inertia, so should not be used to cover
large areas of walls or ceilings.
Most plastic lining materials pose a much greater hazard than wood-based materials.
Foamed plastic materials are especially dangerous because of low thermal inertia lead-
ing to rapid flame spread, large amounts of stored energy, melting droplets in fire, and
excessive amounts of toxic smoke. Most codes do not permit the use of foam plastic
materials as internal linings in dwellings.
Doors
Closed doors are one of the most simple and effective ways of reducing the spread of fire
and smoke in a burning house. Open doors are no use whatsoever. Automatic door clos-
ers are becoming common in commercial buildings, but are generally too expensive for
houses, so it is up to the occupants to ensure that doors are closed in case there is a fire.
Different types of doors have a wide range of fire resisting properties. A post-flashover
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fire can burn through a cheap hollow-core door in a minute or two, but a standard solid
core door can resist a severe fire for a much longer period, provide that it is closed, and
fits well in its frame. The use of solid core doors is recommended, especially in loca-
tions where prevention of fire spread would be beneficial (between garage and house,
between lower and upper floor, for example). The much larger cost of approved firedoors
is not warranted.
Fire resistance
Most building codes require elements of construction to be provided with fire resistance
to prevent spread of fire and to prevent structural collapse during a fire. No such require-
ments apply to single family houses, although typical light timber frame construction
with gypsum plaster board linings has a nominal level of inherent fire resistance.
There may be some areas in a house where it is appropriate to increase the fire
resistance in order to slow or prevent fire spread. This is more likely to benefit property
protection than life safety, unless there is a possibility of people being trapped on an
upper storey. There is no point in spending money on increased fire resistance unless
the doors and other penetrations through the wall or ceiling provide equivalent
resistance to fire spread. If installed at the time of construction, the fire resistance of a
wall or ceiling can be increased at low cost by using fire-rated gypsum board in place of
regular board, or an additional layer of regular board.
Escape routes
In some multi-storey houses, depending on the size and layout, a significant increase in
fire safety may be achieved by providing a second means of escape from the upper
floors. This will be expensive if not required for other reasons, but very large houses
may have two stairs anyway, in which case they should be designed to be fire-separated
to provide two independent means of escape. Other alternative escape routes such as
access ladders to lower roof decks may be appropriate in some individual cases.
15.8 Education
Fire safety education is a cost effective means of reducing fire losses (Beever and Britton,
1999). Some fire safety educational efforts have been less effective in non-European
ethnic groups (Thomas et al, 2000). In a survey of public attitudes to domestic fire
safety Rusbridge (1999) found that most people feel safest from fire in their own homes,
when in reality most fire deaths occur in homes. This finding demonstrates the need for
more public education on fire of which there are many possible components.
Doors open or closed
There has been some debate as to whether it is better for bedroom doors to be open or
closed when occupants are sleeping. The argument for leaving doors open is better




On the other hand, open doors result in much faster spread of smoke and fire, leading to
potentially much greater fire size before the alarm activates, and greater threat to a
sleeping occupant. Palmer (1999) used the FIRE-CAM fire risk model in a probabilistic
study to show that it is safer for bedroom doors to be kept closed. This practice is
generally recommended by fire services. However, a study (Rusbridge, 2000) found
that only 22% of the people surveyed kept their bedroom doors closed at night.
Escape planning
It has been shown on many occasions that home fire safety is greatly increased if the
occupants have a pre-determined escape plan, and an agreed place to meet, if an emer-
gency evacuation becomes necessary. It is recommended that people have a home
escape plan that is practiced at least twice a year. A home fire escape plan should in-
clude the following:
• Make sure there is at least one smoke alarm on each level of the home and in or near
each sleeping area.
• Draw a floor plan of the home. Mark all doors and windows, and the location of
each smoke alarm. If windows or doors have security bars, equip them with quick-
release devices.
• Locate two escape routes from each room. The first way out would be the door, and
the second way out could be a window.
• Close all doors during escape to slow the spread of fire and smoke.
• If an exit is blocked by smoke or fire, use the second exit to escape. To escape
through smoke, stay low and crawl under the smoke to safety.
• Choose a meeting place a safe distance from the home and mark it on the escape
plan. A good meeting place would be a tree, telephone pole, or a neighbour’s home.
• Make sure the street number of the home is visible to fire fighters.
• Memorise the emergency services telephone number (111 in New Zealand). Once
outside, call that number immediately from a neighbour’s phone, or use a cell phone
that can be quickly picked up.
• Practice an escape drill at least twice a year.
• NEVER go back inside a burning building!
Flammability of fabrics
Public education is needed on the fire safety of various types of fabrics and furniture
coverings. People need to know what they are buying, and will exercise discretion if
they have sufficient information to make educated decisions.
15.9 Recommendations
The main recommendations for improving domestic fire safety are:
• Public education programmes.
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• Stand-alone smoke alarms as the minimum requirement in all dwellings.
• Interconnected mains-wired smoke alarms.
• Placement of fire extinguishers in kitchens.
• Installation of low cost residential sprinklers to protect life and property.
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‘Bushfires’, ‘forest fires’, ‘scrub fires’, ‘rural’ or ‘wildland’ fires – these are all terms
used in New Zealand (and Australia) to refer to fires burning in vegetation fuels, most
often in rural areas. Major vegetation wildfires, or ‘rural fires’ as they are commonly
known, can result in significant economic and property losses or environmental dam-
age. They occur when prolonged periods of dry and/or windy conditions coincide with
flammable vegetation fuels and a source of ignition. Fires are a disturbance agent, but
can also have positive effects, including encouraging regeneration and biodiversity,
promoting habitat for wildlife and removing unwanted vegetation. However, rural fires
in New Zealand are generally viewed as a negative influence as they typically have
devastating consequences for both agricultural and conservation lands, and for the peo-
ple that depend on them for their livelihood. They also pose a significant threat to the
lives and safety of rural residents and the rural fire fighters that protect them.
The physical and economic effects of a rural fire depend on the fire intensity and size,
as well as other factors such as the land-use or ecosystems involved. The most obvious
costs are those associated with property damage, fire suppression, recovery and loss of
income, although these may be offset in some cases through insurance or salvage. How-
ever, fires can result in indirect costs that may be even more significant than these
direct losses (e.g., road, rail or power line damage or closures; erosion, water supply
contamination, nutrient loss, smoke pollution and effects on human health; mental and
emotional effects, post-traumatic stress). Financial, environmental and social implica-
tions all need to be considered in assessing a fire’s overall impact.
Large and devastating rural fires occur relatively infrequently in New Zealand when
compared with Australia, North America, the Mediterranean and other parts of the world.
However, the potential exists in most parts of the country for damaging wildfires to
occur. Fortunately, very few lives have been lost to vegetation fires in New Zealand,
although landowners and fire fighters (both urban and rural) have been injured while
conducting burn-offs and controlling wildfires. Structure losses from vegetation fires
in recent years have also been relatively infrequent, although property damages do
occur and very real threats to lives and property exist at many rural fires.
It is the principal goal of fire management organisations to safeguard life, property and
other resources, by preventing fires from starting and restricting those that do start to
the minimum possible size and damage, commensurate with environmental, social,
political and economic considerations. Where possible and practicable, fire manage-
ment also aims to support the use of fire to help achieve these fire control and other
land-use objectives. Successful fire management therefore depends on effective fire
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prevention, detection and pre-suppression readiness, as well having an adequate fire
suppression capability and consideration of ecological fire effects.
Although New Zealand and Australia have quite different fire climates and fuels, both
countries face a number of similar challenges in meeting these fire management
objectives. These include declining resources and expertise at a time when community
demands are increasing, a trend towards separation of fire management from land
management activities, and concerns about the long-term impacts of prescribed burn-
ing and demands for ecologically appropriate fire management practices. The Rural
Urban Interface (RUI), or Wildland-Urban Interface/Intermix (W-UI) as it is known in
some parts of the world, refers to geographical areas where buildings and other human
development, mainly residential, adjoin or are interspersed with undeveloped rural lands
containing flammable vegetative fuels. Expansion of the RUI, with its higher popula-
tion, increased likelihood of fire starts and higher values associated with property and
human life, is an international trend contributing to increased risk from wildfires. Changes
in forest management (e.g., expansion of plantation forests, reduction in silvicultural
operations, outsourcing of fire suppression resources) and other land-use practices (e.g.,
pasture retirement and reversion to tussock or scrublands, conversion of forests and
other land cover to grasslands) are also resulting in more complex fuel types (and often,
more continuous fuels and higher fuel loads) and, in many cases, increased commercial
and/or conservation values that require protection from fire. The increasing frequency
of extreme weather events, due to long-term climate variability and climate change, is
further adding to the increased risk from wildfire and many experts believe this trend
will continue into the future.
While the focus of this Chapter is on rural fire from a New Zealand standpoint, much of
the discussion is generic to vegetation fires and the topics highlighted have broader
applicability and relevance.
16.2 New Zealand fire history and current fire problem
Fire history
New Zealand has always experienced infrequent wildfire events as a result of natural
fire causes, such as lightning and volcanic activity, and evidence from carbon records
shows occasional landscape-scale fires in New Zealand from as early as 40,000 years
before present (BP) (Ogden et al, 1998). Fires occurred between glacial periods and in
the South Island, after the climate dried around 1,800 years BP, more frequent natural
fires removed tall woody vegetation and allowed tussock grasslands to expand in area.
Similar patterns of disturbance are recorded in other parts of New Zealand. Despite
such early occurrences of fire, New Zealand native ecosystems consist of species that
are not specifically adapted to fire (McGlone and Webb, 1981). However, the com-
bined influences of climatic fluctuations and tectonic activity with fire have influenced
the distribution of some plant species and communities.
Polynesian burning in the last 1,000 years further removed tall woody vegetation, with
Maori purported to have reduced the forest cover from about 80% of the country when
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they first arrived in New Zealand to around 50% by the time Europeans arrived (Ogden
et al, 1998). Most fires were probably accidental, but other likely reasons for burning
included encouraging growth of bracken fern (for its edible roots), clearing land for
agriculture, aiding in moa hunting, and as a by-product of warfare (Cameron, 1964).
This process of forest clearance continued following European settlement, when fire
was a primary agent for land clearing, and some large wildfires caused extensive
damage to forest and rural environments. Particular fires of note include the 1878
Waimate fires in South Canterbury, and 1918 Raetihi fires in the central North Island
(McLean, 1992).
Fire continues to be widely used as a land management tool today, to clear scrub weeds
and remove tree trimmings or other heaped vegetation, to reduce logging residues and
aid forestry replanting, to burn off stubble to remove waste residues and sterilise the
soil, or in tussock grasslands to reduce woody weed encroachment, improve stock
access and promote new pasture growth. Unlike Australia or North America, fire is
currently not widely used for fuel reduction specifically or for conservation habitat
management; however, these uses are being considered by some organisations. Fire use
by humans therefore has and will continue to play a major role in shaping the vegeta-
tion cover of New Zealand that we see today and in the future.
Fire losses
In spite of considerable variability from year-to-year (see Figure 16.1) and incomplete
statistics, data shows that New Zealand now experiences around 3,500 vegetation
wildfires each year that burn around 6,500 ha of rural lands, based on statistics derived
from the National Rural Fire Authority’s Annual Return of Fires from 1991/92-2006/07,
land cover data from Newsome (1987), and for forests from NZFOA (2006). This
includes grasslands, shrublands, indigenous and exotic (i.e. plantation) forests. Fires in
native and exotic forests comprise only a relatively small proportion despite making up
around 30% of New Zealand’s land cover, and represent around 7% of the area burnt
compared with scrublands (40% of the area burnt, from 17% of the land cover) and
grasslands (54% of the area burnt, from 52% of the land cover).
Potential damage or loss from fire is still a major risk facing forest owners and, due to
the value of the asset being protected, fire has been an important consideration for New
Zealand forest managers since plantations were first established in the mid-1890s. Dur-
ing the last 60-70 years, fires have resulted in over 40,000 ha of exotic plantation forest
being burned (with a conservative value in excess of $NZ300M), at an annual loss of
around 570 ha (0.12% of the planted estate) (Cameron et al, 2007). The average annual
loss over the past decade (to 2005) is somewhat lower (about 440 ha/annum or 0.03%
of the plantation estate), but current plantation fire statistics are unreliable due to poor
reporting and confidentiality issues.
Little is known on the risk to New Zealand’s native forests as historic fire statistics do
not typically distinguish between exotic and indigenous forest losses, and this contin-
ues to be the case in modern fire reporting systems. However, it is a generally accepted
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view that, in most circumstances, native beech and podocarp forests are less flammable
than their introduced counterparts. This is not to say that they will not burn, and major
fires have occurred in the past, in both beech and podocarp/broadleaf forests, under
drought conditions.
Historical fire events show that periods of severe fire weather have coincided with a
source of ignition about once a decade resulting in major plantation fires (Pearce et al,
2000). The 1945/46 fire season is the worst on record, when over 200,000 ha of indig-
enous forest, exotic plantations, tussock and scrub were burnt in the north, east and
central regions of the North Island, including the 1946 Taupo/Tahorakuri forest fire
which burnt 30,700 ha; this fire represents the largest pine plantation wildfire to have
occurred in Australasia (Pearce and Alexander, 1994). Canterbury also experienced
major plantation fires in 1955, 1973, 1976 and 1988. Since 1955, however, only one
plantation fire (Hira in 1981) has burned over 500 hectares of plantation forest. This is
due to a number of reasons, including improvements in fire management and a reduc-
tion in forestry prescribed burning (and associated risk of escapes).
Not all major fires have involved pine plantations, and the 1982/83 fire season saw a
total of 45,000 ha burnt, including 15,000 ha of tussock and beech forest in the
Ohinewairua Fire in the central North Island. More recently, the 1998/99 fire season
resulted in 18,000 ha burnt, with over half this area from two major grassfires near
Alexandra in Central Otago. The 2000/01 fire season resulted in 13,000 ha burnt, with
7000 ha from two major grassfires in Marlborough. The 2003/04 fire season saw four
significant fires occur in Canterbury over a 3-week period involving a range of fuel
types in remote high country, rural farming areas, and on ‘lifestyle blocks’ in the RUI






















































































































Figure 16.1: Number of fires and area burned by rural wildfires in New Zealand by




number of RUI fire events (Pearce, 1994, NRFA 2004), where vegetation fires are in-
creasingly involving high value assets and posing greater risk to human life.
Rural fire causes
Due to the maritime climate and prevalence of ‘wet’ lightning (i.e., thunderstorms
associated with rainfall), less than 5% of fires in New Zealand are started by natural
causes, and most rural fires are caused by people through escaped land clearing burns
(both permitted and unauthorised) and a steadily increasing number of malicious
(incendiary) fires (Figure 16.2). Outside of forests, railways are also a significant cause
of fire. The principal causes of fires in plantation forests are arson, escaped burns,
vehicles and campfires; forestry operations and spontaneous combustion are also
common causes (Cameron et al, 2007). Again, there are some issues with statistical
reporting, particularly regarding the high proportions of fires categorised as from either
“miscellaneous” or “unknown” causes, although the advent of national training in wildfire
investigation in recent years has gone some way to alleviating this problem.
Regional fire risk
Fire risk varies considerably for different parts of New Zealand, due to the wide
variation in regional climates across the country. In general, the eastern and northern
parts of both islands tend to have the most severe fire climates (Figure 16.3), as they are
most prone to foehn wind and drought conditions. This has been the focus of much
research in recent years, with development of a fire danger climatology database and
comparisons of fire season severity (Majorhazi, 2003; Pearce et al, 2003), and investi-
gation of the effects of interannual and longer term climate variability (Pearce et al,
Figure 16.2: Causes of rural fires in New Zealand, expressed as a percentage (%) of
the total number of fires (left) and area burned (right). (Source: National Rural Fire
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2007) and future climate change (Pearce et al, 2005) on fire danger across the country.
16.3 The fire environment
No two vegetation fires are alike, and this is because fire behaviour is not an independ-
ent phenomenon, but a product of the environment in which the fire is burning. This
concept of the ‘fire environment’ (after Countryman, 1972) defines fire behaviour as
“the manner in which fuel ignites, flame develops, and fire spreads … as determined by
the interaction of fuels, weather, and topography” (Merrill and Alexander 1987). The
elements of fuel, weather and topography make up the components of the fire environ-
ment (Figure 16.4). No matter how wildfires are ignited, the consequences depend on
the amount and type of fuel sources, the terrain in which the fire is burning, and the
climatic and weather conditions in the lead up to and during the fire.
The fire environment is not static, but varies greatly in space and time. The weather
component often receives more attention than the other components of the fire environ-
ment, because its effects are readily apparent and because it is the most changeable or
variable. However, all three components, and their interactions, need to be considered
when attempting to predict or describe fire behaviour. In symbolic form, Countryman’s
(1972) fire environment concept is frequently illustrated using a triangle, with each
Figure 16.3: Pattern of average fire climate severity across New Zealand, as de-
picted by the Fire Weather Index (FWI) component of the NZ Fire Danger Rating
System (from Leathwick and Briggs 2001).
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side depicting one of the components of fuels, weather or topography. The triangular
shape of this ‘fire environment triangle’ (see Figure 16.4) emphasises the constant in-
teractions between each of these components; i.e., topography influences fuels and
weather, weather influences fuels, and fuels can influence weather. The fire itself is
sometimes included as a fourth factor in the fire environment, capturing the situations
where the fire is of sufficient size to develop a convection column (and its ‘own weather’)
that overrides the normal effects of other fire environment factors such as topography
or wind.
Weather
Weather is the most variable of the fire environment components, but very little if
anything can be done to change it. The effects of weather conditions are relatively
obvious, even though they may influence fire behaviour indirectly in many cases:
• Temperature influences the drying of fuels, and therefore the preheating of fuels to
ignition temperature.
• Relative humidity (RH) reflects the amount of moisture in the atmosphere. If the
RH is low it contributes to the drying of fuels; conversely, if the RH is high, fuels
will absorb moisture from the atmosphere.
• Precipitation, usually in the form of rain, has an obvious effect on the wetting of
fuels. Fine fuels absorb moisture more quickly than coarse fuels. Lack of precipita-
tion is the single biggest factor affecting fuel moisture during the drying process.
• Wind speed and direction are the major factors determining a fire’s rate and direc-
tion of spread.
Figure 16.4:  The fire environment triangle and components of the rural fire environ-
ment (adapted from Countryman 1972, Anon. 1981).
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• Atmospheric stability describes the resistance of the atmosphere to vertical motion.
An unstable atmosphere with gusty, turbulent wind conditions allows the fire to
develop vertically, whereas a stable atmosphere restricts convective development.
Topography
Terrain features predominantly influence fire spread, and although topography changes
little over time, it can change quickly in space as a fire spreads into a new area:
• Slope steepness affects fire rate of spread and in turn intensity, with fires burning
more rapidly upslope (and more slowly downslope) than on level terrain. This ef-
fect is due to increased (or in the case of downhill spread, decreased) preheating of
fuels ahead of the fire front through radiation and convection.
• Elevation alters the temperature, relative humidity, and exposure to wind (i.e., cooler,
wetter and more windy at higher altitudes), resulting in potential changes in fuel
moisture, available fuel loads, decomposition rates or fuel type.
• Aspect refers to the direction a slope is facing, and differences in fire behaviour due
to aspect are usually a result of changes in moisture conditions and fuel type be-
cause of exposure to the drying effect of solar radiation. In the southern hemisphere,
north- and west-facing slopes are warmer and drier.
• The position of a fire on a slope has a direct effect on fire behaviour due to changes
during the day in temperature, relative humidity and wind because of the variation
in receipt of solar radiation but, along with elevation, also has an indirect influence
by affecting the climate, vegetation type and fuel moisture conditions.
• Shape of the country affects the direction and rate of fire spread, by funnelling
winds through valleys and saddles. Topography has a mechanical effect on local
winds, and steep, divided terrain can result in increased turbulence.
• Barriers to fire spread (either natural or man-made) can have significant effects on
fire behaviour, affecting the spread of fires directly through the absence of fuels or
indirectly through modification of relative humidity or local winds. The effective-
ness of a barrier will depend on the level of fire behaviour and seasonal conditions
such as grass condition and drought effects.
Fuels
The third component of the fire environment is the fuels, and fuel characteristics in-
clude physical properties, chemistry and moisture content. Fuel characteristics change
slowly over time; however, fuel types can change quickly over distance as a fire burns
into a new area, dramatically altering the potential fire intensity and spread rate. The
fuel is also the one component that realistically can be manipulated, and fuels manage-
ment is therefore a key facet of fire reduction and readiness strategies:
• Fuel moisture content generally reflects the surrounding atmospheric conditions;
that is, it is controlled by the weather component of the fire environment. Dead
fuels are influenced by minute changes in atmospheric conditions, whereas live fuel
moisture contents are related to the physiology of individual species and longer
term weather conditions such as seasonal drought. The moisture content of dead,
fine fuels, in particular, affects ignitability, rate of combustion, and amount of fuel
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consumed; this is strongly related to relative humidity.
• Fuel load is largely dependent on the fuel type, and directly affects fire intensity. Of
the total fuel load, the amount of fuel available to burn is most important, and is
primarily a function of moisture content.
• The size and shape of fuel particles determines the surface area-to-volume ratio
which affects their exposure to heat and ignition sources, and the rate of wetting and
drying of these fuels.
• Arrangement refers to both the horizontal and vertical distribution of all the com-
bustible materials within a fuel complex, which can significantly affect fire behav-
iour. In the case of forest fuels, the presence of ladder fuels can rapidly assist the
spread of a surface fire into the crowns of vegetation above.
• Continuity describes the distribution of fuels over an area, and major fuel
discontinuities can affect the ability of a fire to spread for a significant distance. A
fire may stop at a break in mild conditions, but may surmount some barriers under
extreme ones.
• The presence of volatile compounds in some vegetation types can significantly alter
their combustion chemistry, so that they produce more energy and higher fire
intensities when they burn compared to less flammable species.
16.4 Vegetation fire behaviour
‘Fire behaviour’ is a descriptive term used to describe how fire develops, spreads and
burns and, in vegetation fire terminology, is akin to ‘fire dynamics’ in the structural fire
sense. Fire behaviour characteristics include:
• rate of fire spread (how fast the fire is spreading);
• fire intensity (how ‘fiercely’ the fire is burning);
• flame length or flame height (how big the flames are);
• fire type (what fuel layers the fire is burning, i.e., surface fuels, tree crowns, or in
between);
• fire size and perimeter growth rate (how extensive the fire is, how much edge there
is to be contained and how rapidly this is expanding); and
• extreme fire behaviour (e.g., spotting or firewhirls).
An understanding of fire behaviour is essential for successful fire control and manage-
ment. Knowing how a fire will behave is a critical element in controlling unwanted
fires safely and efficiently, and also for the safe and effective use of prescribed fire.
There are some key differences between structural fires and vegetation fires. Structure
fires are generally stationary fires that burn the fuel in situ, and typically persist for a
long time at one point. Fires burning inside a building are also generally considered to
be burning within a ‘closed’ environment, where fire behaviour is controlled by the fire
environment within the building and the outside environment has little effect. Vegeta-
tion fires, on the other hand, are continually moving forward into new fuel, and gener-
ally persist for only a short time in any one place. They are generally considered to be
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burning in an ‘open’ fire environment as they are exposed to the influences of air move-
ment, and fuel and topographic effects (Countryman, 1966).
Vegetation fire science
Like any other fire, vegetation fires are a series of chemical reactions in which the
combustion of flammable material results in the simultaneous release of heat, light and
flame. In the case of vegetation fires, living and dead fuels made up of cellulose are
converted to mainly carbon dioxide and water vapour, and heat energy is released very
rapidly:
(C6H10O2)n + O2 + Ignition temperature  CO2 + H2O + Heat energy
cellulose  + oxygen  + heat  carbon dioxide  + water  + flame and light
In addition to an agent of ignition, the primary requirement for combustion is a con-
tinuous layer of finely divided fuel or minor vegetation. This material may be pine
needles, leaves, grasses, shrubs or other vegetation. However, it must be present and it
must be continuous, or the possibility of spreading fire does not exist (Van Wagner,
1983). The second requirement is that the material be dry enough. The maximum mois-
ture content at which fire will spread is hard to specify, as for any given fuel or vegeta-
tion complex it will depend on the amount of fuel, its arrangement in space, and the
prevailing wind speed. The two limiting criteria common to all spreading fires are: (i)
the fire must transfer enough heat forward to dry out the unburned fuel and raise it to
ignition temperature by the time the flame front arrives; and (ii) enough fuel must pass
through the moving flame front to produce a continuous flame.
Combustion therefore consists of three more or less distinct but overlapping phases
(after Merrill and Alexander, 1987):
• Preheating phase – unburned fuel is raised to its ignition temperature (i.e., the mini-
mum temperature at which ignition can take place and sustained combustion can
occur – generally around 350˚C) and gaseous vapours begin to evolve.
• Distillation or Gaseous phase – the flammable gases escaping from the fuel surface
are ignited in the presence of oxygen; energy in the form of heat and light is pro-
duced.
• Charcoal or Solid phase – the presence of combustible vapours above the fuel is too
low to support a persistent flame; the residual solid fuel or char burns slowly away.
The preheating process of combustion requires energy. A simple relation is as follows
(from Van Wagner, 1977):
h mi c= +460 26 [16.1]
where hi  = ignition energy (kJ/kg) and mc  = moisture content (%).
The required ignition energy increases sharply with moisture content, so that almost
twice as much ignition energy is required to ignite fuels at 20% moisture content than
fuels at 5%. The effect of increasing fuel moisture content is to slow the rate at which
the fuel can be heated to ignition temperature. As rate of spread slows, fire intensity and
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flame size decreases, and the effect is compounded. Ignition probability generally ap-
proaches zero when dead fuel moisture is 25-30%, although some fuels may ignite at
higher moisture contents.
There are four recognised mechanisms of heat transfer (Figure 16.5) applicable to veg-
etation wildfires (after Merrill and Alexander, 1987): convection, conduction, radiation
and also solid mass or ember transport, where the transfer of heat results from firebrands
being transported by the wind, by gravity (e.g., rolling downhill), or being carried aloft






Figure 16.5: Mechanisms of heat transfer in vegetation fires
(after Countryman, 1977)
Radiation is the principal means by which vegetation fires preheat unburned fuel ahead
of the spreading flame front, although the degree of preheating depends on the charac-
teristics of the flame front such as tilt angle, flame depth and height, etc. Convection is
less important, generally only affecting unburned surface fuels on steep slopes; how-
ever, it is important in promoting fire spread from the surface to aerial fuels in crown
fires in forests. Conduction is not generally considered to contribute significantly to the
forward spread of vegetation fires, as the process is too slow since direct contact is
required and wood is a poor conductor; it is important, however, during the residual
phase when heavier fuels burn-out after the flame front has moved on. The importance
of spotting is dependent on the fuel type and its prevalence for producing firebrands,
together with fuel (fuel moisture) and atmospheric (relative humidity, wind speed)
conditions.
The ‘anatomy’ of a wildfire is depicted in Figure 16.6, together with the terminology
used to describe various parts of a vegetation wildfire. There are three main types of
vegetation fires:
• Ground or Subsurface fire – a fire that burns in the ground fuel layer.
• Surface fire – a fire that burns in the surface fuel layer, excluding the crowns of the
trees, as either a head fire, flank fire or backfire.
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• Crown fire – a fire that advances through the crown fuel layer, usually in conjunc-


































Figure 16.6: Parts of a wildland fire (after Moberly et al, 1979)
Fires burning in different fuel layers or fuel types spread at rates which vary consider-
ably, and are highly dependent on fire environment conditions. Wind velocity, in par-
ticular, is a major factor in determining a fire’s spread rate (and in turn, intensity).
Ground fires can spread as slowly as 1 m per day up to 0.5 m/h, and maximum spread
rates for backfires are probably about 1 m/min. Head fires burning in surface fuels
under forest canopies seldom exceed 6 m/min (0.1 m/h) without the onset of crowning,
whereas crown fires generally spread in the range of 25-50 m/min (1.5-3.0 km/h), up to
100 m/min (6 km/h) and occasionally higher (e.g., 12-14 km/h). Fires spreading in
grassland have been documented at rates in excess of 20 km/h.
A fire lit from a point ignition increases its rate of forward spread until a rate of spread
approximating a ‘quasi’ steady state is reached (McAlpine and Wakimoto, 1991). The
acceleration patterns of a fire are highly variable, but generally the more severe the
conditions, the longer a fire will continue to accelerate. This may take only about 10
minutes in grasslands, but perhaps 30 minutes or more in forests (Brown and Davis,
1973).
In the absence of wind and slope, an incipient fire would spread in a circular pattern if
the fuels were uniformly distributed. Wind-driven fires originating from a point igni-
tion can generally be represented by an ellipse or oval shape (Figure 16.7), provided the
wind direction remains relatively constant (Van Wagner, 1969; Anderson, 1983). Simi-
larly, fires on slope also spread in an oval or elliptical pattern. This principle is an




The maximum temperatures in vegetation fire flames are about 800˚C-1200˚C, and
occur as readily in a single burning pine needle as in an active crown fire. The differ-
ence between these two extreme cases is in the energy output. The most commonly
accepted measure of rating vegetation fire severity is Byram’s (1959a) concept of ‘fireline
intensity’. This is defined as “the rate of energy or heat release per unit length of fire
front per unit time, regardless of its depth” (Merrill and Alexander, 1987), and repre-
sents the energy output being generated from a 1 m wide strip of the active combustion
zone extending from the leading edge of the fire front to the rear of the flaming zone.
Fire intensity cannot be measured directly, but rather it must be calculated from Byram’s
(1959a) formula:
˙ ′ = ′′Q H m vf c f∆ [16.2]
where ˙ ′Q f  = fire intensity (kW/m), ∆Hc  = net heat of combustion (kJ/kg),
′′m = mass of fuel available for consumption (kg/m2), and v f  = rate of spread
(m/s).
For practical purposes, the heat of combustion can generally be considered a constant
(18,000 kJ/kg), so that the standard equation can be reduced to the following formula









where ′′m = available fuel load (metric tonnes/hectare), and v f  = rate of spread
(m/h) (Burrows, 1984).
The ′′m in the fire intensity equation refers to the fuel consumed in the active flame
front (i.e., flaming combustion), and the amount of fuel available for consumption is
primarily a function of moisture content. As fuel moisture content decreases, the fuel
available for combustion in the active fire front increases, and frontal fire intensity in
Wind Direction
















Figure 16.7: Concept of wildfire growth represented by a simple ellipse
(after Alexander 1985)
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turn increases.
Fire intensity varies around the fire’s perimeter, and is greatest at the head of fire where
it is spreading the fastest, intermediate along the flanks, and lowest at the back where
the fire is spreading the slowest (Catchpole et al, 1982). Frontal fire intensity can vary
over four orders of magnitude, from about 10 kW/m to more than 100,000 kW/m (Al-
exander, 2000). Such extremes are due largely to the potential variation in rate of spread
since fuel consumption varies over a fairly narrow range (Alexander, 1982).
Fire intensity is also directly related to flame size. Flame heights associated with high-
intensity fires generally average about 15-45 m with occasional flashes up to 185 m or
more (Byram, 1959b); the maximum documented flame height is about 200 m (Sutton,
1984). Although many fuel type-specific empirical equations exist, a simple approxi-
mation for describing the relationship between fire intensity and flame length is:
˙ ′ =Q Lf 300
2 [16.4]
where L = flame length (m) (after Newman, 1974).
Flame length is defined as the distance between the flame tip and the midpoint of the
active combustion zone in a spreading fire (Figure 16.8), and should not be confused
with flame height which is the maximum vertical extension of the flame front; they are
equal only in still air conditions on level ground. The occasional flashes that rise above
the general level of the flame front should also not be considered in the ‘average’.
Flame length L can be deduced, by simple geometry, from flame height h and flame
angle A (see Figure 16.8).
The importance of fire intensity in the evaluation of fire danger and fire behaviour
cannot be overstated.  Fire intensity is directly related to flame size and is a major
determinant of a fire’s difficulty of control (i.e., how hard it is to suppress) and certain







Figure 16.8: Cross-sectional view of a stylised head fire on level terrain illustrating
flame front characteristics (adapted from Alexander 1982)
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related to the height of lethal crown scorching (Van Wagner, 1973), the occurrence of
spotting (Taylor and Wendel, 1964) and crown fire initiation (Alexander, 1988), likeli-
hood of house survival (Wilson, 1988a), firebreak width requirements (Byram, 1959b;
Wilson, 1988b), and the effectiveness of various types of fire suppression resources








LOW < 10 < 0.2 Ground crews with hand tools 
MODERATE 10 - 500 0.2 - 1.3 Ground crews with back-pack pumps 
HIGH 500 - 2000 1.4 - 2.5 Water under pressure and/or heavy machinery 
VERY HIGH 2000 - 4000 2.6 - 3.5 Aircraft using chemical fire retardants 
EXTREME > 4000 > 3.5 
Very difficult if not impossible to control using 
conventional methods 
Table 16.1: Generalised limits of fire suppression effectiveness in relation to fire
intensity (after Alexander, 2000)
The level of radiation energy (heat flux) received by an object also depends on the
fireline intensity, as well as the size of the heat source and its distance from the fire























where ˙′′q  is the radiation intensity or heat flux (kW/m2), ˙ ′Q f  is the fireline intensity
(kW/m) and D is the distance from the flame front (m).
There are significant differences in the efficiency of radiant heat transfer between point
ignition and line source fires (Figure 16.9). Vegetation wildfires begin as a point radia-
tion source and as they grow and gain momentum they begin to radiate more as a line.
In intense fires, they approach a wall of radiant heat, producing higher levels of radiant
heat at the same distance from the fire perimeter (from Alexander, 1993).
This relationship between fireline intensity and radiation intensity has been used to
define widths of fuel breaks (Green and Schinke, 1971), and ‘setback distances’ for
buildings and fire fighter safety based on the heat resistance of construction materials,
fire fighter protective clothing and human skin (Drysdale, 1998; Fogarty, 1996; Butler
and Cohen, 1998; Sullivan et al, 2003).
16.5 Fire danger rating
A variety of tools are available to assist fire managers with assessment of fire risk,
ranging from simple paper-based fuel hazard (fuel load) or fire behaviour prediction
guides to more complex computer-based decision support systems.  In the latter case,
the main system currently utilised by New Zealand fire managers is the New Zealand
Fire Danger Rating System.
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Fire danger rating systems integrate and evaluate the factors of the fire environment
(topography, fuels and weather) to produce qualitative and/or numerical indices of fire
potential (Stocks et al, 1989). These systems synthesise scientific knowledge of fuel
flammability and fire behaviour potential and integrate this with operational experi-
ence into practical fire management applications, and most countries around the world
therefore utilise some form of formal fire danger rating system to aid fire management
decision-making.
New Zealand Fire Danger Rating System
In New Zealand, fire danger is assessed using the New Zealand Fire Danger Rating
System (NZFDRS), which is based on the Canadian Forest Fire Danger Rating System
(Stocks et al, 1989). This system has been used in New Zealand since 1980, when the
New Zealand Forest Service reviewed international fire danger rating systems (Valen-
tine, 1978) and adopted the Canadian Fire Weather Index System for rating fire danger
in New Zealand’s pine plantations. The NZFDRS is now used by New Zealand rural
fire authorities to assess the probability of a fire starting, spreading and doing damage
in a range of fuel types. It in fact comprises four major subsystems (Figure 16.10a): the
Fire Weather Index (FWI) System, Fire Behaviour Prediction (FBP) System, Acces-
sory Fuel Moisture System, and the Fire Occurrence Prediction System. Currently only
Figure 16.9: Schematic diagram illustrating the physics of radiation heat transfer
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the first two subsystems (the FWI and FBP Systems) are in use in New Zealand, with
the other two subsystems yet to be developed. New Zealand’s adoption and continued
adaptation of the Canadian Forest Fire Danger Rating System has been described by
Fogarty et al (1998) and Anderson (2005, 2006).
The FWI System is at the core of the NZFDRS, and its six components (Figure 16.10b)
account for the effects of fuel moisture and wind on ignition potential and probable fire
behaviour, based solely on weather inputs for a reference fuel type (mature pine) on
level terrain (Van Wagner, 1987; Anderson, 2005). Values of the three fuel moisture
codes and three fire behaviour indices may be determined from tables (e.g., Anon.,
1993) or, more typically, by computer calculation (after Van Wagner and Pickett, 1985).
Automated FWI calculations are run daily for a network of more than 170 weather
stations across the country and, since only four weather inputs are required, it is also
possible to forecast FWI values (Pearce and Majorhazi, 2003). Whilst the FWI itself is
a good indicator of general fire danger across broad areas and of key aspects of associ-
ated fire activity, it is impossible to use one number to summarise daily fire potential.
All six components of the FWI System provide useful information on fuel moisture
(and flammability) and expected fire behaviour. For example, the Fine Fuel Moisture
Code (FFMC) is a useful indicator of ignition potential, the Drought Code (DC) and
Buildup Index (BUI) provide indicators of the potential for deep-seated burning, and
the Initial Spread Index (ISI) indicates the potential for rapid rates of spread and fire
development (Anderson, 2005).
Whereas the FWI System provides fire danger rating system outputs in the form of
relative numerical indices that can only be applied over broad areas, the Fire Behaviour
Prediction (FBP) System (see Figure 16.10a) describes site-specific fire behaviour char-









































































Figure 16.10: Structure diagrams for (a) the New Zealand Fire Danger Rating
System (NZFDRS), illustrating the linkage to fire management actions (after Fogarty
et al. 1998); and (b) the Fire Weather Index (FWI) System (after Anon. 1993).
(a) (b)
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accounted for in the FWI System. Its primary outputs are quantitative estimates of rate
of fire spread, fuel consumption, head fire intensity, and fire description (e.g., crown or
surface fire). A number of secondary outputs (i.e., head, flank and back fire spread
distance, flank and back fire rates of spread and intensities, fire area and perimeter, rate
of perimeter growth, and length-to-breadth ratio) can also be derived (Forestry Canada
Fire Danger Group, 1992; Taylor et al, 1997). The FBP System comprises a series of
models for rate of fire spread and fuel consumption required to provide an estimate of
Byram’s (1959a) head fire intensity. Within the NZFDRS, models for three benchmark
fuel types are currently available (Anderson, 2005), while a number of fire behaviour
prediction models for other fuel types have been developed based on data collected
from wildfires and small-scale experimental burning trials (Pearce and Anderson, 2008),
although these are mostly in interim format that still require further validation.
During fire suppression, predicting fire behaviour correctly allows decisions to be made
on where to best attack the fire, what tools will be effective in controlling and suppress-
ing the fire, when more resources are required, what areas are safe to work in and,
perhaps most importantly, when to pull back fire crews from the fire for safety. Fire
behaviour information can also be used to identify potential threats to communities,
conservation values and other assets, and to aid decisions around evacuations. In addi-
tion to decisions on appropriate suppression strategies and tactics on active wildfires,
predictions of potential fire behaviour are also used as the basis for daily decision-
making within broader fire management. Examples include preparedness planning (i.e.,
the level of readiness and pre-positioning of suppression resources), initial attack
dispatching (i.e., how many and what types of resources are dispatched), and prescribed
fire planning and execution.
In recognition of the fact that the primary purpose of the NZFDRS is to notify the
general public of prevailing fire danger conditions (for example, through roadside fire
danger display boards), the FWI System codes and indices are used in conjunction with
fire behaviour models contained in the FBP System to determine daily fire danger classes
for Forest and Grassland fuel types using the criteria defined by Alexander (1994) and
extended to Scrubland (Anderson, 2006). The five fire danger classes (LOW,
MODERATE, HIGH, VERY HIGH and EXTREME) are based upon fire intensity and
reflect the increasing difficulty of suppressing a fire as intensity increases (Table 16.1).
The fire danger classes and other elements of the NZFDRS form the core of a range of
fire management applications in New Zealand, from reduction and readiness planning,
through to fire response, and recovery (see Figure 16.10a).
16.6 Rural fire legislation and management
Major changes in New Zealand’s rural fire legislation have typically been associated
with significant fire seasons or wildfire events. The first piece of legislation dedicated
wholly to rural fire (the Forest and Rural Fires Act 1947) was passed in reaction to the
1945/46 fire season. This Act extended the concept of Rural Fire Authorities outside
the State, and brought in the concept of restricted fire seasons, specialised officers and
specific regulations. After the Balmoral Forest fire of 1955, the Forest and Rural Fires
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Act (1955) brought all aspects of rural fire legislation together for the first time under
New Zealand Forest Service responsibility.
For the next few decades, the New Zealand Forest Service assumed the fire protection
responsibility for all forest and rural areas, and its demise in 1987 initiated significant
changes in fire management. The Forest Service had a well-organised and well-funded
system to protect state-owned forests and neighbouring rural lands, including smaller
private forests. It had specialist staff, specialised equipment and an organisational cul-
ture of treating fire protection as an integral part of forest management. Following its
disestablishment, new and existing forestry companies maintained the protection of
production forests, but many experienced people left the forest industry. The
Department of Conservation was formed and the management and protection of indig-
enous flora and fauna was given a higher priority than ever before. However, perhaps
the greatest change occurred on private rural lands, where Territorial Authorities were
obliged to meet their legal fire protection commitments.
Under changes made to the Forest and Rural Fires legislation in 1977 and 1990, rural
fire management is now the responsibility of Rural Fire Authorities, which may be the
Department of Conservation, the Ministry of Defence, a local authority or a specially-
gazetted Rural Fire District administered by a committee made up of rural land owners
and other agencies, particularly forest owners. In 1990, following a fire-prone summer
of 1988/89, Hensley (1990) reviewed the state of the rural fire sector and his report led
to an Amendment of the 1975 Fire Service Act. The New Zealand Fire Service
Commission, in addition to its role of a national urban fire service under the Fire
Service Act (1975), was given a new role as the National Rural Fire Authority. This
new role saw the Commission being responsible for national coordination of rural fire
and ensuring the effective and efficient functioning of Rural Fire Authorities. It accom-
plishes this through Regional Rural Fire Committees that recognise the need for a
collective approach to regional coordination, resource sharing and the management of
large, long-duration or complex fire incidents. The advent of other legislation (e.g.,
Local Government Act 2002), including the definition of fire as a ‘natural hazard’
under the Resource Management Act (1991) and as an emergency in the Civil Defence
and Emergency Management Act (2002), means that there is now a wide range of
legislation affecting rural fire.
Fire management activities
In the forest and rural fire sense, ‘fire management’ has been defined as (after Merrill
and Alexander, 1987):
“...the activities concerned with the protection of people, property and
forest areas from wildfire and the use of prescribed burning for the
attainment of forest management and other land use objectives, all
conducted in a manner that considers environmental, social and
economic criteria”.
In an effort to minimise fire losses, forest and rural fire management in New Zealand
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follows a risk management approach of identi-
fying, understanding and assessing rural fire
risks, then developing methods to effectively
mitigate or reduce those risks. Successful fire
management is based around the ‘4 Rs’ of
emergency management, namely Reduction,
Readiness, Response and Recovery (Figure
16.11, after Britton, 1994). An explanation of
the application of these ‘4 Rs’ to rural fire
management follows (after NZFOA ,1999; Far-
row, 2005).
Reduction
Reduction refers to those activities that reduce
the degree of long-term risk (Britton, 1998). In
a fire management sense, reduction is gener-
ally regarded as being ‘fire prevention’, which involves “those activities directed at
reducing fire occurrence” (Merrill and Alexander, 1987). Fire prevention aims to re-
duce the number of fires, and therefore the area burned and associated fire suppression
expenditures and other damages. Examples of fire prevention activities include: public
notification of fire danger; publicity campaigns (e.g. “C’mon, keep it green” and “Dial
111 if you see smoke”); declaration of Open, Restricted and Prohibited fire seasons;
fire permit issue and permit conditions; activity controls, including access restrictions
or closures; and fuels management (roadside vegetation, pruning and thinning, fuel
reduction burning).
Fire reduction activities often need to be targeted at specific groups within the commu-
nity, and therefore usually require a variety of communication and education methods.
They are also most effective if based on prevailing fire danger conditions, i.e., targeted
around those conditions when fires from different activities are most likely to occur.
The need for a sound basis for decisions is especially important where fire reduction
activities (e.g., halting harvesting operations, closing recreational areas) can have
significant financial and public relations implications. Administrative procedures, such
as public relations, fire cause investigation, enforcement, record keeping and analysis
of statistics, are therefore also an important part of fire reduction.
Readiness
Readiness refers to activities that develop operational capabilities for responding to an
emergency event (Britton, 1998). In fire management terms, readiness equates to ‘pre-
suppression preparedness’, which includes “those fire management activities that are
carried out in advance of fire occurrence concerned with the organisation, training, and
management” of fire fighting resources and maintenance of equipment and supplies “to
ensure effective fire suppression” (Merrill and Alexander, 1987). Fire readiness activi-
ties aim to maximise the success of initial attack through a well-prepared, rapid first














pre-attack planning and fire preparedness systems.
A pre-attack plan contains data collected in advance of fire occurrence to support
decision-making for activities that increase the chances of successful fire suppression.
It contains information on: fuel types, fuel loads and condition; topography; fuel and
firebreak locations and maintenance; access routes and travel times; water supply sources;
airstrip and helipad locations; personnel locations, availability, contact details and
capabilities; equipment location and operational status; communications systems; inci-
dent management facilities; and back-up resources and interagency agreements.
Preparedness refers to “determination of when, where, and what level of resource de-
ployment is required to meet anticipated fire incidence” (Merrill and Alexander, 1987).
Preparedness systems include some or all of: pre-determined response levels and initial
attack plans; pre-location of resources, based on identification of problem areas;
manning levels and stand-by arrangements; and dispatch procedures. To be effective,
preparedness levels need to match resource productivity and effectiveness (i.e., fireline
construction rates for various suppression resources) against expected fire danger and
fire behaviour potential.
Readiness typically also includes fire detection activities aimed specifically at
reducing fire losses through early detection and more rapid initial attack. Fire detection
may be organised, as is the case with the manning of fixed fire lookouts or automated
lightning location systems, or it may be random where, for example, an organisation
relies on the general public for the detection and reporting of fires. Organised methods
of fire detection are most efficient if based on prevailing fire danger. Very few fire
lookouts remaining from the New Zealand Forest Service era are still in use, and the
majority of fires are randomly detected and reported by rural landowners, members of
the public and, occasionally, commercial aircraft.
Response
Response refers to “activities taken immediately before, during or directly after an
emergency in an effort to minimise losses and improve recovery” (Britton, 1998). In
the fire management context, response refers to the ‘fire suppression’ phase, which
includes all those activities “concerned with controlling and extinguishing a fire
following its detection” (Merrill and Alexander, 1987). These are the actual fire fight-
ing operations beginning with discovery and continuing until the fire is completely
extinguished. The various fire suppression activities are sometimes represented using
the ‘chain of fire suppression’ (see Figure 16.12a), and it is important to recognise the
effect of elapsed time on fire size (see Figure 16.12b,c) and probability of containment
when developing response strategies to minimise area burned and associated fire
impacts (Alexander, 2000).
Examples of fire suppression activities include: determination of resource requirements;
development of fire suppression strategies and tactics; incident management; fire
behaviour prediction; back burning and burning out. Suppression planning is most
effective if it is based on information on actual and predicted fire danger and fire
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behaviour, and actual resource productivity and effectiveness. The New Zealand Coor-
dinated Incident Management System, CIMS (Anon., 1998) is widely used in fire (and
other emergency) response, and it provides the framework for incident control,
planning, resource management and safety, as well as coordination and cooperation of
the multiple responding Rural Fire Authorities, other agencies (e.g., fire service, police,
defence, welfare support), landowners and affected groups.
Recovery
Recovery refers to the process of returning affected communities to social and
economic normality, and includes immediate, medium- and longer-term rehabilitation
and restoration activities. In fire management, ‘fire recovery’ can apply to rehabilita-
tion of fire-affected individuals, properties and communities, and also to fire-affected
ecosystems and fire-damaged areas. Examples of fire recovery actions include: public
welfare (food, emergency shelter, clothing, health); community lifelines (communica-
tions, essential infrastructure); damage assessment (insurance claim assessment,
emergency relief funding); post-fire salvage; site rehabilitation (firebreaks, fencing,
access), re-establishment and/or replanting; health and safety (personnel recovery, food
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Figure 16.12: (a) The ‘chain of fire suppression’ actions required to control a wildfire
(after Gaylor 1974); (b) Schematic illustration of the various activities involved in
controlling and extinguishing a wildfire as a function of elapsed time since ignition
and cumulative area burned (after Parks 1964); and (c) Conceptualisation of free-
burning fire growth with the passage of time since ignition before containment action
begins (after Alexander 2000).
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supply restocking); debriefs, operational reviews and case studies (safety, operational
learning, research); and administration (control, records, finances, investigation and
prosecution).
For forest owners, salvage of fire-damaged stands is probably most important. Dam-
aged stands need to be salvaged as quickly as possible to minimise potential for insect
(e.g., bark beetle) and pathogen (e.g., staining) attack; however, salvage timing also
needs to be managed to maximise salvage returns as fire-damaged trees generally com-
mand lower wood values (due to charring of sawlogs, and the presence of charcoal on
pulplogs and in woodchips) and a large fire can swamp local markets resulting in even
greater losses. A large fire can cause significant disruption to other work activities due
to staff or volunteers being involved in fire suppression and recovery actions; this needs
to be recognised and, if necessary, managed to minimise its impact. Recovery should
also have a reduction focus, and opportunities to reduce vulnerability to future events
(such as debriefs or operational reviews, investigation and enforcement) should be sought
and implemented during the recovery process.
16.7 The Rural-Urban Interface Problem
The expansion of urban development into rural areas containing flammable vegetation
is a global phenomenon that has lead to increased wildfire risk, exacerbated by increased
population and likelihood of fire starts, and higher values associated with life and prop-
erty. Too often property owners and planning authorities are unaware of the problem
until it is too late. Even vegetation between houses in more densely built up suburbs can
significantly affect the extent and speed of fire spread between houses. A pilot study of
the effect of vegetation on the extent of fire spread in a Wellington study showed that
assuming that fire would spread via relatively isolated trees in suburban gardens, the
increased extent of fire would result in twice the fire loss (Heron et al, 2003).
Fire fighters cannot nor should be expected to attend every threatened structure during
a rural-urban interface fire, because in many instances there are not enough resources
and, even at small fires, severe burning conditions can restrict access and endanger fire
fighter’s lives (Fogarty, 1996). Therefore, in areas where steep slopes, flammable veg-
etation fuels and strong winds are the predominant features of the peri-urban fire envi-
ronment, residents and planners need to initiate some local reduction, readiness and
response measures. Detailed guides are available (e.g., Standards Australia 2001, NFPA
2007) that should be reviewed when determining the levels of fire protection required.
An aim of these guidelines is to reduce the potential for high intensity fires in the area
adjacent to houses, because it has a significant influence on the probability of house
survival (Wilson 1984, 1988a).
Fire intensity and associated flame length and radiant heat transfer are determined by a
fire’s rate of spread and the available fuel load (see Section 16.4), and surveys of homes
damaged or destroyed during Australian bushfires have shown that reducing fuel loads
within 50 to 100 m of the house significantly increases the chances of survival. The
absence of heavy accumulations of flammable materials (e.g., wood heaps) or out-
buildings, and of continuous vegetation within 40 m of a threatened structure further
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increases the probability of survival by reducing fire intensity and allowing safe access
for fire fighters and/or residents to the structure soon after the fire front had passed
(Wilson 1984, 1988a). The size and shape of this defensible space depends on site
factors such as slope, prevailing wind strength and direction, and nature of the sur-
rounding fuel. However, most planning guides (e.g., NRFA 2004) recommend a clean
defensible space of at least 10 m on flat ground, and 30-40 m on slopes, for structure
protection (Figure 16.14a).
Creating large areas of defensible space can often be difficult for homeowners to prac-
tically achieve. Guidelines therefore generally prescribe a series of protection zones
requiring different levels of fuel management (see Figure 16.14b). The inner protection
zone (priority zone 1) should be clear of all flammable material such as scrub vegeta-
tion, rank grass, dead leaves and twigs, etc. The outer protection zones (priority zones
2 and 3) aim to minimise the likelihood of high-intensity fires by reducing (rather than
eliminating, as in priority zone 1) fuel loads and continuity. This can be achieved by
mechanical treatments such as thinning and pruning, or the planting of less flammable
species that have features such as shade tolerance, clean growth habits and low levels
of volatile oil in the leaves (NZ Fire Research, 2000; Fogarty 2001). Well-kept lawns
and gardens provide little fuel for wildfires, and a combination of lawns and gardens
with scattered low flammability shrubs often provides the best solution.
The same principles also apply to subdivisions and, where space and legislation per-
mits, the design of new subdivisions should incorporate strategically placed roads and
green belts (e.g., parklands and golf courses) that act to inhibit fire spread and intensity,
in addition to provision of easy access for emergency vehicles and ample water supply
for fire fighting purposes. Where possible, water supplies should also be ‘fire-proofed’
(by using heat-resistant storage containers, and ensuring pump power supply) so that
Figure 16.14: (a) Defensible space requirements around a house with and without




they are not compromised in a fire event. Water tanks should also have appropriate
couplings that allow fire services to easily connect pumps and hoses. Building design
standards and construction materials can also decrease structure flammability (Wilson
1984, 1988a). Hence, in addition to fuel management, there are many options available
to homeowners and planners for creating less flammable landscapes (Fogarty, 1995)
that help protect lives and property within the rural-urban interface.
16.8 Conclusions
Vegetation fires are different from structural and other industrial fires in many regards,
including terminology, the fuels being burned and consideration of fire environment
effects associated with topography and weather; however, the fundamental principles
governing combustion and heat transfer are universally applicable, and fire behaviour
and flame front characteristics are the key determinants of fire control requirements
and fire effects.
While not on the same scale as wildfires in many other parts of the world, rural
vegetation fires in New Zealand still result in significant economic and property losses
and environmental damage, and the potential exists in most parts of the country for
significant events to occur. Predominantly caused by people, rural wildfires in New
Zealand are typically short duration, wind-driven fire events burning in grass, scrub or
forest fuels that often also involve slope. Extreme fire weather days commonly occur
under foehn or pre-frontal wind conditions, while severe fire seasons are frequently
associated with El Niño-Southern Oscillation fluctuations or longer-term climatic
variability. There is also potential for increases in future threat from wildfires as a result
of projected climate change.
New Zealand’s rural fire legislation and management structures have evolved in re-
sponse to this wildfire threat, and now follow a holistic approach based around the ‘4
Rs’ of emergency management – reduction, readiness, response and recovery. A sound
knowledge of fire science and fire behaviour underpins fire management strategies,
and is vital to fire fighter and public safety and to the safe and effective use of fire as a
land management tool. The New Zealand Fire Danger Rating System incorporates the
effects of the environment (fuels, weather and topography) on vegetation fire danger
and fire behaviour, and provides a key tool to support fire management decision-mak-
ing. Vegetation fire science can also be used to address the expanding rural-urban inter-
face fire problem, by informing subdivision design, building codes, homeowner educa-
tion, fuel reduction options, and other mitigation strategies.
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This Chapter presents only a brief summary of the information pertaining to the science
of vegetation fire behaviour, the fire environment and fire danger rating. Readers want-
ing further information should consider the following sources as a starting point for
further reference:
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Government Publishing Service, Canberra, A.C.T. 359 p.
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interface fires. 49 p. [also available on CD-ROM]
A series of New Zealand Qualifications Authority approved Unit Standard learning
resources and associated training courses on rural fire are also available through the
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National Rural Fire Authority (PO Box 2133, Wellington) or Fire and Rescue Services
Industry Training Organisation (PO Box 11-988, Wellington). Further information on
local rural fire issues can also be obtained through individual Rural Fire Authorities.
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The framework for building regulations and fire safety in Australia is quite different
from the situation in New Zealand. In Australia, there is a federal system and 3 tiers of
government which all play a role in fire safety provisions for buildings. These tiers are:
• Commonwealth (Federal) Government;
• State Government; and
• Local Government.
The objective of the regulatory framework is principally directed towards:
• life safety of occupants;
• protection of fire fighters during rescue and fire fighting; and
• protection of neighbouring (adjoining) property.
In addition, some of the Fire Brigade Acts and other legislation refer to the need to
protect property and the environment.
17.2 Regulatory Framework
The three levels of Government are all important and involved in the ultimate process
of controlling the levels of fire safety in buildings, transport infrastructure and indus-
trial facilities. Australia has a federal system consisting of a broad national government
which unifies the six States and two Territories into the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Commonwealth Government is responsible for the development of the national
‘Building Code of Australia’ (BCA). This contains the technical provisions for build-
ing design, including the Performance Requirements set out in the typical 5 level ‘Nordic
hierarchy’.
The legislation for government control of buildings and other structures is done at the
individual State level. Each State and Territory has its own Building Act which calls up
the BCA for the technical provisions and sets in place all the planning and building
approval mechanisms, appeal processes, inspection procedures and associated regula-
tions for new and existing buildings.
Implementation of the State or Territory legislation and regulation for an individual
building occurs at local government level, i.e. at each local council or municipality.
Planning applications, submissions for building approvals and occupancy permits for
individual projects are dealt with traditionally by local councils across Australia, with
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approvals given by local council building surveyors and inspectors. However, increas-
ingly this statutory role is being undertaken by private building surveyors acting on
behalf of councils and the ‘community’ and simply lodging documents with councils
for record purposes.
There are other regulatory instruments at both Commonwealth and State level which
can have an impact on building design and fire safety, often in a subtle or unclear
manner until issues arise. Some examples are:
• The states’ “Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) Acts”, which require design-
ers of buildings to provide fire safety for occupants in the work place to be provided
as far as is ‘practicable’ without specific performance requirements.
• The Commonwealth “Disability Discrimination Act” (DDA) which requires all peo-
ple, particularly the ‘disabled’ to be considered and provided for in buildings with
access and dignity. This Act has no defined provisions or measurable targets.
Finally, each State and Territory has a Fire Brigades Act which sets out the role and
responsibilities of the Australian fire services to ‘protect life and property’ and in some
States, also ‘protect the environment’. These Acts set out the fire services structure and
operations, funding arrangements, reporting to Government, role and responsibilities,
and other related matters.
17.3 Building Code of Australia
Since 1994 the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) has been responsible for the
management, development and publication of the BCA. The ABCB has its secretariat
in Canberra and allows state-based contributions to BCA development through its Build-
ing Code Committee (BCC). This committee consists of a number of representatives
from each State and Territory to get a broad national industry input.





• Building Solutions – Deemed-to-Satisfy or Alternative Solutions; and
• Assessment Methods.
The sections of the BCA and key aspects which are relevant to fire performance are as
follows:
A General Provisions definition of terminology, acceptance methods,
building classifications
B  Structure none
C Fire Resistance fire protection of structural elements, fire separation,
protection of openings
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D Access and Egress exit locations and dimensions
E Services and Equipment fire fighting equipment, smoke management,
lighting, signs, warning systems
F Health and Amenity none
G Ancillary Provisions atria, alpine areas, bushfire-prone areas
H Special Use Buildings theatres
I Maintenance maintenance of fire safety equipment
J Energy Efficiency none
The BCA includes not only the Performance Requirements for each section, but also
contains the prescriptive, Acceptable Solutions that are ‘Deemed-to-Satisfy’ the Per-
formance Requirements. The document of course makes clear the opportunity to de-
velop Alternative Solutions where they can be justified by fire engineering analysis or
other methods to satisfy the Performance Requirements.
A feature of the BCA is a series of State and Territory Appendices for the Deemed-to-
Satisfy provisions. Traditionally, in the prescriptive model codes for Australia, each
State had its own major variations. While the number of these variations as set out in
the BCA are now very significantly reduced compared with the past, they reflect the
vast size of Australia, the differences in conditions based on geography, climate and
some hangovers from local thinking on each state’s ‘special provisions’.
The criteria in section A0.5 for compliance with the Performance Requirements means
that for any part or aspect of a building an acceptable design may consist of:
(a) Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions;
(b) one or more Alternative Solutions; or
(c) some combination of Deemed-to-Satisfy and Alternative Solutions.
Equally, the design solutions which meet the Performance Requirements may be satis-
fied by design solutions being:
(i) equivalent in level of safety to the Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions; or
(ii) other solutions which satisfy the Performance Requirements using the Assessment
Methods set out under section AO.9 of the BCA.
More details on the ABCB and the development of the Building Code of Australia can
be found at www.abcb.gov.au.
17.4 State Legislation and Regulation
As summarised in Section 1.3, Australia has a wide range of legislation which varies
considerably. The key element in each State or Territory is a form of Building Act
which provides the enabling legislation, such as the Environment Planning and Assess-
ment Act (1979) in NSW, for building regulation and control in that particular State or
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Territory.
The government departments or authorities responsible for the administration of the
Building Acts, such as the Building Commission (BC) in Victoria, also play a public
and industry education role. In the case of Victoria’s BC, they collect a levy on all
buildings which is used for research of fire safety and other building matters.
All States and Territories have one or more Fire Brigade Acts which control the role,
management and operations of the fire services in their State. For example in Victoria,
there are two fire services:
• Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB), covering most of metro-
politan Melbourne; and
• Country Fire Authority (CFA), covering the urban fringes of Melbourne and all
rural areas of Victoria.
By contrast, in Western Australia the fire services form part of the Fire and Emergency
Services Authority (FESA), which operates under a broader Emergency Services Act.
There is a major legislative conflict between the Building Act and the Fire Brigade Act
in most, if not all, States over the issue of property protection. The BCA as called up in
the Building Acts addresses fire spread between fire compartments, between buildings
on the same site and to adjoining properties. However, it does not address the issue of
fire spread within fire compartments, and the BCA uses the term ‘to the degree neces-
sary’ in relation to fire spread under section C. It could be inferred, and has been the
approach on many large warehouse and food processing buildings, for example, that
the owner may reduce fire safety provisions, e.g., delete sprinklers, if life safety and
adjoining property is not threatened and the fire service has reasonable site access for
fire fighting. This approach is encouraged in parts of the explanatory ‘Guide to the
BCA’.
On the other hand, the Fire Brigade Acts typically call for fire services to ‘protect life
and property’, and in some cases ‘the environment’. This is often interpreted by the
fire services as a right to demand higher levels of fire protection when the owner and
their insurer may feel this is not cost-effective.
This is further complicated nationally in that the role of the fire service in building
approvals varies from State to State. In Victoria, relevant building surveyors as certify-
ing authorities for buildings only have to make a formal reference to the fire service if
the Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions are not being strictly followed in the area of fire
service access and fire fighting equipment, e.g. hydrants.
In some other states, the fire service role is more extensive, such as NSW where
the fire services have input on issues of sprinklers and smoke control where Alternative
Solutions are proposed under the Performance Requirements. In Queensland, the fire
service reviews the complete design approach.
Another parcel of legislation relating to fire safety controlled by State governments is
that involved in managing ‘Dangerous Goods’, i.e. high hazard materials, particularly
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flammable liquids and gases. Again, the Dangerous Goods legislation in Victoria re-
quires mandatory reference to the fire service if the required risk assessment shows
other than minimal quantities of hazardous materials.
17.5 Building Approvals
For individual projects, building control is vested with local councils, and increasingly
with private certifiers acting on their behalf. The control mechanisms are the usual
steps as in most countries:
(i) planning permit;
(ii) building approval/permit; and
(iii) certificate of occupancy.
For a new building, or the upgrade, extension or reuse of an existing building, the
application is made to a council or private certifier. They issue the requisite permits in
order and organise the relevant inspections during construction and fitout.
The introduction of private certifiers in Australia varies State by State, with only West-
ern Australia and South Australia yet to introduce and allow private certification. The
usual reason given for introducing private certifiers is that it introduces a degree of
healthy competition into the market place between private certifiers and council build-
ing surveyors.
In most States where private certification has been introduced, they now dominate the
building certification process. Two fundamental tenets of private certification are that:
(i) they act on behalf of the community as a watchdog of public standards; and
(ii) they do not participate in the ‘design process’.
The legislative and regulatory provisions to implement these principles do differ in
each State, with the legislation in NSW requiring the Principal Certifying Authority
(PCA), who may be a private consulting building surveyor, to not be involved in the
design process for a project.
All States have a process where the Relevant Building Surveyor or Principal Certifying
Authority (PCA), as the certifier, may ask for Compliance Certificates for the design
process and Construction Certificates for the completed building from consultants and
builders. These are known by names such as Form 12 and 14 in Victoria, Form 10 in
NSW and Form 15 in Queensland.
It is very important that those issuing such Certificates understand the legislation under
which they are issued. For example, in NSW, a PCA may call for a Compliance Certifi-
cate - Form 10 from the design fire engineer in support of the fire safety strategy and
the Alternative Solutions, indicating which Performance Requirements have been ad-
dressed in a fire engineering report and how the Performance Requirements have been
met. The design fire engineers might be tempted to issue the Form 10 themselves, but
are prevented by the pecuniary interest and conflict of interest provisions of the NSW
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EP&A Act. A person with no connection with the design and no financial or other
pecuniary interest must review the report and sign the Form 10 on which the PCA can
then rely absolutely in relation to those Performance Requirements for the project. The
reason for this action is that the person signing the Form 10 is acting on behalf of the
community in the public interest with no fear or favour as a result of a conflict of
interest.
17.6 Registered Professionals
The registration of fire safety engineers and related professionals is another area which
differs State by State. However, most States are considering registration of profession-
als and are in the process of amending their Building Acts accordingly.
The most developed system is in Victoria, where all involved in the building and con-
struction industry must be ‘Registered Building Practitioners (RBP)’. This requires fire
safety engineers and consulting building surveyors to be registered annually. Evidence
of professional recognised qualifications and experience must be provided together
with evidence of a required level of professional indemnity (PI) insurance.
The process of professional recognised status in Victoria is generally demonstrated
through membership on the National Professional Engineers Register (NPER) main-
tained by The Institution of Engineers, Australia in Canberra for the category of Fire
Safety Engineering.
In NSW, it is necessary to be registered to sign Form 10 Compliance Certificates.
Under the NSW legislation, a new Building Professionals Board (BPB) has been cre-
ated to register accredited certifiers in a wide range of professional areas. Their role is
to review designs and issue compliance certification for building projects. Tasmania
has a form of registration similar to Victoria, but other States are still developing their
approaches.
17.7 Maintenance and Essential Services
Australia has one major Standard (AS 1851 (Standards Australia, 2005)) which covers
maintenance of fire protection systems. This sets out the requirements for maintenance
of sprinklers, fire detection and alarms and other related fire protection equipment.
Unfortunately, the adoption of the latest edition of AS 1851 (2005) varies between
States, with some States still applying older versions of the AS 1851 series, some using
their own regulations or requirements, and some not applying it retrospectively to ex-
isting buildings but only to new buildings.
Until recently, the responsibility for ensuring the maintenance of fire protection equip-
ment was left in the hands of the building owner or operator. However, the advent of
performance based fire engineering has highlighted the importance of key fire protec-
tion measures, including the availability of exits and control of fire loads as well as the
fire protection equipment.
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State legislation for so called essential services is now reasonably well developed in
most States, requiring the fire safety engineer to identify all key fire safety systems in a
building which relate to the BCA Performance Requirements being considered. These
are then often listed on the Certificate of Occupancy as essential services requiring the
owner to maintain those elements, components and systems to the maintenance stand-
ards listed on the Certificate of Occupancy.
Reference
AS 1851:2005. Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems and Equipment, Standards
Australia, Sydney.
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This Chapter provides an introduction to building controls in New Zealand. It illus-
trates the relationship between the New Zealand Building Code (the Building Code)
and the various other provisions that ensure buildings in New Zealand are, among other
things, safe and healthy to use. The Chapter provides a convenient user reference; legal
interpretation must, however, be based on the actual wording of the Building Act 2004
and amendments (Building Act) and Building Regulations themselves.
18.2 Building Control Framework
The regulation and performance of buildings sits under a three-part framework:
• The Building Act contains the provisions for regulating building work.
• The various sets of Building Regulations contain prescribed forms, list the speci-
fied systems, define ‘change the use’ and ‘moderate earthquake’, and set out the
rate of levy and the fees for determinations.
• The Building Code contained in Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 1992 sets
out performance standards that all new building work must meet, and covers
aspects such as stability, fire safety, access, moisture, safety of users, services and
facilities, and energy efficiency.
Figure 18.1 illustrates the legislation that forms the building control framework, with the
Building Act providing overall governance.
The Building Act 2004
The Building Act provides the mandatory framework for the building control system,
which must be followed when undertaking building work within New Zealand. It
applies to:
• all buildings, including Crown buildings, except those which may be exempt for
reasons of national security
• all components of each building, including plumbing, electrical and mechanical
installations.
The Building Act should be read taking into account the changes under the Building
Amendment Act 2005 and any subsequent amendments.
Purpose
The Building Act aims to improve control of and encourage better practices in building
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design and construction, to provide greater assurance to consumers. This means:
• more clarity on the standards that buildings are expected to meet;
• more guidance on how these standards can be met;
• more certainty that capable people are undertaking building design, construction
and inspection;
• more scrutiny in the building consent and inspection process; and
• better protection for homeowners through the introduction of mandatory warranties.
The purpose of the Building Act is to provide for the regulation of building work and to
ensure that people can use buildings safely without endangering their health, can es-
cape the building in case of fire, and that buildings:
• have attributes that contribute appropriately to the health, physical independence
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Figure 18.1: The New Zealand building control framework
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• are designed, constructed and able to be used in ways that promote sustainable
development.
Principles
The Building Act does not contain an equivalent to section 47 of the Building Act 1991
(the former Act), which contained guidance on how a Territorial Authority should
exercise its powers. Under the Building Act, section 4 (section 6 under the former Act),
which contains the principles to be applied in performing functions or duties, or
exercising powers under the Building Act, is now more important. It should be taken
into account when performing functions or duties or exercising powers relating to the
granting of waivers or modifications of the Building Code, and the adoption and review
of policies on dangerous, earthquake-prone or insanitary buildings.
The Building Act re-states many of the principles outlined in the former Act, and makes
explicit some of the implied principles of that legislation (for example, that innovation
is important). However, some significant new concepts have been introduced, includ-
ing a particular focus on the household unit, and that whole-of-life costs of building
work are to be considered.
This is a summary of the principles.
• Household units have an important role in the lives of the people who use them, and
are accorded a special focus.
• The Building Code as it relates to household units is important, and household units
need to comply with the Building Code.
• Maintenance requirements of household units need to be reasonable, and owners of
household units need to be aware of the maintenance requirements of their house-
hold units.
• Harmful effects on human health resulting from the use of building methods, prod-
ucts, design or building work need to be prevented or minimised.
• Buildings need to be durable.
• Special traditional and cultural aspects of the intended use of a building need to be
recognised.
• The whole-of-life costs of a building need to be considered.
• Standards are important in achieving compliance with the Building Code for build-
ing design and construction.
• Innovation in methods of building design and construction is important.
• People who undertake a rescue operation or fire fighting in a building need to be
able to expect a reasonable level of protection from injury or illness while doing so.
• The extent and effects of the spread of fire needs to be limited to protect other
household units and other property.
• Other property needs to be protected from physical damage resulting from the con-
struction, use and demolition of a building.
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• People with disabilities need to be able to enter and carry out normal activities and
processes in a building.
• Buildings of significant cultural, historical or heritage value need to be preserved.
• Energy use in buildings needs to be efficient.
• The use of renewable sources of energy needs to be encouraged.
• Material use in buildings needs to be efficient and sustainable.
• Water use in buildings needs to be efficient and promote water conservation.
• Waste generated during the construction process needs to be reduced.
Application
The Building Act applies to:
• building construction, alteration, demolition or removal; and
• maintenance of a building’s specified systems, such as lifts and fire protection in-
stallations.
The Building Act does not cover:
• planning and resource management; and
• occupational safety and health.
Structure
The Building Act has five parts:
Part 1: This contains the purpose and principles of the Building Act, together with an
overview, commencement dates for various provisions and definitions. These sections
provide an important reference when reading and interpreting the Building Act.
Part 2 (and Schedules 1 and 2): This outlines matters relating to the Building Code and
building control (such as building consents), including requirements of building work,
requirements for the use of buildings, provisions for certain categories of buildings and
provisions for the safety of dams.
Part 3: This sets out the functions, duties and powers of the Chief Executive of the
Department of Building and Housing (the Department), Territorial Authorities, regional
authorities and Building Consent Authorities. It also deals with the accreditation and
registration of Building Consent Authorities, accreditation of dam owners, and product
certification.
Part 4 (and Schedule 3): This covers matters relating to the licensing and disciplining of
building practitioners
Part 5 (and Schedule 4): This describes miscellaneous matters, including offences and
criminal proceedings, implied terms of contracts, regulation-making powers, amend-
ments to other enactments and the repeal of the former Act, and the transitional provi-
sions from the former Act to the Building Act.
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Building Regulations
Building Regulations are made under and in accordance with the Building Act. A number
of regulations have been made under the Building Act. Currently there are six sets of
regulations:
1. Building Regulations 1992, made under the former Act and which include the
Building Code. These regulations have been amended by the Building (Forms) Regu-
lations 2004 so that only certain parts remain in force. These are: Schedule 1 (Building
Code), Regulations 3, Forms 16 & 17 (and as much of Regulation 4 and Schedule 2
as relate to these forms).
2. Building (Forms) Regulations 2004, as amended by the Building (Forms) Amend-
ment Regulations 2005, which prescribes forms to be used under the Building Act.
3. Building (Specified Systems, Change the Use, and Earthquake-Prone Buildings)
Regulations 2005, as amended by the Building (Specified Systems, Change the
Use, and Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Regulations 2005. This set of
regulations outline and define the following terms:
• Specified systems - the building systems that must be listed on Compliance
Schedules and are subject to specific inspection and maintenance procedures.
Schedule 1 provides the list of specified systems.
• Change the use – to determine when a change in a building’s use will require
upgrading to meet certain requirements of the Building Act. Schedule 2
determines the uses of all or parts of buildings.
• Moderate earthquake – to define a moderate earthquake in relation to a
building.
4. Building (Fee for Determinations) Regulations 2005
5. Building Levy Order 2005
6. Building (Accreditation of Building Consent Authorities) Regulations 2006
Note: these regulations can be found at www.legislation.govt.nz
The New Zealand Building Code
The Building Code is contained in the Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 1992.
The Building Code contains the mandatory provisions for all new building work.
Content
The Building Code sets out performance criteria that building work must meet. It cov-
ers aspects such as structural stability, fire safety, access, moisture control, durability,
services and facilities, and energy efficiency.  The Building Code does not prescribe
how work should be done, but states how completed building work and its components
must perform.
An advantage of a performance-based Building Code is flexibility. It contains no pre-
scriptive requirements stipulating that certain products or designs must be used. This
flexibility accommodates developments and innovation in building design, technology
and systems.
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Structure
The Building Code consists of two preliminary clauses and 35 technical clauses. Each
technical clause has three levels that describe the requirements for the clause. They are:
1. Objective The social objectives that the building must achieve.
2. Functional Requirement The functions that the building must perform in
order to meet the Objective.
3. Performance The criteria that the building must achieve. By
meeting the Performance Criteria, the Objective and
Functional Requirement can be achieved.
18.3 Compliance Paths
Compliance with the Building Code can be demonstrated using various pathways.
Understanding the New Zealand building control framework will help a building con-
sent applicant decide which path is most appropriate when designing and constructing
building work.
Figure 18.1 illustrates the hierarchy of New Zealand building controls, including the
various compliance paths. The upper pyramid portion (the Building Act and Building
Regulations) shows the mandatory building legislation that must be followed. The
remainder of the diagram shows various paths that may be used to demonstrate compli-
ance with the Building Code. Compliance with the Building Code must be demonstrated
using one or more of the paths. The applicant can choose which path(s) to follow.
With the exception of Alternative Solutions, the paths illustrated above must be
accepted by the Building Consent Authority as meeting the performance requirements
of the Building Code. These pathways are discussed below.
Compliance Documents
Compliance Documents are published by the Department and provide details for con-
struction that if followed, result in compliance with the Building Code. Compliance
Documents were previously known as Approved Documents, and were published by
the former Building Industry Authority. A design that complies with the Compliance
Documents must be accepted by a Building Consent Authority as complying with the
Building Code.
There is one Compliance Document for each of the 35 technical clauses in the Building
Code. Each Compliance Document contains at least a Verification Method or an Ac-
ceptable Solution and generally both. However, some Compliance Documents have
more than one Verification Method or Acceptable Solution. Verification Methods and
Acceptable Solutions are usually referred to by their Building Code clauses and unique
identification numbers. For example, the Acceptable Solution for Clause E2 External
Moisture is known as E2/AS1.
Verification Methods are tests or calculation methods, which prescribe one way to comply
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with the Building Code. Verification Methods can include:
• Calculation methods: using recognised analytical methods and mathematical
models.
• laboratory tests: using tests (sometimes to destruction) on prototype components
and systems.
• Tests-in-situ: which may involve examination of plans and verification by test, where
compliance with specified numbers, dimensions or locations is required (non-de-
structive tests, such as pipe pressure tests are also included).
• Acceptable Solutions are simple step-by-step instructions that prescribe one way to
comply with the Building Code.
18.4 Building Requirements for Flammable Liquids and
Gases under the HSNO Act 1996
For buildings that hold flammable substances, the Hazardous Substances and New Or-
ganisms Act 1996 (HSNO Act) has separate and additional requirements to those re-
quired by the Building Act.
Two pieces of legislation under the HSNO Act provide controls for the storage and use
of flammable substances:
• The Hazardous Substances (Classes 1 to 5) Regulations 2001; and
• The Hazardous Substances (Dangerous Goods and Scheduled Toxic Substances)
Transfer Notice 2004.
The Classes 1 to 5 Regulations are designed to prevent ignition of flammable liquids
and gases. However, they also require compliance with Schedule 10 of the Hazardous
Substances (Dangerous Goods and Scheduled Toxic Substances) Transfer Notice 2004.
Schedule 10 is primarily designed to control the adverse effects of fire should ignition
occur. It achieves this by ensuring a building holding flammable substances is built to a
certain construction, and has a corresponding safe separation from neighbours.
Flammable substances include: liquids such as petrol, solvents and paints; and gases
such as LPG and CNG. Differing requirements exist for flammable liquids and gases in
different circumstances, and reference should be made to the legislation quoted below
for details.
As a guide the safe separation distance required from a neighbour is determined by
several factors:
• The type and quantity of the flammable substances held in the building.
• The size of the containers holding the flammable substances.
• The fire resisting construction of the building.
• The usage of the neighbouring property.
Schedule 10 details four levels of fire resisting construction for buildings containing
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flammable liquids, referred to as Types A, B, C, and D.
Type A building means a building:
(a) that is:
(i) constructed to provide a platform on which one or more containers are located;
and
(ii) secured to prevent unauthorised access; and
(iii) part of a secondary containment system; and
(b) the following parts of which are made of non-combustible materials:
(i) the platform; and
(ii) the shelter roof (if any).
Type B building means a framed building that:
(a) has non-combustible cladding; and
(b) is part of a secondary containment system.
Type C building means a building that:
(a) has a fire resistance rating of 120/120/120 minutes and which is made of structur-
ally strong materials such as brick, block concrete and reinforced concrete; and
(b) has a roof made of wood and iron or equivalent products; and
(c) is part of a secondary containment system.
Type D building means a building that:
(a) has a fire resistance rating of 240/240/240 minutes and which is made of structur-
ally strong materials such as brick, block concrete and reinforced concrete; and
(b) has a reinforced concrete roof with a fire resistance rating of 240/240/240 minutes;
and
(c) is part of a secondary containment system.
Basically the less fire resistant the building structure, the larger the quantity of
flammables, the larger the pack size, and the more sensitive the neighbouring land use,
the greater the separation distance required. A set of tables specifying the separation
distances is provided in clause 30 of Schedule 10. Separation distance requirements
start at 1 metre for as little as 250 litres of flammable liquid in Type A and Type B
buildings, and can be as great as 30 metres for large quantities.
Should the building not be able to meet the required separation distance the person in
charge of the building may apply to the Environmental Risk Management Authority
(ERMA) for a waiver of the distance required. This application is made under clause 33
of Schedule 10. To qualify for a waiver additional fire protection measures will need to
be taken:
• For a reduction in the separation distance of up to 50% a vapour tight 240/240/240
fire wall will need to be constructed on the boundary of the property.
329
Regulatory Framework in New Zealand
• For a reduction greater than 50% additional measures will need to be put in place
such as sprinkler systems and /or upgrading of the building construction.
ERMA would treat each application on its merits. Granting a waiver would depend on
the building location, and the controls in place both to prevent ignition and to control
the effects of unintended ignition.
18.5 Australian/New Zealand Standards
The design of buildings and their fire safety systems is generally controlled by the Building
Consent Authority, which, under the Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions, calls up a large
number of Australian or Australian/New Zealand standards. These Standards are mostly
developed by Standards Australia, many in partnerships with Standards New Zealand.
Compliance with these standards is no longer compulsory as they form part of the Deemed-
to-Satisfy provisions and are generally not part of the Performance Requirements.
In theory, and sometimes in practice, automatic sprinklers are designed to NFPA or
Factory Mutual Standards, or fire detection systems are designed to NFPA standards.
As well, there are a number of areas where Australia and New Zealand do not have
specific standards for particular types of buildings or systems, and other standards are
used or referred to.
18.6 International Fire Engineering Guidelines
The general technical approach adopted by fire safety engineers in Australia for the
development of fire engineered Alternative Solutions under the performance-based
Building Code of Australia has been to follow the ‘Fire Safety Engineering Guide-
lines’. These were first developed by the Fire Code Reform Centre (FCRC), a not-for-
profit body previously responsible for coordinating fire research and developing tech-
nical tools, data and design methods for fire engineering throughout Australia.
More recently the ‘International Fire Engineering Guidelines’ (IFEG) were updated
and further developed jointly by the Australia Building Codes Board (ABCB), Depart-
ment of Building and Housing New Zealand, International Code Council (USA) and
National Research Council of Canada.
The IFEG document is widely used and referenced in projects as it has the endorsement
of:
• Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB), the organisation that produces the Build-
ing Code of Australia;
• Australian Institution of Building Surveyors (AIBS), representing certifiers;
• Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC), body representing fire services in
Australia and New Zealand; and
• The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) and the Institution
of Engineers Australia (IEAust).
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The International Fire Engineering Guidelines call for a consultative approach to de-
sign, close liaison as appropriate with authorities, and the development of an initial
qualitative design report before detailed analysis is undertaken. This initial report, enti-
tled the Fire Engineering Brief (FEB), has generally proved effective in obtaining early
identification of all key issues and effective communication and negotiation on design
and approval issues.
Whilst much of the IFEG document is universal in its approach to facilitation of the
whole fire engineering process, it has a separate Part 0 for each of Australia, Canada,
USA and New Zealand to provide an insight into the regulatory and other processes






 α fire intensity coefficient MW/s2
 αh horizontal openings ratio –
 αv vertical openings ratio –
 β charring rate mm/min
 ε emissivity –
 λ thermal conductivity W/m.K
 ρ density kg/m3
 ρo density of ambient air kg/m
3
 ρs density of smoke kg/m
3
 σ Stefan-Boltzmann constant kW/m2.K4
 Φ configuration factor –
 φ strength reduction factor –
 A cross section area of beam m2, mm2
 Ad door area m
2
 Ae area of enclosing rectangle m
2
 Af floor area m
2
 Ah area of horizontal roof openings m
2
 Al area for leakage at a door m
2
 Ao area of openings within enclosing rectangle m
2
 At area of total bounding surfaces (wall+floor+ceiling) m
2
 Av area of vertical window and door openings m
2
 a depth of compression stress block in concrete mm
 B width of boundary layer m
 B breadth of burned area m
 b breadth of beam mm
 Symbol Description Units
Note that units for some symbols may vary in the text; for example, heat release rate
may be in MW, kW or W, depending on the specific circumstances.
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 bv vertical openings correction factor –
 C flow coefficient –
 Cw pressure co-efficient –
 c specific heat J/kg.K
 cv cover to reinforcing steel mm
 D distance from the flame front m
 D distance of door knob m
 Db bar diameter mm
 D distance of notional radiator from window m
 Do occupant density persons/m
2
 d thickness of insulation m
 d depth of beam mm
 df flame depth m
′′e f fire load energy density (per square metre of floor) MJ/m2
′′et fire load energy density (per m
2 of bounding surfaces) MJ/m2
 F door opening force N
 Fa actual flow persons/min
 Fdc force to overcome door closer N
 Ff facade factor –
 Fs specific flow persons/min/m
′fc characteristic strength of concrete MPa
 fy yield stress MPa
 G length of going on stairs m
 g acceleration of gravity m/s2
 H height of firecell m
 Hp heated perimeter of steel section m
 Hr height of enclosing rectangle m
 ∆Hc heat of combustion kJ/kg
 h height of window opening m
 h overall height of beam mm
 Symbol Description Units
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 ha nett calorific value of fuel at ambient moisture content MJ/kg
 hi ignition energy kJ/kg
 hn nett calorific value of fuel when oven dry MJ/kg
 j depth ration in concrete beam –
 k fire growth constant s(MW).1/2
 ko discharge coefficient –
 k1 radiation reduction factor –
 kc proportion of fuel available to burn –
 kh factor for height of building –
 ks factor for sprinklers and columns –
 kt travel speed factor –
 ky,T strength reduction factor for steel –
 L length of burned area m
 L span of beam m
 L flame length m
 Lf length of firecell m
 Lt length of travel m
 Mn bending strength kNm
 Mnf bending strength during fire kNm
 Mpos nominal positive moment capacity kNm
Mcold
* bending moment kNm
M fire
* bending moment during fire kNm
Mss
* simply supported bending moment kNm
φMsx design section moment capacity kNm
 m mass of fuel kg
ṁ rate of burning kg/s
˙ ′′m mass of fuel available for consumption kg/m
2, metric
tonnes/hectare
 mc moisture content as percentage by weight %
 md moisture content as percentage of oven dry weight %
ṁs rate of production of smoke kg/s
 Symbol Description Units
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 N number of storeys in a building (integer)
 No number of occupants (integer)
 P flame projection from window m
 Pw wind pressure Pa
 p water pressure kPa
 ∆P pressure difference Pa
 p perimeter of fire m
˙′′q radiation intensity or heat flux kW/m2
˙′′q f heat release rate per square metre of floor area MW/m2
˙′′qR radiant heat intensity kW/m
2
˙′′qRm minimum ignition value of radiant heat intensity kW/m
2
 Q total energy available in fuel MJ
 Q flow through an orifice L/min
 Q live load kN/m
˙ ′Q f fire intensity kW/m
Q̇ rate of heat release MW
Q̇e equivalent rate of heat release MW
Q̇ fo heat release rate at flashover MW
Qm Maximum heat release rate MW
Qp Peak heat release rate MW
Q̇v ventilation-controlled heat release rate MW
 Qw cooling power of water MW/(L/s)
 R distance between radiating and emitting surfaces m
 R height of stair riser m
 r radius mm
 rf load ratio on steel member –
 S speed of travel m/min
 T temperature ˚C
′T temperature K
′Tf flame temperature K
 Symbol Description Units
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′To ambient temperature K
 T1 limiting steel temperature ˚C
 Te temperature of emitting surface (firecell temperature) ˚C
 To ambient temperature ˚C
 Tr temperature of receiving surface ˚C
 t time min, seconds,
hours
 ta time from detection until an alarm is sounded min
 tb duration of burning min
 td time from ignition until detection of the fire min
 te equivalent fire severity min
 tev evacuation time min
 ted design fire severity min
 ti time for investigating the fire min
 tlt time for conditions to become life threatening min
 tm time for all the fuel to be burned s
 to time for occupants to respond to alarm min
 tq time for queuing min
 tr fire resistance period for structural element min
 ts safety margin min
 tts time to pass through a stairway or door min
 tt travel time min
 t1 time to reach peak burning rate s
 t2 time at end of steady burning s
 v wind velocity m/s
vf rate of spread m/s, m/h
 Vf volumetric air flow m
3/s
 Vw water flow L/s
 ωc design load kN/m, kPa
 ωf fire design load kN/m, kPa
 ωG dead load kN/m, kPa
 Symbol Description Units
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 ωL live load kN/m, kPa
 W width of door m
 We effective width of door or stair m
 Wf width of firecell m
 Wr width of enclosing rectangle m
 w width of window opening m
 wf ventilation factor –
 x height ratio –
 Y distance between floor and smoke layer m
 y width ratio –
 z flame height above soffit m
 Z elastic modulus of beam mm3
 Zfire section modulus during fire mm
3






Tables B1 and B2 give heat release rates from selected experimental tests on typical
items of furniture and warehouse goods carried out at NIST (NFPA, 1993).
















15 Metal wardrobe, 41.4 kg (total) 50 10 0.75 
18 Chair F33 (trial love seat), 39.2 kg 400 140 0.95 
19 Chair F21, 28.2 kg (initial) 175 110 0.35 
19 Chair F21, 28.2 kg (later) 50 190 2.0 
21 Metal wardrobe, 40.8 kg (total) (initial) 250 10 0.25 
21 Metal wardrobe, 40.8 kg (total) (average) 120 60 0.25 
21 Metal wardrobe, 40.8 kg (total) (later) 100 30 0.14 
22 Chair F24, 28.3 kg 350 400 0.70 
23 Chair F23, 31.2 kg 400 100 0.70 
24 Chair F22, 31.9 kg 2000 150 0.30 
25 Chair F26, 19.2 kg 200 90 0.80 
26 Chair F27, 29.0 kg 200 360 0.90 
27 Chair F29, 14.0 kg 100 70 1.85 
28 Chair F28, 29.2 kg 425 90 0.70 
29 Chair F25, 27.8 kg (initial) 100 100 2.0 
29 Chair F25, 27.8 kg (later) 60 175 0.70 
30 Chair F30, 25.2 kg 60 70 0.95 
31 Chair F31 (love seat), 39.6 kg 60 145 2.6 
37 Chair F31 (love seat), 40.4 kg 80 100 2.75 
38 Chair F32 (sofa), 51.5 kg 100 50 3.0 
39 12mm plywood wardrobe with fabrics, 68.5 kg 35 20 3.25 
40 12mm plywood wardrobe with fabrics, 68.3 kg 35 40 3.50 
41 3mm plywood wardrobe with fabrics, 36.0 kg 40 40 6.0 
42 3mm plywood wardrobe with fire-retardant interior finish (later 
growth) 
30 100 5.0 
43 Repeat of 12mm plywood wardrobe, 67.6 kg 30 50 3.0 
44 3mm plywood wardrobe with fire-retardant latex paint, 37.3 kg 90 30 2.9 
45 Chair F21, 28.3 kg 100 120 2.1 
46 Chair F21, 28.3 kg 45 130 2.6 
47 Chair, adj. back metal frame, foam cushions, 20.8 kg 170 30 0.25 
48 Easy chair C07, 11.5 kg 175 90 0.95 
49 Easy chair F34, 15.7 kg 200 50 0.20 
50 Chair, metal frame, minimum cushion, 16.5 kg 200 120 3.0  
51 Chair, moulded fibreglass, no cushion, 5.3 kg 120 20 0.35 
52 Moulded plastic patient chair, 11.3 kg 275 2090 0.70 
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Table B1 (cont’d): Furniture heat release rate data obtained
 from furniture calorimeter tests
Test 
No. 












53 Chair, metal frame, padded seat and back, 15.5 kg 350 50 0.28 
54 Love seat, metal frame, foam cushions, 27.3 kg 500 210 0.30 
56 Chair, wood frame, latex foam cushions, 11.2 kg 500 50 0.08 
57 Love seat, wood frame, foam cushions, 54.6 kg 350 500 1.0 
61 Wardrobe, 3/4-in. particle board, 120 kg 150 0 1.2 
62 Bookcase, plywood with aluminium frame, 30.4 kg 65 40 0.03 
64 Easy chair, moulded flexible urethane frame, 16.0 kg 1000 750 0.45 
66 Easy chair, 23.0 kg 76 3700 0.6 
67 Mattress and box-spring, 62.4 kg (initial) 1100 90 0.4 
67 Mattress and box-spring, 62.4 kg (later) 350 400 0.5 
Note:  The virtual time tv  is the time after ignition at which the burning item began to follow the t2 fire. Prior to  
tv  the item may have smouldered but did not burn vigorously with an open flame. 
Reference: NFPA, 1993. National Fire Alarm Code Handbook, National Fire
Protection Association, Boston, USA.
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Table B2: Heat release rate data for warehouse goods obtained from furniture
calorimeter tests







1.  Wood pallets, stack, 0.45m high (6%-12% moisture) 150-310 1.2 
2.  Wood pallets, stack, 1.5m high (6%-12% moisture) 90-190 3.7 
3.  Wood pallets, stack, 3m high (6%-12% moisture) 80-110 6.8 
4.  Wood pallets, stack, 4.6m high (6%-12% moisture) 75-105 10.2 
5.  Mail bags, filled, stored 1.5m high 190 0.4 
6.  Cartons, compartmented, stacked 3m high 60 2.3 
7.  Paper, vertical rolls, stacked 6m high 15-28  
8.  Cotton (also PE, PE/cot, acrylic/nylon/PE),  20-42  
9.  Cartons on pallets, rack storage, 5-10m high 40-280  
10.  Paper products, densely packed in cartons,  rack storage, 6m high  470  
11.  PE letter trays, filled, stacked 1.5m high on cart 190 8.5 
12.  PE trash barrels in cartons, stacked 4.6m high 55 2.8 
13.  FRP shower stalls in cartons, stacked 4.6m high 85 1.2 
14.  PE bottles, packed in item 6 85 6.2 
15.  PE bottles in cartons, stacked 4.6m high 75 1.9 
16.  PE pallets, stacked 1m high 130  
17.  PE pallets, stacked 2-3m high 30-55  
18.  PU mattress, single, horizontal 110  
19.  PE insulation board, rigid foam, stacked 4.6m high 8 1.9 
20.  PS jars, packed in item 6 55 13.6 
21.  PS tubs nested in cartons, stacked 4.3m high 105 5.1 
22.  PS toy parts in cartons, stacked 4.6m high 110 2.0 
23.  PS insulation board, rigid, stacked 4.3m high 7 3.3 
24.  PVC bottles, packed in item 6 9 3.4 
25.  PP tubs, packed in item 6 10 4.4 
26.  PP and PE film in rolls, stacked 4.3m high 40 4.0 
27.  Distilled spirits in barrels, stacked 6m high 23-40  
28.  Methyl alcohol  0.74 
29.  Gasoline  2.3 
30.  Kerosene  2.3 
31.  Diesel oil  2.0 
Notes: The peak heat release rate per unit floor area are for fully involved combustibles, assuming 100% 
combustion efficiency. 
 PE = polyethylene  PS = polystyrene  PVC = polyvinyl chloride   
PP = polypropylene PU = polyurethane FRP = fibreglass reinforced polyester 
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1
Appendix C
Fire Load Energy Densities
This Appendix is extracted from “Design Guide - Structural Fire Safety: Report of CIB
W14 Workshop” (Fire Safety Journal, Vol 10, No 2, 1986, pp 77-137). The table gives
average fire load densities using data from Switzerland.
The following values for fire load densities (only variable fire load densities) are taken
from Beilage 1: Brandschutztechnische Merkmale verschiedener Nutzungen und
Lagerguter and are defined as density per unit floor area (MJ/m2).
Note that for the determination of the variable fire load of storage areas, the values given
in the following table have to be multiplied by the height of storage in metres. Areas and
aisles for transportation have been taken into consideration in an averaging manner.
The values are based on a large investigation carried out during the years 1967-1969 by
a staff of 10-20 students under the guidance of the Swiss Fire Prevention Association
for Industry and Trade (Brandverhutungsdienst fur Industrie und Gewerbe,
Nuschelerstrasse 45, CH-8001 Zurich), with the financial support of the governmental
civil defence organisation.
For each type of occupancy, storage and/or building, a minimum of 10-15 samples
were analysed; normally, 20 or more samples were available. All values given in the
following pages are average values. Unfortunately, it has been impossible to obtain the
basic data sheets of this investigation. In order to estimate the corresponding standard
deviations and the 80%-90%- and 95%-fractile values, the data from this source were
compared with data given in references 1-5, 7-11 from the original journal publication.
This comparison results in the following suggestions:
(a) For well-defined occupancies which are rather similar or with very limited differ-
ences in furniture and stored goods, e.g. dwellings, hotels, hospitals, offices and
schools, the following estimates may suffice:
Coefficient of variation =  30%-50% of the given average value
90%-fractile value =  (1.35-1.65) x average value
80%-fractile value =  (1.25-1.50) x average value
isolated peak values =  2 x average value
(b) For occupancies which are dissimilar or with larger differences in furniture and
stored goods, e.g. shopping centres, department stores and industrial occupancies,
the following estimates are tentatively suggested:
Coefficient of variation =  50%-80% of the given average value
90%-fractile value =  (1.65-2.0) x average value
80%-fractile value =  (1.45-1.75) x average value
isolated peak values =  2.5 x average value
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Academy 300
Accumulator forwarding 800
Accumulator manufacturing 400 800
Acetylene cylinder storage 700
Acid plant 80
Adhesive manufacturing 1000 3400
Administration 800














Artificial flower manufacturing 300 200
Artificial leather manufacturing 1000 1700
Artificial leather processing 300
Artificial silk manufacturing 300 1100
Artificial silk processing 210
Artificial stone manufacturing 40
Asylum 400
Authority office 800
Awning manufacturing 300 1000
Bag manufacturing (jute, paper, plastic) 500
Bakery 200
Bakery, sales 300




Barrel manufacturing, wood 1000 800
Basement, dwellings 900
Basketware manufacturing 300 200
Bed sheeting production 500 1000
Bedding plant 600
Bedding shop 500
Beer manufacturing (brewery) 80
Beverage manufacturing, nonalcoholic 80
Bicycle assembly 200 400
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Biscuit factories 200
Biscuit manufacturing 200
Bitumen preparation 800 3400







Box manufacturing 1000 600
Brick plant, burning 40
Brick plant, clay preparation 40
Brick plant, drying kilnwith metal grates 40
Brick plant, drying kiln with wooden grates 1000
Brick plant, drying room with metal grates 40
Brick plant, drying room with wooden grates 400
Brick plant, pressing 200
Briquette factories 1600
Broom manufacturing 700 400
Brush manufacturing 700 800
Butter manufacturing 700 4000
Cabinet making (without woodyard) 600
Cable manufacturing 300 600
Cafe 400
Camera manufacturing 300
Candle manufacturing 1300 22400
Candy manufacturing 400 1500
Candy packing 800
Candy shop 400
Cane products manufacturing 400 200
Canteen 300
Car accessory sales 300
Car assembly plant 300
Car body repairing 150
Car paint shop 500
Car repair shop 300
Car seat cover shop 700
Cardboard box manufacturing 800 2500
Cardboard manufacturing 300 4200
Cardboard products manufacturing 800 2500
Carpenter shed 700
Carpet dyeing 500
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Cast iron foundry 400 800
Celluloid manufacturing 800 3400
Cement manufacturing 1000
Cement plant 40
Cement products manufacturing 80
Cheese factory 120
Cheese manufacturing (in boxes) 170
Cheese store 100






Chocolate factory, intermediate storage 6000
Chocolate factory, packing 500
Chocolate factory, tumbling treatment 1000
Chocolate factory, all other specialities 500
Church 200




Cloakroom, metal wardrobe 80















Cooking stove manufacturing 600
Coopering 600
Cordage plant 300 600
Cordage store 500
Cork products manufacturing 500 800
Cosmetic manufacturing 300 500
Cotton mills 1200
Cotton wool manufacturing 300
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Cover manufacturing 500
Cutlery manufacturing (household) 200
Cutting-up shop, leather, artificial leather 300
Cutting-up shop, textiles 500
Cutting-up shop, wood 700
Dairy 200
Data processing 400
Decoration studio 1200 2000
Dental surgeon’s laboratory 300
Dentist’s office 200
Department store 400
Distilling plant, combustible materials 200
Distilling plant, incombustible materials 50
Doctor’s office 200




Dry-cell battery 400 600
Dry cleaning 300
Dyeing plant 500
Edible fat forwarding 900
Edible fat manufacturing 1000 18900
Electric appliance manufacturing 400
Electric appliance repair 500
Electric motor manufacturing 300
Electrical repair shop 600
Electrical supply storage H< 3 m 1200
Electro industry 600
Electronic device manufacturing 400
Electronic device repair 500
Embroidery 300
Etching plant glass/metal 200
Exhibition hall, cars including decoration 200
Exhibition hall, furniture including decoration 500




Fertiliser manufacturing 200 200
Filling plant/barrels
liquid filled and/or barrels incombustible <200
liquid filled and/or barrels combustible:
   Risk Class I >3400
346
Fire Engineering Design Guide
Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
   Risk Class II >3400
   Risk Class III >3400
   Risk Class IV >3400
   Risk Class V
   (if higher, take into consideration combustibility
   of barrels) >1700
Filling plant/small casks:
liquid filled and casks incombustible <200
liquid filled and/or casks combustible:
   Risk Class I <500
   Risk Class II <500
   Risk Class III <500
   Risk Class IV <500
   Risk Class V
   (if higher, take into consideration combustibility
   of casks) <500
Finishing plant, paper 500
Finishing plant, textile 300
Fireworks manufacturing Spez 2000
Flat 300
Floor covering manufacturing 500 6000
Floor covering store 1000
Flooring plaster manufacturing 600
Flour products 800
Flower sales 80
Fluorescent tube manufacturing 300
Foamed plastics fabrication 3000 2500




Forwarding, appliances partly made of plastic 700
Forwarding, beverage 300




Forwarding, plastic products 1000
Forwarding, printed matters 1700
Forwarding, textiles 600
Forwarding, tinware 200
Forwarding, varnish, polish 1300





Furniture manufacturing (wood) 600
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Gold plating (of metals) 800 3400
Goldsmith’s workshop 200










Heating equipment room, wood or coal-firing 300
Heat sealing of plastics 800
High-rise office building 800
Homes 500
Homes for aged 400
Hosiery manufacturing 300 1000
Hospital 300
Hotel 300
Household appliances, manufacturing 300 200
Household appliances, sales 300
Ice cream plant (including packaging) 100
Incandescent lamp plant 40
Injection moulded parts manufacturing (metal) 80
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Joiners (machine room) 500
Joiners (workbench) 700
Jute, weaving 400 1300
Laboratory, bacteriological 200
Laboratory, chemical 500




Lacquer manufacturing 500 2500
Large metal constructions 80
Lathe shop 600
Laundry 200
Leather goods sales 700
Leather product manufacturing 500
Leather, tanning, dressing, etc 400
Library 2000 2000
Lingerie manufacturing 400
Liqueur manufacturing 400 800
Liquor manufacturing 500 800
Liquor store 700
Loading ramp, including goods (rough average) 800
Lumber room for miscellaneous goods 500
Machinery manufacturing 200
Match plant 300 800
Mattress manufacturing 500 500
Meat shop 50
Mechanical workshop 200
Metal goods manufacturing 200
Metal grinding 80
Metal working (general) 200
Milk, condensed, evaporated manufacturing 200 9000
Milk, powdered, manufacturing 200 10500
Milling work, metal 200
Mirror manufacturing 100
Motion picture studio 300
Motorcycle assembly 300
Museum 300
Musical instrument sales 281
News stand 1300
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Office, engineering 600
Office furniture 700
Office, machinery manufacturing 300
Office machine sales 300
Oilcloth manufacturing 700 1300
Oilcloth processing 700 2100
Optical instrument manufacturing 200 200
Packing, food 800
Packing, incombustible goods 400
Packing material, industry 1600 3000
Packing, printed matters 1700
Packing, textiles 600
Packing, all other combustible goods 600
Paint and varnish, manufacturing 4200
Paint and varnish, mixing plant 2000
Paint and varnish shop 1000
Painter’s workshop 500
Pain shop (cars, machines, etc) 200
Paint shop (furniture, etc) 400
Paper manufacturing 200 10000
Paper processing 800 1100
Parking building 200
Parquetry manufacturing 2000 1200
Perambulator manufacturing 300 800
Perambulator shop 300
Perfume sale 400
Pharmaceutical manufacturing 300 800
Pharmaceuticals, packing 300 800




Picture frame manufacturing 300
Plaster product manufacturing 80
Plastic floor tile manufacturing 800
Plastic manufacturing 2000 5900
Plastic processing 600
Plastic products fabrication 600
Plumber’s workshop 100
Plywood manufacturing 800 2900
Polish manufacturing 1700
Post office 400
Potato, flaked, manufacturing 200
Pottery plant 200
Power station 600
Precious stone, cutting etc 80
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Precision instrument manufacturing
   containing plastic parts 200
   without plastic parts 100
Precision mechanics plant 200
Pressing, metal 100
Pressing, plastics, leather, etc 400
Preparation briquette production
Printing, composing room 300
Printing, ink manufacturing 700 3000
Printing, machine hall 400
Printing office 1000
Radio and TV manufacturing 400
Radio and TV sales 500
Radio studio 300
Railway car manufacturing 200
Railway station 800
Railway workshop 800
Record player manufacturing 300 200
Record repository, documents see also storage 4200
Refrigerator manufacturing 1000 300
Relay manufacturing 400
Repair shop, general 400
Restaurant 300
Retouching department 300
Rubber goods manufacturing 600 5000
Rubber goods store 800
Rubber processing 600 5000
Saddlery manufacturing 300
Safe manufacturing 80
Salad oil forwarding 900
Salad oil manufacturing 1000 18900





Sewing machine manufacturing 300
Sewing machine store 300
Sheet manufacturing 100
Shoe factory, forwarding 600
Shoe factory, manufacturing 500
Shoe polish manufacturing 800 2100
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
Silk spinning (natural silk) 300
Silk weaving (natural silk) 300
Silverwares 400
Ski manufacturing 400 1700
Slaughter house 40




Spinning mill, excluding garnetting 300
Sporting goods store 800
Spray painting, metal goods 300
Spray painting, wood products 500
Stationery store 700
Steel furniture manufacturing 300
Stereotype plate manufacturing 200
Stone masonry 40
Storeroom (workshop storerooms etc) 1200
Synthetic fibre manufacturing 400
Synthetic fibre processing 400
Synthetic resin manufacturing 3400 4200
Tar-coated paper manufacturing 1700
Tar preparation 800
Telephone apparatus manufacturing 400 200
Telephone exchange 80
Telephone exchange manufacturing 100
Test room, electric appliances 200
Test room, machinery 100
Test room, textiles 300
Theatre 300
Tin can manufacturing 100
Tinned goods manufacturing 40
Tinware manufacturing 120
Tire manufacturing 700 1800
Tobacco products manufacturing 200 2100
Tobacco shop 500
Tool manufacturing 200
Toy manufacturing (combustible) 100






Turnery (wood working) 500
Turning section 200
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Type of Occupancies Fabrication (MJ/m2) Storage (MJ/m2/m)
TV studio 300
Twisting shop 250
Umbrella manufacturing 300 400
Umbrellas store 300
Underground garage, private >200





Vegetable, dehydrating 1000 400
Vehicle manufacturing, assembly 400
Veneering 500 2900
Veneer manufacturing 800 4200
Vinegar manufacturing 80 100
Vulcanising plant (without storage) 1000
Waffle manufacturing 300 1700
Warping department 250
Washing agent manufacturing 300 200
Washing machine manufacturing 300 40
Watch assembling 300 40
Watch mechanism manufacturing 40
Watch repair shop 300
Watch sales 300
Water closets ~0
Wax products forwarding 2100
Wax products manufacturing 1300 2100
Weaving mill (without carpets) 300
Welding shop (metal) 80
Winding room 400
Winding, textile fibres 600
Window glass manufacturing 700
Window manufacturing (wood) 800
Wine cellar 20




Wood drying plant 800
Wood grinding 200
Wood pattern making shop 600
Wood preserving plant 3000
Youth hostel 300
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Appendix D
Section Factors for Steel Beams
This appendix provides section factors for standard hot-rolled Australian Universal
Beams.
These tables give the dimensions and weight of each beam, but not the structural sec-
tion properties which must be obtained from standard section property tables. The sec-
tion factors have been calculated assuming that all sections are made from rectangular
components, with no allowance for tapered flanges and root radii, and assuming that
the protective insulation is in contact with the steel.
The tables do not include hollow sections, angles and channels. Section factors for
these, and other sizes and shapes, can be easily calculated or can be obtained from
manufacturer’s literature.
The numbers in these tables have been obtained from The Heavy Engineering Research
Association of New Zealand (HERA). The Australian Universal Beam data is from the
“BHP Hot Rolled and Structural Steel Products” catalogue from BHP Steel, 1998.





Figure D1: Geometry of hot rolled section
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Note that for any section, the ratio of heated surface area to mass (m2/tonne) can be
obtained by dividing the Hp/A ratio by the density of steel (7.85 tonne/m
3).
Australian Universal Beams
and Universal Columns Section factor
Contour Hollow






Flange       Web








kg/m mm mm mm mm m-1 mm m-1 mm m-1 mm m-1 mm
610 UB 125 612 229 19.6 11.9 118 8.5 132 7.6 91 11.0 105 9.5
610 UB 113 607 228 17.3 11.2 129 7.7 145 6.9 99 10.1 115 8.7
610 UB 101 602 228 14.8 10.6 144 7.0 161 6.2 110 9.1 128 7.8
530 UB 92.4 533 209 15.6 10.2 142 7.1 159 6.3 108 9.3 126 8.0
530 UB 82.0 528 209 13.2 9.6 158 6.3 178 5.6 120 8.3 140 7.1
460 UB 82.1 460 191 16.0 9.9 140 7.1 158 6.3 106 9.5 124 8.1
460 UB 74.6 457 190 14.5 9.1 154 6.5 174 5.7 116 8.6 136 7.4
460 UB 67.1 454 190 12.7 8.5 170 5.9 192 5.2 128 7.8 150 6.7
410 UB 59.7 406 178 12.8 7.8 174 5.7 197 5.1 130 7.7 153 6.5
410 UB 53.7 403 178 10.9 7.6 192 5.2 218 4.6 143 7.0 169 5.9
360 UB 56.7 359 172 13.0 8.0 168 5.9 192 5.2 123 8.1 147 6.8
360 UB 50.7 356 171 11.5 7.3 187 5.3 214 4.7 136 7.3 163 6.1
360 UB 44.7 352 171 9.7 6.9 210 4.8 240 4.2 153 6.5 183 5.5
310 UB 46.2 307 166 11.8 6.7 185 5.4 213 4.7 132 7.6 160 6.3
310 UB 40.4 304 165 10.2 6.1 209 4.8 241 4.1 148 6.7 180 5.6
310 UB 32.0 298 149 8.0 5.5 253 4.0 289 3.5 183 5.5 219 4.6
250 UB 37.3 256 146 10.9 6.4 197 5.1 228 4.4 139 7.2 169 5.9
250 UB 31.4 252 146 8.6 6.1 232 4.3 268 3.7 162 6.2 199 5.0
250 UB 25.7 248 124 8.0 5.0 262 3.8 300 3.3 190 5.3 228 4.4
200 UB 29.8 207 134 9.6 6.3 210 4.8 245 4.1 143 7.0 179 5.6
200 UB 25.4 203 133 7.8 5.8 246 4.1 287 3.5 167 6.0 208 4.8
200 UB 22.3 202 133 7.0 5.0 276 3.6 323 3.1 187 5.3 233 4.3
200 UB 18.2 198 99 7.0 4.5 295 3.4 338 3.0 213 4.7 256 3.9
180 UB 22.2 179 90 10.0 6.0 218 4.6 250 4.0 159 6.3 191 5.2
180 UB 18.1 175 90 8.0 5.0 265 3.8 304 3.3 191 5.2 230 4.3
180 UB 16.1 173 90 7.0 4.5 298 3.4 342 2.9 214 4.7 258 3.9
150 UB 18.0 155 75 9.5 6.0 227 4.4 260 3.8 167 6.0 200 5.0
150 UB 14.0 150 75 7.0 5.0 289 3.5 331 3.0 211 4.7 253 4.0
310 UC 158 327 311 25.0 15.7 77 12.9 93 10.8 48 20.8 63 15.8
310 UC 137 321 309 21.7 13.8 88 11.4 106 9.5 54 18.4 72 13.9
310 UC 118 315 307 18.7 11.9 102 9.8 122 8.2 62 16.0 83 12.1
310 UC 96.8 308 305 15.4 9.9 122 8.2 146 6.8 74 13.5 99 10.1
250 UC 89.5 260 256 17.3 10.5 111 9.0 134 7.5 68 14.7 91 11.0
250 UC 72.9 254 254 14.2 8.6 134 7.4 162 6.2 82 12.2 109 9.2
200 UC 59.5 210 205 14.2 9.3 133 7.5 160 6.2 82 12.2 109 9.2
200 UC 52.2 206 204 12.5 8.0 151 6.6 182 5.5 92 10.8 123 8.1
200 UC 46.2 203 203 11.0 7.3 170 5.9 204 4.9 103 9.7 138 7.3
150 UC 37.2 162 154 11.5 8.1 163 6.1 195 5.1 101 9.9 134 7.5
150 UC 30.0 158 153 9.4 6.6 197 5.1 237 4.2 122 8.2 161 6.2
150 UC 23.4 152 152 6.8 6.1 251 4.0 302 3.3 153 6.5 204 4.9
100 UC 14.8 97 99 7.0 5.0 254 3.9 307 3.3 155 6.5 207 4.8













Items in bold type indicate a definition of the term is given
4 Rs  300
500˚C Isotherm Method  83
A
absorptivity  117
acceptable performance  15
acceptable solution  2, 3
Accessory Fuel Moisture System  296
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensa-
tion Insurance Act  7
accidental ignition  26
activation time  49
advanced calculation methods  88
aerosol  26, 129, 134
air
changes per hour  175
conditioning  110, 127, 184
handling  206
leakage  194
Alarm Verification Facility (AVF)  49
ALARP  20
alerting devices  127
alternative designs  2
alternative solutions  3
analogue addressable  139, 140, 212
antifreeze systems  154, 160
apartment buildings  269
applied loads  62
argon  163
AS 1530  65, 66, 102
AS 1603  133, 137, 139
AS 1670  128, 129, 133, 137, 139, 169,
207, 271
AS 1720  88
AS 1851  128, 166, 214, 318
AS 2118  145, 154, 207, 260, 264
AS 2419  162, 258, 260
AS 2441  166
AS 3786  137, 271
AS 4100  75
AS 4214  163
AS 4428  128, 169, 203
AS 60849  169
AS 7240  128, 133, 139
AS/NZS 1170  69
AS/NZS 1221  161
AS/NZS 1668  183, 203
AS/NZS 4360  19, 22
ASFP  69
asphyxia  225
aspirating smoke detector  131, 135
ASTM E119  66
atriums  144
attic sprinklers  153
Australian Building Codes Board
(ABCB)  314
Australian Fire Brigade Acts  248
Australian/New Zealand Standards  329
Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ)
160, 257
automatic door closers  275
Available Safe Egress Time (ASET)
107
axial restraint  83
B
back burning  301
backdraft  34
backfire  291
backup power  207
Ballantynes fire  1
ball-bearing model  239
barometric dampers  199
battery powered alarms  271
356
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Bernoulli’s equation  54
blankets  270
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding
Vapour Explosion)  156
boundaries  116
boundary layer width  224
boundary walls  61
BRANZ  67
BRANZFIRE  237
BS 3251  250
BS 476  66
BS 5839  129
building
characteristics  12
control system  2
design consideration  5
facade  112




surveyors  314, 316
Building Act  2, 321-324
Building Code of Australia  3
Building Consent Authority  3
Building Control Authority  202
Building Industry Authority  2
Building Warrant of Fitness  5, 26
BuildingEXODUS 240
Buildup Index  297
buoyancy  174, 237
burning
objects  43
rate  107, 114, 237
burnout  39
bushfires  281, 315
C
Canadian Forest Fire Danger Rating
System  297
carbon dioxide  32, 129, 162, 163, 227,
290
carbon monoxide  32, 35, 129, 225
carpets  274
CCFM code  242
ceiling voids  103
cellulose  290
Certificate of Occupancy  319
Certified Building Surveyor  10
Certified Coating Inspector  79
CESARE-RISK  240
CFAST  237
chain of fire suppression  301
chain reaction  29
charring  62
chemical agents  163
Chief Fire Officer  248, 265
Civil Defence and Emergency Manage-
ment Act  299
cladding materials  113
code compliance  161
combustion  29, 30
factor  55
products  38, 48
communication and consultation  22
compartment  34, 36, 53, 101, 185
complete burnout  104
compliance  2
Compliance Document  3, 4, 54, 59, 70,
326
Compliance Schedule (New Zealand)
5, 202, 205, 208
compressive forces  62, 63, 64, 72
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
models  237
computer modelling  9, 17, 31, 37, 41,
48, 235
concealed
spaces 53, 102, 109, 111
sprinklers  150
conduction  16, 29, 69
conductivity factor (C factor)  148
configuration factor  117
conflagrations  122
constant burning  45
construction  2, 17
materials - conversion factor  58
357
Index
control mode specific application
(CSMA)  151
control versus suppression  149
convection  16, 29, 69
conventional fire detection  140
cooking  270
cool lower layer  237
cooling
efficiency  254
power of water  254
Coordinated Incident Management
System (CIMS)  302
corridor sprinklers  153
corrosion  256, 260
cotton  274
CRISP  240
crown fire  292, 293, 295
crystallisation  92
CSIRO  67




damage to buildings, minimising  14
dampers  207
Darcy-Weisbach method  159
dead load  61, 69
decay stage  38
Deemed-to-Satisfy  4, 315
defensible space  304
deflections  62
deluge systems  155




fire load  53
fires  38, 41, 46, 178, 236
detection
system  155
time lag  178
zones  127
detector activation  43
deterministic models  236
DIANA  238
diffusion  130
Disability Discrimination Act (DDA)
314
disabled people  197
discharge coefficient  153
distribution patterns  149
domestic
(residential) alarms  136
smoke alarms  270
sprinkler systems  159
doors  17, 110, 197, 275
opening forces  197
drencher systems  115, 156
Drought Code (DC)  297
dry
chemical system  165
pipe sprinkler  154
powder  165, 166
sprinklers  152
drywall systems  92
duct smoke detector housings  139
dust explosion  24-25
E
Early Fire Hazard Test  102
Early Suppression Fast Response
(ESFR) sprinklers  151
earthquake  17, 256, 259, 321
education  300
effective openings  60
egress  13
egress design  229
electrical flush boxes  109
ember transport  291
Emergency Control Panels (ECPs)  167
Emergency Intercommunication  168
emergency lighting  5, 206, 207
emergency power supply  214
Emergency Warning and Intercommu-
nication System (EWIS)  166, 228
358
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emissivity  115, 117
EN 12106  197, 200
EN 54-11  137
entrained air  237
entrainment  33, 174, 176
equivalent
fire severity  57, 65





Essential Services Legislation (Aus-
tralia)  6, 209
Eurocode 1  59, 96
Eurocode 3  70, 74
Eurocode 5  89
EVACNET  240
evacuation  127






expansion ratio of water  255
extended coverage sprinklers  131, 151
exterior windows  111, 113
extra light hazard  158
F
F7/AS1  137
fabric flammability  277
facade  113, 119
factor  119
Factory Mutual Standards  7
failure modes  17
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)  23
false activation  127, 140, 141, 142, 212,
222
fans  207
Fast fires  43
Fast Response  149
fast response sprinkler 131
fatalities  269
fault tree analysis  23, 24, 26, 27
fibreboard  275
field models  236, 237
Fine Fuel Moisture Code (FFMC)  297
finite element analysis  238
fire
alarm  5, 128
appliances  248






detection systems  24, 127
development  29, 30
districts  260
door  5, 67
duration  54
engineering brief  15
engineering design  1, 2
environment  286
environment triangle  287
exposure  39
extinguishers  165, 273
growth  12, 17, 41
growth models  235, 237
growth stage  32, 33
hazard  158
hose reels  5, 166, 254, 260, 265, 273
hydrant  258, 248, 258
initiation  30
intensity  281
intensity coefficient  45
investigation  1
load  17, 41, 53
management  281, 299
model  68




resistance  38, 39, 53, 64, 276
resistance level  64
resistance rating  64, 103, 251
resistance test  42
resisting construction  7
retardant  274
risk  257
safety education  276
sealing  7
separations  104, 108
service  120
service access  2486
service inlet  259
service operations  14, 247
severity  53, 57
spread  13, 48, 101, 116, 122
suppression  298
suppression operations  248
temperatures  54
tests, large-scale  15
triangle  29
Fire Behaviour Prediction (FBP)  296
Fire Brigade Acts (Australia)  3, 314
Fire Danger Rating System  295
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS)  242
Fire Fan Control Panel (FFCP)  203
Fire Hazard Categories  54
Fire Occurrence Prediction System  296
Fire Officer’s Committee  145
Fire Safety and Evacuation of Building
Regulations   6
Fire Service Act 1975  249, 260, 266
FIRE SIMULATOR  237
Fire Weather Index (FWI)  296
firebrands  291
firebreak  301
FIRECAM  240, 277
firecells  35, 53, 101
fireline intensity  293, 295
First Interstate Bank  14
first-aid fire fighting  222
flame
detectors  137, 209
height  289, 294
length  289, 294
production  29
spread  32, 43, 241
tip  114
flaming combustion  32, 33
flaming fires  137
flammable
gases  327
liquid  30, 31, 32, 156, 157, 327
vapour  30, 32
flank fire  291
flashover  32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 178, 252
flexural capacity  83
floor access  252
flying brands  116, 122
foam  156, 160
Forest and Rural Fires Act  298
forest fires  281, 282
FPETool  237
fractional effective dose  241
frangible bulb  147




load energy density  54, 274
fully-developed fire  35
furniture  269, 273, 277
heat release rates  44, 47
fusible link  147
G
gas  129
detector   131
flood systems  157, 162
gaseous phase  290
gasoline  118
generic listings  69
GIS models  124
glass fracture  241
glazing  118
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glue laminated timber (glulam)  89
growth constant  43
gypsum  275
H
Halon 1211  166
hand calculations  48
hazard category  178
hazardous substances  327
Hazardous Substances and New Organ-
isms Act  267
Hazen Williams formula  159, 264
HAZOP  23
HB 436   19
HB 4525  22
head fire  291
heat
detectors  31, 33, 49, 131
of combustion  41, 47, 54, 293
release rate  32
transfer  29, 68
Heating, Ventilation and Air Condition-
ing (HVAC)  184, 207
heavy timber  89
high expansion foam  157
high rise buildings  164
High Sensitivity Smoke Detector  135
high velocity water spray  156
hospitals  223
hostels  269
hot upper layer  33, 48, 237
hotels  269
human senses  130
HVAC  see Heating, Ventilation and Air
Conditioning
hydrant mains systems  162
hydrogen chloride  228
hydrogen cyanide  227
hyperthermia  226
I
ignition  12, 30
incapacitation  225
incipient phase  31
Independent Qualified Person  5
INERGEN  163
inert agents  163
infrared (IR)  137
Initial Spread Index (ISI)  297
injuries  269
insects  144
insulation  66, 77
insurance  6, 26, 281, 263, 316, 318




interior finishes  101, 102
internal partitions  103
International Fire Engineering Guide-
lines (IFEG)  9, 329
intervention  247
intumescent paint  78
ionisation chamber smoke  134
irritant gases  226, 228
irritants  225
ISO 1716  41
ISO 31000  26
ISO 7240  140
ISO 8201  169
ISO 834  66
ISO 9705  102
J
JASMINE  238
JET model  242
K
kerosene  118
Kobe earthquake  123
k-ε method  238
L
ladders  276
Large Eddy Simulation  238
lateral buckling  63
361
Index
legislation  2, 247
life safety  1, 16, 32, 38, 41, 50, 159,
176, 205
lift shafts  111, 179
light gauge steel  77
light timber frame  276
lightning  282, 301
limiting
steel temperature  73
temperature  65
linear beam (obscuration) detectors  135
linear heat sensing (LHS) detector  131
linings  275
liquid fuels  42
live load  69
load carrying capacity  72
load ratio  63
lobbies  112, 199, 200
Local Government Act  299
Loss Prevention Council  145
low expansion foam  157
M
maintenance, alarms  271
malicious  285
manual call points  127, 137
marine cargo  6
means of escape  5, 276
Measuring Ionisation Chamber (MIC)
134
mechanical systems  173
medium expansion foam  157
Medium fires  43
metal fasteners  90
mineral fibre spray  81
mitigation measures  123
modulus of elasticity  63
moisture content  288
moment restraint  74
MP9  69
multi-sensor detectors  139, 140
multi-storey buildings  60, 72, 111, 179,
228, 264
N
narcotic gases  226
National Commander  248, 267
National Fire Protection Association
see NFPA
National Research Council  175
National Rural Fire Authority  283, 299
neutral plane  180
New Zealand
Building Code (NZBC) 2, 131, 205,
325
Compliance Document  65
Fire Service (NZFS) 2, 142, 248,
249, 269
Fire Service Commission  248, 266,
299
Forest Service  299
NFPA  129, 145, 157
NFPA 12  164
NFPA 13  264, 273
NFPA 15  145, 155
NFPA 17  164, 165
NFPA 2001  163
NFPA 204  43
NFPA 24  266
NFPA 409  155
NFPA 92A  214
NFPA Standards  7
nitrogen  163
NZS 3404  71, 72, 75
NZS 3603  88
NZS 3604  93
NZS 4404  262
NZS 4501  250
NZS 4503  166, 260
NZS 4510  162, 258, 260, 264
NZS 4512  49, 133, 207
NZS 4514  137, 271
NZS 4515  103, 145, 159, 260, 264
NZS 4517  145, 159
NZS 4541  7, 103, 123, 145, 146, 154,
207, 260, 263, 264
NZS/BS 750  250
362





characteristics  12, 219
density  219
load  219
Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S)
314
on-off sprinklers  152
optical density  227
optimisation models  239
ordinary hazard  158
Ordinary Hazard Group 3  157
orifice  153
owner’s requirements  4
oxygen  227
Ozone Layer Protection Act  164
P
partitions  103
passive fire protection  77, 78
peak
burning rates  236
heat release rate  46
peer review  9
penetrations and closures  108, 109
performance requirements  2, 8, 15
performance-based fire engineering  2
Period of Structural Adequacy    75
photoelectric detection  135
photoelectric smoke detectors  133
photoluminescent  206
piloted ignition  30




plume  33, 129, 154, 174, 176, 177, 237
plywood  275
point smoke detector  131
pool fires  42
post-flashover  32, 53, 236
power failure  123
pre-action sprinklers  155
pre-alarm  141
pre-alert  143
pre-attack plan  301
pre-evacuation  222
pre-flashover  32, 41, 236
preheating phase  290
pre-movement  222
preparedness planning  298




pressurisation  189, 206, 207, 241
presuppression preparedness  300
Principal Certifying Authority (PCA)
317
probabilistic models  236
professional liability  7, 24
progressive evacuation  167, 206, 228
proprietary approvals  69
public address (PA)  168
pyrolysis  31, 32, 35
Q
quantifying performance  4
queuing time  218
Quick Response  149
R
radiation  16, 30, 31, 34, 38, 69
reduction factor  117, 120
rate of burning  41
rate of fire development  16
reasonably practicable  20
recessed sprinklers  150
redundancy  205, 255
Regional Commanders  250







Resource Management Act  299
response time  136
Response Time Index (RTI)  147
reticulated mains  261
review process  24
risk
assessment  4, 15, 23
criteria  22, 23
evaluation  24
exposure  7
management  19, 20, 21, 26
naming  22
tolerance  20
runoff  255, 267
Rural Fire Authorities  298
Rural Fire District  299
rural fires  281, 285
Rural-Urban Interface (RUI)  282,
303
S




scrub fires  281
search and rescue  252
search zone  127
seawater  256
section factor  74, 75
security  206, 207, 277
seismic resisting  74
self-contained breathing apparatus  252
sensitivity analysis  219, 236, 255
service ducts and shafts  111
setback distances  295
signage  206, 221, 227
Simulex  240
simultaneous fires  212
single family homes  269
single-storey buildings  60, 71
skin  295
slab panel method  73
sleeping accommodation  120, 270
slope steepness  288
Slow fires  43
smoke  31, 32, 130
clearance systems  182
constituents  174
control  173, 206
damage  157
density  49














smoke-stop door  127
SmokeView  243
smoking  270
smouldering combustion  31, 33
SNZ PAS 4509  249, 254
social science model  238
solid










spontaneous ignition  30, 31, 285
spotting  289, 291, 295
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Spread of Flame Index  102
sprinkler identification numbers  147
Sprinkler System Certifier  158, 161
sprinklers  5, 31, 33, 38, 39, 49, 104,
146, 150, 156, 209, 254
domestic  272
system failures  161
types  154-172
stability  66
stack effect  180
stairwells  113, 179
standard
fire  121, 139
furnace test  105
response sprinkler 131
test fire  64, 65, 66
statutory requirements  256
steady burning phase  46
steam  253
steel beams  71
Stefan-Boltzmann constant  117
stickability  78
stratified smoke detection  144
structural
collapse  14, 53, 276
design  61
model  69
performance in fire  61
stability  35
Subdivision and Development Principles
and Requirements (SDPR)  262
subsurface fire  291
suppression
mode sprinklers  151
systems  24, 127, 141
time lag  178
suspended floor/beam systems  62
T
tall buildings  258
temperature rise  16
tenability  225
tension membrane concept  73





expansion  62, 238
gradients  238
properties  35
Thomas’s flashover correlation  56
timber structures  88




products  16, 31
smoke  275
toxicity  130, 174
transformers  157




time  218, 301
t-squared  43
turbulent flow  238
two-layer model  33
two-stage pressurisation  199
Type 1 alarms  136, 271
Type 5 systems  142
Type 7 systems  142
Type 8 systems  169, 228
Type A building  328
Type B building  328
Type C building  328
Type D building  328
U
UL  69
Ultra fast fires  43
ultraviolet (UV)  129
unprotected steel  70




vapour  129, 134, 174
vegetation fires  281
vehicle exhaust  144




verification method  3
Vermiculite board  81
VESDA (Very Early Smoke Detecting
Apparatus)  136
video smoke and fire detection  140
visibility  49, 173, 179, 203, 226, 227
W
waking effectiveness of alarms  272
Warden Intercommunication Point  168
warehouse  35, 60
Warrington Fire Research  67
water
flow switches  139
mist systems  157
reservoirs  259, 261
spray systems  254
storage  257, 263
supplies  248, 249, 253, 256, 304
supply failure  123
Water Supplies Protection Regulations
267
weather  282, 286, 287
wet
chemical system  164
pipe sprinkler  154
wildland fires  281
wind  181, 287, 303
window sprinklers  153
Winstone Wallboards  110
wood  56, 88, 274, 275, 303
cribs  34, 36, 37
wool  274
Y
yield strength  63
Z
zone models  236, 237
366
Fire Engineering Design Guide
